Metaphysics of God - A level Philosophy

Omniscience

All knowing; having perfect knowledge, often defined as knowing everything that it is (logically) possible to know

Omnipotence

All powerful; having perfect power, often defined as having the ability to do anything that it is (logically) possible to do

Omnibenevolence

All good; being perfectly or supremely good, often defined as being perfectly morally good

Omnipresence

All present; being present everywhere at all times

Maximally great being

A being so perfect and splendid that nothing greater is conceivable; the foundational concept of God in philosophy of religion

Ontological argument

An a priori deductive argument that seeks to deduce the existence of God from the concept of God alone, claiming that the definition of God includes the impossibility of His non-existence

A priori knowledge

Knowledge that is independent of sense experience and can be known through pure reason or reflection

A posteriori knowledge

Knowledge that can only be known through sense experience

Analytic truth

A proposition that is true (or false) in virtue of the meanings of the words, such as "a bachelor is an unmarried man"

Synthetic truth

A proposition that is true or false depending on how the world actually is

Necessary truth

A proposition which is always true as it could not have been otherwise

Contingent truth

A proposition that could be either true or false, depending on how the world actually is

Predicate

Something we can say about a subject that tells us about some property the subject might have

Self-sufficient

Not dependent on anything else for existence; a key attribute of God

Everlasting

Lasting through all time without beginning or end (experiencing time temporally)

Eternal

Timeless, outside time, atemporal, 'without beginning or end' because these are temporal concepts

ET-Simultaneity

God as an eternal being's relationship to time, where all events occur at the same time for Him - there is no future or past, only an eternal 'now' in which all things happen for God

Divine Command Theory

The view that God's commands define what is morally right; morality is whatever God wills it to be

Theological voluntarism

The position that God's will determines moral standards rather than conforming to independent moral truths

The Paradox of the Stone

Can God create a rock so heavy that God couldn't lift it? If yes, then God cannot lift the stone (not omnipotent). If no, then God cannot create it (not omnipotent).

Aquinas' response to the Stone Paradox

God cannot do the logically impossible. 'A stone an omnipotent being can't lift' is self-contradictory and logically impossible. This is no limitation on God's power since there is nothing that God can't do.

Descartes' response to the Stone Paradox

God is supremely perfect and can create the rock that He cannot lift and then lift it anyway. God has the power to bring about contradictions.

Leibniz's response to the Stone Paradox

God is as powerful as it is possible to be, but there must be logical limitations. God is the most powerful a being can be within logical constraints.

Free will and omniscience problem

P1. God is omniscient and knows all true future propositions. P2. For me to act freely, I must be able to do or refrain from an action. P3. If God knows my future actions, those propositions cannot be false. P4. If those propositions cannot be false, I cannot refrain from those actions. P5. If I cannot refrain, I am not free. C. Therefore, if God is omniscient, I am not free.

ET-Simultaneity solution to free will problem

God is eternal (atemporal) and sees all actions simultaneously. For God there is no future or past, only 'now'. Since God doesn't know what I will do 'in the future' (as temporal concepts don't apply to eternal beings), I can maintain free will while God remains omniscient.

Everlasting solution to free will problem

God is everlasting but not eternal. It is impossible to know what a free agent will choose in advance. Since such knowledge is impossible, God can still be omniscient (knowing all that is possible to know) while preserving human free will.

Compatibilist solution to free will problem

God can know what I will do and yet I can act freely. 'If God knows X, then X is true' is necessarily true, but 'If God knows X, then X is necessarily true' is false. God knows what I will do, but that doesn't mean I must do it.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

Is an action right because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally right?

Horn 1: Divine Command Theory

Morality is whatever God wills. If God commands murder, then murder would be morally right. What is morally right is right purely because God wills it.

Problems with Horn 1

Arbitrariness: there are no moral reasons for God to act upon since only His will defines morality. Possibility of vile morality: killing babies would be correct if God commanded it. 'God is good' becomes a tautology and loses meaning.

Horn 2: Independent morality

Morality is independent of what God wills. God cannot make what is wrong be right. To be good, God must conform His will to something independent of Him.

Problems with Horn 2

Limits God's omnipotence if He is confined by something outside Him. Severs the connection between God and morality. Challenges aspects of scripture that suggest God's commands create moral law.

Descartes' support for Divine Command Theory

Given God's omnipotence and ultimate greatness, there could not be any standard beyond Him. A standard of goodness outside God would limit His power and freedom.

Leibniz's objection to Divine Command Theory

If there is no moral standard outside God, His will is arbitrary without proper basis. This undermines the idea of God's goodness - He cannot make good, admirable decisions if they have no basis at all.

Kant's position on God and morality

There is an objective moral standard (categorical imperative) that all rational beings must follow. God's will is in complete accordance with what is objectively good - He always acts according to the moral law because He is in perfect accordance with it.

Modified Divine Command Theory response

Good = what God wills, not conceptually but metaphysically. 'God is good' is not an analytic truth but they are the same property, just as water = H2O without being conceptually identical.

Anselm's definition of God

A being than which nothing greater can be conceived

Anselm's first ontological argument

P1. It is a conceptual truth that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined. P2. God exists as an idea in the mind. P3. A being that exists in mind and reality is greater than one that exists only in mind. P4. If God exists only in mind, we can imagine something greater than God. P5. But we cannot imagine something greater than God. C. Therefore, God exists.

Anselm's second ontological argument

P1. A being whose non-existence is inconceivable is greater than a being whose non-existence is conceivable. P2. God is the greatest conceivable being. P3. Therefore, God's non-existence must be inconceivable. C. Therefore, God exists necessarily.

Descartes' definition of God

A supremely perfect being

Descartes' ontological argument

P1. I have the idea of God, so it is coherent. P2. The idea of God is the idea of a supremely perfect being. P3. A supremely perfect being does not lack any perfection. P4. Existence is a perfection. C. Therefore, God exists.

Clear and distinct ideas (Descartes)

Clear ideas are vividly present to the attentive mind; distinct ideas are sharply separated from all other ideas

Gaunilo's 'perfect island' objection

P1. The concept of the greatest conceivable island exists in my mind. P2. An island that exists in mind and reality is greater than one in mind only. P3. Therefore, the greatest conceivable island must exist. Since this is absurd, Anselm's reasoning must be flawed.

Anselm's response to Gaunilo

The cases are different; God is unique. The concept of 'greatest conceivable island' is incoherent because island qualities have no intrinsic maximum, but God's qualities do have intrinsic maximums.

Plantinga's response to Gaunilo

God's qualities (power, love) have intrinsic maximums, while island qualities (palm trees) have no intrinsic maximum. Therefore, the greatest conceivable being makes sense while the greatest conceivable island does not.

Hume's objection to ontological arguments

P1. Nothing is demonstrable unless its contrary implies a contradiction. P2. Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction. P3. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. C1. Therefore, there is no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction. C2. Therefore, there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.

Hume's fork

All propositions are either matters of fact (known a posteriori through experience) or relations of ideas (known a priori and necessarily true). Existence claims are matters of fact and cannot be proven a priori.

Kant's objection to ontological arguments

P1. If 'God does not exist' is a contradiction, then 'God exists' is analytic. P2. If 'God exists' is analytic, then 'existence' is part of the concept 'God'. P3. Existence is not a predicate. C1. Therefore, 'existence' is not part of the concept God. C2. Therefore, 'God does not exist' is not a contradiction. C3. Therefore, ontological arguments fail.

Kant's claim that existence is not a predicate

Existence doesn't add anything to the concept of a thing - there is no difference between the concept of 100 possible thalers and 100 real thalers in terms of their properties. Existence merely 'substantiates' the object.

Malcolm's distinction

While existence is not a predicate, necessary existence is a predicate because it makes something independent and unlimited, which are great-making properties.

Malcolm's ontological argument

P1. Either God exists or God does not exist. P2. God cannot come into or go out of existence. P3. If God exists, God cannot cease to exist. C1. Therefore, if God exists, God's existence is necessary. P4. If God doesn't exist, God cannot come into existence. C2. Therefore, if God does not exist, God's existence is impossible. C3. Therefore, God's existence is either necessary or impossible. P5. God's existence is only impossible if the concept is self-contradictory. P6. The concept of God is not self-contradictory. C4. Therefore, God's existence is not impossible. C5. Therefore, God exists necessarily.