Trespass to the person

What are the 3 shared characteristics of all trespass to the person torts?

(1) Must be committed intentionally (or recklessly).

(2) Must cause direct and immediate harm.

(3) Actionable per se — no need to prove actual damage.

What is the difference between trespass and negligence?

Trespass = direct, intentional harm.

Negligence = indirect or unintentional harm. You cannot reframe a negligent act as an intentional tort. Letang v Cooper [1965]: where injury is not intentional, the only cause of action is negligence.

Does recklessness satisfy the intention requirement?

Yes — subjective recklessness suffices. D must foresee that their actions will have the relevant consequences and proceed anyway. Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2009] (Smith LJ); Pritchard v Co-operative Group [2012].

What is 'transferred intent'?

If D intends to touch A but instead touches B, D is still liable in battery to B. Intent transfers from the intended target to the actual victim. Livingstone v Ministry of Defence [1984].

Define battery

The actual infliction of unlawful force on another person. (Goff LJ in Collins v Wilcock [1984]). No need to prove injury — any unlawful direct contact suffices.

What are the 4 elements of battery?

(1) An act (positive, not omission).

(2) Unlawful contact — no consent; hostility not required.

(3) Intention or recklessness as to the contact.

(4) Directness — contact is the direct/immediate result of D's act.

What is the test for whether contact is unlawful?

Contact must exceed physical contact generally acceptable in ordinary daily life. Collins v Wilcock [1984] (Goff LJ). Context matters — jostling in a busy bar is not battery; grabbing someone's arm to stop them is battery.

Is hostility required for battery?

No. 'Hostile intent' was suggested in Wilson v Pringle [1987] but rejected by Lord Goff in Re F [1990]. An over-friendly slap, a surgical error, or a prank that gets out of hand can all be batteries without hostility.

Can battery be committed by omission?

Generally no — there must be a positive act. Innes v Wylie [1844]. Exception: if D's original act was involuntary but D then fails to stop inflicting unlawful force when they had the opportunity. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969].

Does injury need to result for battery to be committed?

No. It is sufficient that D intended the contact. There is no need to intend harm. Williams v Humphrey [1975]: boy pushed claimant into a pool — intended the push, no need to intend the broken ankle.

Key battery rule from Cole v Turner [1704]?

'The least touching of another in anger is battery.' Even minimal contact suffices if unlawful.

Can an unwanted kiss be battery?

Yes. 'An unwanted kiss may be a battery although the defendant's intention may be most amiable.' R v Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, ex p CEGB [1982].

Define assault

An act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of immediate, unlawful force on their person. (Goff LJ, Collins v Wilcock [1984]). No physical contact needed — the wrong is the anticipation of contact.

What are the 3 elements of assault?

(1) D intends the act that causes C to apprehend force (or is reckless).

(2) Reasonable apprehension of immediate battery — judged objectively.

(3) Apprehension of immediate and direct application of unlawful force — D must have the means to carry it out.

Stephens v Myers [1830] — what does it establish?

D advanced with clenched fist at a parish meeting but was stopped before reaching C. Held: assault established — C's apprehension was reasonable. D does not need to reach C; the threat of immediate force is enough.

Tuberville v Savage [1669] — key principle?

D placed hand on sword but said 'if it were not assize time I would not take such words.' No assault — words negated the threatening gesture. The key question is always whether C reasonably apprehended immediate unlawful force.

Can words alone constitute assault?

Yes (after some doubt). R v Ireland & Burstow [1998] (HL): Lord Steyn confirmed words — and even silence on the phone — can amount to assault depending on circumstances. 'A thing said is also a thing done.'

Can conditional threats amount to assault?

Yes. 'Stand and deliver — your money or your life' is assault despite offering an option. Read v Coker [1853]: workers threatening to break C's neck if he stayed = assault

Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] — key rule?

Picketers behind a police cordon threatening working miners in vehicles: no assault. D must have the means and ability to carry out the threat immediately. Threats from a distance with police preventing approach = no immediacy.

Define false imprisonment.

The unlawful imposition of constraint on another's freedom of movement from a particular place. (Goff LJ, Collins v Wilcock [1984]). Liberty is protected even without physical force.

What are the 4 elements of false imprisonment?

(1) Intention or recklessness as to the imprisonment.

(2) Directness — positive act required.

(3) Complete restraint of freedom of movement.

(4) Unlawfulness — no need to intend unlawfulness, just that the detention was in fact unlawful.

Must the restraint be complete? Bird v Jones [1845]?

Yes — total restraint required. Bird v Jones: D blocked part of Hammersmith Bridge footway. C could go back another way — no false imprisonment. Partial obstruction or inconvenience is not enough.

Must C be aware of the imprisonment?

No. C can be imprisoned while asleep, unconscious, or unaware. However, lack of awareness will reduce damages to nominal. Meering v Grahame-White Aviation [1920]; confirmed in Murray v Ministry of Defence [1988].

Can false imprisonment be committed by omission?

No — requires a positive act. Iqbal v Prison Officers Association [2009]: prison officers' failure to unlock cells during an illegal strike = omission only, not false imprisonment. No positive duty owed to prisoners by the POA.

Robinson v Balmain Ferry Co [1910] — principle?

C paid to enter a wharf but changed his mind. Refused to pay again to leave. Held: no false imprisonment. Keeping someone on your property until they fulfil a reasonable condition is not imprisonment — C knew the terms when he entered.

Must D intend to act unlawfully?

No. D only needs to intend the confinement — not that it is unlawful. R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, ex p Evans (No.2) [2001]: prison governor miscalculated release date = false imprisonment even though acting in good faith.

What is the tort in Wilkinson v Downton [1897]?

Liability arises where D wilfully does an act calculated to cause physical harm to C, and harm in fact results. Originally: D falsely told C her husband was badly injured (claimed it was a joke). C suffered severe psychiatric and physical reaction.

What are the 3 elements from Rhodes v OPO [2015]?

(1) Conduct element: words/conduct directed at C for which there is no justification.

(2) Mental element: D intends to cause at least severe mental or emotional distress.

(3) Consequence element: actual physical harm or recognised psychiatric illness.

Does mere distress suffice for Wilkinson v Downton?

No. Wainwright v Home Office [2003] (Lord Hoffmann): the tort does not provide a remedy for distress that does not amount to recognised psychiatric injury. 'Sloppiness' does not equal intention. Rudeness and bad manners are not actionable.

What does 'calculated to cause harm' mean?

D does not need to want harm. 'Calculated' means deliberately doing an act likely to result in physical or psychiatric harm. Test is partly objective. Wong v Parkside NHS Trust [2001] (Hale LJ). Recklessness does not suffice — actual intention needed

Janvier v Sweeney [1919] — what makes it a strong Wilkinson example?

D (posing as police) falsely accused C of associating with a spy. C suffered psychiatric injury. Strong case because it was deliberate deception intended to frighten C to obtain information — not a prank. Clear intention to cause harm.

Rhodes v OPO [2015] — why did the claim fail?

Father planned to publish memoir about childhood abuse. Ex-wife claimed it would harm vulnerable son. Claim failed:

(1) publication was in the public interest — justified;

(2) no intention to cause harm to the child;

(3) burden of proof on C not met.

What does s.1(1) Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provide?

'A person must not pursue a course of conduct (a) which amounts to harassment of another, and (b) which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of the other.'

What is a 'course of conduct' under the PHA 1997?

Conduct on at least two occasions (s.7(3)). The further apart and less frequent, the less likely it qualifies. However, a single online publication can qualify if D knows it will cause alarm on multiple occasions. Law Society v Kordowski [2011].

What standard of knowledge is required under PHA 1997?

Objective: would a reasonable person in possession of the same information think the conduct amounted to harassment? (s.1(2)). Actual knowledge of harm not required — constructive knowledge suffices.

What threshold must conduct reach to be harassment?

Must be oppressive and unacceptable — crossing the boundary from regrettable to unacceptable. Majrowski v Guy's and St Thomas' NHS Trust [2007]. Merely annoying or aggravating everyday behaviour does not qualify.

What are the defences under PHA s.1(3)?

No liability if D shows:

(a) conduct was for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime;

(b) pursued under a rule of law or enactment;

(c) in the circumstances, pursuit was reasonable. Reasonableness defence requires rational, not just subjective, belief.

What remedies are available under PHA 1997?

Injunction and/or damages (s.3). Damages can include anxiety caused by the harassment and financial loss. Unlike Wilkinson, no requirement of recognised psychiatric illness — distress/alarm suffices.

What are the three main defences to trespass to the person?

(1) Consent — genuine, not induced by fraud.

(2) Necessity — used where C cannot consent (unconscious/incapacitated).

(3) Self-defence — honest and reasonable belief of threat; response must be proportionate.

What is the test for consent in trespass?

Consent must be genuine and freely given, not obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. For medical treatment: patient must understand the broad nature of the procedure (Chatterton v Gerson [1981]). Mental Capacity Act 2005 codifies this for those over 16.

How does self-defence differ in tort from criminal law?

In tort, D's belief must be honest AND reasonable (unlike criminal law where honest belief alone suffices). Ashley v Chief Constable of West Sussex Police [2008]. Response must also be proportionate — Cockcroft v Smith [1705]: biting off a finger was disproportionate to a poke at the eye.

What is the necessity defence? Key case?

Where C cannot consent (e.g. unconscious), D may act in C's best interests. F v West Berkshire Health Authority [1990]. Now codified in Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.5. A doctor treating an unconscious patient commits no battery if acting in the patient's best interests.