cps outlines

BOTTOM UP V TOP DOWN

Democratic transitions can emerge from two fundamentally different pathways

• Thesis: Bottom-up transitions stem from mass popular movements overcoming collective action problems, while top-down transitions result from elite miscalculations under uncertainty about opposition strenght

II. Bottom-Up Transitions: Democracy from Below 

A. Core Concept & Basic Assumptions

• Definition: Popular revolutions that overthrow authoritarian regimes through mass mobilization

• Key assumption: Citizens prefer democracy but face coordination challenges

• Examples: East Germany (1989), Philippines (1986), Tunisia (2011)

B. Collective Action Theory & The Free-Rider Problem

Key Terms:

• Public goods: Non-excludable (can't keep people out) and non-rivalrous (one person's use doesn't diminish another's) goods—democracy is a public good

• Free-rider problem: Individuals benefit from democracy whether they participate in protest or not, creating incentive to let others take risks

The Model:

• Let K = number of participants needed for revolution success

• Let N = total group size

• Let C = individual cost of participation (arrest, injury, death)

• Let B = benefit of democracy

Decision Matrix:

1. If fewer than K-1 participate → Don't participate (payoff = 0)

2. If exactly K-1 participate → Participate (payoff = B - C)

3. If K or more participate → Free-ride (payoff = B, no cost)

Paradox of Size: Larger groups should be more powerful but actually face greater collective action problems because each individual matters less, making free-riding more attractive

Success factors: Small N, K close to N, low C, high B

C. Tipping/Threshold Model (Kuran 1991)

Preference Falsification:

• Private preference: True anti-regime attitudes

• Public preference: What citizens reveal publicly

• Regime-induced censorship: Dictatorships punish dissent, forcing people to hide true views

• Information bias: No one knows how many others oppose regime

Revolutionary Threshold: The protest size at which an individual will join (varies by person: 0, 1, 2, 3... 10)

Revolutionary Cascade:

• Example: Society A {0,2,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10} → Only person with threshold 0 protests (1 person)

• Society A' {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10} → Creates cascade: 0 joins→1 joins→2 joins... (9 people!)

• "Predictability of unpredictability": Small changes in threshold distribution create massive outcome differences

Overall outcome: Revolutions appear inevitable in hindsight but are actually unpredictable due to hidden preferences

III. Top-Down Transitions: Democracy from Above

A. Core Concept & Basic Assumptions

• Definition: Authoritarian elites introduce liberalizing reforms that unintentionally lead to democracy

• Key assumption: Soft-liners don't know opposition's true strength (preference falsification creates uncertainty)

• Examples: Poland (1989), Indonesia under Suharto

B. Hardliners vs. Softliners

Split in regime (often due to economic crisis):

• Hardliners: Want status quo maintained

• Softliners: Want to broaden dictatorship's base through liberalization—controlled opening of political space (forming parties, elections) to co-opt opposition

C. Transition Game with Incomplete Information

Preference Ordering:

• Soft-liners: Broadened dictatorship (5) > Status quo (4) > Narrow dictatorship (3) > Democracy (2) > Insurgency (1)

• Opposition: Democracy (5) > Broadened dictatorship (4) > Status quo (3) > Insurgency (2) > Narrow dictatorship (1)

Game Structure:

1. Soft-liners choose: Do Nothing or Open

2. If Open, Opposition chooses: Enter or Organize

3. If Enter, Soft-liners choose: Repress or Democratize

Complete Information Outcomes:

• Weak opposition → Broadened dictatorship (soft-liners Open, opposition Enters, soft-liners Repress)

• Strong opposition → Status quo (soft-liners Do Nothing, knowing strong opposition would Organize)

• Democracy never happens!

Incomplete Information (P > ⅔ rule):

• Nature assigns probability p (opposition weak) and 1-p (opposition strong)

• Soft-liners liberalize when p > 2/3 (confident opposition is weak)

• Critical insight: Democracy requires mistakes—soft-liners misjudge opposition strength, Open, opposition Enters, soft-liners realize opposition is strong and Democratize rather than face insurgency

Overall outcome: Top-down democratization is accidental—results from elite miscalculation under uncertainty

IV. Comparison & Contrast 

Similarity: Both rely on preference falsification creating uncertainty about opposition strength

Key difference: Bottom-up requires coordination success; top-down requires elite miscalculation

V. Critiques 

• Both models: Overly rationalist; ignore ideology, emotions, international pressure

• Bottom-up: Can't predict which threshold distributions exist

• Top-down: Assumes elites always miscalculate; doesn't explain why some softliners never liberalize

How do the two visions of democracy relate to the CHOICE OF INSITUTIONS

PARTY SYSTEMS, CONCENTRATION OF POWER V ILLUSION DIFFUSION OF POwER

Hook: Democratic systems face a fundamental choice between concentrating or dispersing political power

• Thesis: The majoritarian and consensus visions represent competing philosophies about democratic legitimacy that systematically shape institutional choices regarding electoral systems, party systems, and power concentration, though apparent power diffusion may sometimes be illusory

• Roadmap: Examine both visions, how they drive institutional choices, and the reality of power concentration versus its appearance

II. The Two Visions of Democracy

A. Majoritarian Vision: Power Concentration Over Time

Core concept: Democracy means giving the electoral majority unfettered control to implement its program

Basic assumptions:

• Voters choose between two competing teams of politicians at election time

• Winning team should hold ALL political power to implement promised policies

• Clear accountability requires concentration, not diffusion

• Power shared OVER TIME through alternation in government

• Self-imposed restraint prevents tyranny (majority must avoid driving minority to violence/exit)

Key principle: Few veto players make changing the political status quo easy—this IS the goal

B. Consensus Vision: Power Diffusion At Each Moment

Core concept: Democracy means ensuring as many citizens as possible participate in governance through their representatives

Basic assumptions:

• Voters choose from wide range of social groups

• Legislature should be miniature reflection of society as whole

• Representatives bargain continuously over policy after elections

• Power shared AT EACH MOMENT through multiple actors

• External checks and balances prevent tyranny of majority

Key principle: Many veto players make changing status quo difficult—this IS the goal

III. Institutional Choices Flowing From Each Vision

A. Electoral System Choices

Majoritarian vision → Majoritarian electoral systems (SMDP):

• Single-Member District Plurality (SMDP) translates votes to seats disproportionally

• Mechanical effect: Punishes small, geographically dispersed parties; rewards large parties

• Example: UK 1992—Conservatives won 51.6% of seats with only 41.9% of votes (manufactured majority), while Liberal Democrats got 3.1% of seats despite 17.8% of votes

• Strategic effect: Voters abandon small parties; politicians avoid joining them (Duverger's strategic entry/voting)

• Goal: Produce clear single-party majority governments

Consensus vision → Proportional Representation (PR):

• List PR translates votes to seats proportionally using quotas (Hare, Droop) or divisors (D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë)

• Larger district magnitude increases proportionality (single most important factor)

• Goal: Ensure legislature mirrors society's diversity

• Example: With 10 seats and 100,000 votes, party with 47% of votes gets 5 seats (not 10)

B. Party System Consequences (Duverger's Theory)

How electoral systems shape party systems:

• Social cleavages (demand side): Number and type of divisions in society (class, religion, ethnicity, urban-rural)

• Electoral institutions (supply side): Determine if demand translates into actual parties

Majoritarian systems → Two-party systems:

• Mechanical effect punishes third parties severely

• Strategic voting: Supporters of small parties vote for "lesser evil" among viable candidates

• Strategic entry: Quality candidates avoid small parties with no chance

• Duverger's prediction: Even with multiple social cleavages, SMDP produces two-party competition AT DISTRICT LEVEL

• Example: US averages ~2 effective parties per district despite 3-7 nationally

Consensus systems → Multiparty systems:

• PR permits small parties to win seats proportional to votes

• No mechanical punishment for being small

• Cross-cutting cleavages can all gain representation

• Result: Multiple parties representing different social groups

• Example: Netherlands, Belgium with 6-10 effective parties

C. Government Formation and Power Concentration

Majoritarian institutional package:

1. SMDP electoral system

2. Two-party system

3. Single-party majority government (most common outcome)

4. Unitary state structure

5. Unicameral or weak bicameralism

6. Legislative supremacy (no strong constitutional review)

Power concentration reality:

• Winner controls executive AND legislative branches completely

• Few institutional veto players

• Large winset of status quo—easy to change policy

• Strong agenda-setting power for government

• Clear accountability: voters know exactly who's responsible

Consensus institutional package:

1. PR electoral system

2. Multiparty system

3. Coalition governments (minimal winning coalition, surplus majority, or minority coalition)

4. Federal state structure

5. Strong bicameralism (symmetric and incongruent chambers)

6. Higher law constitution with constitutional court

Power diffusion reality:

• Multiple parties share executive power

• Many institutional veto players (regional governments, two chambers, constitutional court)

• Small winset—hard to change status quo

• Weak agenda-setting power

• Accountability diffused across coalition partners

IV. The Illusion of Power Diffusion: Reality vs. Appearance

A. When Consensus Systems Concentrate Power

Dominant party systems masquerading as multiparty:

• Japan (1955-1993): Liberal Democratic Party won every election despite multiparty system

• Sweden: Social Democrats governed 1932-1976 almost continuously

• Reality: De facto single-party dominance despite PR and multiple parties

• Appearance suggests power diffusion; reality shows concentration

Coalition government concentration:

• Formateur power: Leader of largest party (usually) becomes Prime Minister, controls coalition negotiations

• Small "pivot" parties gain disproportionate power

• Example: Free Democrats (FDP) in Germany participated in almost every government 1949-1998 despite 5-10% vote share

• Principal-agent problem: Coalition partners monitor imperfectly; lead party has agenda-setting advantages

B. When Majoritarian Systems Diffuse Power

Manufactured majorities hide weak mandates:

• Winner may have plurality, not majority, of votes

• Example: UK 2005—Labour won 55% of seats with only 35% of votes

• 65% of voters opposed the "majority" government

• Power appears concentrated but lacks broad legitimacy

Intraparty factionalism:

• Two parties may contain internal factions acting as veto players

• US Democrats: Progressive vs. moderate wings; Republicans: MAGA vs. establishment

• Reality: Intraparty negotiations resemble coalition bargaining

• Partisan veto players (generated by political game) matter as much as institutional veto players

Federal systems with majoritarian elections:

• US, Canada, Australia combine SMDP with federalism

• Vertical power diffusion (across levels) despite horizontal concentration (within level)

• State/provincial governments act as veto players on some policies

• Example: US states can refuse to implement federal programs

C. Veto Player Theory: Unifying Framework

Core insight: Both visions create veto players, but different types and numbers

Veto player definition: Individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary to change status quo

Two types:

1. Institutional veto players: Generated by constitution (president, two chambers, constitutional court, regional governments)

2. Partisan veto players: Generated by political game (coalition parties, intraparty factions)

Winset logic:

• More veto players + greater ideological distance = smaller winset = harder to change status quo

• Fewer veto players + smaller ideological distance = larger winset = easier to change status quo

Majoritarian systems:

• Few institutional veto players BY DESIGN

• But may have significant partisan veto players (party factions, narrow majorities)

Consensus systems:

• Many institutional veto players BY DESIGN

• Plus partisan veto players from coalition negotiations

• Combined effect: very small winsets, high policy stability

Conclusion

The two visions systematically shape institutional choices, with majoritarian systems concentrating power through electoral rules that produce two parties and single-party governments, while consensus systems diffuse power through PR, multiparty systems, and coalitions. However, partisan veto players can create hidden diffusion in majoritarian systems, while dominant parties and formateur advantages can concentrate power in consensus systems. Veto player theory reveals that real power distribution depends on both institutional design AND political configuration the distinction between concentration and diffusion is often more complex than institutional structures initially suggest.

Problem group decision-making

I. Introduction

• Thesis: Group decision-making faces fundamental problems of intransitivity and instability

• Central paradox: Rational individuals can form irrational groups

• Core problems: Condorcet's Paradox,

• Two proposed solutions (MVT and agenda control) address instability but create new trade-offs

• Arrow's Theorem unites these findings, revealing no perfect democratic system exists

II. Condorcet's Paradox: When Rational Individuals Create Irrational Group

The Problem:

• Group intransitivity despite individual rationality

• City Council example: I>C>D for Left; C>D>I for Centrist; D>I>C for Right

• Round-robin produces cycle: D beats I, I beats C, C beats D

• No stable majority preference exists

• "Cyclical majorities" - different coalitions form for each contest

Why It Matters:

• Undermines concept of "group will"

• Makes outcomes arbitrary, dependent on voting procedure

• Questions democratic legitimacy

• Probability increases with more alternatives/voters

• With infinite alternatives (common in bargaining), cycles nearly guaranteed

IV. Solution #1: Agenda Setting

How It Works:

• Structure sequence of pairwise votes

• Different agendas produce different winners

• Agenda setter effectively dictates outcome

Example:

• Three possible agendas yield three different winners (I, D, or C)

• Enables strategic voting to achieve better ultimate outcomes

Pro:

• Creates stability (determinate outcomes)

• Avoids endless cycling

• Clear decision-making process

Con:

• Concentrates enormous power in agenda setter

• Outcome reflects agenda-setter preferences, not group preferences

• Instability shifts to fights over agenda control

• Opens door to manipulation

V. Solution #2: Median Voter Theorem

Requirements:

• Odd number of voters

• Single-peaked preferences

• Single-issue dimension

• Sincere voting

How It Works:

• Median voter's ideal point becomes Condorcet winner

• Stable equilibrium exists

• Proposals converge on median position

Pro:

• Eliminates Condorcet's Paradox completely

• Predictable, stable outcomes

• Clear representation of "center"

• No agenda-setter manipulation possible

Con:

• Requires restrictive assumptions about preferences

• Most political questions multidimensional (Chaos Theorem)

• Single-peaked assumption rules out legitimate preference orderings

• Controversial to exclude certain preferences

• Reality: preferences often NOT single-peaked (e.g., Right councillor: D>I>C)

VI. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Uniting the Problems

The Question:

• Can ANY decision-making procedure be both fair AND produce rational outcomes?

Four Fairness Conditions:

1. Non-dictatorship

2. Universal admissibility (any rational preferences allowed)

3. Unanimity

4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

The Result:

• IMPOSSIBLE to satisfy all conditions simultaneously

• Must choose only TWO of three: Group rationality, Non-dictatorship, Universal admissibility

Institutional Trilemma:

• MVT solution: Restricts preferences (abandons universal admissibility)

• Agenda-setting solution: Accepts dictatorship (abandons non-dictatorship)

• Alternatively: Accept intransitivity (abandon group rationality)

VII. Conclusion

• Arrow's Theorem reveals fundamental impossibility, not just practical difficulty

• Both solutions involve accepting one "horn" of the trilemma

• No perfect democratic system exists - all involve trade-offs

• Implications: "Will of the people" more problematic than assumed; institutional design critically important; outcomes may reflect procedural choices rather than genuine preferences

• Understanding these problems essential for evaluating democratic legitimacy and designing institutions

• Democracy necessarily imperfect but awareness of limitations helps us choose wisely among flawed alternatives

GOV FORMATION

I. Introduction

• Thesis: Government formation differs fundamentally across parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential democracies based on legislative responsibility

• Key distinction: Can legislatures remove governments?

• Unifying framework: Principal-agent theory shows parliamentary systems create simple delegation chains with clear accountability, while presidential systems create multiple chains with diffused accountability

II. The Key Distinction: Legislative Responsibility

A. Three Regime Types

1. Parliamentary: Legislature CAN remove government (votes of no confidence)

   • Example: UK, Germany, India

2. Presidential: Legislature CANNOT remove government (fixed terms)

   • Example: U.S., Brazil, Mexico

3. Semi-Presidential: Dual executive (president + PM)

   • Premier-presidential: Government responsible to legislature only (France)

   • President-parliamentary: Government responsible to both (rare, unstable)

B. Why This Matters

• Legislative responsibility determines who controls executive power

• Shapes formation process, coalition dynamics, accountability

• Parliamentary: unified government (same forces control executive and legislature)

• Presidential: separation of powers (different forces can control each branch)

III. Parliamentary Government Formation

A. Formation Process

1. Voters elect legislature (NOT government directly)

2. Head of state appoints formateur (usually largest party leader)

3. Formateur negotiates coalition (single-party majorities rare)

4. Government formed with legislative majority support

5. Rules until: no-confidence vote or new election

B. What Politicians Want Shapes Outcomes

Office-seeking:

• Minimal winning coalitions (no extra parties)

• Gamson's Law: portfolios proportional to seats

• Example: Party A (60 seats) + Party B (40 seats) = Party A gets 60% portfolios

Policy-seeking:

• Connected coalitions (ideologically adjacent parties)

• Example: Left-Center-Right spectrum → Center + Right coalition (not Left + Right)

Reality: Politicians trade off between office and policy

C. Five Government Types (European frequencies)

1. Single-party majority: 15.6%

2. Minimal winning coalition: 27.3% (most common)

3. Surplus majority: 23.1%

4. Single-party minority: 18.2%

5. Minority coalition: 15.8%

D. Why Minority Governments Work

• Must have implicit legislative majority

• Support arrangements: formal or ad hoc

• Common in Denmark (89.7%), Sweden (73.3%), Norway (71.9%)

• NOT anti-democratic—different way to organize support

IV. Presidential Government Formation

A. Key Differences from Parliamentary

• President = formateur (always)

• President's party always in government (by definition)

• Reversion point = minority government (not crisis)

• Cabinet ≠ legislative coalition (appointments don't guarantee support)

• Fixed terms (govern despite opposition legislature)

B. Consequences

• Minority governments much more common: 30.8% in Latin America (most common type)

• Can exist WITHOUT legislative support (impossible in parliamentary)

• More nonpartisan ministers: 29.17% vs. 2.12% parliamentary (technocrats, cronies)

• Less proportional cabinets: 0.65 vs. 0.90 parliamentary correlation

C. Why?

• No legislative responsibility → president doesn't need legislative coalition

• Can govern through executive authority, vetoes, decrees

• Cabinet appointments reward loyalists, not coalition partners

V. Semi-Presidential Systems

A. Dual Executive

• President: Directly elected, fixed term, head of state

• Prime Minister: Responsible to legislature, head of government

B. Cohabitation

• President from one bloc, PM from another

• Can be effective checks OR bitter conflict

• Example: France with left president/right PM (or reverse)

C. Formation

• Follows parliamentary process for PM

• BUT presidential preferences influence heavily

• Coordination challenges between president and PM

VI. Principal-Agent Framework: Unifying Analysis

A. Core Concepts

• Delegation: Citizens (principals) rely on representatives (agents)

• Benefits: Expertise, specialization, reduced costs

• Risks: Agents may pursue own interests, imperfect monitoring

• Principal-agent problem: How to ensure agents serve principals' interests?

B. Information Problems

1. Adverse selection (before): Can't observe agent quality

2. Moral hazard (after): Can't monitor agent actions

C. Parliamentary Delegation: SINGLE CHAIN

Voters → Representatives → PM & Cabinet → Ministers → Civil Servants

• Simple, hierarchical

• Clear accountability

• Voters know who's responsible

• Can sanction through elections or no-confidence votes

• Lower agency loss (easier monitoring)

D. Presidential Delegation: MULTIPLE CHAINS

Parallel chains:

• Voters → President → Cabinet → Civil Servants

• Voters → Lower House

• Voters → Upper House

• Voters → State/Local Representatives

• Complex, independent branches

• Diffused accountability

• When policy fails: Who's responsible? President? Legislature? States?

• Blame-shifting confuses voters

• Higher agency loss (harder monitoring)

E. Key Insight

• Structure determines accountability effectiveness

• Parliamentary: simple chain → clear accountability

• Presidential: multiple chains → diffused accountability

• Semi-presidential: hybrid → depends on cohabitation

VII. Mechanisms for Monitoring Agents

A. Ex Ante (Before Selection)

• Screening: Learn agent quality

  • Parliamentary: Politicians rise through party ranks (better screening)

  • Presidential: Voters judge from campaigns (limited information)

• Selection: Choose based on observed attributes

B. Ex Post (After Selection)

• Police Patrol: Direct monitoring (question time, committees)

• Fire Alarm: Media, civil society report problems

C. Ultimate Sanction

• Parliamentary: No-confidence vote (continuous accountability)

• Presidential: Wait for term to expire or impeachment (high bar)

• Key difference: Parliamentary can correct failures quickly without regime crisis

VIII. Systematic Consequences

A. Trade-offs Summary

Parliamentary Systems:

• ✓ Clear accountability (simple delegation)

• ✓ Rapid policy change (unified control)

• ✓ Flexible correction (no-confidence votes)

• ✗ Power concentration risk (single-party majorities)

• ✗ Voters don't directly choose government

Presidential Systems:

• ✓ Separation of powers (checks and balances)

• ✓ Voters directly choose president

• ✓ Fixed terms (stability)

• ✗ Diffused accountability (multiple chains)

• ✗ Gridlock risk (no resolution mechanism)

• ✗ Regime instability risk (sustained deadlock)

B. Government Duration Patterns

• Parliamentary: Average 536.9 days

  • Single-party majority: 989.7 days (longest)

  • Surplus coalitions: 502 days (shortest)

  • Variation: UK >1,000 days; Italy <400 days

• Presidential: Fixed at term length (4-6 years)

  • But effectiveness varies with legislative support

IX. Conclusion

Summary:

• Legislative responsibility fundamentally distinguishes regime types

• Parliamentary: legislative negotiations, coalition governments, clear accountability

• Presidential: presidential appointments, minority governments common, diffused accountability

• Principal-agent framework reveals: delegation chain structure determines accountability effectiveness

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

THEORIES OF REGIME SURVIVAL IN AUTOCRATIRC WHAT ARE THOSE THEORIES COMPARE AND CONTRAST

• Three main theories:

  1. Selectorate theory (coalition size)

  2. Institutional co-optation (Gandhi & Przeworski)

  3. Coercive apparatus (Bellin)

• Organizing framework: Svolik's two problems all dictators must solve

• Also: Different types of dictatorships face different challenges

II. What is Autocracy? Three Types of Dictatorships

A. Definition

• Autocracy: Power not allocated through competitive elections; rulers not accountable to citizens

B. Three Types (Based on Support Coalitions)

1. Monarchies

• Power through family/kinship

• Examples: Saudi Arabia, Jordan

• Most stable (solve credible commitment through heredity)

• Rarely transition to democracy

2. Military Dictatorships

Power through armed forces

• Examples: Myanmar, Thailand

• Shorter duration (internal fractionalization)

• Transition through negotiation (can threaten re-intervention)

3. Civilian Dictatorships

• Must create support from scratch (no ready-made institution)

• Two subtypes:

  • Dominant-party: One party dominates (China, Russia)

  • Personalistic: Leader controls everything (North Korea)

• Dominant-party = second most stable (party unity serves all)

• Personalistic = often ends violently

III. Svolik's Framework: Two Fundamental Problems

Problem 1: Authoritarian Power-Sharing (Managing Elites)

• The challenge: Ruling elites must share power

• The problem: No third-party enforcer

• Commitment issues:

  • Can dictator credibly commit to sharing power?

  • Can coalition credibly commit not to renegotiate with violence?

• Information asymmetry: Coalition has limited info about dictator's actions

• Result: Dictators gradually consolidate power

• Outcome: Contested dictatorships → Personalist dictatorships

Problem 2: Authoritarian Control (Managing the Masses)

• The challenge: Must control population

• Two strategies:

  1. Repression: Controls masses BUT empowers military

  2. Co-optation: Give masses stakes in regime

• Trade-offs based on opposition strength:

  • High opposition → Military tutelage (military demands concessions)

  • Low opposition → Civilian control (weak military, strong palace guard)

  • Moderate opposition → Military brinkmanship (mutual threats

IV. Theory 1: Selectorate Theory

A. Core Concepts

• Residents: Everyone

• Selectorate (S): Those who can select leader

• Winning Coalition (W): Those whose support necessary for power

• Key variable: W/S ratio (loyalty norm)

B. How W/S Affects Survival

Small W/S = High Loyalty

• Coalition members unlikely to join next coalition

• No credible exit threat

• Leader can perform poorly, use kleptocracy, stay in office

• Example: W=1,000, S=100,000 → W/S=0.01

  • Expected payoff from defection = only 1% of challenger's offer

  • Leader needs to give just slightly more to keep loyalty

Large W/S = Low Loyalty

• Coalition members likely to join next coalition

• Credible exit threat exists

• Leader must perform well, provide public goods

C. How W Size Affects Allocation

• Small W: Buy support with private goods (feasible)

• Large W: Must use public goods (too expensive to buy everyone)

D. Predictions

• Small W, Small W/S (Personalist/Dominant-party):

  • Poor performance + Long tenure

• Small W, Large W/S (Monarchies):

  • Middling performance

• Large W, Large W/S (Democracies):

  • Good performance + Shorter tenure

E. Key Insight

• Civic virtue NOT necessary for good governance

• Institutions matter more than character

F. Connection to Svolik

• Problem 1 (Power-sharing): Small W/S creates loyalty, reduces coup threats

• Problem 2 (Control): Large W forces public goods, reduces grievances

G. Exogenous vs. Endogenous

• Selectorate treats institutions as EXOGENOUS

• Leaders inherit W and S as constraints

• Theory asks: Given W and S, what strategies will leaders pursue?

V. Theory 2: Institutional Co-optation (Gandhi & Przeworski)

A. Core Argument

• Autocrats strategically create institutions (parties, legislatures) to survive

• Why? To solicit cooperation and neutralize opposition threats

B. Two Needs Determine Institutionalization

Need for Cooperation:

• Civilian leaders need MORE (no ready-made organization)

• Military/monarchs need LESS (have armed forces/family)

• Resource-rich countries need LESS (oil rents reduce cooperation needs)

Opposition Strength:

• Inherited parties → stronger opposition

• Past leadership turnover → unstable regime → stronger opposition

• More democracies worldwide → external pressure → stronger opposition

C. Institutional Solutions

First Trench (Problem 1 - Elites):

• Consultative councils (monarchs)

• Juntas (military)

• Political bureaus (civilians)

• Keep rivals close, monitor threats

Second Trench (Problem 2 - Masses):

• Legislatures: Co-opt through policy concessions

  • Ruler controls access

  • Opposition pursues interests within regime

  • Example: Jordan's King Hussein + Muslim Brotherhood

• Parties: Mobilize support, supervise society

  • Single party: penetrate and control society

  • Multiple parties: when opposition can threaten overthrow (riskier)

D. Empirical Evidence

• Underinstitutionalized: Survive only 3.30 years

• Sufficiently institutionalized: Survive 8.38 years

• Overinstitutionalized: Survive 9.36 years (extra benefit)

E. Key Insight

• Institutions are NOT "window dressing"

• Strategically chosen and have real consequences

F. Connection to Svolik

• Problem 1: Inner sanctums (councils, juntas) monitor elites

• Problem 2: Legislatures and parties co-opt masses

G. Exogenous vs. Endogenous

• Gandhi & Przeworski treat institutions as ENDOGENOUS

• Autocrats strategically CREATE institutions in response to threats

• Theory asks: Why do autocrats choose different institutions?

VI. Theory 3: Coercive Apparatus Robustness (Bellin)

A. Core Argument

• Democratic transition occurs ONLY when coercive apparatus lacks capacity or will to crush it

• Middle East exceptionalism = exceptionally robust coercive apparatuses

B. Four Variables Determine Robustness

1. Fiscal Health

• Financial crisis "hollows out" militaries

• Soldiers unpaid, materiel deteriorates

• Example: Sub-Saharan Africa → fiscal crisis → democratization

2. International Support

• Loss of foreign backing devastates capacity and will

• Example: Soviet withdrawal → Eastern Europe democratization

• Middle East: Continued Western support (oil security, Islamist threats)

3. Institutionalization vs. Patrimonialism

Institutionalized (willing to reform):

• Rule-governed, meritocratic

• Corporate identity separate from state

• Officers can imagine life after power

• Clear public-private boundaries

• Example: Brazil, Argentina militaries relinquished power

Patrimonial (resistant to reform):

• Cronyism in staffing

• Ethnic ties ensure loyalty

• Blurred public-private boundaries

• Elites fear "ruin by reform"

• Example: Syria (Alawi officers), Iraq (Sunni elite units)

4. Popular Mobilization

• High mobilization raises repression costs

• Can tip elites toward reform (if they don't perceive existential threat)

• Example: South Korea 1987 → cross-class protests → Roh Tae Woo chose reform

• Low mobilization = cheap repression

C. Middle East Example

• Fiscal health: Oil rents maintain high military budgets (6.7% GNP vs. 3.8% global)

• International support: Continued Western backing post-Cold War

• Patrimonialism: Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia (ethnic-based loyalty)

• Low mobilization: Islamist threats justify brutal crackdowns

D. Key Insight

• Ultimate gatekeeper for Problem 2 (Control)

• Without coercive will/capacity, no institutional solution matters

• Example: Iran 1979 → military will collapsed despite capacity

E. Connection to Svolik

• Problem 2 (Control): Coercive apparatus is the FIRST solution

• If coercion fails, co-optation won't save regime

• If coercion succeeds, co-optation extends survival

VII. How Theories Work Together

A. Different Layers of Survival

Bellin = Foundation

• Identifies when ANY regime can survive mass challenges

• Coercive apparatus = ultimate gatekeeper

Gandhi & Przeworski = Strategic Choices

• Given robust coercion, which institutions to create?

• Autocrats who choose correctly survive longer

Selectorate Theory = Structural Effects

• Given institutional choices (W and S), what outcomes result?

• Explains why certain configurations produce better performance/loyalty

Svolik = Organizing Framework

• Problem 1 (elites): Inner sanctums + small W/S loyalty

• Problem 2 (masses): Coercion + co-optation + public goods

B. Exogenous vs. Endogenous

• Gandhi & Przeworski: Institutions are ENDOGENOUS (strategically chosen)

  • Asks: WHY do autocrats choose institutions?

• Selectorate Theory: Institutions are EXOGENOUS (inherited constraints)

  • Asks: WHAT happens given institutional constraints?

• Both correct: Institutions chosen endogenously → become exogenous constraints

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VIII. Compare and Contrast Theories

A. What They Explain

Theory	Main Question	Key Variable
Selectorate	Why performance varies?	W/S ratio
Gandhi & Przeworski	Why institutions exist?	Cooperation needs + Opposition strength
Bellin	Why some survive mass protests?	Coercive apparatus robustness

B. Similarities

• All focus on institutions as survival mechanisms

• All recognize information problems (asymmetric info, monitoring difficulties)

• All show rational choices under constraints

• All explain variation in autocratic durability

C. Differences

Level of Analysis:

• Selectorate: System-level (how size affects outcomes)

• Gandhi & Przeworski: Leader-level (strategic choices)

• Bellin: State-level (military/security apparatus)

Treatment of Institutions:

• Selectorate: Exogenous constraints (given)

• Gandhi & Przeworski: Endogenous choices (strategic)

• Bellin: Both (coercive structure given + choices about using it)

Primary Mechanism:

• Selectorate: Loyalty through coalition size

• Gandhi & Przeworski: Co-optation through institutions

• Bellin: Repression through coercive capacity/will

What Causes Regime Failure:

• Selectorate: Large W/S reduces loyalty → defections

• Gandhi & Przeworski: Underinstitutionalization → opposition mobilizes

• Bellin: Fiscal crisis/lost support/institutionalization → coercion fails