Cold War
met for the first time (Churchil, Roosvelt, Stalin) to discuss post-war Europe
Stalin would claim all the territories the USSR had annexed in Poland and the Baltic in 1939-1940
Poland would be compensated with German territory (no opposition from Churchill or Roosevelt)
decision to land British, Commonwealth and US troops in France (Opperation Overlord) in 1944 (not in Balkans as Churchil wanted)
this ensured that USSR would liberate both eastern and south-eastern Europe by itself → turn the region into Soviet spehre of interest
this left the Western Powers with little option but to recognise the USSR’s claims to eastern Poland and Baltic States
February 1945
S + CH + R
creating plans for finishing the war in Europe and eastern Asia
laying foundation of the coming peace
plans for occupation of Germany were finalized
France was to be included (Churchil was afraif US might withdraw troops from Europe)
each power was allotted its own zone - Berlin under Four Power Control
decision to establish United Nations
Declaration on Liberated Europe
POLAND:
confirmed that Poland’s eastern border would run along the Curzon Line
agreed in principle (like in Teheran) that for compensation of land lost to USSR, Poland would receive a increase in territory in the north and west from land to be removed from Germany - exact details were not stated
elections in Poland would be held as soon as possible
Allies recognised Polish committee of national liberation (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej), and unrecognised the goverment-in-exile in London
Stalin promised to allow free elections in a
ll territories in Eastern Europe liberated from Nazi occupation - Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
US and UK agreed that future governments in Eastern Europe bordering the USSR should be ‘friendly’ to the Soviet regime
Stalin agreed to Soviet participation in UN + who would hold the veto power
In return for the Soviet Union’s entering the war against Japan within “two or three months” after Germany’s surrender, the U.S.S.R. would obtain from Japan the Kuril Islands and regain the territory lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 (including the southern part of Sakhalin Island), and the status quo in pro-Soviet Outer Mongolia would be maintained.
Stalin agreed to sign a pact of alliance and friendship with China.
S + CH (later Clement Attlee)+ Truman
agreed on necessary measures for German demilitarization, denazification and punishment of war crimnals
only able to conclude minimal poltical and economic guidelines for the future of Germany:
The Allied Control Council
Reparations
temporary compromise was negotiated whereby both the USSR and Western powers would take reparations from their own zones
Britan and US would grand 10% of these reparations to SU and further 15% in exchange for the supply of food and raw materials from the Soviet zone
Poland
UK and US said that the new boundray between Germany and Poland gave too much territory for Poland (agreed at Yalta)
SU troops occupied eastern Germany and Poland so they was nothing they could do to change it
US and Britain eventually recognised Oder-Neisse Line (pending a final decision at a future conference)
hoped it would persuade the SU to be more flexible about German reparations and establishement of democratic government in Poland
The Communist Information Bureau established in 1947 to exchange information among nine eastern European countries and co-ordinate their activities.
set up in each occupied territory (including Germany), in order to administer its terrains in the name of Allies
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Romania were all Axis states with their own governments allowed, however the real power rested within the ACC.
The first ACC was established in Italy, in 1943 by Britain and US following the fascists collapse
Representation of the main European powers on each occupied country’s ACC was determined by their involvement within them, including liberation or the amount of troops.
composed of military commanders from each of 4 occupying powers in Germany
to avoid being out-voted by the three Western powers, Soviets insisted that each commander have compelte responsibity it his own zone
it stopped ACC from execrsing any real power in Germany as a whole
limited number of German deprartments dealing with finance, transport, trade and industry were to be formed at some point in future
Roosvelt persuaded Stalin and Churchil to agreeto it at Yalta Conference
it committed the 3 goverments to carry out emergency measures to assist liberated states and encourage democratic governments & free elections
a key text ‘upon which all future accusations of Soviet betrayal and bad faith were made’ (historian Martin Walker)
The process of removing all Nazi Party ideology, propaganda, symbols, and adherents from all aspects of German’s life
The Allied Kommandatura was the four power (British, American, French and Soviet) body established by the allies at the end of the Second World War to conduct the administration of Berlin, following agreement at the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945.
On 21 February Britain informed US that its financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey would cease on 31 March as a result of financial problems
US faced deteriorating relations with SU over Germany
in 1946 SU had put military and poltical pressure on Turkey and Iran
A communist led rebelion (not directly by USSR) was also threatening the pro-Western goverment in Greece
This led Truman to act quickly to strengthen non-communist forces in these areas = required money which had to be approved by the Congress
On 12 March, Truman appealed to Congress by outlining his views on the state of international politics, highlighting the increasing divide between the US and the Soviets Union. He outlined plans for financially assisting states like Greece and Turkey, which were perceived to be threatened by communism.
PROBELMS in countries threatened by SU in details ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
in 1942 UK and SU moved troops there to safeguard its oil supplies from threats from Italy and Germany - agreed to remove them 6 months after end of hostilities
at the war’s end SU increased their troop numbers in Iran - threat to both Turkey and Iraq
US protested against SU moves
Iran appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations → to have Soviets withdraw their forces = March 1946
Turkey
In August 1946 a new crisis arose → Soviets suggested a plan for a joint Turkish-Soviet defence of the Dardanelles
US suspected this as attempt by the Soviets to establish naval bases in Turkey and make it a Soviet satellite state
In response, the US encouraged Turkey to resist Soviet demands & dispatched units of the US naval fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in a demonstration of military strength
The Soviets soon dropped their demands on Turkey
In Greece, Stalin proceeded with caution as he had agreed with Churchill in 1944 that the country was in Britain’s sphere of interest
The Soviets gave little direct aid to the communist guerrillas who were fighting a civil war there
Instead, Stalin allowed Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to assist the Greek Communist Party with both soldiers and money in the campaign against the British-backed Greek government
This communist-led rebellion threatened to topple the Greek government just as the British withdrew their troops
Truman regarded the rebels as an instrument of Soviet policy
he feared that their success in Greece would lead to a domino effect that would force Turkey and other countries in the region into the Soviet sphere of influence
1946
George Kennan, the American charge d’affaires in Moscow, sends an 8,000-word telegram to the Department of State detailing his views on the Soviet Union, and U.S. policy toward the communist state. Kennan’s analysis provided one of the most influential underpinnings for America’s Cold War policy of containment.
The lengthy memorandum began with the assertion that the Soviet Union could not foresee “permanent peaceful coexistence” with the West.
This “neurotic view of world affairs” was a manifestation of the “instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” As a result, the Soviets were deeply suspicious of all other nations and believed that their security could only be found in “patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power.”
Kennan was convinced that the Soviets would try to expand their sphere of influence, and he pointed to Iran and Turkey as the most likely immediate trouble areas.
In addition, Kennan believed the Soviets would do all they could to “weaken power and influence of Western Powers on colonial backward, or dependent peoples.”
Fortunately, although the Soviet Union was “impervious to logic of reason,” it was “highly sensitive to logic of force.” Therefore, it would back down “when strong resistance is encountered at any point.”
The United States and its allies, he concluded, would have to offer that resistance.
5 March 1946
Speech delivered by former British prime minister Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946 in response to Stalin speech from February
I which he stressed the necessity for the United States and Britain to act as the guardians of peace and stability against the menace of Soviet communism, which had lowered an “iron curtain” across Europe.
'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent' Claiming that the Russians were bent on 'indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines', he called for a Western alliance which would stand firm against the communist threat.
blamed USSR for causing the Cold War
George Kennan: blamed Stalin => his motives were sinister and he intended to spread communism as widely as possible through Europe and Asia, thus destroying capitalism
Soviet historians during 1960s + some American in early 1970s
the Cold War ought not to be blamed on Stalin
Their theory was that Russia had suffered enormous losses during the war, and therefore it was only to be expected that Stalin would try to make sure neighbouring states were friendly, given Russia's weakness in 1945
They believe that Stalin's motives were purely defensive and that there was no real threat to the West from the USSR
Some Americans argued that claimed that the USA should have been more understanding and should not have challenged the idea of a Soviet 'sphere of influence' in eastern Europe
The actions of American politicians, especially Truman, provoked Russian hostility unnecessarily
William Appleman Williams: believed that the Cold War was mainly caused by the USA's determination to make the most of its atomic monopoly and its industrial strength in its drive for world hegemony.
some American historians, and this became popular in the 1980s
new evidence suggested that the situation at the end of the war was far more complicated than earlier historians had realized
this led them to take a middle view → both sides should take some blame for the Cold War
They believe that American economic policies such as Marshall Aid were deliberately designed to increase US political influence in Europe
they also believe that although Stalin had no long-term plans to spread communism, he was an opportunist who would take advantage of any weakness in the West to expand Soviet influence
with their entrenched positions and deep suspicions of each other, the USA and the USSR created an atmosphere in which every international act could be interpreted in two ways
what was claimed as necessary for self-defence by one side was taken by the other as evidence of aggressive inten
but at least open war was avoided, because the Americans were reluctant to use the atomic bomb again unless attacked directly, while the Russians dared not risk such an attack
official
offered economic and financial help wherever it was needed
to promote the economic recovery of Europe
unofficial
prosperous Europe would provide lucrative markets for American exports
but its main aim was probably political → communism was less likely to gain control in a flourishing western Europe
In the months following Potsdam, the Russians systematically interfered in the countries of eastern Europe to set up pro-communist governments.
This happened in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania. Tn some cases their opponents were imprisoned or murdered.
In Hungary for example, the Russians allowed free elections; but although the communists won less than 20 per cent of the votes, they saw to it that a majority of the cabinet were communists.
Stalin frightened the West → speech in February 1946 in which he said that communism and capitalism could never live peacefully together, and that future wars were inevitable until the final victory of communism was achieved.
Churchill responded to all this in a speech in March 1946 → 'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent').
By the end of 1947 every state in that area with the exception of Czechoslovakia had a fully communist government.
Elections were rigged, non-communist members of coalition governments were expelled, many were arrested and executed and eventually all other political parties were dissolved.
All this took place under the watchful eyes of secret police and Russian troops.
In addition, Stalin treated the Russian zone of Germany as if it were Russian territory, allowing only the Communist Party and draining it of vital resources.
There was a coalition government of communists and other left-wing parties, which had been freely elected in 1946.
The communists had won 38 per cent of the votes and 114 seats in the 300-seat parliament, and they held a third of the cabinet posts.
The prime minister, Klement Gottwald, was a communist; President Benes and the foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, were not; they hoped that Czechoslovakia, with its highly developed industries, would remain as a bridge between east and west.
However, a crisis arose early in 1948. Elections were due n May, and all the signs were that the communists would lose ground; they were blamed for the Czech rejection of Marshall Aid, which might have eased the continuing food shortages.
The communists decided to act before the elections; already in control of the unions and the police, they seized power in an armed coup.
All non-communist ministers with the exception of Benes and Masaryk resigned.
A few days later Masaryk's body was found under the windows of his offices. His death was officially described as suicide. However, when the archives were opened after the collapse of communism in 1989, documents were found which proved beyond doubt that he had been murdered.
The elections were held in May but there was only a single list of candidates - all communists. Benes resigned and Gottwald became president.
The western powers and the UN protested but felt unable to take any action because they could not prove Russian involvement - the coup was purely an internal affair.
However, there can be little doubt that Stalin, disapproving of Czech connections with the West and of the interest in Marshall Aid, had prodded the Czech communists into action. Nor was it just coincidence that several of the Russian divisions occupying Austria were moved up to the Czech frontier. The bridge between East and West was gone; the 'iron curtain' was complete.
GREECE
because of Britain
it was in the British influence sphere - it was a sphere of vital strategic and economic interests
Suez Canal, main trade route from India to Britain, was accessed from Greece
There was also a lot of oil trade between Britain and Middle East countries at that time
Thus, Churchill kept Greece in the sphere of British influence, one of his top priorities.
FINLAND
Its government was headed by a conservative politician and supported by the Democratic Bloc, a coalition composed of the Communist, the Social Democrat and the Agrarian Parties.
The Communist Party was relatively weak and received no assistance from the Soviet Union.
historian Adam Ulam argues that Finland escaped being integrated into the Soviet bloc merely by chance, as Zhdanov, the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, was away most of the time in Moscow.
Yet, another historian, Jukka Nevakivi, argues that Stalin simply wanted to neutralize Finland, and once the peace treaty with Finland was concluded in 1947, which committed Finland to paying $300 million in reparations and ceding the strategically important naval base of Petsamo to the USSR , he was ready to leave them alone.
He was convinced that, unlike Poland, Finland was no threat to the USSR and the threat of invasion through Finland into the Soviet Union was considered highly unlikely.
Finland’s neutrality was emphasized in 1947 when its government declined an invitation to the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan on the grounds that it wished ‘to remain outside world political conflicts’.
On the other hand, it did not become a member of Cominform, and received financial assistance from the USA outside the Marshall Plan.
The Percentages Agreement was signed in 1944 in Moscow, it was an agreement that divided Europe into spheres of influence by percentages.
The division appeared as:
Rumunia – Russia 90%, G. Britain 10%
Greece – G. Britain 90%, Russia 10%;
Yugoslavia – 50%/50%
Hungary – 50%/50%
Bulgaria – Russia 75%, G. Britain 23%.
Although Stalin did not honour the whole agreement, it demonstrates the pragmatism of Churchill and Stalin against the idealism of Roosevelt.
Following Germany's expulsion by the Red Army, the British government aimed to witness the emergence of a democratic Poland
Stalin had a resolute objective not only to recover territories that had come under Soviet influence through the Nazi-Soviet Pact but also to guarantee the presence of a pro-Soviet government in Poland
This essentially entailed the imposition of a communist dictatorship since most Polish citizens held strong anti-Soviet and anti-communist sentiments
Britain and the USA had initially given their consent in Tehran for the Soviet takeover of eastern Poland, extending up to the Curzon Line
It was understood that Poland would eventually receive compensation for this by gaining land on its western borders from Germany. They both held hopeful expectations that Stalin would accept a democratically elected government in Warsaw
After the Red Army crossed into eastern Poland in early January 1944, the Soviet Union took control of the territory it had laid claim to back in September 1939.
By July, Soviet forces had crossed the Curzon Line and entered western Poland. As they advanced, they systematically dismantled the nationalist Polish resistance organisation, recognized as the Polish Home Army.
Stalin significantly weakened the authority of the Polish government-in-exile in London by establishing the Committee of National Liberation, headquartered in Lublin within Poland, which later came to be known as the Lublin Committee.
Soviets wanted to create a military and political alliance between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the USSR, however, Tito tried to carry out his own policies, independently of USSR
Tito established communist governments in Yugoslavia and Albania (which he controlled by November 1944), despite Stalin’s reluctance to provoke a crisis with Britain and America (Yalta Conference was coming)
Stalin however managed to establish a firmer control over Tito’s foreign policy and in January 1945, he vetoed Tito’s plan for a federation with Bulgaria (which would have turned into a mere province of Yugoslavia)
Stalin made it clear that Yugoslavia would have to subordinate its local territorial ambitions to the overall foreign policy consideration determined by USSR (this displeased Tito)
Stalin doubted Tito’s loyalty to marxism. Tito saw himself as an ally of communist states, but not Stalin’s puppet, which was a fundamental distinction.
His foreign policy decisions often caused the conflicts between Yugoslavia and USSR, as in cases of Trieste, Greek Civil War, and most importantly, his idea of the Balkan Federation.
Official aims
To hasten (speed up) the inevitable surrender of The Japanese
To exert control in the Asian vacuum of power
rendered Soviet military assistance to defeat Japan unnecessary
Unofficial aims
A show of power
A monopoly on a revolutionary type of a weapon
To show scientific superiority over the Soviet Union
The Potsdam agreement required Germany to pay reparations to the USSR. Instead of monetary compensation => Allies confiscated all military industry, state-owned industry and Nazi-owned industry.
In East Germany this was roughly 60% of all industrial activity, amounting to nearly $100 billion ($910 billion in 2015 dollars) in lost income for the East Germans. Entire factories were dismantled and sent to the USSR, so no heavy industry remained in the eastern sector.
By the spring of 1946, the compromise over reparations which had been negotiated in Potsdam was already breaking down
The western zones were absorbing the majority of the German refugees who had been expelled by the Poles and Czechs from the former German territories (ceded to them at the end of the war) => were now many more people to feed
Britain and the USA wanted Germany to have a moderate economic recovery, so their zones could at least pay for their own food imports. Consequently, until it was reached, they wished to delay delivering to the USSR the quotas from their own zones of machinery and raw materials, which had been agreed at Potsdam. They furthermore pushed for the Soviet zone to have to deliver food to the hardpressed western zones.
Those attempts were seen by Soviets as an attempt by the US to force Germany’s reconstruction along capitalist lines, which would benefit both US and British industries, and inevitably integrate Germany into their trading systems.
Thus responded in June 1946, increasing the industrial production of their zone of Germany, while directly claiming its products as reparations, while taking over control of 213 east German companies.
CAUSES
DISAGREMENTS OVER THE TREATMENT ON GERMANY
On 7 June, Germans in the western zones were granted permission to create a constitution for a democratic, federal West Germany.
The Soviets believed they could force the Western allies to abandon their plans for a west German state by applying pressure to West Berlin (controlled by the Western allies but separated from the rest of Germany)
West Berlin was totally dependent on the rail and road links running through the Soviet-controlled zone for its supplies of food and new materials from western Germany.
On 20 June, the Western allies, without consulting the Soviet Union, introduced a new currency for western Germany, the Deutschmark, or German mark.
CONSEQUENCES
Four days later, the Soviets responded by introducing a new currency for their eastern German zone, the Ostmark, or East Mark. With the introduction of new currencies, two separate German states began to take shape
The Soviets reacted to the introduction of the Deutschmark into West Berlin on 23 June 1948 by blockading West Berlin.
They argued that the blockade was a defensive measure to stop the Soviet zone being swamped with the devalued Reichsmark, which the new Deutschmark was replacing in western Germany and West Berlin.
Rail and road links to the west, as well as the supply of electricity which came from East Berlin, were cut.
CAUSES
Berlin Blockade which stopped the supplies needed extra measures to deliever them
CONSEQUENCES
The outcome gave a great psychological boost to the western powers, though it brought relations with Russia to their worst ever.
It caused the western powers to co-ordinate their defences by the formation of NATO.
It meant that since no compromise was possible, Germany was doomed to remain divided for the foreseeable future.
western Allies decided to supply West Berlin with goods transported by aircraft
This airlift would follow routes or corridors that the Soviet Union had granted the Western allies in 1945
In order to apply further, but implicit, pressure on the Soviets, the US transferred 60 long-range bombers to Britain which most governments believed held atomic bombs
This was a bluff as bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs only arrived in 1949
Nevertheless, this deterrent may have prevented the Soviet Union from aggressively countering the Berlin Airlift, as the operation is known, since the Soviets had few bombers and no atomic bombs at this time
The Moscow Talks:
three Western allies met in Moscow on 2 August with the Soviet government to try to reach an agreement whereby West Berlin could again be supplied by road and rail.
The Soviets believed this indicated that their blockade was achieving its aims and decided to reject the proposals of the Western allies as they hoped to gain more concessions, perhaps in the coming critical winter months when more supplies would be needed, such as coal, to maintain West Berlin.
Western allies would not reverse their decision to create a west German state, but they were ready to agree to the circulation of the Ostmark in the whole of Berlin, subject to the financial control of all four occupying powers.
Yet, as further discussions between the Military Governors of the four zones in September demonstrated, the USSR wanted the Ostmark to be under Soviet control as the Deutschmark was under US, British and French control.
The Western allies believed the Soviets wanted to retain control of the Ostmark as a step towards the full economic integration of all Berlin with eastern Germany which was already dominated by the Soviets.
These talks ended on 7 September as neither side would compromise.
By the end of January 1949, it became clear that Stalin’s plan to force the Western allies to abandon their plans for establishing an independent West Germany was failing.
The winter of 1948–49 was exceptionally mild and, thanks to the effective deployment of the large US transport aircraft, the average daily deliveries for West Berlin in January was 5620 tons. By April, this reached 8000 tons per day.
The Soviets were not prepared to go to war over Berlin and, in an interview with a US journalist on 31 January, Stalin made a considerable concession.
He indicated that he would make the lifting of the blockade dependent only on calling another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
The US responded and talks began between the Soviet and US Security Council representatives at the United Nations in New York.
On 4 May, they finally reached agreement that the blockade would end on 12 May and that eleven days later a Council of Foreign Ministers would convene in Paris to discuss both the future of Germany and the Berlin currency question.
On neither issue did the Council produce a breakthrough, but the four states approved the New York agreement on lifting the blockade and agreed to discuss how the situation in Berlin could be resolved.
met for the first time (Churchil, Roosvelt, Stalin) to discuss post-war Europe
Stalin would claim all the territories the USSR had annexed in Poland and the Baltic in 1939-1940
Poland would be compensated with German territory (no opposition from Churchill or Roosevelt)
decision to land British, Commonwealth and US troops in France (Opperation Overlord) in 1944 (not in Balkans as Churchil wanted)
this ensured that USSR would liberate both eastern and south-eastern Europe by itself → turn the region into Soviet spehre of interest
this left the Western Powers with little option but to recognise the USSR’s claims to eastern Poland and Baltic States
February 1945
S + CH + R
creating plans for finishing the war in Europe and eastern Asia
laying foundation of the coming peace
plans for occupation of Germany were finalized
France was to be included (Churchil was afraif US might withdraw troops from Europe)
each power was allotted its own zone - Berlin under Four Power Control
decision to establish United Nations
Declaration on Liberated Europe
POLAND:
confirmed that Poland’s eastern border would run along the Curzon Line
agreed in principle (like in Teheran) that for compensation of land lost to USSR, Poland would receive a increase in territory in the north and west from land to be removed from Germany - exact details were not stated
elections in Poland would be held as soon as possible
Allies recognised Polish committee of national liberation (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej), and unrecognised the goverment-in-exile in London
Stalin promised to allow free elections in a
ll territories in Eastern Europe liberated from Nazi occupation - Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
US and UK agreed that future governments in Eastern Europe bordering the USSR should be ‘friendly’ to the Soviet regime
Stalin agreed to Soviet participation in UN + who would hold the veto power
In return for the Soviet Union’s entering the war against Japan within “two or three months” after Germany’s surrender, the U.S.S.R. would obtain from Japan the Kuril Islands and regain the territory lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 (including the southern part of Sakhalin Island), and the status quo in pro-Soviet Outer Mongolia would be maintained.
Stalin agreed to sign a pact of alliance and friendship with China.
S + CH (later Clement Attlee)+ Truman
agreed on necessary measures for German demilitarization, denazification and punishment of war crimnals
only able to conclude minimal poltical and economic guidelines for the future of Germany:
The Allied Control Council
Reparations
temporary compromise was negotiated whereby both the USSR and Western powers would take reparations from their own zones
Britan and US would grand 10% of these reparations to SU and further 15% in exchange for the supply of food and raw materials from the Soviet zone
Poland
UK and US said that the new boundray between Germany and Poland gave too much territory for Poland (agreed at Yalta)
SU troops occupied eastern Germany and Poland so they was nothing they could do to change it
US and Britain eventually recognised Oder-Neisse Line (pending a final decision at a future conference)
hoped it would persuade the SU to be more flexible about German reparations and establishement of democratic government in Poland
The Communist Information Bureau established in 1947 to exchange information among nine eastern European countries and co-ordinate their activities.
set up in each occupied territory (including Germany), in order to administer its terrains in the name of Allies
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Romania were all Axis states with their own governments allowed, however the real power rested within the ACC.
The first ACC was established in Italy, in 1943 by Britain and US following the fascists collapse
Representation of the main European powers on each occupied country’s ACC was determined by their involvement within them, including liberation or the amount of troops.
composed of military commanders from each of 4 occupying powers in Germany
to avoid being out-voted by the three Western powers, Soviets insisted that each commander have compelte responsibity it his own zone
it stopped ACC from execrsing any real power in Germany as a whole
limited number of German deprartments dealing with finance, transport, trade and industry were to be formed at some point in future
Roosvelt persuaded Stalin and Churchil to agreeto it at Yalta Conference
it committed the 3 goverments to carry out emergency measures to assist liberated states and encourage democratic governments & free elections
a key text ‘upon which all future accusations of Soviet betrayal and bad faith were made’ (historian Martin Walker)
The process of removing all Nazi Party ideology, propaganda, symbols, and adherents from all aspects of German’s life
The Allied Kommandatura was the four power (British, American, French and Soviet) body established by the allies at the end of the Second World War to conduct the administration of Berlin, following agreement at the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945.
On 21 February Britain informed US that its financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey would cease on 31 March as a result of financial problems
US faced deteriorating relations with SU over Germany
in 1946 SU had put military and poltical pressure on Turkey and Iran
A communist led rebelion (not directly by USSR) was also threatening the pro-Western goverment in Greece
This led Truman to act quickly to strengthen non-communist forces in these areas = required money which had to be approved by the Congress
On 12 March, Truman appealed to Congress by outlining his views on the state of international politics, highlighting the increasing divide between the US and the Soviets Union. He outlined plans for financially assisting states like Greece and Turkey, which were perceived to be threatened by communism.
PROBELMS in countries threatened by SU in details ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
in 1942 UK and SU moved troops there to safeguard its oil supplies from threats from Italy and Germany - agreed to remove them 6 months after end of hostilities
at the war’s end SU increased their troop numbers in Iran - threat to both Turkey and Iraq
US protested against SU moves
Iran appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations → to have Soviets withdraw their forces = March 1946
Turkey
In August 1946 a new crisis arose → Soviets suggested a plan for a joint Turkish-Soviet defence of the Dardanelles
US suspected this as attempt by the Soviets to establish naval bases in Turkey and make it a Soviet satellite state
In response, the US encouraged Turkey to resist Soviet demands & dispatched units of the US naval fleet to the eastern Mediterranean in a demonstration of military strength
The Soviets soon dropped their demands on Turkey
In Greece, Stalin proceeded with caution as he had agreed with Churchill in 1944 that the country was in Britain’s sphere of interest
The Soviets gave little direct aid to the communist guerrillas who were fighting a civil war there
Instead, Stalin allowed Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania to assist the Greek Communist Party with both soldiers and money in the campaign against the British-backed Greek government
This communist-led rebellion threatened to topple the Greek government just as the British withdrew their troops
Truman regarded the rebels as an instrument of Soviet policy
he feared that their success in Greece would lead to a domino effect that would force Turkey and other countries in the region into the Soviet sphere of influence
1946
George Kennan, the American charge d’affaires in Moscow, sends an 8,000-word telegram to the Department of State detailing his views on the Soviet Union, and U.S. policy toward the communist state. Kennan’s analysis provided one of the most influential underpinnings for America’s Cold War policy of containment.
The lengthy memorandum began with the assertion that the Soviet Union could not foresee “permanent peaceful coexistence” with the West.
This “neurotic view of world affairs” was a manifestation of the “instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” As a result, the Soviets were deeply suspicious of all other nations and believed that their security could only be found in “patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power.”
Kennan was convinced that the Soviets would try to expand their sphere of influence, and he pointed to Iran and Turkey as the most likely immediate trouble areas.
In addition, Kennan believed the Soviets would do all they could to “weaken power and influence of Western Powers on colonial backward, or dependent peoples.”
Fortunately, although the Soviet Union was “impervious to logic of reason,” it was “highly sensitive to logic of force.” Therefore, it would back down “when strong resistance is encountered at any point.”
The United States and its allies, he concluded, would have to offer that resistance.
5 March 1946
Speech delivered by former British prime minister Winston Churchill in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946 in response to Stalin speech from February
I which he stressed the necessity for the United States and Britain to act as the guardians of peace and stability against the menace of Soviet communism, which had lowered an “iron curtain” across Europe.
'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent' Claiming that the Russians were bent on 'indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines', he called for a Western alliance which would stand firm against the communist threat.
blamed USSR for causing the Cold War
George Kennan: blamed Stalin => his motives were sinister and he intended to spread communism as widely as possible through Europe and Asia, thus destroying capitalism
Soviet historians during 1960s + some American in early 1970s
the Cold War ought not to be blamed on Stalin
Their theory was that Russia had suffered enormous losses during the war, and therefore it was only to be expected that Stalin would try to make sure neighbouring states were friendly, given Russia's weakness in 1945
They believe that Stalin's motives were purely defensive and that there was no real threat to the West from the USSR
Some Americans argued that claimed that the USA should have been more understanding and should not have challenged the idea of a Soviet 'sphere of influence' in eastern Europe
The actions of American politicians, especially Truman, provoked Russian hostility unnecessarily
William Appleman Williams: believed that the Cold War was mainly caused by the USA's determination to make the most of its atomic monopoly and its industrial strength in its drive for world hegemony.
some American historians, and this became popular in the 1980s
new evidence suggested that the situation at the end of the war was far more complicated than earlier historians had realized
this led them to take a middle view → both sides should take some blame for the Cold War
They believe that American economic policies such as Marshall Aid were deliberately designed to increase US political influence in Europe
they also believe that although Stalin had no long-term plans to spread communism, he was an opportunist who would take advantage of any weakness in the West to expand Soviet influence
with their entrenched positions and deep suspicions of each other, the USA and the USSR created an atmosphere in which every international act could be interpreted in two ways
what was claimed as necessary for self-defence by one side was taken by the other as evidence of aggressive inten
but at least open war was avoided, because the Americans were reluctant to use the atomic bomb again unless attacked directly, while the Russians dared not risk such an attack
official
offered economic and financial help wherever it was needed
to promote the economic recovery of Europe
unofficial
prosperous Europe would provide lucrative markets for American exports
but its main aim was probably political → communism was less likely to gain control in a flourishing western Europe
In the months following Potsdam, the Russians systematically interfered in the countries of eastern Europe to set up pro-communist governments.
This happened in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania. Tn some cases their opponents were imprisoned or murdered.
In Hungary for example, the Russians allowed free elections; but although the communists won less than 20 per cent of the votes, they saw to it that a majority of the cabinet were communists.
Stalin frightened the West → speech in February 1946 in which he said that communism and capitalism could never live peacefully together, and that future wars were inevitable until the final victory of communism was achieved.
Churchill responded to all this in a speech in March 1946 → 'From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent').
By the end of 1947 every state in that area with the exception of Czechoslovakia had a fully communist government.
Elections were rigged, non-communist members of coalition governments were expelled, many were arrested and executed and eventually all other political parties were dissolved.
All this took place under the watchful eyes of secret police and Russian troops.
In addition, Stalin treated the Russian zone of Germany as if it were Russian territory, allowing only the Communist Party and draining it of vital resources.
There was a coalition government of communists and other left-wing parties, which had been freely elected in 1946.
The communists had won 38 per cent of the votes and 114 seats in the 300-seat parliament, and they held a third of the cabinet posts.
The prime minister, Klement Gottwald, was a communist; President Benes and the foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, were not; they hoped that Czechoslovakia, with its highly developed industries, would remain as a bridge between east and west.
However, a crisis arose early in 1948. Elections were due n May, and all the signs were that the communists would lose ground; they were blamed for the Czech rejection of Marshall Aid, which might have eased the continuing food shortages.
The communists decided to act before the elections; already in control of the unions and the police, they seized power in an armed coup.
All non-communist ministers with the exception of Benes and Masaryk resigned.
A few days later Masaryk's body was found under the windows of his offices. His death was officially described as suicide. However, when the archives were opened after the collapse of communism in 1989, documents were found which proved beyond doubt that he had been murdered.
The elections were held in May but there was only a single list of candidates - all communists. Benes resigned and Gottwald became president.
The western powers and the UN protested but felt unable to take any action because they could not prove Russian involvement - the coup was purely an internal affair.
However, there can be little doubt that Stalin, disapproving of Czech connections with the West and of the interest in Marshall Aid, had prodded the Czech communists into action. Nor was it just coincidence that several of the Russian divisions occupying Austria were moved up to the Czech frontier. The bridge between East and West was gone; the 'iron curtain' was complete.
GREECE
because of Britain
it was in the British influence sphere - it was a sphere of vital strategic and economic interests
Suez Canal, main trade route from India to Britain, was accessed from Greece
There was also a lot of oil trade between Britain and Middle East countries at that time
Thus, Churchill kept Greece in the sphere of British influence, one of his top priorities.
FINLAND
Its government was headed by a conservative politician and supported by the Democratic Bloc, a coalition composed of the Communist, the Social Democrat and the Agrarian Parties.
The Communist Party was relatively weak and received no assistance from the Soviet Union.
historian Adam Ulam argues that Finland escaped being integrated into the Soviet bloc merely by chance, as Zhdanov, the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, was away most of the time in Moscow.
Yet, another historian, Jukka Nevakivi, argues that Stalin simply wanted to neutralize Finland, and once the peace treaty with Finland was concluded in 1947, which committed Finland to paying $300 million in reparations and ceding the strategically important naval base of Petsamo to the USSR , he was ready to leave them alone.
He was convinced that, unlike Poland, Finland was no threat to the USSR and the threat of invasion through Finland into the Soviet Union was considered highly unlikely.
Finland’s neutrality was emphasized in 1947 when its government declined an invitation to the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan on the grounds that it wished ‘to remain outside world political conflicts’.
On the other hand, it did not become a member of Cominform, and received financial assistance from the USA outside the Marshall Plan.
The Percentages Agreement was signed in 1944 in Moscow, it was an agreement that divided Europe into spheres of influence by percentages.
The division appeared as:
Rumunia – Russia 90%, G. Britain 10%
Greece – G. Britain 90%, Russia 10%;
Yugoslavia – 50%/50%
Hungary – 50%/50%
Bulgaria – Russia 75%, G. Britain 23%.
Although Stalin did not honour the whole agreement, it demonstrates the pragmatism of Churchill and Stalin against the idealism of Roosevelt.
Following Germany's expulsion by the Red Army, the British government aimed to witness the emergence of a democratic Poland
Stalin had a resolute objective not only to recover territories that had come under Soviet influence through the Nazi-Soviet Pact but also to guarantee the presence of a pro-Soviet government in Poland
This essentially entailed the imposition of a communist dictatorship since most Polish citizens held strong anti-Soviet and anti-communist sentiments
Britain and the USA had initially given their consent in Tehran for the Soviet takeover of eastern Poland, extending up to the Curzon Line
It was understood that Poland would eventually receive compensation for this by gaining land on its western borders from Germany. They both held hopeful expectations that Stalin would accept a democratically elected government in Warsaw
After the Red Army crossed into eastern Poland in early January 1944, the Soviet Union took control of the territory it had laid claim to back in September 1939.
By July, Soviet forces had crossed the Curzon Line and entered western Poland. As they advanced, they systematically dismantled the nationalist Polish resistance organisation, recognized as the Polish Home Army.
Stalin significantly weakened the authority of the Polish government-in-exile in London by establishing the Committee of National Liberation, headquartered in Lublin within Poland, which later came to be known as the Lublin Committee.
Soviets wanted to create a military and political alliance between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the USSR, however, Tito tried to carry out his own policies, independently of USSR
Tito established communist governments in Yugoslavia and Albania (which he controlled by November 1944), despite Stalin’s reluctance to provoke a crisis with Britain and America (Yalta Conference was coming)
Stalin however managed to establish a firmer control over Tito’s foreign policy and in January 1945, he vetoed Tito’s plan for a federation with Bulgaria (which would have turned into a mere province of Yugoslavia)
Stalin made it clear that Yugoslavia would have to subordinate its local territorial ambitions to the overall foreign policy consideration determined by USSR (this displeased Tito)
Stalin doubted Tito’s loyalty to marxism. Tito saw himself as an ally of communist states, but not Stalin’s puppet, which was a fundamental distinction.
His foreign policy decisions often caused the conflicts between Yugoslavia and USSR, as in cases of Trieste, Greek Civil War, and most importantly, his idea of the Balkan Federation.
Official aims
To hasten (speed up) the inevitable surrender of The Japanese
To exert control in the Asian vacuum of power
rendered Soviet military assistance to defeat Japan unnecessary
Unofficial aims
A show of power
A monopoly on a revolutionary type of a weapon
To show scientific superiority over the Soviet Union
The Potsdam agreement required Germany to pay reparations to the USSR. Instead of monetary compensation => Allies confiscated all military industry, state-owned industry and Nazi-owned industry.
In East Germany this was roughly 60% of all industrial activity, amounting to nearly $100 billion ($910 billion in 2015 dollars) in lost income for the East Germans. Entire factories were dismantled and sent to the USSR, so no heavy industry remained in the eastern sector.
By the spring of 1946, the compromise over reparations which had been negotiated in Potsdam was already breaking down
The western zones were absorbing the majority of the German refugees who had been expelled by the Poles and Czechs from the former German territories (ceded to them at the end of the war) => were now many more people to feed
Britain and the USA wanted Germany to have a moderate economic recovery, so their zones could at least pay for their own food imports. Consequently, until it was reached, they wished to delay delivering to the USSR the quotas from their own zones of machinery and raw materials, which had been agreed at Potsdam. They furthermore pushed for the Soviet zone to have to deliver food to the hardpressed western zones.
Those attempts were seen by Soviets as an attempt by the US to force Germany’s reconstruction along capitalist lines, which would benefit both US and British industries, and inevitably integrate Germany into their trading systems.
Thus responded in June 1946, increasing the industrial production of their zone of Germany, while directly claiming its products as reparations, while taking over control of 213 east German companies.
CAUSES
DISAGREMENTS OVER THE TREATMENT ON GERMANY
On 7 June, Germans in the western zones were granted permission to create a constitution for a democratic, federal West Germany.
The Soviets believed they could force the Western allies to abandon their plans for a west German state by applying pressure to West Berlin (controlled by the Western allies but separated from the rest of Germany)
West Berlin was totally dependent on the rail and road links running through the Soviet-controlled zone for its supplies of food and new materials from western Germany.
On 20 June, the Western allies, without consulting the Soviet Union, introduced a new currency for western Germany, the Deutschmark, or German mark.
CONSEQUENCES
Four days later, the Soviets responded by introducing a new currency for their eastern German zone, the Ostmark, or East Mark. With the introduction of new currencies, two separate German states began to take shape
The Soviets reacted to the introduction of the Deutschmark into West Berlin on 23 June 1948 by blockading West Berlin.
They argued that the blockade was a defensive measure to stop the Soviet zone being swamped with the devalued Reichsmark, which the new Deutschmark was replacing in western Germany and West Berlin.
Rail and road links to the west, as well as the supply of electricity which came from East Berlin, were cut.
CAUSES
Berlin Blockade which stopped the supplies needed extra measures to deliever them
CONSEQUENCES
The outcome gave a great psychological boost to the western powers, though it brought relations with Russia to their worst ever.
It caused the western powers to co-ordinate their defences by the formation of NATO.
It meant that since no compromise was possible, Germany was doomed to remain divided for the foreseeable future.
western Allies decided to supply West Berlin with goods transported by aircraft
This airlift would follow routes or corridors that the Soviet Union had granted the Western allies in 1945
In order to apply further, but implicit, pressure on the Soviets, the US transferred 60 long-range bombers to Britain which most governments believed held atomic bombs
This was a bluff as bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs only arrived in 1949
Nevertheless, this deterrent may have prevented the Soviet Union from aggressively countering the Berlin Airlift, as the operation is known, since the Soviets had few bombers and no atomic bombs at this time
The Moscow Talks:
three Western allies met in Moscow on 2 August with the Soviet government to try to reach an agreement whereby West Berlin could again be supplied by road and rail.
The Soviets believed this indicated that their blockade was achieving its aims and decided to reject the proposals of the Western allies as they hoped to gain more concessions, perhaps in the coming critical winter months when more supplies would be needed, such as coal, to maintain West Berlin.
Western allies would not reverse their decision to create a west German state, but they were ready to agree to the circulation of the Ostmark in the whole of Berlin, subject to the financial control of all four occupying powers.
Yet, as further discussions between the Military Governors of the four zones in September demonstrated, the USSR wanted the Ostmark to be under Soviet control as the Deutschmark was under US, British and French control.
The Western allies believed the Soviets wanted to retain control of the Ostmark as a step towards the full economic integration of all Berlin with eastern Germany which was already dominated by the Soviets.
These talks ended on 7 September as neither side would compromise.
By the end of January 1949, it became clear that Stalin’s plan to force the Western allies to abandon their plans for establishing an independent West Germany was failing.
The winter of 1948–49 was exceptionally mild and, thanks to the effective deployment of the large US transport aircraft, the average daily deliveries for West Berlin in January was 5620 tons. By April, this reached 8000 tons per day.
The Soviets were not prepared to go to war over Berlin and, in an interview with a US journalist on 31 January, Stalin made a considerable concession.
He indicated that he would make the lifting of the blockade dependent only on calling another meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
The US responded and talks began between the Soviet and US Security Council representatives at the United Nations in New York.
On 4 May, they finally reached agreement that the blockade would end on 12 May and that eleven days later a Council of Foreign Ministers would convene in Paris to discuss both the future of Germany and the Berlin currency question.
On neither issue did the Council produce a breakthrough, but the four states approved the New York agreement on lifting the blockade and agreed to discuss how the situation in Berlin could be resolved.
