Behaviourism 25 marker

Introduction

Introduction

Behaviourism is an analytical theory of mind as it is assumed with the meaning of the ‘mind’ as a concept. It claims that talk about mental states is analytically reducible to talk about behaviours.

Behaviourism cannot be successfully defended against the asymmetry objection

Cannot attempt to evade further criticisms without collapsing into MBTIT

Explain Ryle’s argument for behaviourism (mid as hypothetical argument)

Argued that SD committed a category mistake

Ryle argues that we confuse the language used to describe the mind with the language which only refers to physical things

Ryle argues that the mind is not a thing at all, it instead refers to a set of behavioural dispositions

For example, if I describe someone as scared, we aren’t describing a private mental state, I am describing their disposition to make scared faces.

If Ryle is correct, then SD fails and behaviourism is correct.

Explain how Ryle’s argument is supported by verificationism

Verificationism argues that a statement is only meaningful if it can be verified analytically or empirically

Mental states cannot be verified but behaviours can be verified empirically

What is the problem with verificationism? (mid)

Verification itself seems to fail as by its principle, itself becomes meaningless as it cannot be verified itself

Define Hempel’s Hard behaviourism (weaker than SB in terms of arguments sake)

Suggests statements about mental states can be directly translated without loss of meaning into statements about current behaviours which use purely the language of physics

For example, ‘James is sad’ which cannot be verified analytically or empirically can be fully translated into observable behaviours such as ‘a liquid is secreted from James’ tear duct’ and further what are called verification conditions.

The verification conditions of a behaviour, when combined, are a full translation of the mental state

Explain the criticism where a problem is encountered with loss of meaning in translation (strong)

Full translation without loss of meaning appears impossible as particular mental states may be realised by different behaviours.

The list of verification conditions for ‘James is sad’ is infinite, and so is therefore the same list for ‘James is angry’

This can be said of all mental states

Therefore HB can never fully translate mental states into behaviours

Explain the criticism that it seems impossible to refer to a mental state in the form of purely behaviour without referencing other mental states (strong)

It seems impossible to refer to a mental state in the form of purely behaviour without referencing other mental states.

For example, one cannot conclude that I am thirsty (mental state) purely from watching me drink something (behaviour). I could instead believe the drink is poisoned (mental state) and feel suicidal (mental state) hence why I drank the drink.

You cannot have inferred suicidal thoughts from my behaviours. It is only explained through reference to my belief (mental state).

So you cannot truly explain one mental state without referencing another. This means the translation from mental states to behaviours doesn’t work.

Explain the perfect actor objection (strong)

The perfect actor objection suggests that people can feign behaviours and so we cannot verify our observations of others’ behaviours.

For example, someone can pretend to act sad to the point at which it is fully believable, but they are actually happy.

Explain Hempel’s response to the perfect actor objection (weak)

Hempel argues that we can distinguish between fake and real behaviours as it is impossible for people to fake behaviours such as neural activity which Hempel regards as observable behaviour.

Explain the criticism of Hempel’s response to the perfect actor objection (strong)

If analysis of neural activity is required to determine true behaviours, then the theory appears to collapse into MBTIT as it goes beyond what is typically referred to as behaviours.

Define Ryle’s soft behaviourism (stronger than HB in terms of arguments sake)

The theory that statements about mental states can be analysed in terms of statements about behavioural dispositions using ordinary language.

Explain how SB overcomes the perfect actor objection (strong)

SB overcomes the perfect actor objection as, under neutral circumstances, someone who is feigning schizophrenia is disposed to not say they hear voices under neutral circumstances (regardless of whether they do so).

So you can’t say they are schizophrenic.

Explain how SB accounts for prolonged mental states (strong)

SB would say that in that random moment, you had the behavioural dispositions of someone who knew that Paris is the capital of France, for example if you were listing capital cities you would mention Paris as it is the capital of France

Explain the criticism that SB finds it difficult to account for thinking (mid)

SB finds it difficult to account for thinking as it doesn’t display any observable behaviours, and so arguably no behavioural dispositions.

For example, daydreaming about a bird does not show any observable behaviours.

Explain the response from SB to the criticism that SB finds it difficult to account for thinking (weak)

It can be argued that thinking isn’t always unobservable, for example the process of thinking through a sum on paper in maths, or thinking out loud using your voice.

There is then observable behaviours to suggest thinking in the use of the voice or the writing of a sum on paper.

However, it still fails to account for daydreaming and what can be known as ‘silent thinking’.

Explain the super-spartan’s objection (strong)

The super-spartans objection attempts to prove that mental states are distinct from behavioural dispositions.

Hilary Putnam asks us to imagine a super-spartan who is trained not only to suppress pain behaviour but to suppress their disposition towards pain behaviour.

A SB would have to argue that when one of these super-spartans steps on a nail, they would not feel pain. Putnam thinks this is ridiculous as it goes against our intuition to the point of being implausible.

Explain the response to the super-spartan’s objection (weak)

In response, a SB could just accept the conclusion that the super-Spartan would not feel pain. The fact that this is counter-intuitive doesn’t matter.

However, to disregard intuition is problematic in itself as it produces many further problems.

Explain how both SB and HB struggle with the argument that mental states are distinct from behaviours (strong)

Intuitively it makes sense to say that mental states such as pain have qualia.

Define Qualia.

Qualia cannot be captured within a description of behaviour.

Explain the asymmetry objection (strongest argument)

The idea that we experience other people’s mental states through observing their behaviour, whereas we access our own mental states through introspection.

Define introspection.

There is then obviously an asymmetry of experience of mental states.

Behaviourism says that all mental states are behaviours as they are observed this way, however I do not need to observe my own behaviours in order to know of my mental states, therefore showing how mental states and behaviours differ.

This shows that behaviourism fails.

Explain Ryle’s response to the asymmetry objection

Ryle argues that there is no essential and fundamental difference between the ways we experience our own mental states in comparison to others.

He instead argues that we become aware of our own and others’ mental states through ‘paying attention’ and that we have ‘inner behaviours’.

Explain how Ryle’s response to the asymmetry objection fails

‘Inner behaviours’ are unobservable to other’s, and therefore don’t follow Ryle’s definition of behaviours.

So Ryle contradicts his own theory, meaning the asymmetry argument succeeds.

Conclusion

Behaviourism as a whole has been shown to fail to the strongest argument, this being the argument from asymmetry.

The 2 separate forms of behaviourism have also been shown to individually fail to other criticisms, and so to argue that behaviourism is a convincing theory of mind seems implausible.