Modern Scholarship

Mouritsen (Politics 1)

There were no 'populares'. Those who employed the strategy of relying entirely on the assemblies to pass laws did so for such a wide range of purposes that the Romans couldn't apply just one label to them

Summary: No such thing as populares

Mouritsen (Politics 2)

The role of the senate was partly practical, partly symbolic. Its approval carried the status of auctoritas, which went well beyond any simple constitutional classification of powers. Ideally a politician aimed for a unanimous response which demonstrated the unity of the elite.

Morstein-Marx (Politics 1)

'We must at last abandon the old tendency... to write as if being popularis was somehow to be opposed to "the Republic."'

Morstein-Marx (Politics 2/ Caesar's Consulship)

'Bibulus' violation of norms (in 59), both in his initial, mute rejection of the proposal, and now in his attempt to quash an overwhelming consensus of the voters, helps to explain an important feature of the violence used against Bibulus: the breaking of his fasces.'

Morstein-Marx (Politics 3)

'Roman voters were notably "politicised" and keen to defend certain core rights and interests, in particular the protections Roman citizens enjoyed from arbitrary punishment grouped loosely around the term provocatio.'

Morstein-Marx (Politics 4/ The Civil War)

'One might say that a Roman civil war was competitive politics by other means.'

Morstein-Marx (Politics 5)

When the people chose not to defer to senatorial opinion, it was probably because the consuls and Senate neglected the public forum, denied the popular will, and trampled on the traditional rights of the tribunes to represent the popular interest. The Republic was not defined by the senatorial/optimate viewpoint

Vasaly (Oratory and Correspondence)

'Oratory is a tool to manipulate an audience, most effectively by playing on their emotions. The point is not necessarily for them to understand or reason, but to respond, by thinking and acting in a way that the orator alone has determined to be most advantageous to the state.'

Morello (Oratory and Correspondence)

Letters are an inactive genre and it is a cliché of epistolary theory that letters substitute conversation. They anticipate an answer, maintain an apparent realism and seek to minimise the sense of geographical separation between people.

Powell (Oratory and Correspondence)

'In one sense, there is no more essentially written medium than the letter... On the other hand, casual correspondence can appear to be virtually a transcription of spoken language.'

Stowers (Oratory and Correspondence)

'(The distinction between) warm, personal, spontaneous, artless, common-private-friendly letters and impersonal, conventional, artificial literary letters is extremely misleading.'

Taylor (In Verrem)

Cicero was a Roman patriot, and he did have... a sense of obligation to this oldest of the Roman provinces [Sicily]. He speaks with obvious sincerity when he praises the land itself and Sicily's past relations with Rome... But this was a crucial time in the career of Cicero, and it must be admitted that he would not have taken the case if he had not been convinced that it would further his career.' (especially considering that the rest of his extortion speeches were defensive.)

Rawson (In Verrem)

'It is likely that Cicero's heart was to some extent in his case. It was not necessary to be an extreme popularis to think some reform was needed... what the People wanted was simply honest government.'

Tatum (Cicero's Principles)

Cicero's principles were complex. Roman dignitas explains his efforts to protect and his inclination to glorify his reputation as the senate's champion; but the personal aspect of this shouldn't dismiss Cicero's genuine commitment to senatus auctoritas (the authority of the senate), which was consistent in his fairly flexible political career

Grant (Cicero' Principles)

Cicero was not often a successful politician, but his true greatness lies in his belief that dictatorial rulers were wrong to suppress individual freedom. He suggested that true authority lay not in people, but in unchangeable morals which they cannot alter.

Tempest (Cicero' Principles)

'Cicero did not hate the dictator as a man, but he did hate the fact that Caesar had no desire to restore the Republic.'

Everitt (Cicero' Principles)

'...his basic aim - to restore traditional political values -remained unchanged throughout his life, although in his last two years his character hardened and he became willing to adopt unconstitutional methods.'

Morstein-Marx (Cicero' Principles/ Caesar's Consulship)

'This was an opportunity for the senate to adopt symbolic leadership and demonstrate its solicitude for the interests of the People - something that Cicero himself at other times insists that the senate and the leading men of the Republic must always do.'

Mouritsen (Catiline)

'Catiline may be the classic example of an indebted aristocrat driven to desperate actions, but most likely he was simply an extreme manifestation of a wider structural problem, which affected large sections of the Roman elite.'

Parenti (Catiline)

Cicero's strategy was to demonise and isolate Catiline, push him to the wall, and goad him into an act of unlawful resistance, while creating a sense of alarm within the city. He then used the 'perilous emergency' as an opportunity to restore the authority of the inner circle of aristocratic senators, earning their gratitude and thus glory for himself.

Billows (Caesar's Consulship/Caesar)

'He knew he could not (fail to pass his land laws) if he was determined enough, and determination was a quality he never lacked.'

Tatum (Caesar's Consulship)

"He had reached the top of the greasy pole by means of a calculated combination of boldness and conventionality."

Gelzer (Caesar's Consulship/Caesar 1)

For Caesar, achieving his goals was more important to him than how he did it, using almost popular, revolutionary tactics, like flaunting his strength to influence the comitia. These kinds of actions were a result of the restrictive nature of the Roman constitution.

Gelzer (Caesar's Consulship/Caesar 2)

Caesar was as aware of the greatness of the past and of the responsibility of the aristocracy for its preservation, but his genius led him to deeds with which he intended to round off the constitution of the empire. His consulship shows us his first steps in this direction, but also his boldness. The old world optimates rose in opposition, and Caesar faced it alone while his allies Pompey and Crassus were fighting for their own principate.

Goldsworthy (Caesar's Consulship 1)

'No one was killed, which may suggest that the violence was tightly controlled by Caesar and his allies. Covering the consul in manure rather than actually injuring him adds to the impression of well-orchestrated and restrained use of force'

Goldsworthy (Caesar's Consulship 2)

During his consulship the conventions that regulated public life had come under great strain and been further eroded. Bibulus' and Cato's determination to block Caesar was equally as damaging as as his own determination keep going. Even then, Caesar had won, and he gained the chance to win great military glory.

Chrissanthos (Caesar's Consulship)

The outbreaks of violence during Caesar's consulship ultimately led to the end of the Republic. It allowed the Triumvirate to seize power, pass laws and support the careers of people like Clodius who would then have a significant effect on politics. Caesar gained his three proconsular provinces, and 10 legions which helped him conquer Gaul. His consulship marked the start of the Republic's decline.

Meier (Caesar's Principles)

As far as we can judge, Caesar was not in principle opposed to the Roman order. If he acted against it, he was simply putting his own interest above respect for its rules. He may have been motivated also by anger at the restrictions they imposed.

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Principles 2)

(During the Cat Con) 'Caesar pointed a way forward that could maintain the dignity of the curia and ward off the danger of an eventual popular backlash that could deeply undermine the broad support on which its authority depended.'

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Principles 1)

'Caesar... first came to public notice in Rome not as a demagogue or "politician", but as a patrician warrior in the mould of the Scipiones.'

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Principles 3)

(Caesar's Agrarian Laws 59) 'It is possible that he saw his proposal as a way of elevating not merely his own "popularity" and prestige, but also that of the Roman Senate.'

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Principles 4)

We may say that civil war reconciliation is a "red thread" that runs through Caesar's career from beginning to end.

Mouritsen (Caesar's Principles)

Caesar's pursuit of popular favour was noted by all ancient commentators- an unusual strategy which most abandoned after the early stages of their career. It was essentially a style, involving gestures, spectacle, generosity, and public shows of defiance towards the nobility. It may not have had much effect on the lives of the urban poor.

Parenti (Caesar's Principles 1)

'Caesar accumulated individual power in order to break the oligarchic stranglehold and thereby initiate popular reforms. Without too much overreaching, we might say that his reign can be called a dictatorship of the proletarii, an instance of ruling autocratically against plutocracy on behalf of the citizenry's substantive interests.'

Parenti (Caesar's Principles 2)

If Caesar was primarily led by unprincipled ambition and a lust for power, as Cicero claimed, he would have eagerly accepted this chance to be catapulted into the highest circles as (Sulla's) protege (i.e. by divorcing Cornelia).

Rawson (Caesar's Principles)

Caesar probably stood above many of the prejudices of the including, party, class, race etc and was uninfluenced by his associates. But Cicero was right to say, at the beginning of the civil war, that he did not put 'the safety and honour of his country' above his own advantage.

Tatum (Cato's Principles)

Within the confines of the senate, Cato was a moral force- stubborn, unafraid to give offense and an advocate for old-fashioned values. His nobility of birth and traditional principles made up for his lack of intelligence or opportunism

Drogula (Cato's Principles)

Cato promoted and popularised the idea that he was the most conservative and traditional man in the state, which he used as a political tool. His calculated appeal to an imaginary past which Roman society revered allowed him to form close ties with the so-often cynical senators of Rome.

Scullard (Cato's Principles)

Cato's death symbolised the death of the Republic, which he sought to uphold for the duration of his life. Under the Empire he was idealised as a martyr of Republican liberty and a paragon of Stoic virtues.

Syme (Cato's Principles)

The Stoics could support doctrines distasteful to Roman Republicans, namely monarchy or the brotherhood of man. The Stoic teaching was nothing more than a theoretical defence of traditional values of the governing class in an aristocratic and Republican state.

Marin (Cato's Principles)

Cato never achieved the consulship due to exasperation of the common folk, who were angry at his aloofness and refused to partake in the usual bribery that surrounded elections. Cato believed that had offended the people but he wouldn't change himself to accommodate them, and thus didn't seek the consulship further. While the people might have applauded Cato for his moral integrity ... this did not translate to votes for his consulship.

Morrell (Cato's Principles)

'Cato valued moral excellence above military achievements in a manner atypical for a Roman'

Morstein-Marx (Cato's Principles)

'In 62, Cato had explored a new way of frustrating the popular will; now, in this first instance of the use of the filibuster - a tactic that would become his trademark over the next decade - he was evidently experimenting with new ways to undermine and ultimately to overturn the opinion of the Senate's majority'

Goldsworthy (Cato's Principles)

'It is no exaggeration to say that Cato loathed Caesar.'

Rawson (Cato's Principles)

'Cato, high-minded and courageous as well as narrow and stiff-necked in his defence of the old order,... repeatedly driven to compromise, when it was too late for compromise to do any good'

Parenti (Cato's Principles)

'Cato treated the obstacle-ridden procedures of the un-written constitution as chiselled in stone. But when the optimates needed to bend or even suspend rules and basic rights... Cato was capable of infinite flexibility, treating the constitution as not only elastic but expendable.'

Osgood (Cato's Principles)

'Cato's obstruction and boycotts were in their own way revolutionary and damaging, both inciting Caesar's escalation and precluding any alternative solution. In trying to throttle Caesar, Cato had throttled compromise, an essential feature of politics.'

Scullard (The First Triumvirate/The Civil War)

'Its formation was a turning point in the history of the Free State, and it was, as both Cicero and Cato recognised, the ultimate origin of the Civil War of 49 BC.'

Tatum (The First Triumvirate 1)

'The destruction of the republic was hardly what any of the three had in mind at the time. Crassus, Pompey and Caesar each had his own immediate agenda, which for none of them included toppling the state.'

Tatum (The First Triumvirate 2)

'It is another of Caesar's real achievements that he managed to persuade Pompey and Crassus to put aside their mutual loathing and to be reconciled with one another.'

Billows (The First Triumvirate)

The political pact the Triumvirate formed was a traditional part of Roman politics. It was how the state had been governed for centuries- by leading men forming agreements to implement certain policies or laws that they deemed necessary or for the good of the state. Even the optimates fit this mould.

Goldsworthy (The First Triumvirate)

'Cato and the other nobles who had blocked and embittered the two greatest men in the Republic had created the opportunity to (form the triumvirate)'

Mitchell (The First Triumvirate/Cicero's Principles)

Cicero did not join the Triumvirate because he did not want to sacrifice his political integrity for security and peace, but he also couldn't revert to advocation for the sensus bonorum (opinion of the good men)

Raaflaub (The First Triumvirate)

'The triple alliance represented large and important groups of Roman citizens whose needs and interests were consistently neglected by the ruling circles among the senatorial elite.'

Tempest (Cicero's Exile)

'When we consider how much Cicero hated to be away from Rome, perhaps, as he claims, death would have been an easier sentence. Admittedly, Cicero had chosen to leave Rome before the bill had been passed; yet it is hard to imagine what else he could have done.'

Seager (Cicero's Exile)

'Pompeius had finally decided to sacrifice Cicero.'

Billows (Cicero's Exile)

'Cicero's exile, though Caesar personally regretted it and would have saved him from it, had shown that the optimates had neither the will nor the power to stand up against their opponents'

Tatum (Amicitia/Cicero's Principles)

In Roman society, personal obligations like friendship and favours carried significant moral weight, often creating difficult choices. Cicero's internal conflict before the civil war shows how such debts could override even political convictions, as he felt compelled to honour obligations to both Caesar and Pompey. He owed Caesar for a generous loan, but Pompey his return from exile.

Brunt (Amicitia/Cicero's Principles)

Cicero's hesitations in 49 BC reflect his inner conflict between loyalty to Pompey, fear of tyranny under either side, and a longing for compromise, as well as his sense of duty. Torn between the causa bonorum and the turpitudo of civil war, he often justified his position through personal loyalty, suggesting that in such uncertainty, friendship could rightly guide a man of honour.

Steel (Amicitia)

Without formal political parties, Roman politicians depended on personal alliances, often described as amicitia, which ranged from deep emotional bonds to strategic, superficial connections. These relationships carried ethical obligations, and during the civil war of 49 BC, individuals had to balance loyalty to friends with political judgment and self-interest.

Seager (The Civil War)

Pompey's actions aimed to show his superior power and independence to both Caesar and the optimates. His behaviour showed Caesar that their alliance was conditional and that Caesar relied on him, but also showed the optimates that he hadn't completely abandoned Caesar. In doing so, Pompey ensured both sides needed his support—Caesar for protection, and the optimates for stability and potentially Caesar's removal in the future.

Scullard (The Civil War)

Civil war wasn't desired by Caesar- see his negotiations, Pompey- see his indecisiveness, or most of the senators- see the vote, but the small faction of 22 optimates who votes against Curio's disarmament proposal

Goldsworthy (The Civil War)

'Jealousy and suspicion between allies was as much a hindrance to a negotiated settlement as mistrust between enemies.'

Crawford (The Civil War)

The growing use of violence in Roman politics had made Caesar's decision natural and acceptable. Competition within the oligarchy had finally destroyed the framework which made competition meaningful and the collective power of the oligarchy as a whole was powerless under the leadership of Cato, which was determined to bend Caesar to its will.

Morstein-Marx (The Civil War 1)

The civil war was not the result of a deliberate plan by either man to dominate Rome, but rather the unintended outcome of a gradual breakdown in trust between them from 52 to 49. This mistrust was worsened by Caesar's political opponents, who feared his growing power and sought to block his celebrated return to Rome, while Caesar was determined to secure the honours and political rewards he believed he had earned.

Morstein-Marx (The Civil War 2)

The 370-22 vote count shows how few (literally twenty-two optimates) were actually prepared to take strong measure against him that ran a real risk of precipitating a civil war.

Morstein-Marx (The Civil War 3)

Caesar saw that his enemies were offering him only a choice between war and humiliation, despite his legal entitlement to honors and strong popular support. His defense of his dignitas was not self-serving, but a stand for fundamental Roman republican principles, particularly the People's right to pass binding laws.

Bradley (Pompey)

'His [Pompey's] career embodied everything that the oligarchy opposed and yet they were responsible for granting him many of his exceptional appointments. He was a catalyst in the breakdown of the republic, and yet his friendship was eagerly sought by the conservative Cicero and he died in 48 leading the republicans. His whole career was a paradox.'

Leach (Pompey)

'In 56, Pompey was much more concerned with building up his own power once more than with cutting a potential rival down to size.'

Seager (Pompey)

'For both the present and the future (i.e. in 56), (Pompey's) best policy lay in preserving his association with Caesar and Crassus.'

Mitchell (Pompey)

('Pompey) wished for power freely given and for acclaim gratefully bestowed by a reverential public for glorious achievements in the service of the state.'

Shotter (Caesar's Dictatorship)

Caesar is said to have called the Republic 'a mere name, without form or substance.' This is often taken as a simply a remark signalling Caesar's belief that he was free to do as he pleased. It may also have been his advocation for the fact that the way the government had been handled wasn't 'sacred' and that it had never risen to meet the challenges of the past, so it wouldn't in the future.

Tempest (Caesar's Dictatorship)

Cicero may have seen potential in Caesar to fit the mould of the 'ideal statesman' and hoped to serve as Caesar's advisor, regaining influence within his circle to protect his own allies and assert his political relevance. While partly self-serving, perhaps justifying his accepting of Caesar's pardon, Cicero's actions also reflected his desire to restore the Republic which he aimed to do by bringing his former comrades back to Rome

Goldsworthy (Caesar's Dictatorship)

'(Rome was) better run than it had been for decades, even if things were not being done in the traditional way.'

Scullard (Caesar's Dictatorship)

'That Caesar's mind must have been moving toward monarchy was the only practical solution of the constitutional problem is obvious enough. But an outraged group of nobles prevented Caesar from revealing to the world the solution.'

Parenti (Caesar's Dictatorship)

'Caesar's concern was not to lord it over the common people but to outdo a powerfully entrenched aristocratic oligarchy. By elevating himself above that plutocracy, he was more likely to attain success with his reform agenda.'

Syme (Caesar's Dictatorship)

As dictator, Caesar showed himself to be merciful and forgiving but his clemency depended not on duty, but on choice and whim. 'It was the will of a master, not an aristocrat's virtue' and meant that accepting it implied the recognition of his absolute power.

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Dictatorship 1)

Caesar's policy of leniency put him in a position where he was unable to distribute benefits after his victory to his loyal followers while also increasing the number of people it would be necessary to gratify or placate.

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Dictatorship 2)

'Cicero, and perhaps many other senators, urgently desired him to clarify as soon as possible his status against the constitutional framework of the Roman Republic, but he does not seem to have shared their priority.'

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Dictatorship 3)

It was idiotic for poltically active urban plebs to assume that Caesar would act as a traditional popularis politician (patron/protector of their interests)

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Dictatorship 4)

Caesar's problems largely stemmed from clashes between the hopes/expectations of both his supporters and enemies, and their deferral to deal with the emergency of the Parthian campaign because of how instable the eastern frontier was.

Tatum (Caesar's Dictatorship)

'.Once Caesar attained absolute power...he abandoned the causa popularis entirely.'

Tatum (Caesar's Assassination)

'He had to go. Caesar ruined the perpetual competition for rewards.'- Caesar had won what was supposed to have been a perpetual contest.

Billows (Caesar's Assassination)

'Had Caesar been willing to slaughter his opponents brutally, to eliminate ruthlessly any of his supporters who became too strong or seemed insufficiently enthusiastic or submissive, he might have lived on for a while'

Tempest (Caesar's Assassination)

'If it did not provide the stimulus, Brutus' commitment to his chosen philosophy almost certainly sealed his decision to join the conspiracy.'

(Brutus believed that only when virtue was combined with other conditions, such as health, wealth and honour, could a man attain greatest happiness)

Shotter (Caesar's Assassination)

(On the conspirators) 'This mixture of immediate backgrounds reflects well the nature of Caesar's problem of trying to satisfy a variety of interests between 48 and 44, as well as his failure to find an acceptable solution.'

Rawson (Caesar's Assassination)

'Tragic, too, are many of the other figures of the time: the brilliant Caesar, trapped at last by megalomania and a partly justified contempt for a tradition that others still revered...'

Parenti (Caesar's Assassination)

'The Senate aristocrats killed Caesar because they perceived him to be a popular leader who threatened their privileged interests.'

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Assassination 1)

The catalyst for Caesar's assassination was his complete domination over the political ambitions of both former allies and enemies, sealing the future political order without room for opposition. His absolute control over elections and legislation stripped the Roman People of their traditional rights, tolerable during wartime but unacceptable in peacetime. He undermined the aristocracy's core values virtus, dignitas, and gratia, making them honors granted by Caesar rather than earned through public approval, removing their meaning.

Morstein-Marx (Caesar's Assassination 2)

'Caesar's assassination... did the most to fuel the cycle of destruction that would in time tear the life out of the republic. The killing unleashed extraordinarily powerful emotions - a lust for bloody vengeance opposed by exultation in reclaimed freedom.'

Meier (Caesar's Assassination)

Cicero's belief that it was planned with 'the courage of men but the understanding of boys' shows the one-sidedness of the late republic: these honourable republicans were convinced that the republic would be restored with Caesar dead, but understood nothing of the conditions that made his ascendancy possible.

Tempest (Rome Post-Assassination 1/Cicero's Principles)

Cicero believed that war was the only way to stop Antony, and he was willing to bend the law to do this e.g. championing Octavian's illegal army

Tempest (Rome Post-Assassination 2)

'(Cicero) had perished... with his neck out-stretched in defence of liberty and the Republic. He may only have entered the fray in defence of an ideal that was past saving, but Cicero had resolved to fight to the end rather than submit to tyranny.'

Rawson (Rome Post-Assassination/Cicero 1)

'The next six months (the first half of 43) were the heroic period of Cicero's career, his aristeia as the Greeks would term it.'

Rawson (Rome Post-Assassination/Cicero 2)

Cicero was still prone to emotional extremes, and inconsistencies of judgement. If he wanted to provoke Antony, he wasn't able to face him, and he begged for mercy from Octavian.

Southern (Rome Post-Assassination/Cicero)

Either Cicero was blinded by hatred for Antony, or Octavian had been incredibly convincing, but he saw his sole purpose as eliminating Antony. There was not a genuine friendship between Octavian and Cicero.

Billows (Rome Post-Assassination)

'Roman political life continued for years to revolve around Caesar: his wishes, his policies, his appointments, his heir, his friends, his soldiers and his enemies. Relationship to Caesar seemed to be a litmus test for everything.'