Crim Cases

state v. utter (actus reus)

D (war veteran) killed son while black out drunk; he claimed unconsciousness but unconsciousness cannot negate actus reus when the unconsciousness is voluntarily induced

state v. owens (evidence)

after a caller reported a suspicious vehicle, the description of which matched D’s, an officer arrived and found D passed out drunk in the running vehicle in his friend’s driveway. D’s conviction is rational because he had 2 cans of beer in his car and one usually does not go out, start the vehicle, drink beer, and then pass out without going anywhere

us v. brewer (punishment)

Ds were indicted related to creating a sham contracting operation. the advised sentence was 108 to 135 months in prison for Mr.D and 70 to 87 months for Mrs. D. Court said since Ds are 64 years old and suffers medical issues, the advised sentencing guidelines would result in a life sentence. Court said it would be expensive to imprison Mr.D and the public shame is enough

us v. madoff (punishment)

D defrauded thousands of investors in a ponzi scheme. D had a life expectancy of 13 years so any sentence over 20 years would be symbolic. Court said symbolism was important because retribution for his evil, deterrence to dissuade those that would engage in similar crimes, and for victims to trust the justice system. D was sentenced to 150 years

people v. traughber (negligent homicide)

D was driving down the road shortly after midnight. another car was approaching in oncoming traffic, he saw a large metal real estate sign on the road in front of him. the ditch on the right was narrow with trees so D swerved into the oncoming lane to avoid the sign. the other car, upon seeing D swerve into its lane, swerved into D’s lane resulting in a head-on collision. Court said D was not ordinarily negligent because it was an emergency situation which he did not create only reacting to it

people v. newton (consent)

D had sex with another man while D was intoxicated. He was then indicted for two counts of sodomy and for sexual abuse. intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge but may be offered to negate an element of the crime. D did not have to perceive the lack of consent. the victim only had to clearly express that he did not consent

state v. small (gross negligence)

D left her stove on and her children home unsupervised in her apartment. the stove set the apartment on fire and one of her children died. Court said D’s neglect was a legal cause of her daughter’s death. if her children were supervised, the fire might not have occurred or at least they may have been able to escape in time.

commonwealth v. penley (property crime)

D was discovered to have an illegal power meter on his house after his power was turned off. he asked the power company employee to leave it in place but the employee refused, cut off the power, and called the police.

people v. sexton (MPC mistake of fact)

D was having an argument with decedent Matthews. Matthews had given D a gun and told him that there were no bullets in it. D then accidentally shot Matthews. D had never used a gun before and the gun was defective so that it could be loaded without being easily detectable by someone unfamiliar with them. Court said D was reckless in causing Matthews’s death if he was reckless in forming the belief that the gun was not loaded

people v. oxendine (acceleration)

D’s gf pushed his 6 year old son into the bathtub causing microscopic tears in his intestines. the next day, D beat his son for 5-10 minutes. the boy’s abdomen had become swollen. Gf took the boy to the hospital but he died on the way due to the first set of injuries. contribution without acceleration towards death is insufficient to establish causation. Court said no evidence that D hastened his son’s death

state v. biechele (misdemeanor manslaughter)

D was the tour manage of Great White, a band that performed at a nightclub. D allegedly ignited pyrotechnic devices inside the club as part of the band’s performance. the ignition would constitute a misdemeanor if D was not licensed to possess, control, or use the pyrotechnics. many people died. Court said D can be charged with misdemeanor manslaughter if a misdemeanor occurred and the misdemeanor was the proximate cause of the victim’s death

commonwealth v. pestinikas (actus reus)

Ds’ omission to care for 92-year old friend broke their oral K made with the doctor. when kly was found dead from neglect, their omission made them culpable for the killing

state v. davis (actus reus)

davis’s son was the perpetrator. davis aided and abetted his son’s rape of a family friend because davis watched the rape and did not interfere which acted as intentional encouragement and protection of the perpetrator

us v. bailey (mens rea)

Ds escaped from prison claiming necessity as a defense because the prison conditions were bad. Claimed there were fires and threats of death. Court said escaping from prison only requires that you know you are leaving confinement and Ds had to make an effort to return to custody

us v. jewell (mens rea)

willful blindness is the same as knowledge. D choosing not to check if he was smuggling drugs across the border but being aware of the secret compartment is enough

state v. olsen (mens rea)

D turning tractor into field on highway and colliding with oncoming car → couldn’t be charged with recklessness because facts do not confidently show that he was aware of the risk

staples v. us (strict liability)

national firearms act which was punishable by up to 10 years in prison cannot be a strict liability crime, if mens rea is not given SCOTUS says test is that “one would hardly be surprised to learn that __ is not an innocent act”. since guns are generally lawful, the statute required D to know that his gun was a machinegun and thus unlawful

people v. navarro (mistake of fact)

D couldn’t be charged of theft in stealing for wooden beams because he had “mistake of fact” by thinking the beams were abandoned property. Theft requires intent to deprive owner of property – D cannot have proper mens rea if he doesn’t believe there is an owner

people v. weiss (mistake of law)

Defendants were approached by Parker, who sought help in apprehending Wendel, whom they thought kidnapped the Lindbergh baby. Prosecution gave defendant a badge and said he was appointing them deputies and to help him arrest him. They accepted, captured Wendel, and tortured him into confessing. Parker was not actually a law enforcement officer, Wendel was innocent, and defendants had no authority to confine him

people v. marrero (mistake of law)

P, a federal corrections officer interpreted a statute to allow him to carry a gun at his job. thought the statute’s “peace officer” included “federal corrections officer".” Mistake of Law defense not awarded to reading the statute wrong – but for relying on authoritative interpretation of it

state v. smith (causation)

D punches victim in the head; as a result, the victim suffers massive brain injury, stops taking insulin, and dies. D argued that victim refusing to take medication was an unforeseeable response to the punch and cannot be the cause. The court said victim’s conduct was not abnormal nor unforeseeable, and that their actions were in line with someone with head trauma. D had causation.

people v. jennings (substantial factor)

son endured intense abuse. Autopsy revealed the main cause of death to be combined drug toxicity. Court said not one cause was the but-for cause but convicted based on the substantial factor

state v. taylor (express malice murder)

D was driving his car and crashed into victim, was found with manilla envelope with victims’ information and various legal documents with yearlong dispute – charged with express malice murder

state v. guthrie (premeditation)

D stabbed his coworker in the neck at the restaurant after he was taunted about his nose. Court changed jury instruction to emphasize that D would have had committed the killing with a clear head to be charged with 1st degree

commonwealth v. carroll (instantaneous premeditation)

D decided to kill wife right before he shot her in the head while they were lying in bed. D was offered teaching role and a violent argument ensued until four in the morning. As defendant got more and more angry, he thought of the gun, grabbed it, and shot his wife twice in the back of her head while she slept, killing her. Claimed it was voluntary manslaughter – court decided jury had enough facts to determine whether he had enough time to premeditate

people v. snyder (reckless murder)

A mother frequently suffocated her children to inflict apnea on them to collect social security benefits. Mother’s reckless behavior and blatant disregard for human life lead to the death of one of her children

people v. knoller (implied malice murder)

After being warned by their vet and having numerous incidents with their giant and dangerous dogs, one of D’s dogs attacks and kills their neighbor. Ds consciously disregarded the risk of serious bodily injury – was a gross deviation from a normal dog owner. Malice was implied and Ds were charged with 2^nd d murder

state v. white (intentional manslaughter mpc)

Defendant was going through a very stressful divorce, following a stressful marriage. After ∆ saw her ex-husband talking on a cellphone he had said didn’t exist, she ran her car into his building trying to run him over. Victim was fine. ∆ was charged with attempted murder, but was allowed to use the EED defense to evaluate all evidence relating to their relationship, not just the cellphone moment to determine whether she could be acquitted.

state v. castagna (voluntary manslaughter)

∆ killed victim in the heat of a mob, because ∆ claimed that he was responding to an assault the victim had done onto his friend, and with the mob not allowing a reasonable time to cool, the court allowed him to present this defense at trial

girouard v. state (voluntary manslaughter)

Husband kills his wife by stabbing her 19 times, he was provoked by what she was saying. In this common law state, the court ruled that words can only be provokers if they are accompanied by conduct indicating present intention/ability to cause bodily harm. Court found this could not be voluntary manslaughter because his wife was 5ft and words alone are not enough for adequate provocation

people v. kolzow (involuntary manslaughter)

A mother was convicted of involuntary manslaughter due to the death of her baby, after purposefully leaving her baby in the car in the morning while she slept. Court found that this grossly deviated from a standard of care a reasonable person would exercise since they would have been aware of the risks of either death or great bodily harm to a baby.

people v. sarun chun (FM merger doctrine)

D, a gang member of the Tiny Rascals shot a gun into a car with the intent to scare the passengers, not to kill them, 1 person died. The prosecution attempted to bring this under FM but failed because shooting into a vehicle is an assaultive crime in the abstract

state v. stewart (FM inherently dangerous based on facts)

A few days after giving birth to their son, Ds went on a cocaine bender causing their baby to die from neglect. Ds were charged with F-M using the crime of “wrongfully permitting a child to be a habitual sufferer”. § in abstract wasn’t inherently dangerous, but this jurisdiction had the jury look at if the Ds committed the crime in an inherently dangerous way. Jury said they did – F-M charge

people v. howard (FM inherently dangerous in the abstract)

D was driving a stolen car and engaged in a high-speed chase when the police asked him to pull over, D ran a red light, hit another car, and killed the other driver on impact. D couldn’t be charged with FM because fleeing or attempting to flee an officer is a crime that could be committed in a non-dangerous way, therefore not a crime that is inherently dangerous when looked at in the abstract

people v. hernandez (FM proximate cause approach)

Defendants tried to rob an undercover state trooper. One was arrested, but the other fled, got cornered outside, and got into a standoff with police. Defendant approached pointing his gun at an officer, the officers opened fire, and one officer's stray bullet hit and killed his fellow cop. D was charged with FM because when he refused to drop his gun and advanced towards police, it was highly foreseeable that death would result. The officer’s actions were a response to D’s.

state v. sophophone (FM agency approach)

Defendant and three co-felons were burglarizing a house, and the resident called the police. The police arrived, saw them fleeing the house, ordered them to stop. The individuals started to run away, but defendant was caught and arrested. One of his co-felons ran at first but then, stopped, laid down, and shot at an officer when he approached closer. The officer then returned fire and killed him. D cannot be charged with FM because they personally did not kill anyone. It was the police who did.

state v. carswell (larceny)

D broke into an under-construction motel, took an air conditioner from the wall, set it on the floor 4-6 inches away. Court held that the bare removal from the place in which D found the good is sufficient asportation or carrying away to put the object under D’s control and sever the owner’s possession.

marsh v. commonwealth (larceny)

D took his gf’s jewelry and pawned it. D would have needed $3,272.50 to redeem the property, while his paycheck would have been for $2,000, and $800 of that went to paying other bills he was behind on. He could not have actually redeemed it. Court held that because D did not have the substantially ability to actually return the jewelry, there was intent to permanently deprive.

us v. villalobos (extortion)

a rabbi ran a business helping people fraudulently get their visas by claiming these people worked for him. The rabbi terminated one of these people’s (Orit) “wage” and D got involved as the lawyer. D told rabbi that he would tell Orit to say whatever necessary (lie etc.) if rabbi didn’t give the payment back. Court held that D’s conduct was wrongful because the means to obtain the property (threats) were unlawful and thus wrong.

people v. peck (battery)

D was involved in a neighborhood disturbance, he then resisted arrest and spit on the face of one of the officers. D was charged with battery because although he did not physically touch or harm the officer, contact was made by spitting, which is obviously insulting/provoking conduct.

commonwealth v. boodoosingh (assault by attempted battery)

D was in fight, and raised baseball bat to hit victim saying “I’m going to fuck him up”, victim’s mother pushed D away from victim before he could hit. D charged with attempted battery because he came rushed the victim and came within a few feet of hitting him (1) which brought him reasonably close in time and ability in completing the battery

state v. birthmark (assault by threat)

D returned home from party and verbally assaulted/threatened his mother/brother saying he was going to kill them and grabbed a piece of lumber, mom called 911. D was charged with assault even though he didn’t intend the result (causing fear) because he intended to do the act itself.

state v. jones (extrinsic force rape)

D and survivor were having an affair, after victim said the affair was over, D pinned her down on top of her own elbows, moved her underwear to the side and raped her. Moving of underwear, and holding victim down satisfied extrinsic force

state v. rusk (threat of force rape)

D and survivor flirting at bar, S drove D home, he took her keys and asked if she would come up, he lightly choked her and she asked if she had sex would he not kill her, he said yes. Jury found this as a threat to put a reasonable person at fear for their safety.

commonwealth v. lopez (lack of consent rape)

D meets a foster girl and lures her into the forest to rape her. Presents a mistake of fact defense saying he did not know there was a lack of consent; this did not matter because the § did not require the D to know whether there was consent, it just required lack of consent from the victim & commission of the crime

boro v. superior court (rape by fraud)

D posed as survivor’s Dr., claiming that the only way to cure the highly deadly disease was to do a really extensive procedure or have sex – survivor consents to sex. Because victim understood the “nature of the act” (sex) but agreed to it anyway, D’s fraud did not constitute rape (fraud in the inducement)

people v. gentry (inchoate attempt - specific intent/purpose)

D and his gf were arguing. D spilled gasoline on her and gf walked too close to stove and caught fire. D put out fire but gf had burns on body. Court said D needed specific intent to kill; other mental states are irrelevant.

people v. rizzo (actus reus inchoate attempt)

Ds were mob members planning to rob Rao who had the payroll. Ds checked multiple buildings but could not find him. Police found Ds and arrested them before they found Rao. Court said D did not actually get an opportunity to commit a crime because they did not find Rao and thus their plan was far from succeeding; not in dangerous proximity (CL). Ds not guilty of attempted robbery.

state v. reeves (actus reus inchoate attempt)

two 12-year-old girls wanted to kill their teacher with rat poison. Someone snitched on the girls and teacher saw them hovering over her desk. One of the girls left their purse with the rat poison in it. Ds actions of buying the poison and almost putting it in the teacher’s coffee were substantial steps toward murder so guilty of attempt.

state v. smith (factual impossibility)

D was an inmate with HIV and bit a correction officer’s hand to try to give him HIV to kill him. Court said since D believed that he was giving the victim HIV, even if actually impossible for him to do so, D’s subjective belief makes it an intent to kill so D was found guilty of attempted murder. Court rejected the factual impossibility defense.

people v. dlugash (mpc impossibility)

D and Co-D both shot the victim in his apartment. Co-D shot him first then D shot him 2-5 minutes after. Court said since D believed the victim to be alive when he shot him, it would have been murder so D’s purpose and intention makes this attempted murder even though victim was actually dead at that point.

ross v. mississippi (abandonment)

D knocked on victim’s door asking for directions. Victim pointed at neighbor who could help D and when she turned around, D pointed a gun at her and ordered her inside, threatening to kill her if she didn’t undress. Victim cried and said she had a daughter. D then said he wasn’t going to do anything to her anymore and left. Court said victim persuaded D and thus D abandoned the crime of his own free will so not guilty of attempted rape.

state v. pacheco (agreement inchoate conspiracy)

D was a deputy sheriff and told his co-worker that he was engaged in illegal activities. The co-worker told the FBI and the co-worker set up an undercover deal. CL requires bilateral but D made an agreement with an undercover agent which is a unilateral agreement so not guilty.

us v. valle (specific intent/purpose inchoate conspiracy)

D was a cop and active member of a sexual fetish website. D discussed kidnapping women with other users but kidnappings never occurred, no follow-up, and D gave the other users fake names for the women. Court said no specific intent because it doesn't show going through.

us v. shabani (“overt act” inchoate conspiracy)

D arranged for smuggling drugs but distributors sold them to federal agents. Because statute did not require overt act, D could be convicted of conspiracy

us v. ghayth (overt act inchoate conspiracy)

D made a speech threatening the US with a "storm of planes” during 9/11. Court said speech counts as an overt act because saying something is different than merely thinking it.

commonwealth v. nee (renunciation)

D conspired with other students to carry out school shooting. D changed his mind but put blame on someone else and didn’t acknowledge he was a part of the crime. Court said D did not renounce his conspiracy because he did not admit that he also agreed to the crime.

state v. VT (actus reus accomplice liability)

D and two friends spent the night at D’s aunt’s house. Next morning, they took two of her guns and her camcorder. Boys refused to return items. Police found camcorder at pawn shop and there was video where D’s friends discussed pawning the camcorder but D did not talk or gesture in the video. Court said encouragement requires some form of active behavior so not enough evidence to show D was an accomplice because he was merely present.

rosemond v. US (mpc mens rea accomplice liability)

D was in a car with two others to sell marijuana. The buyer got in the car, punched the person in the backseat and fled with the drugs. One of the passengers shot the thief. Court said D intended to facilitate the use of the gun if he knew beforehand that the shooter had a gun. Just learning of it during his commission of the crime is not sufficient to be an accomplice.

waddington v. sarausad (mens rea accomplice liability - natural and probable consequences doctrine)

D drove two members of his gang to a high school for an assault. When they got in front of the school, D slowed down, a passenger fired into a crowd, D sped off. Court said in WA, one must have knowledge of the crime that occurs. Natural and probable consequence does not apply in WA so because D didn’t know he was facilitating a killing and thought he was driving to a fistfight, he is not an accomplice to murder.

us v. alvarez (pinkerton liability)

Cocaine deal in Miami turned into a shoot-out. Ds were engaged in a drug deal with undercover agents but backup officers entered the scene too early and a shoot-out occurred, resulting in murder of a federal agent. Court said the crime of murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the drug conspiracy given the quantity of drugs, money involved, and presence of weapons. Liable for both conspiracy and murder.

people v. bruno (scope of conspiracy)

Ds were indicted for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. Smugglers knew that the middlemen must sell to retailers and retailers knew that middlemen must buy from importers even though no cooperation between smugglers and retailers. Court said this was one conspiracy because Ds knew about the other members involved in the conspiracy.

kotteakos v. US (scope of conspiracy)

D and 31 others were involved with inducing lending institutions to make loans based on fraudulent information. There were multiple conspiracies with a common broker, Simon Brown, but each conspiracy had no connection to the other except for Brown’s involvement. Court said this is not one conspiracy because the conspirators did not have any reason to be aware of the other conspiracies.

us v. schweihs (withdrawal defense conspiracy liability)

Wemette and Cross paid street tax to members of the Chicago Outfit, an organized crime group. W was having financial difficulties and wanted to stop payment. Daddino showed up to collect payments anyway but was replaced. Court said Daddino did not properly withdraw because no affirmative action; he was only relieved of the duty to participate physically.

state v. norman (imminent threat self-defense)

D was a victim of 20 years of intense domestic abuse by husband and suffered battered wife syndrome. Her husband would tell her to sleep on the floor, abuse her, put out cigs on her body. On the night of the killing, husband went to sleep and told her to sleep on the floor. While he was asleep, D left the room to get a gun and shot him in the head 3 times. Court said because husband was asleep, there was no imminent threat and D couldn’t invoke self-defense.

us v. peterson (aggressor self-defense)

D responded to people stealing parts from his car which was parked on his driveway. Victim attempted to drive away with his car. D got his weapon and shot and killed the victim. Court said D not able to use self-defense because D getting the gun made victim’s non-deadly force into deadly force so D became the new aggressor and thus cannot invoke self-defense.

people v. riddle (castle doctrine self-defense)

In response to a friend making a comment about his wife, D grabbed a gun and shot him 11 times in the legs and victim died. Because they were in his backyard and not inside the home, D had a duty to retreat and therefore cannot invoke self-defense.

state v. wong (omission of act)

2 parents but 1 shook the baby and the baby died. No one knows who killed the baby so prosecution argued an omission theory stating that even if only one parent committed the shaking, the other parent is guilty because they failed to act to protect the baby. since Shaken Baby Syndrome is hard to identify, the omission theory fails because you can’t be guilty for failing to act unless you knew action was required and could act

young v. state (mens rea)

D hit her 7 year old son with an electrical cord, leaving bruises around his torso, after he stole a dollar from her and threw a joy stick at her. Court said to convict someone of aggravated child abuse, D must have acted with actual malice meaning proof of evil intent or motive and not legal malice (without legal justification or excuse)