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external costs
costs that buyers/sellers don’t pay or even consider
coass theorem
reach solution through side payments, can go either way, get to the point of msc
pigovian tax
gov imposed tax to move to socially optimal equillibrium, based on externality
subsidies
for msb, opposite of tax
non excludable
can’t exclude someone from using it
non rival
when someone is using it, it doesn’t deter others from also using
aggregate demand
sum vertically (p = form)
tragedy of the commons
higher profit for you = higher social costs for others
average tax rate
total tax paid as share of before tax income
marginal tax rate
tax paid on last dollar earned, progressive tax
shutdown decision
firm shuts down when revenue no longer covers variable cost
econ revenue
total rev - financial costs - implicit op costs (key to start up and shut down)
marginal product of labor
how much output you get for one hour of a worker working
legal market power
may be given to firms by the governemnt (tm/copyright)
natural market power
control key resources
price effect
price rises, demand drops
output effect
lower price = more sales = higher revenue
marginal revenue
derivative of total revenue / derivtative of quantity (twice slope demand curve w same intercept)
price discrimination
firms charging different consumers different prices
perfect price discrimination
each customer pays reservation value, no dwl
group pricing
3rd degree, change dif price based on group you’re in
second degree
price based on characteristics of the purchase, give discounts to those who clear hurdles
anti-trust
breaking up monopolies to restore competition
incentive to innovate
benefit of monopolies
product differentiation
convincing customer rival product is not a perfect substitute
nash equilibrium
combo of strategies in which each is the best response to the strategies of others, no one wishes they could change their mind
expected payoff
sum of product of the probability and payoff from each outcome
best response
highest payoff given strategies by other players
dominant strategy
provides highest payoff to player regardless of what other players do
dominant strategy equilibrium
no one wants to deviate from their strategy
prisoner’s dilemma
two people act in their own self interst and fail to cooperate even when its in their collective interest to do so
coordination game
players benefit from aligning their actions
anti-coordination game
players benefit from choosing different actions (chicken)
bertrand competition
firms compete by setting prices
bertrand nash equilibrium
price = marginal cost
expected payoff
E(p) = ½ x 0 + ½ - 2
extensive form game
sequential termination, game tree, start from end and work backward
first mover advantage
play 1 dictates eventual outcome
grim strategy
plan to price at marginal cost if competitor cheats