General IGCSE History - Core content

High Hopes for Peace

Looking back it may seem that the peacemakers in 1919 had an impossible job. But that is not how people saw it at the time. There was great optimism. One of the main reasons for these high hopes was the American President Woodrow Wilson. In 1918 Wilson made a speech outlining Fourteen Points (see Factfile), guidelines for a just and lasting peace treaty to end conflict. When he arrived in Europe for the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson was seen almost as a saintly figure. Newspaper reports described wounded soldiers in Italy trying to kiss the hem of his cloak and in France peasant families kneeling to pray as his train passed by.

Wilson’s ideas

Don’t be too harsh on Germany. Wilson did believe Germany should be punished. But he also believed that if Germany was treated harshly, some day it would recover and want revenge. He was also concerned that extremist groups, especially communists, might exploit resentment among the Germans and communists might even seize power in Germany as they had in Russia in 1917. ■ Strengthen democracy in defeated countries. For Wilson democracy was a key to peace in Europe. If leaders in defeated nations had to listen to the views of their people and win their votes those people would not let their leaders cause another war. ■ Give self-determination to small countries that had once been part of the European empires. He wanted the different peoples of eastern Europe (for example, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks) to rule themselves rather than be part of Austria–Hungary’s empire. ■ International co-operation. Wilson also believed that nations should co-operate to achieve world peace. This would be achieved through a ‘League of Nations’, Wilson’s most important of the Fourteen Points. You can see from these principles that Wilson was an idealist. However, he was not a politician who could be pushed around. For example, he refused to cancel the debts owed to the USA by Britain and its Allies so that he could put pressure on them to accept his ideas.

The Fourteen points

No secret treaties.

2 Free access to the seas in peacetime or wartime

. 3 Free trade between countries

. 4 all countries to work towards disarmament.

5 Colonies to have a say in their own future.

6 German troops to leave Russia.

7 Independence for Belgium.

8 France to regain alsace–Lorraine

. 9 Frontier between austria and Italy to be adjusted.

10 Self-determination for the peoples of eastern Europe(they should rule themselves and not be ruled by empires).

11 Serbia to have access to the sea

. 12 Self-determination for the people in the Turkish empire.

13 Poland to become an independent state with access to the sea.

14 League of Nations to be set up

Did everyone share Wilson’s viewpoint?

Not surprisingly, when Wilson talked about lasting peace and justice other leaders agreed with him. After all, who would want to stand up in public and say they were against a just and lasting peace?! However, many were doubtful about Wilson’s ideas for achieving it. For example, ‘self-determination’: it would be very difficult to give the peoples of eastern Europe the opportunity to rule themselves because they were scattered across many countries. Some people were bound to end up being ruled by people from another group with different customs and a different language. Some historians have pointed out that while Wilson talked a great deal about eastern and central Europe, he did not actually know very much about the area. There were other concerns as well. So let’s look at the aims and views of the other leaders at the Paris Peace Conference: David Lloyd George (from Britain) and Georges Clemenceau (from France).

Did Lloyd George agree with Wilson?

In public Lloyd George praised Wilson and his ideas. However, in private he was less positive. He complained to one of his officials that Wilson came to Paris like a missionary to rescue the Europeans with his little sermons and lectures. He agreed with Wilson on many issues, particularly that Germany should be punished but not too harshly. He did not want Germany to seek revenge in the future and possibly start another war. Like Wilson he was deeply concerned that a harsh treaty might lead to a communist revolution like the one in Russia in 1917. He also wanted Britain and Germany to begin trading with each other again. Before the war, Germany had been Britain’s second largest trading partner. British people might not like it, but the fact was that trade with Germany meant jobs in Britain. However, unlike Wilson, Lloyd George had the needs of the British empire in mind. He wanted Germany to lose its navy and its colonies because they threatened the British empire.

Pressures on Lloyd George

Lloyd George faced huge public pressures at home for a harsh treaty (see Source 2). People in Britain were not sympathetic to Germany in any way. They had suffered over 1 million casualties in the fighting, as well as food shortages and other hardships at home. They had been fed anti-German propaganda for four years. They had also seen how Germany had treated Russia in 1918 when Russia surrendered. Under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Germany had stripped Russia of 25 per cent of its population and huge areas of Russia’s best agricultural land. Lloyd George had just won the 1918 election in Britain by promising to ‘make Germany pay’, even though he realised the dangers of this course of action. So Lloyd George had to balance these pressures at home with his desire not to leave Germany wanting revenge.

Did Clemenceau agree with Wilson?

In public, Clemenceau of course agreed with Wilson’s aim for a fair and lasting peace. However, he found Wilson very hard to work with. While he did not publicly criticise the Fourteen Points, Clemenceau once pointed out that even God had only needed Ten Commandments! The major disagreement was over Germany. Clemenceau and other French leaders saw the Treaty as an opportunity to cripple Germany so that it could not attack France again. Pressures on Clemenceau France had suffered enormous damage to its land, industry, people – and self-confidence. Over two-thirds of the men who had served in the French army had been killed or wounded. The war affected almost an entire generation. By comparison, Germany seemed to many French people as powerful and threatening as ever. German land and industry had not been as badly damaged as France’s. France’s population (around 40 million) was in decline compared to Germany’s (around 75 million). The French people wanted a treaty that would punish Germany and weaken it as much as possible. The French President (Poincaré) even wanted Germany broken up into a collection of smaller states, but Clemenceau knew that the British and Americans would not agree to this. Clemenceau was a realist and knew he would probably be forced to compromise on some issues. However, he had to show he was aware of public opinion in France

Clemenceau clashed with Wilson over many issues.

The USA had not suffered nearly as badly as France in the war. Clemenceau resented Wilson’s more generous attitude to Germany. They disagreed over what to do about Germany’s Rhineland and coalfields in the Saar. In the end, Wilson had to give way on these issues. In return, Clemenceau and Lloyd George did give Wilson what he wanted in eastern Europe, despite their reservations about his idea of self-determination. However, this mainly affected the peace treaties with the other defeated countries rather than the Treaty of Versailles.

Clemenceau also clashed with Lloyd George

particularly over Lloyd George’s desire not to treat Germany too harshly. For example, Clemenceau said that ‘if the British are so anxious to appease Germany they should look overseas and make colonial, naval or commercial concessions’. Clemenceau felt that the British were quite happy to treat Germany fairly in Europe, where France rather than Britain was most under threat. However, they were less happy to allow Germany to keep its navy and colonies, which would be more of a threat to Britain.

Wilson and Lloyd George did not always agree either.

Lloyd George was particularly unhappy with point 2 of the Fourteen Points, allowing all nations access to the seas. Similarly, Wilson’s views on people ruling themselves were threatening to the British government, for the British empire ruled millions of people all across the world from London.

TOV - WAR GUILT

Article 231 of the Treaty was simple but was seen by the Germans as extremely harsh. Germany had to accept the blame for starting the war.

TOV - Reparations

The major powers agreed, without consulting Germany, that Germany had to pay reparations to the Allies for the damage caused by the war. The exact figure was not agreed until 1921 when it was set at £6,600 million (132 billion gold marks) – an enormous figure. If the terms of the payments had not later been changed under the Young Plan in 1929 (see page 38), Germany would not have finished paying this bill until 1984. ■ France also received the coal from the Saarland for fifteen years.

TOV - German territory and colonies

Germany’s European borders were very extensive, and the section dealing with German territory in Europe was a complicated part of the Treaty. You can see the detail in Figure 6. The Treaty also forbade Germany to join together (Anschluss) with its former ally Austria.

Germany’s overseas empire was taken away. It had been one of the causes of bad relations between Britain and Germany before the war. Former German colonies, such as Cameroon, became mandates controlled by the League of Nations, which effectively meant that France and Britain controlled them

TOV - German Armed forces

The size and power of the German army was a major concern, especially for France. The Treaty therefore restricted German armed forces to a level well below what they had been before the war. ■ The army was limited to 100,000 men

. ■ conscription was banned – soldiers had to be volunteers.

■ Germany was not allowed armoured vehicles, submarines or aircraft.

■ The navy could have only six battleships and 15,000 sailors.

■ The Rhineland became a demilitArised zone. This meant that no German troops were allowed into that area. The Rhineland was important because it was the border area between Germany and France (see Figure 6).

TOV - LON

Previous methods of keeping peace had failed and so the League of Nations was set up as an international ‘police force’. (You will study the League in detail in Chapter 2.) ■ Germany was not invited to join the League until it had shown that it was a peace-loving country.

General German reactions to the Treaty of Versailles

The government that took Germany to war in 1914 had been overthrown in a revolution and the new democratic government in Germany was hoping for fair and equal treatment from the Allies. When the terms were announced on 7 May the Germans were horrified. Their reasons are summarised in the diagram opposite. The new German government refused to sign the Treaty and the German navy sank its own ships in protest. At one point, it looked as though war might break out again. But what could the German leader Friedrich Ebert do? Germany would quickly be defeated if it tried to fight. Reluctantly, Ebert agreed to accept the terms of the Treaty and it was signed on 28 June 1919

German reaction to the treaty of versailles - War guilt and reparations

 This ‘war guilt’ clause was particularly hated.

Germans did not feel they had started the

war. They felt at the very least that blame

should be shared.

• They were bitter that Germany was expected

to pay for all the damage caused by the war

even though the German economy was

severely weakened

German reaction to the treaty of versailles - Disarmament

Germans felt these terms were very unfair. An

army of 100,000 was very small for a country

of Germany’s size and the army was a symbol

of German pride.

Also, despite Wilson’s Fourteen Points calling for

disarmament, none of the Allies were being

asked or forced to disarm in the same way.

German reaction to the treaty of versailles - Territories

Germany certainly lost a lot

of territory.

• 10 per cent of its land in Europe

• All of its overseas colonies

• 12.5 per cent of its population

• 16 per cent of its coalfields and

almost half of its iron and steel

industry.

This was a major blow to German pride, and

to its economy. Both the Saar and Upper Silesia

were important industrial areas.

Meanwhile, as Germany was losing colonies,

the British and French were increasing their

empires by taking control of German territories

in Africa

German reaction to the treaty of versailles -The Fourteen Points

and the League of Nations

 To most Germans, the treatment of Germany

was not in keeping with Wilson’s Fourteen

Points. For example, while self-determination

was given to countries such as Estonia,

Latvia and Lithuania, German-speaking

peoples were being hived off into new

countries such as Czechoslovakia to be ruled

by non-Germans. Anschluss (union) with

Austria was forbidden.

• Germany felt further insulted by not being

invited to join the League of Nation

German reaction to the treaty of versailles - Non representation

Germans were angry that their government was

not represented at the peace talks and that they

were being forced to accept a harsh treaty

without any choice or even comment. Germans

did not feel they had lost the war so they should

not have been treated as a defeated country.

Consequences of versailles for germany - General

The Treaty of Versailles had a profound effect on Germany for the next ten

years and more. The Treaty was universally resented. The historian Zara

Steiner argues that hatred of the Versailles Treaty was almost the only issue

which all Germans in this period agreed on.

Many Germans viewed the signing of the Treaty as a betrayal and a

humiliation. Right-wing groups referred to the Weimar politicians as the

‘November Criminals’ who had stabbed Germany in the back at the end of

the war. Territorial losses to France, Belgium, Denmark and Poland meant

many ethnic Germans now lived in different countries, which led to social

problems and even conflict. Also, the creation of the Polish Corridor had

split East Prussia from the rest of Germany causing many German families

to migrate back to mainland Germany. The military restrictions left German

citizens feeling defenceless and demoralised as the German army had been

a source of pride for many.

Consequences of versailles for germany - Political violence

Right-wing opponents of Ebert’s government protested against the Treaty. In

1920, bands of ex-soldiers called Freikorps were ordered to disband by the

government as their existence broke the military terms of the Treaty. Led

by Wolfgang Kapp, an uprising began in March 1920 to overthrow Ebert and

install a nationalist government. This rising, called the Kapp Putsch, was

defeated by a general strike by Berlin workers which paralysed essential

services such as power and transport. It saved Ebert’s government

but it added to the chaos in Germany – and the bitterness of Germans

towards the Treaty.

Although Kapp was defeated, political violence remained a constant

threat. There were numerous political assassinations or attempted

assassinations. In the summer of 1922 Germany’s foreign minister

Walther Rathenau was unalived by extremists. Then in November

1923 Adolf Hitler led an attempted rebellion in Munich, known as

the Munich Putsch (see page 236). Hitler’s rebellion was defeated

but he was let off lightly when he was put on trial and it was clear

many Germans shared his hatred of Versailles. Over the next ten years

he exploited German resentment of the Treaty of Versailles to gain

support for himself and his Nazi party

Consequences of versailles for germany - Conflict in the Ruhr

Under the Treaty Germany agreed to pay £6,600 million in reparations

to the Allies. The first instalment of £50 million was paid in 1921, but

in 1922 nothing was paid. Ebert tried to negotiate concessions from

the Allies, but the French ran out of patience. In 1923 French and

Belgian soldiers entered the Ruhr region and simply took what was

owed to them in the form of raw materials and goods. This was quite

legal under the Treaty of Versailles.

The results of the occupation of the Ruhr were disastrous for Germany.

The German government ordered the workers to go on strike so that

they were not producing anything for the French to take. The French

reacted harshly, killing over 100 workers and expelling over 100,000

protesters from the region. More importantly, the strike meant that

Germany had no goods to trade, and no money to buy things with.

Their response led, in turn, to hyperinflation 

There is much debate about the developments in the Ruhr. Most Germans

believed that the crisis arose because the reparations were too high

and Germany was virtually bankrupted. Many commentators at the time

(including the British and French leaders) claimed that Germany was quite

able to afford reparations: it just did not want to pay! Some historians

argue that Germany stopped paying reparations in order to create a crisis

and force the international community to revise the terms of the Treaty.

The debate goes on, but there is no doubt that most Germans at the time

believed the Treaty was responsible for the crisis and that the reparations

were far too high.

Consequences of versailles for germany - Hyper inflation

The government solved the problem of not having enough money by simply

printing extra money, but this caused a new problem – hyperinflation. The

money was virtually worthless, so prices shot up. The price of goods could

rise between joining the back of a

queue in a shop and reaching the front

(see page XXX)! Wages began to be

paid daily instead of weekly.

Some Germans gained from this

disaster. The government and big

industrialists were able to pay off

their huge debts in worthless marks.

But others, especially pensioners,

were practically left penniless. A

prosperous middle-class family would

find that their savings, which might

have bought a house in 1921, by 1923

would not even buy a loaf of bread

Germany eventually recovered from this disaster, but it left a bitter

memory. The bitterness was directed towards the Treaty of Versailles. It is

no coincidence that when Germany faced economic problems again in 1929

many Germans believed Hitler’s claims that the Treaty was to blame and

they should support his plans to overturn it.

Others said the Treaty was fair! - TOV

At the time German complaints about the Treaty mostly fell on deaf ears.

There were celebrations in Britain and France. If ordinary people in Britain

had any reservations about the Treaty it was more likely to be that it was

not harsh enough.

n Many people felt that the Germans were themselves operating a double

standard. Their call for fairer treatment did not square with the harsh

way they had treated Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918.

Versailles was a much less harsh treaty than Brest-Litovsk. This is the

comment being made in the cartoon on page 4.

n There was also the fact that Germany’s economic problems, although

real, were partly self-inflicted. Other states had raised taxes to pay

for the war. The Kaiser’s government had not done this. It had simply

allowed debts to mount up because it had planned to pay Germany’s war

debts by extracting reparations from the defeated states.

The birth of the league + Planning & Hopes - LON

After the First World War everyone wanted to avoid repeating the mass

slaughter of the war that had just ended. They also agreed that a League

of Nations – an organisation that could solve international problems

without resorting to war – would help achieve this. However, there was

disagreement about what kind of organisation it should be.

n President Wilson wanted the League of Nations to be like a world

parliament where representatives of all nations could meet together

regularly to decide on any matters that affected them all.

n Many British leaders thought the best League would be a simple

organisation that would only meet in emergencies. An organisation like

this already existed – the ConfereNCe of Ambassadors.

n France proposed a strong League with its own army.

It was President Wilson who won. He insisted that discussions about a

League should be a major part of the peace treaties and by February 1919

he had drawn up a very ambitious plan for the League.

All the major nations would join the League. They would disarm. If they

had a dispute with another country, they would take it to the League. They

promised to accept the decision made by the League. They also promised

to protect one another if they were invaded. If any member did break the

Covenant (see page 30) and go to war, other members promised to stop

trading with it and to send troops if necessary to force it to stop fighting.

Wilson’s hope was that citizens of all countries would be so much against

another conflict that this would prevent their leaders from going to war.

The plan was prepared in a great hurry and critics suggested there was

some woolly thinking. Some people were angered by Wilson’s arrogant style.

He acted as if only he knew the solutions to Europe’s problems. Others were

worried by his idealism. Under threat of war, would the public really behave

in the way he suggested? Would countries really do what the League said?

Wilson glossed over what the League would do if they didn’t.

Even so, most people in Europe were prepared to give Wilson’s plans a try.

They hoped that no country would dare invade another if they knew that the

USA and other powerful nations of the world would stop trading with them

or send their armies to stop them. In 1919 hopes were high that the League,

with the United States in the driving seat, could be a powerful peacemaker.

A body blow to the league - THE USA - LON

Back in the USA Woodrow Wilson had problems. Before the USA could even

join the League, let alone take a leading role, he needed the approval of his

Congress (the American ‘Parliament’). And in the USA the idea of a League

was not at all popular, as you can see from Figure 5.

Together, the critics of Wilson’s plans (see Figure 5) put up powerful

opposition to the League. They were joined by Wilson’s many other political

opponents. Wilson’s Democratic Party had run the USA for eight troubled

years. Its opponents saw the League as an ideal opportunity to defeat

him. Wilson toured the USA to put his arguments to the people, but when

Congress voted in 1919 he was defeated. So, when the League opened for

business in January 1920, the American chair was empty.

Reasons for opposition to the League in the USA.

The League was supposed to

enforce the Treaty of Versailles

yet some Americans, particularly

the millions who had German

ancestors, hated the Treaty itself.—

If the League imposed sanctions

(e.g. stopping trade with a

country that was behaving

aggressively) it might be

American trade and business

that suffered most!

Some feared that joining the

League meant sending US

soldiers to settle every little

conflict around the world.

No one wanted that after the

casualties of the First World War.

Some feared that the League

would be dominated by Britain

or France – and would be called

to help defend their empires!

Many in the US were anti-

empires.

Wilson defeated - LON

In 1920 Wilson became seriously ill after a stroke. Despite that, he

continued to press for the USA to join the League. He took the proposal

back to Congress again in March 1920, but they defeated it by 49 votes

to 35.

Still the Democrats did not give up. They were convinced that if the USA did

not get involved in international affairs, another world war might follow. In

the 1920 election Wilson could not run for president – he was too ill – but

his successor made membership of the League a major part of the Democrat

campaign.

The Republican candidate, Warren Harding, on the other hand, campaigned

for America to be isolationist (i.e. not to get involved in international

alliances but follow its own policies and self-interest). His slogan was to

‘return to normalcy’, by which he meant life as it was before the war, with

the USA isolating itself from European affairs. Harding and the Republicans

won a landslide victory.

The USA never joined the League. This was a personal rebuff for Wilson and

the Democrats, but it was also a body blow to the League.

The aims of the league - LON

A Covenant set out the aims of the League of Nations. These were:

to discourage aggression from any nation

to encourage countries to co-operate, especially in business and trade

to encourage nations to disarm

to improve the living and working conditions of people in all parts of

the world.

LON factfile

The League of Nations

n The League’s home was in

Geneva in Switzerland.

n Despite it being the brainchild of

the US president, the USA was

never a member of the League.

n The most influential part of the

League was the Council – a small

group representing the most

powerful members. But it was

a vast organisation with lots of

different parts to fulfil

different functions (see chart

on pages 32–33).

n The League did not have its

own army. But it could call on

the armies of its members if

necessary.

n One of the jobs of the League was

to uphold and enforce the Treaty

of Versailles. This included

running some of the territories

(mandates) that had belonged to

the defeated countries.

n Forty-two countries joined the

League at the start. By the 1930s

it had 59 members.

Article 10 - Collective security

Article 10 = collective security

The Covenant set out 26 Articles or rules, which all members of the League

agreed to follow. Probably the most important Article was Article 10. It said:

‘The members of the League undertake to preserve against external

aggression the territory and existing independence of all members of the

League. In case of threat of danger the Council [of the League] shall advise

upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.’

Article 10 really meant collective security. By acting together (collectively),

the members of the League could prevent war by defending the lands and

interests of all nations, large or small

Membership of the league

In the absence of the USA, Britain and France were the most powerful

countries in the League. Italy and Japan were also permanent members

of the Council. The League had 42 members when it was founded in

January 1920. Germany was not allowed to join until it could prove it was

a peaceful nation. It was allowed to join in 1926. The USSR was prevented

from joining until 1934 as many member states, including Britain and

France, did not trust communist states. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s it

was Britain and France who usually guided policy. Any action by the League

needed their support.

However, both countries were poorly placed to take on this role. Both

had been weakened by the First World War. Neither country was quite the

major power it had once been. Neither of them had the resources to fill

the gap left by the USA. Indeed, some British politicians said that if they

had foreseen the American decision, they would not have voted to join the

League either. They felt that the Americans were the only nation with the

resources or influence to make the League work. In particular, they felt

that trade sanctions would only work if the Americans applied them.

For the leaders of Britain and France the League posed a real problem. They

had to make it work, yet from the start they doubted how effective it could be.

Both countries had other priorities.

n British politicians, for example, were more interested in rebuilding

British trade and looking after the British empire than in being an

international police force.

n France’s main concern was still Germany. It was worried that without

an army of its own the League was too weak to protect France from its

powerful neighbour. It did not think Britain was likely to send an army

to help it. This made France quite prepared to bypass the League if

necessary in order to strengthen its position against Germany.

Organisation of the league - The Assembly

● This was the League’s ‘Parliament’.

● Every country in the League sent

a representative to the Assembly.

● The Assembly could recommend

action to the Council.

● It could also vote on admitting

new members to the League.

● The Assembly only met once a year.

● Decisions made by the Assembly

had to be unanimous – they had to

be agreed by all members of the

Assembly.

Organisation of the league - The Council

The Council was a smaller group than the Assembly, which met more often, usually about five times a year or more often in case of emergency. It included: ● permanent members. In 1920 these were Britain, France, Italy and Japan. ● temporary members. They were elected by the Assembly for three-year periods. ● Each of the permanent members of the Council had a veto. This meant that one permanent member could stop the Council acting even if all other members agreed. ● The main aim of the Council was to resolve disputes by talking. However, if this did not work, the Council could use a range of powers: ● Moral condemnation: they could decide which country was ‘the The Assembly aggressor’, and tell it to stop what it was doing. ● Economic and financial sanctions: members of the League could refuse to trade with the aggressor. ● Military force: the armed forces of member countries could be used against an aggressor.

Organisation of the league - The Secretariat

● The Secretariat was a sort of civil service serving all the other

bodies within the League.

● It kept records of League meetings and prepared reports.

● The Secretariat had a key role in

bringing together experts from across

the world on key issues such as health,

disarmament and economic matters.

Organisation of the league - The Permanent Court of

International Justice

● The Court was based at the Hague

in the Netherlands and was made

up of judges from the member

countries.

● This was meant to play a key role

in the League’s work by settling

disputes between countries

peacefully.

● If it was asked, the Court would

give a decision on a border

dispute between countries.

● However, the Court had no way

of making sure that countries

followed its rulings.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) -The International Labour Organization (ILO)

● The ILO brought together employers,

governments and workers’ representatives.

● Its aim was to improve the conditions

of working people throughout the world.

● It collected statistics and information about

working conditions and how to improve them

and it tried to persuade member countries to

adopt its suggestions.

The League of Nations Agencies and Commissions - The Mandates Commission

The First World War had led to many former colonies of

Germany and her allies ending up as League of Nations

mandates ruled by Britain and France on behalf of the

League. The Mandates Commission was made up of

teams of expert advisers whose job was to report to

the League on how people in the mandates were being

treated. Their aim was to make sure that Britain and

France acted in the interests of the people of that

territory, not its own interests.

The League of Nations Agencies and Commissions - The Slavery Commission

This Commission worked to abolish slavery around the

world. It was a particular issue in East Africa but slavery

was also a major concern in many other parts of the world.

There were also many workers who were not technically

slaves but were treated like slaves. The Commission tried

to help them too.

The League of Nations Agencies and Commissions - The Health Committee

The Health Committee attempted to deal with the problem of dangerous

diseases and to educate people about health and sanitation. The First World

War had brought about rapid developments in medicine and ideas about

public health and disease prevention. The Health Committee brought experts

together and worked with charities and many other independent agencies to

collect statistics about health issues, to spread the new ideas and to develop

programmes to fight disease.

The League of Nations Agencies and Commissions - The Refugees Committee

At the end of the First World War there were hundreds of

thousands of refugees who had fled from the areas of

conflict. Some were trying to get back to their homes;

others had no homes to go to. The most pressing problems

were in former Russian territories: the Balkans, Greece,

Armenia and Turkey. It was a huge task.

How successful were

the League's attempts at

peackeeping in the 1920s?

The treaties signed at the Paris Peace Conference had created new states and

changed the borders of others. Inevitably this led to disputes and it was

the job of the League to sort out border disputes. From the start there

was so much to do that some disputes were handled by the Conference of

Ambassadors. Strictly this was not a body of the League of Nations. But it

was made up of leading politicians from the main members of the League

– Britain, France and Italy – so it was very closely linked to the League. As

you can see from Figure 11 the 1920s was a busy time. This map only shows

a small selection of the disputes which involved the League in this period

Vilna: Polish–Lithuanian dispute, 1920–29 - LON

Poland and Lithuania became independent states after the breakup of the

Russian Empire at the end of the war. There had already been some conflict

between the two states and the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1920.

But on 7 October 1920, Vilna, with its largely Polish-speaking population,

became the new seat of the Lithuanian government after negotiations

with the League and the withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, two days

later, Vilna was annexed by a Polish army and Lithuania appealed to the

League of Nations. The League ordered the Polish army to withdraw from

the region and wait for a plebiscite. Poland refused and the League was

powerless to stop the conflict. France and Britain were not prepared to

escalate the situation.

Aaland Islands dispute, 1921 -LON

The Aaland Islands, located in the Baltic Sea between Finland and Sweden,

was a Finnish territory but whose population was largely Swedish. Many

islanders wanted independence from Finland which almost led to conflict

between the two countries. The League investigated the dispute and

awarded the Aaland Islands to Finland but with protections for Swedish

Islanders, including the removal of Finnish troops. Both countries accepted

the League’s decisio

Corfu 1923 - LON

One of the boundaries that had to be sorted out after the war was the

border between Greece and Albania. The Conference of Ambassadors was

given this job and it appointed an Italian general called Tellini to supervise

it. On 27 August, while surveying the Greek side of the frontier area, Tellini

and his team were ambushed and killed. The Italian leader Mussolini was

furious and blamed the Greek Government for the murder. On 31 August

Mussolini bombarded and then occupied the Greek island of Corfu. Fifteen

people were killed.

Greece appealed to the League for help. Fortunately, the Council was

already in session, so the League acted swiftly. Articles 12 and 15 of the

League of Nations were designed for exactly this situation. They said that

when League members were in dispute and there was a danger of war,

members could take their dispute to the Council and get a judgement.

By 7 September it had prepared its judgement. It condemned Mussolini’s

actions. It also suggested that Greece pay compensation, but that this

would be held by the League to be paid to Italy if, and when, Tellini’s

killers were found.

Mussolini refused to let the matter rest. He insisted that this dispute had

to be settled by the Conference of Ambassadors because, he said, the

Council of the League was not competent to deal with the issue. He even

threatened to leave the League if this did not happen.

Mussolini would probably not have got his way if the British and French had

stood together. Records from the meetings show that the British did not

accept the Italian case and were prepared to send warships to force

Mussolini out of Corfu. However, the French completely disagreed and

backed the Italians, probably because their forces were tied up in the Ruhr

at this time (see page 16) and could not tackle a dispute with Italy as well.

The British were not prepared to act without the French and now argued

that Mussolini’s actions did not constitute an act of war

In the end Mussolini got his way and the Conference of Ambassadors made

the final ruling on the dispute. The League’s ruling was changed. Instead

of condemning Mussolini the Conference ordered that the Greeks apologise

and pay compensation directly to Italy. On 27 September, Mussolini

withdrew from Corfu, boasting of his triumph.

There was much anger in the League over the Ambassadors’ actions and

League lawyers challenged the decision. However, the ruling was never

changed. As historian Zara Steiner says, ‘the dispute showed that the

weakest of the great powers could get its way when Britain and France

agreed to sacrifice justice for co-operation’.

The Geneva Protocol - LON

The Corfu incident demonstrated how the League of Nations could be

undermined by its own members. Britain and France drew up the Geneva

Protocol in 1924, which said that if two members were in dispute they

would have to ask the League to sort out the disagreement and they would

have to accept the Council’s decision. They hoped this would strengthen

the League. But before the plan could be put into effect there was a

general election in Britain. The new Conservative government refused

to sign the Protocol, worried that Britain would be forced to agree to

something that was not in its own interests. So the Protocol, intended to

strengthen the League, in fact weakened it.

Bulgaria, 1925 - LON

Bulgaria, 1925

Two years after Corfu, the League was tested yet again. In October 1925,

Greek troops invaded Bulgaria after an incident on the border in which

some Greek soldiers were killed. Bulgaria appealed for help. It also sent

instructions to its army (see Source 14).

The secretary-general of the League acted quickly and decisively, calling a

meeting of the League Council in Paris. The League demanded both sides

stand their forces down and Greek forces withdraw from Bulgaria. Britain and

France solidly backed the League’s judgement (and it is worth remembering

they were negotiating the Locarno Treaties at the same time – see the Factfile

on page 38). The League sent observers to assess the situation and judged in

favour of the Bulgarians. Greece had to pay £45,000 in compensation and was

threatened with sanctions if it did not follow the ruling.

The Greeks obeyed, although they did complain that there seemed to be one

rule for the large states (such as Italy) and another for the smaller ones (such

as themselves). Nevertheless the incident was seen as a major success for the

League and many observers seemed to forget the shame of the Corfu incident

as optimism about the effectiveness of the League soared. Few pointed out

that it was not so much the effectiveness of the machinery of the League in

this dispute but the fact that the great powers were united in their decision.

LON - 1920’s - success or failure

The League’s most important aims were to try to prevent future wars and

to encourage cooperation and compromise between nations. As you can

see over the last few pages, the League cannot be considered a complete

failure. Even without the USA, Germany or the USSR as members, the

League did manage to intervene in border disputes and help different

countries avoid conflict by accepting its judgements.

However, it is important to remember that the League was often frustrated

by the actions of its own leading members. The League found it very

challenging to get more powerful countries, such as Italy, to accept its

decisions, especially when these countries were leading members of the

League’s Council. It was also increasingly clear to many that without

Britain and France being willing to act and enforce decisions, the League

became less effective and even failed to resolve disputes satisfactorily.

Britain and France were prepared to use the League to solve disputes as

long as it did not interfere with their national interests and priorities.

You will now look at the League’s record on disarmament and the climate of

economic recovery and internationalism that developed in the 1920s.

37

LON 1920’S - Disarmament

In the 1920s, the League largely failed to bring about disarmament. At the

Washington Conference in 1921 the USA, Japan, Britain and France agreed to

limit the size of their navies, but that was as far as disarmament ever got.

The failure of disarmament was particularly damaging to the League’s reputation

in Germany. Germany had disarmed. It had been forced to. But no other

countries had disarmed to the same extent. They were not prepared to give up

their own armies and they were certainly not prepared to be the first to disarm.

Even so, in the late 1920s, the League’s failure over disarmament did not

seem too serious because of a series of international agreements that

seemed to promise a more peaceful world (see Factfile).

International agreements of the 1920s - FACTFILE

1921 Washington Conference: USA, Britain, France and Japan agreed to limit the size of their navies.

1922 Rapallo Treaty: the ussr and Germany re-established diplomatic relations.

1924 The Dawes Plan: to avert a terrible economic crisis in Germany, the USA lent money to Germany to help it to pay its

reparations bill (see this page).

1925 Locarno treaties: Germany accepted its western borders as set out in the Treaty of Versailles. This was greeted with

great enthusiasm, especially in France. It paved the way for Germany to join the League of Nations.

1928 Kellogg–Briand Pact: 65 nations agreed not to use force to settle disputes. This is also known as the Pact of Paris.

1929 Young Plan: reduced Germany’s reparations payments.

LON 1920’S - Economic recovery

Another reason for optimism in 1928 was that, after the

difficult years of the early 1920s, the economies of the

European countries were once again recovering. The Dawes

Plan of 1924 had helped to sort out Germany’s economic

chaos and had also helped to get the economies of

Britain and France moving again (see Figure 19).

Increased trade between countries helped to reduce

political tension. That is why one of the aims of the

League had been to encourage trading links between the

countries. When countries trade with one another, they

are much less likely to go to war with each other.

LON 1920’s - Internationalism

Although Wilson’s version of the League never happened,

the League still achieved a lot in the 1920s. Perhaps most

important of all, the League became one of the ways in

which the world sorted out international disputes (even if

it was not the only way). Historian Zara Steiner has said

that ‘the League was very effective in handling the “small

change” of international diplomacy’. Her implication, of

course, is that the League could not deal with ‘big’ issues,

but it was not tested in this way in the 1920s.

Some historians believe that the biggest achievement

of the League was the way it helped develop an

‘internationalist mind-set’ among leaders – it encouraged them to think in

terms of collaborating rather than competing. One way it did this was simply

by existing! Great and small powers felt that it was worth sending their

ministers to League meetings throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This meant

they would often talk together when they might not have done so otherwise.

Even when powerful countries acted on their own (for example, over Corfu) it

was often after their ministers had discussed their plans at League meetings!

How important was the League's

humanitarian work? - Refugees

Refugees

It is estimated that in the first few years after the war, about 400,000

prisoners were returned to their homes by the League’s agencies. When war

led to a refugee crisis in Turkey in 1922, hundreds of thousands of people

had to be housed in refugee camps. The League acted quickly to stamp

out cholera, smallpox and dysentery in the camps. However, the Refugees

Committee was constantly short of funds and its work became more

difficult in the 1930s as the international situation became tenser and the

authority of the League declined

How important was the League's

humanitarian work? - Slavery and forced labour

It helped free 200,000 slaves in British-owned Sierra Leone. It organised

raids against slave owners and traders in Burma. It challenged the use of

forced labour to build the Tanganyika railway in Africa, where the death

rate among the African workers was a staggering 50 per cent. League

pressure brought this down to 4 per cent, which it said was ‘a much more

acceptable figure’.

How important was the League's

humanitarian work? - Working conditions

The International Labour Organization succeeded in banning poisonous

white lead from paint and in limiting the hours that small children were

allowed to work. It also campaigned strongly for employers to improve

working conditions. It introduced a resolution for a maximum 48-hour

week, and an eight-hour day, but a majority of members refused to adopt it

because they thought it would cost their industries too much. The ILO was

hampered by lack of funds and lack of power. It could not do much more

than ‘name and shame’ countries or organisations that broke its regulations.

How important was the League's

humanitarian work? - Health

As well as collecting statistical information and spreading good practice,

it sponsored research into infectious diseases at institutes in Singapore,

London and Denmark. These institutes helped develop vaccines and

medicines to fight deadly diseases such as leprosy and malaria. The Health

Committee is generally regarded as one of the most successful of the

League’s organisations and its work was continued after 1945 in the form of

the World Health Organization

How important was the League's

humanitarian work? - Other

Even in the areas where it could not remove social injustice the League

kept careful records of what was going on and provided information on

problems such as drug trafficking, prostitution and slavery. The League

blacklisted four large German, Dutch, French and Swiss companies

which were involved in the illegal drug trade. The League also made

recommendations on practical problems such as marking shipping lanes and

produced an international highway code for road users.

LON - 1930’s - economic depression

In the late 1920s international trade prospered. The USA, the world’s

richest nation, was a market for other countries to export to. It also helped

economic recovery with loans to many countries, particularly Germany.

In 1929 disaster struck. The Wall Street Crash in the USA started a long

depression that quickly caused economic problems throughout the rest of

the world (see Figure 2).

In the 1930s, as a result of the Depression, much of the goodwill of the

late 1920s evaporated.

n As US loans dried up, businesses in many countries went bankrupt,

leading to unemployment.

 Some countries tried to protect their own industries by putting tariffs

on imports. But this just meant their trading partners did the same

thing and trade got even worse.

Many countries (including Germany, Japan, Italy and Britain) started to

rearm (build up their armed forces) as a way of trying to get industries

working and giving jobs to the unemployed. But these new armies

caused alarm and tension.

The internationalist spirit of the 1920s was replaced by a more nationalist

‘beggar my neighbour’ approach in the 1930s (protecting a country’s

interest at the expense of other countries).

LON 1930’S - how the depression effected many countries

The USA

One way that the League of

Nations could stop one

country invading another

was to use economic

sanctions. But the

Depression made the USA

unwilling to help in this

because economic

sanctions would make its

own economy even worse.

Japan

The Depression threatened to bankrupt Japan.

Its main export was silk to the USA, but the USA

was buying less silk. So Japan had less money

to buy food and raw materials. Its leaders were

all army generals. They decided to continue to

expand their empire by taking over weaker

countries that had the raw materials Japan

needed. They started by invading Manchuria

(part of China) in 1931.

Britain

Britain was one of the leaders of the

League of Nations. But, like the USA,

it was unwilling to help sort out

international disputes while its economy

was bad. For example, when Japan

invaded Manchuria it did nothing – it did

not support economic

sanctions against Japan

and did not send troops

to protect manchuria

Germany

The Depression hit Germany badly.

There was unemployment, poverty and

chaos. Germany’s weak leaders seemed

unable to do anything. Many Germans

began supporting the Nazi Party and

Hitler was appointed chancellor in 1933.

He was not good news for international

peace. He openly planned to invade

Germany’s neighbours and to win back

land that Germany had lost in the

Treaty of Versailles.

Italy

In Italy economic problems encouraged

Mussolini to try to build an overseas

empire to distract people’s attention from

the difficulties the government faced.

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - Background

Since 1900 Japan’s economy and population had been growing rapidly.

By the 1920s Japan was a major power with a powerful military, strong

industries and a growing empire (see Figure 3). But the Depression hit

Japan badly as China and the USA put up tariffs (trade barriers) against

Japanese goods. Army leaders in Japan were in no doubt about the solution

to Japan’s problems – Japan would not face these problems if it expanded

its empire to provide resources and markets for Japanese goods.

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - Invasion 1 1931

In 1931 an incident in Manchuria gave them an ideal opportunity. The

Japanese army controlled the South Manchurian Railway (see Figure 3).

When Chinese troops allegedly attacked the railway the Japanese armed

forces used this as an excuse to invade and set up a government in

Manchukuo (Manchuria), which they controlled. This was known as the

Mukden Incident. Japan’s civilian government protested but the military

were now in charge

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - China appeals

China appealed to the League. The Japanese argued that China was in such

a state of anarchy that they had to invade in self-defence to keep peace

in the area. For the League of Nations this was a serious test. Japan was a

leading member of the League. It needed careful handling. What should the

League do?

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - The lytton Report

Britain and France both had colonies in South-East Asia. They did not want

to provoke a war with Japan. Many European member states also viewed

the incident as a problem far away. Some members even believed that

Japanese rule would bring order to the region. Investigation of the Mukden

Incident was finally entrusted to Lord Lytton and the Lytton Commission.

It took them over a year to present the Lytton Report in September 1932.

It was detailed and balanced, but the judgement was very clear. Japan had

acted unlawfully. Manchuria should be returned to the Chinese.

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - Invasion 2 1933

However, in February 1933, instead of withdrawing from Manchuria the

Japanese announced that they intended to invade more of China. They

still argued that this was necessary in self-defence. On 24 February 1933

the report from the League’s officials was approved by 42 votes to 1 in

the Assembly. Only Japan voted against. Smarting at the insult, Japan

resigned from the League on 27 March 1933. The next week it invaded

Jehol (see Figure 3

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - The league responds

The League was powerless. It discussed economic sanctions, but without the

USA, Japan’s main trading partner, they would be meaningless. Besides, Britain

seemed more interested in keeping up a good relationship with Japan than in

agreeing to sanctions. The League also discussed banning arms sales to Japan,

but the member countries could not even agree about that. They were worried

that Japan would retaliate and the war would escalate.

There was no prospect at all of Britain and France risking their navies or

armies in a war with Japan. Only the USA and the USSR would have had the

resources to remove the Japanese from Manchuria by force and they were

not even members of the League.

LON 1930’S Manchurian crisis - Consequences

All sorts of excuses were offered for the failure of the League: Japan was

so far away; Japan was a special case; Japan did have a point when it said

that China was itself in the grip of anarchy.

However, the significance of the Manchurian

crisis was obvious. As many of its critics had

predicted, the League was powerless if a

strong nation decided to pursue an aggressive

policy and invade its neighbours. Japan had

committed blatant aggression and got away

with it. Back in Europe, both Hitler and

Mussolini looked on with interest. Within three

years they would both follow Japan’s example.

LON 1930’S - Disarmament conference

After the Manchurian crisis, members of the League realised the urgency of

the problem. In February 1932 the long-promised Disarmament Conference

finally got under way. By July 1932 it had produced resolutions to

prohibit bombing of civilian populations, limit the size of artillery, limit

the tonnage of tanks, and prohibit chemical warfare. But there was very

little in the resolutions to show how these limits would be achieved. For

example, the bombing of civilians was to be prohibited, but all attempts

to agree to abolish planes capable of bombing were defeated. Even the

proposal to ban the manufacture of chemical weapons was defeated.

LON 1930’S - German disarmament

It was not a promising start. However, there was a bigger problem facing

the Conference – what to do about Germany. The Germans had been in the

League for six years. Most people now accepted that they should be treated

more equally than under the Treaty of Versailles. The big question was

whether everyone else should disarm to the level that Germany had been

forced to, or whether the Germans should be allowed to rearm to a level

closer to that of the other powers. The experience of the 1920s showed

that the first option was a non-starter. But there was great reluctance in

the League to allow the second option. The timeline shows how events

relating to Germany moved over the next 18 months.

July 1932: Germany proposed all countries disarm to its level. When the

Conference failed to agree this principle of ‘equality’, the Germans walked out.

September 1932: The British sent the Germans a note that went some way to

agreeing equality, but the superior tone of the note angered the Germans still

further.

December 1932: An agreement was finally reached to treat Germany equally.

January 1933: Germany announced it was coming back to the Conference.

February 1933: Hitler became Chancellor of Germany at the end of January. He

immediately started to rearm Germany, although secretly.

May 1933: Hitler promised not to rearm Germany if ‘in five years all other

nations destroyed their arms’.

June 1933: Britain produced an ambitious disarmament plan, but it failed to

achieve support at the Conference.

October 1933: Hitler withdrew from the Disarmament Conference, and soon after

took Germany out of the League altogether.

By this stage, all the powers knew that Hitler was secretly rearming

Germany already. They also began to rebuild their own armaments. Against

that background the Disarmament Conference struggled on for another year

but in an atmosphere of increasing futility. It finally ended in 1934.

LON 1930’S - disarmament - reasons for failure

The Conference failed for a number of reasons. Some say it was all doomed

from the start. No one was very serious about disarmament anyway. But

there were other factors at work.

It did not help that Britain and France were divided on this issue. By 1933

many British people felt that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair. In fact,

to the dismay of the French, the British signed the Anglo-German Naval

Agreement with Germany in 1935 that allowed Germany to build up its

navy as long as it stayed under 35 per cent of the size of the British navy.

Britain did not consult either its allies or the League about this, even

though this violated the Treaty of Versailles.

It seemed that each country was looking after itself and ignoring the

League.

How did Mussolini’s invasion of

Abyssinia damage the League

The fatal blow to the League came when the Italian dictator

Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in 1935. There were both

similarities with and differences from the Japanese invasion

of Manchuria.

n Like Japan, Italy was a leading member of the League.

Like Japan, Italy wanted to expand its empire by

invading another country.

n However, unlike Manchuria, this dispute was on the

League’s doorstep. Italy was a European power. It

even had a border with France. Abyssinia bordered on

the Anglo-Egyptian territory of Sudan and the British

colonies of Uganda, Kenya and British Somaliland. Unlike

events in Manchuria, the League could not claim that

this problem was in an inaccessible part of the world.

Some argued that Manchuria had been a special case. Would

the League do any better in this Abyssinian crisis?

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis - Background

The origins of this crisis lay back in the previous century.

In 1896 Italian troops had tried to invade Abyssinia but

had been defeated by a poorly equipped army of tribesmen

in the Battle of Adowa. Mussolini wanted revenge for this

humiliating defeat. He also had his eye on the fertile land

and mineral wealth of Abyssinia. However, most importantly,

he wanted glory and conquest. His style of leadership

needed military victories and he had often talked of

restoring the glory of the Roman Empire.

In December 1934 there was a dispute between Italian and Abyssinian

soldiers at the Wal-Wal oasis – 80 km inside Abyssinia. Mussolini took this

as his cue and claimed this was actually Italian territory. He demanded an

apology and began preparing the Italian army for an invasion of Abyssinia.

The Abyssinian emperor Haile Selassie appealed to the League for help.

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis - Phase 1: the League plays for time

From January 1935 to October 1935, Mussolini was supposedly negotiating

with the League to settle the dispute. However, at the same time he was

shipping his vast army to Africa and whipping up war fever among the

Italian people.

To start with, the British and the French failed to take the situation

seriously. They played for time. They were desperate to keep good relations

with Mussolini, who seemed to be their strongest ally against Hitler. They

signed an agreement with him early in 1935 known as the Stresa Pact, which

was a formal statement against German rearmament and a commitment to

stand united against Germany. At the meeting to discuss this, they did not

even raise the question of Abyssinia. Some historians suggest that Mussolini

believed that Britain and France had promised to turn a blind eye to his

exploits in Abyssinia in return for his joining them in the Stresa Pact.

However, as the year wore on, there was a public outcry against Italy’s

behaviour. A ballot was taken by the League of Nations Union in Britain in

1934–35. It showed that a majority of British people supported the use ofmilitary force to defend Abyssinia if necessary. Facing an autumn election at

home, British politicians now began to ‘get tough’. At an assembly of the

League, the British foreign minister, Hoare, made a grand speech about the

value of collective security, to the delight of the League’s members and all

the smaller nations. There was much talking and negotiating. However, the

League never actually did anything to discourage Mussolini.

On 4 September, after eight months’ deliberation, a committee reported

to the League that neither side could be held responsible for the Wal-Wal

incident. The League put forward a plan that would give Mussolini some of

Abyssinia. Mussolini rejected it.

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis - Phase 2: sanctions or not?

In October 1935 Mussolini’s army was ready. He launched a full-scale invasion

of Abyssinia. Despite brave resistance, the Abyssinians were no match for the

modern Italian army equipped with tanks, aeroplanes and poison gas.

This was a clear-cut case of a large, powerful state attacking a smaller

one. The League was designed for just such disputes and, unlike in the

Manchurian crisis, it was ideally placed to act.

There was no doubting the seriousness of the

issue either.

The Covenant (see page 30) made it clear

that sanctions must be introduced against

the aggressor. A committee was immediately

set up to agree what sanctions to impose.

Sanctions would only work if they were

imposed quickly and decisively. Each week a

decision was delayed would allow Mussolini to

build up his stockpile of raw materials.

The League banned arms sales to Italy; banned

loans to Italy; banned imports from Italy. It

also banned the export to Italy of rubber, tin

and metals. However, the League delayed a

decision for two months over whether to ban

oil exports to Italy. It feared the Americans

would not support the sanctions. It also feared

that its members’ economic interests would be

further damaged. In Britain, the Cabinet was

informed that 30,000 British coal miners were

about to lose their jobs because of the ban on

coal exports to Italy.

More important still, the Suez Canal, which

was owned by Britain and France, was not

closed to Mussolini’s supply ships. The

canal was the Italians’ main supply route to

Abyssinia and closing it could have ended the

Abyssinian campaign very quickly. Both Britain

and France were afraid that closing the canal

could have resulted in war with Italy. This

failure was fatal for Abyssinia.

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis - The Hoare-Laval pact

Equally damaging to the League was the secret dealing between the British

and the French that was going on behind the scenes. In December 1935, while

sanctions discussions were still taking place, the British and French foreign

ministers, Hoare and Laval, were hatching a plan. This aimed to give Mussolini

two-thirds of Abyssinia in return for his calling off his invasion! Laval even

proposed to put the plan to Mussolini before they showed it to either the League

of Nations or Haile Selassie. Laval told the British that if they did not agree to

the plan, then the French would no longer support sanctions against Italy.

However, details of the plan were leaked to the French press. It proved

quite disastrous for the League. Haile Selassie demanded an immediate

League debate about it. In both Britain and France it was seen as a blatant

act of treachery against the League. Hoare and Laval were both sacked. But

the real damage was to the sanctions discussions. They lost all momentum.

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis - No oil sanctions

The question about whether to ban oil sales was further delayed. In February

1936 the committee concluded that if they did stop oil sales to Italy, the

Italians’ supplies would be exhausted in two months, even if the Americans

kept on selling oil to them. But by then it was all too late. Mussolini had

already taken over large parts of Abyssinia. And the Americans were even

more disgusted with the ditherings of the French and the British than they

had been before and so blocked a move to support the League’s sanctions.

American oil producers actually stepped up their exports to Italy.

LON 1930’S - Abyssinian crisis -The outcomes

On 7 March 1936 the fatal blow was delivered. Hitler, timing

his move to perfection, marched his troops into the Rhineland,

an act prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles (see page 12).

If there had been any hope of getting the French to support

sanctions against Italy, it was now dead. The French were

desperate to gain the support of Italy and were now prepared

to pay the price of giving Abyssinia to Mussolini.

Italy continued to defy the League’s orders and by May

1936 had taken the capital of Abyssinia, Addis Ababa.

On 2 May, Haile Selassie was forced into exile. On 9 May,

Mussolini formally annexed the entire country.

The League watched helplessly. Collective security had

been shown up as an empty promise. The League of Nations

had failed. If the British and French had hoped that their

handling of the Abyssinian crisis would help strengthen

their position against Hitler, they were soon proved very

wrong. In November 1936 Mussolini and Hitler signed an

agreement of their own called the Rome–Berlin Axis.

Hitler - background summary - Collapse of international peace

Between 1918 and 1933 Adolf Hitler rose from being an obscure and

demoralised member of the defeated German army to become the all-

powerful Führer, DICTATOR of Germany, with almost unlimited power and

an overwhelming ambition to make Germany great once again. His is an

astonishing story which you can read about in detail in Chapter 9. Here you

will be concentrating on just one intriguing and controversial question:

how far was Hitler’s foreign policy to blame for the outbreak of war?

Collapse of international peace - Hitlers plans

Hitler was never secretive about his plans for Germany. As early as 1925

he had laid out in his book MEIN KAMPF what he would do if the Nazis ever

achieved power in Germany.

Abolish the Treaty of Versailles!

Like many Germans, Hitler believed that the TREATY OF VERSAILLES was unjust.

He hated the Treaty and called the German leaders who had signed it ‘The

NOVEMBER CRIMINALS’. The Treaty was a constant reminder to Germans of their

defeat in the First World War and their humiliation by the Allies. Hitler

promised that if he became leader of Germany he would reverse it (see

Source 1).

By the time he came to power in Germany, some of the terms had already

been changed. For example, Germany had stopped making REPARATIONS

payments altogether. However, most points were still in place. The table on

page 57 shows the terms of the Treaty that most angered Hitler.

Expand German territory!

The Treaty of Versailles had taken away territory from Germany. Hitler

wanted to get that territory back. He wanted Germany to unite with

Austria. He wanted German minorities in other countries such as

Czechoslovakia to rejoin Germany. But he also wanted to carve out an

empire in eastern Europe to give extra LEBENSRAUM or ‘living space’ for

Germans (see Source 2).

Defeat communism!

A German empire carved out of the SOVIET UNION would also help Hitler in

one of his other objectives – the defeat of COMMUNISM or BOLSHEVISM. Hitler

was anticommunist. He believed that Bolsheviks had helped to bring about

the defeat of Germany in the First World War. He also believed that the

Bolsheviks wanted to take over Germany (see Source 3).

Collapse of international peace - Rearmament

Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933. One of his first steps was to

increase Germany’s armed forces. Thousands of unemployed workers were

drafted into the army. This helped him to reduce unemployment, which was

one of the biggest problems he faced in Germany. But it also helped him to

deliver on his promise to make Germany strong again and to challenge the

terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

Hitler knew that German people supported rearmament. But he also knew it

would cause alarm in other countries. He handled it cleverly. Rearmament

began in secret at first. He made a great public display of his desire not to

rearm Germany – that he was only doing it because other countries refused

to disarm (see page 46). He then followed Japan’s example and withdrew

from the League of Nations.

In 1935 Hitler openly staged a massive military rally celebrating the

German armed forces and he even reintroduced conscription to the army.

He was breaking the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, but he guessed

correctly that he would get away with rearmament. Many other countries

were using rearmament as a way to fight unemployment. The collapse of

the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in 1934 (see pages 48–49)

had shown that other nations were not prepared to disarm.

Rearmament was a very popular move in Germany. It boosted Nazi support.

Hitler also knew that Britain had some sympathy with Germany on this

issue. Britain believed that the limits put on Germany’s armed forces by the

Treaty of Versailles were too tight. The permitted forces were not enough

to defend Germany from attack. Britain also thought that a strong Germany

would be a good buffer against communism.

Britain had already helped to dismantle the Treaty by signing the Anglo-

German Naval Agreement with Hitler in 1935, allowing Germany to increase

its navy to up to 35 per cent of the size of the British navy. The French

were angry with Britain about this, but there was little they could do.

Through the rest of the 1930s Hitler ploughed more and more spending into

armaments (see Figures 6 and 7).

Collapse of international peace - The Saar plebescite

The SAAR region of Germany had been run by the League of Nations since

1919 (see page 34).

In 1935 the League of Nations held the promised plebiscite for people to vote

on whether their region should return to German rule. Hitler was initially wary

as many of his opponents had fled to the Saar. The League, however, was

determined that the vote should take place and Hitler bowed to this pressure.

So it seemed that the League was being firm and decisive with Hitler. The

vote was an overwhelming success for Hitler. His PROPAGANDA minister Joseph

Goebbels mounted a massive campaign to persuade the people of the Saar to

vote for the Reich. Around 90 per cent of the population voted to return to

German rule. This was entirely legal and within the terms of the Treaty. It was

also a real morale booster for Hitler. After the vote Hitler declared that he had

‘no!further territorial demands to make of France’.

Collapse of international peace - Remilitirization of the Rhineland

In March 1936, Hitler took his first really big risk by moving troops into the

Rhineland area of Germany. The Rhineland was the large area either side

of the River Rhine that formed Germany’s western border with France and

Belgium.

The demilitarisation of the Rhineland was one of the terms of the Treaty of

Versailles. It was designed to protect France from invasion from Germany.

It had also been accepted by Germany in the Locarno Treaties of 1925.

Hitler was taking a huge gamble with REMILITARISATION. If he had been forced

to withdraw, he would have faced humiliation and would have lost the

support of the German army (many of the generals were unsure about him,

anyway). Hitler knew the risks, but he had chosen the time and place well.

■ France and the USSR had just signed a treaty to protect each

other against attack from Germany (see Source 11). Hitler used the

agreement to claim that Germany was under threat. He argued that

in the face of such a threat he should be allowed to place troops on

his own frontier.

■ Hitler knew that many people in Britain felt that he had a right to

station his troops in the Rhineland and he was fairly confident that

Britain would not intervene. His gamble was over France. Would France

let him get away with it?

Hitler ordered 20,000 troops into the Rhineland and his generals had

orders to retreat if there was any resistance from the French. Despite the

rearmament programme, Germany’s army was no match for the French army.

It lacked essential equipment and air support. In the end, however, Hitler’s

luck held.

The attention of the League of Nations was on the Abyssinian crisis which

was happening at exactly the same time (see pages 51–52). The League

condemned Hitler’s action but had no power to do anything else. Even the

French, who were most directly threatened by the move, were divided over

what to do. They were about to hold an election and none of the French

leaders was prepared to take responsibility for plunging France into a war.

Of course, they did not know how weak the German army was. In the end,

France refused to act without British support and so Hitler’s big gamble

paid off. Maybe next time he would risk more!

The collapse of international peace - The spanish civil war

In 1936 a CIVIL WAR broke out in Spain between supporters

of the Republican Government (Republicans) and RIGHT-

WING rebels (Nationalists) under General Franco. The war

quickly gained an international dimension.

STALIN

’S USSR supported the Republican Government (in

the form of weapons, aircraft and pilots). Thousands

of volunteers from around 50 countries joined

International Brigades to support the Republicans.

Hitler and Mussolini then declared their support for

General Franco as a man who shared their world view.

Britain and France refused to intervene directly,

although France did provide some weapons for the

Republicans. Germany and Italy also agreed not to

intervene but then blatantly did so. Mussolini sent

thousands of Italian troops (officially they were

‘volunteers’). Germany sent aircraft and pilots who

took part in most of the major campaigns of the war

including bombing raids on civilian populations (see

Source 16). Hitler viewed the Spanish Civil War as a

good opportunity to try out his new Luftwaffe (air

force) and develop the Blitzkrieg tactics the German

military would use in future conflicts.

The conflict had important consequences for peace.

It strengthened the bonds between Mussolini and

Hitler. It encouraged Hitler to believe that Britain

and France would not intervene against him if he

took further actions against the Treaty of Versailles.

Although Britain did not intervene, Hitler’s actions

alarmed Chamberlain and he ordered massive increases

in spending on Britain’s armed forces, especially the

Royal Air Force. At the same time, the USSR became

increasingly suspicious of Britain and France because of

their reluctance to get involved in opposing fascism.

The collapse of international peace

Militarism and the Axis

Meanwhile, in the east Japan was under the control of

hardline nationalist commanders such as General Tojo.

They also had the support of business leaders in Japan.

They wanted to extend Japan’s empire across Asia so it

could compete with other world powers, particularly the

USA. In 1937 the Japanese took their next big step with

the invasion of China. Some historians regard this as the

first campaign of the Second World War.

Hitler and Mussolini saw that they had much in common

with the military DICTATORSHIP in Japan. In 1936, Germany and

Japan signed an ANTI-COMINTERN PACT, to oppose communism.

Comintern was the USSR’s organisation for spreading

communism to other countries. In 1937, Italy also signed

it. This was called the Rome–Berlin Axis alliance.

There was very little Britain or France could do about

the Axis, but it was another worrying development,

especially as Britain did not have the resources to fight

Japan in the Far East and Germany in Europe.

The collapse of international peace - Anschluss 1938

With the successes of 1936 and 1937 to boost him, Hitler turned his

attention to his homeland of Austria. Hitler believed that the two states

belonged together as one German nation. Many in Austria supported the

idea of union with Germany. Hitler had tried to take over Austria in 1934,

but on that occasion Mussolini had stopped him. But in 1938 the situation

was different. Hitler and Mussolini were now allies.

There was a strong Nazi Party in Austria. Hitler encouraged them to stir

up trouble for the Government and hold demonstrations demanding union

with Germany. Hitler then told the Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg that

only ANSCHLUSS (political union) could sort out these problems. Schuschnigg

appealed to Britain and France but it failed to provide any support so

Schuschnigg felt he had no option but to call a plebiscite (a referendum)

to see what the Austrian people wanted. Hitler was not prepared to risk

this – he might lose! He simply sent his troops into Austria in March 1938,

supposedly to guarantee a trouble-free plebiscite. Under the watchful eye

of the Nazi troops, 99.75 per cent voted for Anschluss.

Anschluss was completed without any military confrontation with France

and Britain. Chamberlain felt that Austrians and Germans had a right to be

united and that the Treaty of Versailles was wrong to separate them.

Once again, Hitler’s risky but decisive action had reaped a rich reward –

Austria’s soldiers, weapons and its rich deposits of gold and iron ore were

added to Germany’s increasingly strong army and industry. Hitler was

breaking yet another condition of the Treaty of Versailles, but it seemed

clear to him that Britain and France were not prepared to go to war to

defend it. However, Britain and France were not naïve either. Chamberlain

increased Britain’s rearmament spending further still and made plans for

compulsory military service and the preparation of air-raid defences.

The collapse of international peace - Appeasement : for and against

If Britain and France were not prepared to defend the Treaty of Versailles,

would they let Hitler have more of his demands? The short answer is yes,

and Britain’s policy at this time is known as APPEASEMENT. Neville Chamberlain

is the man most associated with this policy (see Profile on page 67)

although he did not become prime minister until 1937. Many other British

people (probably the majority), including many politicians, were also in

favour of this policy. However, there were some at the time who were very

critical. Here are the main arguments for and against.

Trusting Hitler

After each new move he made

Hitler said this was all he

wanted. Yet he often went back

on those promises. Appeasement

was based on the mistaken idea

that Hitler was trustworthy

---

*Fear of communism

Hitler was not the only concern of

Britain and its allies. He was not

even their main worry. They were

more concerned about the spread

of communism and particularly

the dangers to world peace posed

by Stalin, the new leader in the

USSR. Many saw Hitler as the

buffer to the threat of spreading

communism——————————————————————————————————————————————————————--

*Memories of the Great War

Both British and French leaders,

and much of their population,

vividly remembered the horrific

experiences of the First World

War. They wished to avoid

another war at almost any cost.

---

*German arms

Germany was rearming publicly

and quickly year by year. Hitler

claimed he was trying to catch

up with other countries, but

others could see that Germany

was better armed than Britain or

France.

---

*British arms

The British Government believed

that the armed forces were not

ready for war against Hitler.

Britain only began rearming in

1935 and INTELLIGENCE suggested

the British were some way behind

the Germans.

---

*The USA

American support had been

vital to Britain’s success in the

First World War. Britain could

not be sure it could face up to

Germany without the guarantee

of American help. But since

1919 the USA

had followed

a policy of

ISOLATIONISM.

American

leaders were

determined

not to be

dragged into

another European war

---

*The British empire

For Britain to fight a war against

Germany it needed to be sure it

had the support of the countries

in its empire or Commonwealth.

It was not a guaranteed certainty

that they would all support a war.

There was also the prospect of

Japan threatening British

interests in Asia, particularly

Singapore and even India.

---

*The Treaty of Versailles

Many felt that the Treaty of

Versailles was unfair to Germany.

Some of Hitler’s demands were

not unreasonable. They assumed

that once these wrongs were

put right then Germany would

become a peaceful nation again.

---

*The Soviet Union

Hitler made no secret of his plans

to expand eastwards. He had

openly talked of taking land in

Russia. Appeasement sent the

message to Stalin and the USSR

that Britain and France would

not stand in Hitler’s way if he

invaded Russia.

---

*Hitler’s allies

Hitler had already observed how

his allies, particularly the right-

wing dictatorships in Japan and

Italy, had got away with acts of

aggression.

---

*Economic problems

Britain and France had large

debts (many still left over from

fighting the First World War) and

huge unemployment as a result

of the Depression. They could not

afford a war.

The collapse of international peace - Czech Fears

Unlike the leaders of Britain and

France, Edvard Beneš, the leader

of Czechoslovakia, was horrified

by the Anschluss. He realised

that Czechoslovakia would be the

next country on Hitler’s list for

take-over. It seemed that Britain

and France were not prepared to

stand up to Hitler. Beneš sought

guarantees from the British and

French that they would honour

their commitment to defend

Czechoslovakia if Hitler invaded.

The French were bound by a

treaty and reluctantly said they

would. The British felt bound

to support the French. However,

Chamberlain asked Hitler whether

he had designs on Czechoslovakia

and was reassured by Hitler’s

promise (Source 21)

The collapse of international peace -Czechoslovakia - Hitlers threats

Despite what he said to Chamberlain, Hitler did have designs on

Czechoslovakia. This new state, created by the Treaty of Versailles, included

a large number of Germans – former subjects of Austria–Hungary’s empire

– in the Sudetenland area. Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazis in the

Sudetenland, demanded that the area should be part of Germany. In May

1938, Hitler made it clear that he intended to fight Czechoslovakia if

necessary. Historians disagree as to whether Hitler really meant what he

said. There is considerable evidence that the German army was not at all

ready for war. Even so, the news put Europe on full war alert.

The collapse of international peace - Czechoslovakia - Preparation for War

Despite what he said to Chamberlain, Hitler did have designs on

Czechoslovakia. This new state, created by the Treaty of Versailles, included

a large number of Germans – former subjects of Austria–Hungary’s empire

– in the Sudetenland area. Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazis in the

Sudetenland, demanded that the area should be part of Germany. In May

1938, Hitler made it clear that he intended to fight Czechoslovakia if

necessary. Historians disagree as to whether Hitler really meant what he

said. There is considerable evidence that the German army was not at all

ready for war. Even so, the news put Europe on full war alert.

The collapse of international peace - Czech - crisis talks

In September the problem reached crisis point. In a last-ditch effort to

avert war, Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler on 15 September. The meeting

appeared to go well. Hitler moderated his demands, saying he was only

interested in parts of the Sudetenland – and then only if a plebiscite

showed that the Sudeten Germans wanted to join Germany. Chamberlain

thought this was reasonable. He felt it was yet another of the terms of

the Treaty of Versailles that needed to be addressed. Chamberlain seemed

convinced that, if Hitler got what he wanted, he would at last be satisfied.

On 19 September the French and the British put to the Czechs their plans

to give Hitler the parts of the Sudetenland that he wanted. However, three

days later at a second meeting, Hitler increased his demands. He said he

‘regretted’ that the previously arranged terms were not enough. He wanted

all the Sudetenland.

To justify his demands, he claimed that the Czech Government was

mistreating the Germans in the Sudetenland and that he intended to

‘rescue’ them by 1 October. Chamberlain told Hitler that his demands were

unreasonable. The British navy was MOBILISED. War seemed imminent.

The collapse of international peace - czech - The Munich agreement

With Mussolini’s help, a final meeting was held in Munich on 29 September 1938.

While Europe held its breath, the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and

Italy decided on the fate of Czechoslovakia.

On 29 September they decided to give Hitler what he wanted. They

announced that Czechoslovakia was to lose the Sudetenland. They did not

consult the Czechs, nor did they consult the USSR. This is known as the

MUNICH AGREEMENT. The following morning Chamberlain and Hitler published a

joint declaration, which Chamberlain said would bring ‘peace for our time’.

The collapse of international peace - Consequences of the Munich Agreement

Hitler had gambled that the British would not risk war. The prize of the

Sudetenland had been given to him without a shot being fired. On 1

October German troops marched into the Sudetenland. At the same time,

Hungary and Poland helped themselves to Czech territory where Hungarians

and Poles were living.

The Czechs had been betrayed. Beneš resigned and the country descended

into chaos. But the rest of Europe breathed a sigh of relief. Chamberlain

received a hero’s welcome back in Britain, when he returned with the ‘piece

of paper’ – the Agreement – signed by Hitler (see photo in the Profile,

page 67).

Triumph or sell-out?

What do you think of the Munich Agreement? Was it a good move or a

poor one? Most people in Britain were relieved that it had averted war,

but many were soon openly questioning the whole policy of Appeasement.

Opinion polls in September 1938 show that the British people did not

think Appeasement would stop Hitler. It simply delayed a war, rather than

preventing it. And while he hoped for peace Chamberlain continued to

increase arms spending in preparation for war.

Czechoslovakia, 1939: the end of

Appeasement:

Although the British people welcomed the Munich Agreement, they did

not trust Hitler. In an opinion poll in October 1938, 93 per cent said they

did not believe him when he said he had no more territorial ambitions in

Europe. In March 1939 they were proved right. On 15 March, German troops

took over the rest of the country. ——- There was no resistance from the Czechs. Nor did Britain and France do

anything about the situation. However, it was now clear that Hitler could

not be trusted. For Chamberlain it was a step too far. Unlike the Sudeten

Germans, the Czechs were not separated from their homeland by the Treaty

of Versailles. This was an invasion. If Hitler continued unchecked, his next

target was likely to be Poland and his annexation of Czechoslovakia would

allow him to invade Poland from two fronts.

Britain and France told Hitler that if he invaded Poland they would declare

war on Germany. The policy of Appeasement was ended. However, after

years of Appeasement, Hitler did not actually believe that Britain and

France would risk war by resisting him.

The collapse of international peace - Stalins fears

Stalin had been very worried about the German threat to the Soviet Union

ever since Hitler came to power in 1933. Even so, Stalin could not reach any

kind of lasting agreement with Britain and France in the 1930s. In 1934 he

had made the USSR a member of the League of Nations, hoping the League

would guarantee his security against the threat from Germany. However,

all he saw at the League was its lack of action over Abyssinia and the

Spanish Civil War. Politicians in Britain and France had not resisted German

rearmament in the 1930s. Indeed, some in Britain seemed even to welcome

a stronger Germany as a force to fight communism, which they saw as a

bigger threat to British interests than Hitler.

Stalin’s fears and suspicions grew in the mid-1930s.

■ He signed a treaty with France in 1935 that said that France would help

the USSR if Germany invaded the Soviet Union. But Stalin was not sure

he could trust the French to stick to it, particularly when they failed

even to stop Hitler moving his troops into the Rhineland, which was

right on their own border.

■ The Munich Agreement in 1938 increased Stalin’s concerns. He was not

consulted about it. Stalin concluded from the agreement that France

and Britain were powerless to stop Hitler or, even worse, that they were

happy for Hitler to take over eastern Europe and then the USSR.

The collapse of international peace - Stalins negotations

Despite his misgivings, Stalin was still prepared to

talk with Britain and France about an alliance against

Hitler. The three countries met in March 1939, but

Chamberlain was suspicious of the USSR and was

reluctant to commit Britain. From Stalin’s point of

view, France and Britain then made things worse by

giving Poland a guarantee that they would defend it

if it was invaded. Chamberlain meant the guarantee as

a warning to Hitler. Stalin saw it as support for one of

the USSR’s potential enemies.

Negotiations between Britain, France and the USSR

continued through the spring and summer of 1939.

However, Stalin also received visits from the Nazi

foreign minister Ribbentrop. They discussed a very

different deal, a NAZI–SOVIET PACT.

The collapse of international peace - Stalins decision

In August, Stalin made his decision. On 23 August

1939, Hitler and Stalin, the two arch enemies,

signed the Nazi–Soviet Pact and announced the

terms to the world. They agreed not to attack one

another. Privately, they also agreed to divide Poland

between!them.

The collapse of international peace - Why did Stalin sign the Pact?

It was clear what Hitler gained from the Pact. He regarded it as his greatest

achievement. It gave him half of Poland and ensured he would not face a

war on two fronts if he invaded Poland. He had promised the Russians they

could have the rest of Poland as well as the Baltic states, but he never

intended to allow Stalin to keep these territories.

It is also clear what Stalin gained from it. It gave him some territory that

had once been part of Russia, but that was not the main point. The real

benefit was time! Stalin did not expect Hitler to keep his word. He knew

he was Hitler’s number one target. But he did not trust Britain and France

either. He did not think they were strong enough or reliable enough as

allies against Hitler. He expected to have to fight Hitler alone at some

point. So what he most needed was time to build up his forces to protect

the USSR from the attack he knew would come.

The collapse of international peace - Consequences - Nazi-soviet pact

The Pact cleared the way for Hitler to invade Poland. On 1 September 1939

the Germany army invaded Poland from the west, where they met little

resistance. Britain and France demanded he withdraw from Poland or they

would declare war. After the experience of the past three years Hitler was

certain Britain and France would not actually do anything about this. If

he was planning ahead at all, then in his mind the next move would surely

be an attack against his temporary ally, the USSR. However, Hitler was in

for a surprise. Britain and France kept their pledge. On 3 September they

declared war on Germany.