Philosophy Final Exam Study Guide

Substance Dualism (aka Descartes’ Dualism)

• there are two things that exist: matter and the soul

• recall the Cogito Argument

• what is “I” in this argument

Cogito Argument

• cogito ergo sum: I think, therefore I am

Descartes’ View of “I”

• “a thing that thinks”

• Descartes thinks that this thinking thing is a non-physical thing, ergo a soul; thoughts could occur in the absence of anything physical

Concepts that Underlie Descartes’ View of “I”

• the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas

• the indiscernibility of identicals

The Doctrine of Clear and Distinct Ideas

• whatever I clearly and distinctly conceive or perceive is true

• if I do my utmost to ensure that my reasoning is accurate, I can’t go wrong

• Descartes believes that this doctrine is guaranteed by God

• we can be neural with theism about this doctrine

The Conceivability of Disembodied Mind

• can you conceive, clearly and distinctly, of the situation where one can have mental states by surviving the destruction of the body; example would be the possibility of live after death

• if you can, then the doctrine of clear and distinct perception allows you to say that one CAN possibly exist without the other; one has a property of being capable of surviving the destruction of her body

• the possibility of the mind without the body

The Indiscernibility of Identicals

• if x=y (identical), then for any property x has, y has as well; if Venus is the Morning Star, then any property had by one WILL be had by the other

• if x and y don’t have all of the same properties, then x is not identical to y

• numerical identity as well, not just qualitative identity; strictly speaking, two things cannot be numerically identical to each other, for each thing is numerically identical only to itself

Descartes’ Argument for Dualism

1. If x=y, then x and y have all their properties in common.

2. My mind has the property of being capable of existing without my body (I clearly and distinctly perceive the possibility of my mind existing without my body).

3. My body does not have the property of being capable of existing without my body.

4. My mind and my body don’t have exactly the same properties.

5. Therefore, my mind is not identical to my body (e.g., brain).

In simpler terms:

1. My body does not have the property of being able to exist without my body.

2. So there is at least one property that is not shared by my body and me.

3. So my mind is not identical to my body (a material object).

4. My mind is an immaterial, non-physical entity.

5. I, the thing that thinks, must also be a non-physical entity; soul.

Objections to Dualism

1. the interaction problem

2. the brain problem

3. the conceivability problem

The Interaction Problem (Cartesian Problem)

• how could mental and physical things interact if they are different kinds of substances

• if the two substances are so different, it seems hard to explain how they can causally interact with one another

• how can thoughts cause physical motions of the body; the principle of causal closure of the physical: all physical effects have physical causes

The Brain Problem

• dualism seems to imply that the brain does not play any role in mental capacity

• is dualism compatible with contemporary scientific theories about the brain

• the brain damage case

The Conceivability Problem

• do we all clearly and distinctly conceive the possibility of one’s survival of the destruction of the body; against premise 2

• does “conceivability” really entail “possibility”

Philosophical Behaviorism (Behaviorism)

• mind = behavior or a set of dispositions to behaviors

• Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976)

• category mistake: placing an idea of a certain object in the wrong category

• example: Troy University is not over and above its buildings, students, professors, and the like; it is a logical construction out of those objects, not a separate, real entity from the collection of them.

Category Mistake on the Mind

• thinking of the mind as a separate substance from the body

• example: thinking of Troy University as a separate substance from the collection of buildings, students, professors, and the like

• Ryle thinks that the question “what is the mind” is concerned with the meaning of the psychological statement

• “X believes/desires/feels/loves” = “X behaves or is likely to behave in a certain way”

What is the Mind

• mind is nothing but a huge collection of behaviors or dispositions to behaviors

• “Your mom believes that it will rain” = “Your mom carries (or is likely to carry) and umbrella”

• This mental state must be understood in terms of various behavioral dispositions

• the disposition to carry an umbrella, to cancel plans for a picnic, etc.

Philosophical Behaviorism

• the mind is not an extra thing lying behind behavior or dispositions to behavior

• if you know enough of these “dispositional” features of a person, there is no further question to be asked about what his mind is like. (to ask that question would be to commit a category mistake)

Critique of Behaviorism

• trouble with behaviorism: it is partly right, but it does not tell us a full story about the nature of the mind

• it does not tell us why and how a person has particular dispositions to behaviors

• Why that disposition?

• Why does an object have the disposition it does?

Foundation of Dispositions

• “I am angry”: this mental state involves a disposition to behave in a certain way

• but if it does, that is due to some state occurring within me, the state apt for producing a range of behavior articulated by behaviorists such as Ryle

• this is a certain state in the central nervous system (analogous to the underlying crystalline structure of salt)

Identity Theory

• mind = CNS (central nervous system)

• thinking about my mom, feeling excited about soccer, feeling pain, desiring to study, etc.

• all of these mental states are the matter of having a set of neurons activated in the central nervous system

• a psychological statement = a physical description in the vocabulary of physics

• sciences tell/will tell us the nature of our minds

Numerical Identity Theory

• if X and Y are numerically identical, it is impossible that X and Y can be numerically different (or they must be numerically identical)

• example: if Spiderman is Peter Parker, it is impossible that Peter Parker and Spiderman are numerically different

Objection to Identity Theory: Chaubinism

• it seems conceivable that a being without a human central nervous system could show all the signs of mentality

• examples: animals, aliens, computers (can beat the top chess champion, write excellent poetry, compose beautiful symphonies, etc.)

• it seems chauvinistic to hold that because they lack a human central nervous system or brains, they cannot really have mental states

The Turing Test

• the imitation game: interrogator, human behind the window, machine behind the window

• the machine is programmed to fool the interrogator into thinking that it is a human

• the aim of interrogator: to find out which is the human and which is the machine

• if a machine can pass Turing’s criterion, namely fool the interrogator in such a way that she cannot tell which is the machine and which is the person, then, Turing proposes that machine has a good a claim as anyone else to the title “Thinking Thing”

• created by Alan Turing (1912-1954)

• instrumental in cracking the code used by the Nazis in WWII, laid some crucial foundations for modern computer science, and conjectured that it is in principally possible that a computer could be made to think

Functionalism Regarding a Mind

• a mental state M is a physical state of an entity (not necessarily organism) produced by characteristic environmental stimuli, and in conjunction with other mental states, tends to produce characteristic behavioral output

• psychological languages are reduced to languages about physical functional states

• not chauvinistic; a radically different internal structure from our own, but which nevertheless possesses intellectual states

Can Science Explain Cousciousness

• if materialism about mental states is true, then if we can have knowledge of all the physical facts, we will then be in a position to know all there is to know

• so, if there is at least one thing that is beyond such knowledge, materialism about the mind is false; the problem of consciousness

Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument Against Materialism

• example: Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way, she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world.

• if materialism is true, she knows all there is to know; she knows what it is like to see color by knowing the neurological description of what it is like to see color

• materialism is unable to account for the experiential component of the mind; therefore, Jackson concludes materialism about the mind is false

Senses of Identity

• qualitative identity: two things are qualitatively identical if they have all of their properties in common; for instance, two nickels are (approximately) qualitatively identical because they (roughly) have the same weight, constitution, etc.

• numerical identity: if A is numerically identical to B, A and B are one and the same thing; strictly speaking, two things cannot be numerically identical to each other, for each thing is numerically identical only to itself

Personal Identity

• “I am not the same person as the one-year-old child” vs “I am the same person as the one-year-old child”

• the question concerns numerical identity

• doesn’t ask how you know your identity but rather what does the identity of you today consist of

Criteria of Identity Theory

• X is sufficient condition of Y; X guarantees Y (if X, then Y)

• X X is necessary condition of Y; if no X, no Y (Y only if X)

• X is necessary and sufficient condition of Y; Y if and only if X

Criteria of Personal Identity Over Time

• necessary and sufficient condition for personal identity over time

• a person persists t1 through t2 if, and only if, a certain condition is met; what is this condition?

Same Soul Condition

• if you have the same soul, you continue to exist, and you continue to exist only if you have the same soul (the soul criterion)

• objection: recall the problems of Descartes’ substance dualism

Same Body Condition

• if you have the same body, then you are the same person over time, and if you do not have the same body, you cannot be the same person over time (the bodily criterion)

• objection: none of the cells that made up your body fifteen years ago are part of your current body

John Locke’s Ideas on Personal Identity Theory

• same human/man involves the sameness of the body

• same person involves the sameness of mind

• “same” here means numerically identical

• a person is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places

• objections: A (who exists today) and B (who exists tomorrow) are the same person, but different humans (or bodies)

Locke’s Psychological Continuity Theory (Memory Criterion)

• whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong

• memory/consciousness is the criterion of personal identity; memory is necessary and sufficient condition for person identity over time

1. If p at t2 does not remember her past experiences at t1, P at t2 is not the same person as the person at t1 (the necessary condition part)

2. If P at t2 remembers her past experiences at t1, P persists t1 through t2 (the sufficient condition part)

Implication of the Lockean Theory of Personal Identity

• if there is no psychological continuity (memory or consciousness link) between the person stages, the person does not continue to exist

• application to ethical issues: euthanasia and abortion

• you go with your (working) brain; further, you at t1 can be whittled dow to brain size at t2 so long as there is psychological continuity between t1 and t2

Reid’s Objection

• Locke’s account of personal identity has the consequence that a man be, and at the same time not be, the person that did a particular action

• depends on the Transitivity of Identity: if A=B, and B=C, then A=C

Duplication Problem

• Suppose that your psychological states (including consciousness, memory, and character traits) are transferred into two people, Smith and Jones, whose psychological states had been completely erased. Suppose also that your body is destroyed. Are you surviving this brain-state transfer and, if so, which person are you?

• the Lockean theory implies that you are identical to both at the same time, but you can’t be two people

Bundle Theory

• According to Hume, I (person/self) am not an enduring, individual substance (soul, body, animal). I am nothing but a bundle or an aggregate of different perceptions/experiences.

• on this theory, a person is a long series of mental states and events connected by various kinds of causal relation

• Hume’s assumption: if you do not encounter something in experience, you cannot talk of it

Objections to the Bundle Theory

• are we really perceptions; this theory seems at odds with our basic conception of persons (I am not feeling!)

• how can I be morally responsible for something I did yesterday

Moral Relativism

• moral properties (goodness, wrongness, etc.) are not absolute properties of actions, but attach to them only relative to culture or person

• statements attributing moral properties aren’t true or false absolutely

Cultural Relativism

• what determines the rightness or wrongness of actions are the practices of the culture to which the person evaluating the action belongs

• an action is right if one’s culture approves of it

Subjectivism

• what determines the rightness or wrongness of actions is the opinion of the individual evaluating the action; an action is right if one approves of it

Implications of Moral Relativism

1. Every culture/person is morally infallible (who’s to say?)

2. Cultural/personal values cannot be criticized from outside the culture/person (we should not sit judgement of others)

3. Social reformers within a culture are, by definition, morally wrong.

4. Moral progress is virtually impossible.

5. Moral Judgements are a matter of preference/taste/

Argument for Moral Relativism

• premise: different cultures/people have different moral codes

• conclusion: therefore, there is no objective truth in morality; what is “right” or “wrong” is simply a matter of opinion, reflecting cultural or subjective practices