10 - Eliminative Materialism Objections

why does EM seem counter-intuitive

it seems certain that we have thoughts, desires, beliefs etc

why is the certainty of our mental states a weak objection (reason one)

things seeming obvious doesn’t mean they are the case e.g. the sun circling the earth

ow does the certainty of mental states misunderstand the Churchland’s claims

they don’t deny the existence of psychological phenomena, they just deny that folk psychology

what does folk psychology arguably have, which paul churchland denies

strong predictive and explanatory powers

what is folk psychology meant to do

explain human behaviour, specifically human action

developments in what have led to developments in folk psychology

developments in psychology have expanded its predictive and explanatory power

what could we argue about folk psychology and its developments

it will continue to develop and exist as a theory

why can eliminativism refute the claim that folk psychology has good predictive power etc

relies on us knowing how behaviour relates to the rest of mental life, developments in FP are relatively superficial

how do FP claim that EM is self-refuting

eliminativism is an argument, based on beliefs, but one of its principle claims is that there are no beliefs

what fallacy do EM claim the self-refuting objection commits

begs the question

what could we compare the self-refuting claim with

the 19th century claim about ‘special life force’ - claiming this doesn’t exist does not mean one drops dead

hoewver, how can the self-refuting claim be pushed further

EM claim Intentionality (including things like beliefs) must be eliminated, so they cannot provide an alternative conceivable account of meaning

rather than an empirical theory, what might we claim FP/the concept of Intentionality is

a condition of intelligibility