Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Theory

These flashcards cover key concepts related to nuclear weapons and deterrence theory, aiding in understanding the intricacies of international relations and military strategies.

Mearsheimer - offensive realism

A theory of international relations that suggests states are inherently aggressive due to the anarchic nature of the international system, seeking power to ensure their survival.

Mearshimers’s “strategies of survival”

■ Strategies to gain power:

● War, blackmail, bait and bleed, bloodletting

Bait and bleed: is a military strategy described by John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) where a state maneuvers to incite two or more rivals into a long, costly war. The goal is for the baiter to remain on the sidelines, conserving its strength while its competitors "bleed each other white".

bloodletting: Bloodletting is a high-risk realism strategy defined by John Mearsheimer where a state encourages an ongoing conflict between rivals to last longer, weakening both through mutual attrition while the "bloodletter" stays out of the fight, preserving its own strength. It is distinct from "bait and bleed," which involves actively provoking the war

■ Strategies to check aggressors:

Balancing: Core Principle: The U.S. should trust local allies to contain regional hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf.

Avoid "Buck-Passing": Instead of taking the lead (buck-catching), the U.S. should let other nations do the heavy lifting in their own neighborhoods.

Buck-passing:

Instead of engaging in "balancing" (joining with other states to counter a threat), a state acts as a "buck-passer" by staying on the sidelines, hoping others will take on the dangerous and costly task of tackling the threat.

■ Strategies to avoid:

Appeasement and Band wagoning:

Bandwagoning: Mearsheimer views this as a strategy where a weak state joins forces with a rising hegemon because they are too weak to fight or believe they can benefit from the status quo. It is often a tactic of necessity for survival rather than choice.

• Appeasement/Non-Balancing: Appeasement is viewed as a dangerous alternative to balancing or buck-passing, where states fail to act against a rising threat, often hoping the aggressor will turn elsewhere.

Blainey on balance of power

The balance of power is only truly clear after a decisive war — war reveals who was actually stronger

• Why? Power is multidimensional, only partially observable, hard to measure

• So states go to war when they disagree about relative power — each thinks it can win

When is war more likely: Blainey vs . Waltz

Waltz: When there is a imbalanced distribution of power, since rising powers will come into conflict with declining powers and the security dilemma is acute.

• Blainey: When there is a balanced distribution of power, since rough parity increases the chances that states will disagree about the final outcome of a war, each thinking it will win.

Second strike capability:

Ability to withstand a nuclear attack from another state, and launch a retaliatory nuclear attack in

response.

Principle of MAD

In a bipolar system, when both states have nuclear capability:

“stable” equilibrium (theoretically)

• Principle of MAD – mutually assured destruction through imilarly sized arsenals (parity)

Incentive - first strike advantage.

Fear of being a poor second” —

if the other side is about to strike,

waiting is fatal

• Technology can also create

incentives to strike first:

– MIRVs (1970) — one missile,

multiple warheads, first strikes

become far more efficient

• Even though we’re both safer

maintaining second-strike

capability, we have incentives to

build first-strike capability: strike

so devastating the other side

cannot retaliate

Deterrence:

Deterrence: Discourage potential aggressor from attacking by convincing him/her that the probable cost of attacking will far exceed any anticipated gains

Conditions for deterrence to succeed?

– Commitment/clarity

– Capability

– Credibility

When Deterrence Fails: A Classic Case

January 1950: US Secretary of State Acheson gives speech describing US “defense perimeter“ in Asia

• Extended deterrence strategy

• June 1950: North Korea invades