moral hazard - life and health

a life insurer offers a premium discount for a verified annual health checkups at renewal. this can best be described as

ex ante observation linked to pricing to influence care

which par best summarizes the core Delia described n “on moral hard”

none of the above

in the presence of insurance, moral hazard typically implies

too little care relative to the socially optimal level

Maria chooses a rich long term care policy because of a family history of dementia; after enrolling, she becomes less careful about fall prevention because “the policy will cover it” this is

adverse selection first, moral hazard second

which are examples of noise that complicate observing care

a careful driver is momentarily blinded by the sun before a crash, a inspector misses a crucial detail during a property visit

which statement best captures moral hazard as discussed in on moral hazard and insurance

the tendency for insurance protection to reduce an indviduals’s incentive prevent loss

which pairing is correct

ex ante = observation before the loss event (purchase/renewal)

which of the following are cited forms of incomplete coverage that preserve incentives

co pays, deductibles, policy limits

an annuity provider uses wearables to adjust benefits or pricing based on sustained activity levels. conceptually this is

linking premiums/benefits to observed care to mitigate moral hazard

an LTC insurer discounts premiums for installing grab bars and keeps a small deductible on fall claims. which are true

the deductible supplies incomplete coverage (skin in the game) and the discount uses ex ante observation of fixed risk reducing assets

in policy design, the sweet spot refers to

balancing incentives effects of partial coverage with sufficient protection

when an auto insurer cannot directly observe day to day careful driving, why would it use deductibles and copays

to keep some skin in the game so care remans worthwhile for drivers

which actions are consistent with insurers actively encouraging additional care

sending safety tips to policyholders, using telematics/sensors to observe care and shape incentives, offering premium discounts for safety features, trying coverage or payout terms to observed care

a plan makes vaccinations for free but imposes copays for non urgent ER vistas. how does this align with moral hazard

low care cost prevention can merit near full coverage, co pays elsewhere preserve incentives

if markets exhibit advantageous selection, a plausible policy lever is

taxing insurance to curb over provisions