SOC SCI H1G MIDTERM 1

standard account of propositional knowledge (descartes)

agent x knows proposition p if and only if

1. X believes P (can’t know something unless you believe it)

2. P is true (can’t know something unless it is true)

3. X has rational justification for believing P (have a good reason for believing something)

   1. normative because you are saying whether the justification is good or not

explanation vs justification (descartes)

• explanation = description for what has happened (there is…)

• justification = good reason/prescription for why something is the way it is (i think…)

magic 8 ball example (descartes)

• the magic 8 ball can provide an explanation but we do not have justification to believe what it says

• the standard acc of propositional knowledge says we cannot count what the magic 8 ball tells us as knowledge since we do not have rational justification to believe what it says

knowledge vs opinion (descartes)

• knowledge = true rationally justified belief with logos (logic, reason, explanation, justification)

• opinion = what one beliefs, and it can be false

foundationalist (descartes & hume)

• someone who views knowledge in the form of a house, with a base and structure

• goal = to find the foundation of knowledge, which is the ultimate rational justification for everything. this ultimate rational justification cannot be justified itself

• descartes = rationalist who believes only things we can clearly and distinctly perceive to be true can serve as foundations to knowledge

• hume = empiricist who believes sensory experience is the foundation of knowledge

persistent skeptic (descartes)

• someone who constantly questions rational justification and asks for justification for everything

• infinite regress problem: persistent skeptics are impossible to satisfy since anything given as rational justification requires rational justification

truth & justification in relation to cultural norms (descartes)

• truth = people believe whatever their culture believes, showing that belief is not a reliable guide to truth since there is bias

  • truth is not relative to cultural norms because truth is objective

• justification = cultural practices determine what counts as good reasoning

  • justification can be relative to cultural norms because it is based on what a culture accepts as good reasoning

descartes’ doubting method

• in order to find the foundation to knowledge, descartes started by doubting everything that his culture taught him to believe, in order to avoid biases when rebuilding his structure of knowledge

• he only added things that he could clearly and distinctly perceive to be true

descartes & existence of himself and god

• himself = cogito ergo sum (i think, therefore i am) is concluded because he cannot think without existing

• god = the idea of god is so perfect that an imperfect human could not have conceived that idea; existent beings are more perfect than nonexistent ones; god is not deceptive so descartes cannot be deceived when he comes to clearly and distinctly perceive something

descartes’ conclusions

• i exist (cogito ergo sum; you can’t think without existing, and since i can think, i exist)

• god exists (idea of god serves as a watermark left by god because the idea itself is too perfect to be created by a human; existent beings are more perfect and powerful, and perfection and power are baked into the idea of god; god is good since perfection involves goodness)

• god created me (since god is perfect, god created everything; god gave me freedom to make mistakes)

• everything i clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is true (god is not a deceiver)

descartes’ ultimate rational justification & issues with it

• clear and distinct perception

• issues

  • cartesian circle = critique of descartes’ ideology that highlights how descartes assumes clear and distinct perceptions by using clear and distinct perception. he says we find these perceptions by knowing that god exists and is not a deceiver. but he comes to this conclusion about god through a so-called clear and distinct perception

  • heavy reliance on intuition, which is subjective and therefore an unreliable guide to truth

impressions vs ideas (hume)

• impressions = more lively perceptions we get from the 5 senses

• ideas = conscious results of our impressions, and connecting them

  • every idea is a copy of a prior impression because (1) it is impossible to think of an idea not derived from a preexistent impression (golden mountain = gold and mountain), (2) ideas are dependent on impressions (blind people have no ideas of color), and (3) someone can only discover causal relaitionships through experience (adam in eden lake)

relations among ideas vs matters of fact and real existence (hume)

• relations among ideas = can be explained deductively; beliefs are necessary; contraries are inconceivable; knowable a priori (before experience)

  • ex: the fact that the angles of a triangle add to 180 degrees

  • provide rational justification because their truths can be demonstrated by reason alone

• matters of fact & real existence = can be explained empirically and inductively; beliefs are contingent; contraries are conceivable; knowable a posteriori (after experience)

  • ex: learning water’s ability to drown you

  • grounded in relation of cause and effect because we can only come to learn matters of fact & real existence via prior experience

  • do not provide rational justification because we can imagine that the future can change, and thus cannot deductively reason for a permanent outcome

  • based on past experience, not reason, so we cannot claim to have knowledge of matters of fact and real existence since they are not rationally justified

3 laws of mental association (hume)

1. resemblance = when x and y look similar so when we see x we think of y

2. contiguity in time or place = when every time we see x we also see y, so we come to associate x with y

3. cause and effect = events that follow each other become associated; when we push the chair, the chair moves forward, so when we think of pushing something we think of it also moving forward

problem of induction (hume)

• problem = relying on past experience is an inductive process, and inductive processes cannot be rationally justified 

  • our beliefs about matters of fact and real existence rely on our knowledge of cause and effect, which relies on past experience

  • thus, we cannot truly know any matters of fact and real existence because they are not based on deductive reasoning

• solution = custom, habit, and instinct evolved as part of our psychological nature, and these lead us to inductively reason that the past serves as a good guide for the future

  • we are not creatures of reason. we are creatures of nature.

  • we can explain our actions. we cannot justify them.

  • rationality and reasoning are not as important as we think.

problem of reflection + hume’s response

• problem of reflection = hume has been relying on inductive inferences since the beginning, so his argument is self-undermining. 

• hume’s response

  • he acknowledges that he too relies on custom and habit 

  • he knows he is not rationally justified in doing so

  • he provides us with a belief, not a justification

  • he encourages us to be inductive skeptics 

  • if he is right, we will come to believe him because we reason in the same ways he does 

  • accept that you can only have explanations for things and stop looking for justifications

rat trap example (hume)

• we have no rational justification to assume that a rat trap will consistently crush whatever triggers it, but we still assume it will because it is in our human nature to assume the past resembles the future

what should be removed from libraries (hume)

• religious writings and scholastic metaphysics because they do not provide knowledge in the proper sense, do not rely on reason or experience, and are based on speculation

humans as active vs reasonable beings (hume)

• active = hume describes humans as driven by passions, emotions, desires, and habits. this is why humans act.

• reasonable = hume thinks reason only helps us build upon experience. it cannot make us act alone like emotions can. reason only helps us figure out how to achieve emotions to get the goals they provide.

hume’s scientific method

• empirical (relies on his experience)

• introspective (evidence comes from his own mind)

• inductive (generalizes from his past experiences)

black box model of vision (hoffman)

• vision works by input > visual system > output

• input = upside-down projection of photons triggering a highly inhomogenous distribution of receptors with a blindspot

• visual system = constructs the input to make the output

• output = right-side up phenomenal image in homogenous color and detail, smooth without gaps

central problem of vision (hoffman)

• there is a disconnect between perception and objective reality

• the 2D image at the eye has countless possible 3D interpretations

• our visual system uses rules of construction to reason inductively and make guesses about what that 3D image should look like based on the 2D input it receives at the retina

optical illusions (hoffman)

• demonstrate that our perceptions do not accurately reflect objective reality

  • we see a 3D ripple when it is just ink on paper

• shows that our visual system constructs what we see using evolutionary mechanisms and ability to fill in gaps

rules (hoffman)

• role of visual rules = help us construct visual worlds from ambiguous images, even ones we have never seen before because these rules are innate

• rule of generic views = our brains prefer stable, generic interpretations since they are more likely in the real world

  • seeing a v as chopsticks is accidental because the tips could create a gap or coincide depending on the perspective

• always interpret a straight line in 2D as a straight line in 3D

• if the tips of 2 lines coincide in 2D, always interpret them as coinciding in 3D

5 differences between input (retina) and output (visual experience) (hoffman)

1. retinal image is upside down but we see right side up

2. blindspot but we never notice it

3. most cones for color are at the center of the retina but we see color across the entire visual field

4. image at retina is 2D but we see in 3D

5. raw input is fragmented and noisy, but we see smoothly

wavy line cosine function (hoffman)

• when viewed one way, we see dots on the hills

• when we rotate it, we see dots on the valleys

• we evolved this way because top-down views were more likely in our ancestor’s environments

  • our brain uses preconscious rules to favor the most probable interpretations of the world

vision as constructive vs interpretive (hoffman)

• constructive = brain uses visual rules to create a 3D world based on a structurally different 2D image at the retina

• interpretive = interprets sensory data rather than perceiving it as is

properties of memory (loftus)

• memories that have had more time to fade are more susceptible to misinformation

• moldable and not permanently stored

disney experiment #1 for memory inflation (loftus)

• week 1 = people take the life events inventory, with the target item being “shaking hands with theme park character”

• week 2 = look at disney ad (mickey asks you to remember the magic, autobiographical referencing); everyone repeats the life events inventory

• result = viewing disney ad inflates confidence of shaking hands with character at theme park

• conclusion = imagination inflation: autobiographical suggestion can increase confidence that something happened to you

disney experiment #2 for memory implantation (loftus)

• same as experiment 1, but instead implanted false memories

  • “you met ariel/bugs at disney” = impossible autobiographical memory

• result = people who read bugs/ariel autobiographical ad were more confident they met them at disney

• conclusion = false memories can be implanted

car accident experiment (loftus)

• shows the effectiveness of anchors (smashed, hit, contacted) on estimates of speed when watching a car accident

• results = subjects asked with the word smashed provide the fastest estimates of speed of the cars and falsely report seeing broken glass

loftus & hume on imagination

• hume = you cannot produce (imagine) new beliefs without physically experiencing them

• loftus = if you have an experiential basis and are asked to imagine some scenario and rehearse it to yourself, your beliefs can be modified and your confidence can increase

cognitive dissonance (festinger & carlsmith)

• when how we act does not match what we believe 

• we try to resolve this tension by changing our beliefs to match our actions 

festinger & carlsmith $ experiment

• participants perform boring tasks and are paid either $1 or $20 to lie to the next “participant” (confederate) about how “fun” the task was

• results = $1 group experienced the most dissonance, so they rated the task as more fun; $20 group experienced less dissonance, so they rated the task more honestly as less fun

  • we know the experimenters ruled out the possibility of monetary incentives because the $20 group did not rate the task as super fun

festinger & carlsmith on beliefs and values

• belief formation is not purely rational

• we believe that our beliefs come from ourselves and that we have autonomy over them, when in reality our beliefs are unconsciously malleable

descartes and cognitive dissonance (festinger & carlsmith)

• descartes’ doubting method may have created tension between his beliefs and actions

  • maybe some beliefs you can’t doubt cannot be doubted because of your culture

    • he may have still doubted his cultural beliefs while simultaneously giving into what the culture told him to do (i.e. religion)

  • maybe he said he cannot doubt god is real because it is what he was raised to believe

    • he can doubt everything BUT what his culture taught him

• thus, descartes should not be so certain that his clear and distinct perceptions are undoubtable

choice blindness vs change blindness (hall & johansson)

• choice blindness = we do not notice when the choice we made has been manipulated

• change blindness = we fail to detect changes in a scene

face selection experiment (hall & johansson)

• protocol = subjects presented with 2 face cards and they choose which they find the most attractive

  • experimenter secretly switches the subject’s choice with the opposite card, then presents it to them and asks why they “chose” it

• result = subject confabulates and fails to notice the change

tea and jam experiment (hall & johansson)

• protocol = shoppers try 2 jams and choose the tastiest

  • experimenter secretly swaps their choice then gives them the opposite choice of jam and asks why they chose it

• result = subject confabulates and fails to notice the change

apartment, phone, and laptop experiment (hall & johansson)

• protocol = subjects are given a powerpoint slide with different products and bullet points of positive/negative attributes for each

  • experimenters secretly swap 2 of the most important attributes

• result = subject confabulates and fails to notice change

political opinion experiment (hall & johansson)

• protocol = subjects fill out paper survey of moral opinions

  • experimenters secretly swap out the questions, such that they resemble the opposite opinion

• result = subjects confabulate and fail to notice change; they end up believing whatever they are shown they answered as 

  • less extreme agreeness/disagreeness = more failure to notice change

• this study shows how change blindness translates to situations with serious moral obligations

choice blindness blindness (hall & johansson)

• overconfidence in our ability to detect choice manipulations

• “i totally could’ve detected a change if you did one”

takeaways from hall & johansson experiments

• justifications come post-hoc choices, showing that justification is not responsible for the original choice

  • justification can influence future preferences because people come to prefer the choices they did not make but are forced to justify

• people are unaware of the true basis of their choices, and can construct justification for choices they did not make

  • rational choices do not always come from conscious reasoning, challenging the view that humans are rational decision makers

• justification is motivated by the need to be confident and coherent

  • justification is more about story telling rather than truth or causal explanation

maier’s experiment

• protocol = subjects enter a room with 2 cords hanging from the ceiling and a set of objects (poles, ringstands, clamps, pliers, extension cords)

  • the task is to tie the 2 cords together, but it is impossible to do by simply holding the 2 cords since they are too far apart

  • there were 4 possible solutions, and the 4th one called for a subtle hint where the experimenter nonchalantly sets one cord in motion

• result = within 45 sec of that hint, subjects produce the 4th solution; when asked how, subjects who got the hint as a whole do not bring up the hint and instead confabulate, such as what one psych professor said about thinking about monkeys swinging; subjects how got it in parts give the hint some credit

  • when experimenters bring up the hint, subjects deny having even seen it

  • subjects admit having seen another hint which was logistically useless, so we know they really didn’t see the main hint

  • subjects who got it in parts are not afraid to admit they saw the hint, so we know that the others just genuinely did not see it

takeaways from maier’s experiment

• we can reach solutions via unconscious cues, leading us to often justify our actions post-hoc

• introspective reports are unreliable because we do not know where they came from

• we typically lack epistemic access to our own cognitive processes, and hence may attribute cognitive effects to the wrong causes

nisbett & wilson’s 3 main conclusions

1. subjects very often cannot accurately report on the effects of stimuli on higher order inference-based responses (they do not know what affects how they think/form beliefs)

   1. argued for via = presenting experiments showing dissociations where behavior changes but verbal reports fail to report the change

   2. implication for empirical psych = self-reports are not reliable

   3. implication for knowledge as justified belief = we cannot use what we know as a foundation for knowledge because we do not really know what we know (we may have true beliefs but are unable to correctly justify them since we justify them using post-hoc justifications AKA confabulations)

   4. implication for rational choice = it is weakened since we do not have complete access to our reasoning

2. when reporting on said effects of stimuli, subjects typically do not utilize their memories of cognitive processes. instead, they base their reports on implicit a priori theories about the causal connection between stimulus and response

   1. everyone walks around with a folksy psych theory to assess others (when i see you buy cheerios, i conclude you must like cheerios. when i see myself buy cheerios, i conclude i must like cheerios)

   2. argued for via = subjects confabulate using theories supplied by their culture + observers explaining subject behavior using general causal theories

3. subjective reports about higher mental processes are sometimes right, but not because of direct introspective awareness. instead, it is due to accidental correct employment of the a priori causal theory

   1. argued for via = presenting circumstances where accurate reports occur: when stimuli are SALIENT, AVAILABLE, and PLAUSIBLY LINKED TO RESPONSE (when the true case is also the most representative and available)

confabulation (nisbett & wilson)

• making up reasons for why we do something when we actually do not know why

• result of lacking direct access to the real causal process of a behavior, but still needing to find ways to explain that behavior

bem and mcconnell 

• protocol = subjects asked detailed questions regarding position on an issue; asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay; then (1 week later) asked what WAS your position before you wrote the essay (1 week earlier)

  • cognitive dissonance theory says their beliefs will shift toward the essay’s opinion

• result = control subjects could remember their original beliefs; subjects who wrote the essay falsely reported that their beliefs were what they currently are

  • subject knows that we know what their position was because we have the survey

  • subjects cannot know WHY they changed their beliefs because they don’t even know THAT they changed their beliefs 

• moral = we typically do not detect changes in our beliefs in the context of cognitive dissonance

goethals and reckman

• protocol = subjects asked detailed questions about their position on a number of issues, including forced busing to desegregate schools; subjects consider anti-busing and pro-busing arguments in a group discussion; subjects asked to remember what they reported believing before they participated in the group discussion 

  • 3 real subjects (i.e. all pro-busing), 1 confederate (i.e. anti-busing) meant to sway the subjects’ opinion

• result = subjects change their views to the confederate’s; control subjects were able to recall their original positions accurately; original anti-busing subjects recalled their opinions as having been more pro-busing than they actually were, and vice versa; original pro-busing subjects recalled they had been more anti-busing than the original anti-busing subjects recalled they had been; no subject reported that the discussions had any effect in changing their original position  

  • subjects cannot know WHY they changed their beliefs because they don’t even know THAT they changed their beliefs 

• moral = we typically fail to detect changes in our own beliefs in the context of explicit arguments because it helps to prevent conflict, but we are seriously misled

nisbett and schachter

• protocol = subjects are told that a placebo pill causes heart palpitations, breathing irregularities, and heart tremors, which are symptoms of electric shock; subjects then withstand electric shocks and decide how far they can go

• result = subjects who took the pill withstood higher currents of electric shocks (4x more) because they attribute symptoms to the pill; controls correctly attribute the symptoms to the shock, so they withstand less shocks 

  • when asked why, experimental subjects do not attribute their resilience to the pill, and instead confabulate 

    • “it did not hurt that much”

    • “i am a tough person”

  • only 3/12 subjects reported that the pill might have helped them withstand more shocks 

• moral = we typically do not have epistemic access to our own cognitive processes, and hence may attribute cognitive effects to the wrong causes

nisbett and wilson ocean-moon

• protocol = subjects are asked to memorize a list of 8 word pairs (i.e. ocean-moon); each word pair is associated with a target response (i.e. detergent- Tide), but subjects do not know

  • semantic cueing meant to double frequency of target responses from 10% to 20%

• results = when asked why they said Tide, for example, no one mentioned the word pairs, and instead confabulated; when specifically asked whether word pairs might have had an effect, ⅓ of subjects said they might have (but there is reason to doubt subjects’ reliability on this because the number of subjects who thought they were affected by the cues differs a lot from the number who probably were)

  • “my mom used Tide”

  • “i’ve always liked Tide”

  • “tide smells good”

• moral = we do not know the degree to which a factor might have been relevant to our actions even when we believe the factor was relevant

nisbett and wilson nightgown & stockings

• protocol = went to shopping area and asked passerby to choose the highest quality nightgown from a series of 4 identical (except for pattern) nightgowns

• results = the last nightgown in each series was 4x more likely to be selected than the first; no subject mentioned that the position in the series might matter to their judgment of the quality of the item; subjects who chose the last nightgown were simply confused when they were told they probably chose it because it was last

  • the longer we look for something, the higher the value of what we get at the end

  • the first examined are not as valued as the last, which is the most valuable of all

• moral = we typically do not know what factors are relevant to the decisions we make and are only willing to attribute relevance to factors that make sense given our background intuitions about how cognition works

latane and darley

• result = the more bystanders present, the less likely an individual is to help; subjects claimed their behavior was not influenced by the presence of others; observers predicted the presence of others would not influence subject behavior 

• moral = we misinterpret the influence of situational factors (aka people) and are unaware of situational causes on behavior

first-person authority (nisbett & wilson)

• first person authority = mistaken belief that we know our own thoughts, what we experience, what be believe, and why

  • almost everyone believes this, but there is evidence for it because false because we do not have access to these cognitions in many circumstances

• nisbett and wilson show that first person authority is very often violated

• the maier experiment shows that we cannot rely on first person authority when seeking for answers for our behavior

did descartes rely on first person authority? (nisbett & wilson)

• yes! he depends heavily on first person authority as the foundation of knowledge

• his cogito, ergo sum philosophy highlights the importance he placed on himself as a thinking thing who can rely on his cognitions because god would not deceive him

• he came to believe god through his clear and distinct perceptions, in which he claims are true because he cannot doubt them

hume & first person authority (nisbett & wilson)

• hume said our psychological nature can be faulty because we reason inductively

• he was skeptical about the reliability of our impressions and ideas since they came from past experience, which is not rationally justified

• problem w/ hume = hume said causal beliefs come from habit and experience, while the psychology experiments show that we form causal attributions post-hoc and inaccurately. thus, it can be problematic to rely so heavily on our causal beliefs like hume wants us to

on nisbett and wilson's account, how do we in fact answer questions like: “why did you vote republican?” (or most any other question about our mental processes, motivations for decision, etc.) why are our answers often wrong? why are our answers sometimes right?

• we construct answers by applying a priori causal theories and heuristics. we search for causes that are salient, available, plausible, and that match our causal theories.

• our answers are often wrong because true causal factors can occur unconsciously, as less salient, too small, or separated in time from the decision. when these are the circumstances, we select plausible but incorrect reasons and produce confabulations.

• we are sometimes right because the causal stimulus can be salient, available, and plausibly linked to the choice, and thus the a priori theory will happen to hit the true cause.

system 1 vs system 2 (dual process theory)

• system 1 = fast, automatic, unconscious, intuitive, constantly working without requiring much effort

  • ex: ducking when something is thrown at our head, finishing “peanut butter and…”

  • humean custom

  • we do not always know where system 1’s rationale comes from

• system 2 = slow, conscious, resource-intensive, analytic, systematic, logical

  • ex: solving 17 × 24, cost-benefit analysis

  • humean judgments about relations of ideas

  • works to control impulsivity of system 1, but cannot always protect us because system 2 takes too much effort and needs system 1’s products

system 1’s heuristics (dual process theory)

• availability = likelihood is judged by how easily examples come to mind

  • ex: air travel declining after 9/11

• representative = likelihood is judged based on how easily something fits into a category

  • ex: gambler’s fallacy b/c our expectation better represents our stereotype for a random/fair sequence

• anchoring and adjustment = estimates are biased based on an initial value

  • ex: loftus’ car accident experiment with different anchors

  • ex: ghandi died before 170 years old vs before 20 years old

sentimentalism (haidt + hume)

• moral psychology is driven by emotions

• you see something and just feel that it is right/wrong

• we only make moral decisions based on our emotional states because we can only learn facts from the world (bomb blows up), not morality (bomb is dangerous)

moral rationalism vs social intuitionism (haidt)

• moral rationalism = moral judgments arise from conscious moral reasoning (system 2)

  • eliciting situation > affect > reasoning > judgment

• social intuitionism = moral judgments arise from quick, automatic moral intuitions like gut feelings or emotional reactions (system 1)

  • eliciting situation > intuition > judgment > reasoning

  • moral judgments THEN reasoning

  • social = moral reasoning happens in conversation and interaction

  • intuitionist = moral judgments come from affective intuitions

  • integrates sentimentalist traditions (emotions) and rationalist traditions (reflection, justification, coordination)

moral dumbfounding (haidt)

• when we have strong moral reactions without being able to articulate reasons for why

• ex: haidt’s brother and sister sex story where they have sex with no harm but listeners still say the story is wrong because it just is!

• supports intuitionism over rationalism because it shows we have an intuitive reaction of disgust while struggling to reason why

• similar to confabulation because both involve bad post-hoc attempts at rationalization for feelings we feel unconsciously 

dual process problem in support of social intuitionism (haidt)

• system 1 is our default system, showing support for social intuitionism

• only when intuitions conflict does system 2 (moral rationalism) come into play

motivated reasoning problem in support of social intuitionism (haidt)

• our reasoning is motivated by what our desired outcome is because we are self-serving and seeking reasoning that will support the outcome dictated by our intuition

post hoc problem in support of social intuitionism (haidt)

• people’s moral intuitions are too quick and automatic for us to generate justifications for them a priori, so we do it post-hoc from a priori moral theories

the action problem in support of social intuitionism (haidt)

• moral action covaries with moral emotion more than moral reasoning

• for rationalist theories, it is hard to explain how mere moral reasoning motivates moral action

• rationalists say we act morally because we see what is right via reasoning, but in reality, people who know the right think still do bad things (i.e. psychopaths)

• thus, haidt thinks emotions influence our actions more than reasoning does

moral intuitions as innate and enculturated (haidt)

• universal norms = norms applied universally (i.e. it is bad to hit people)

• conventional norms = rules that differ by society (i.e. which side of the road to drive on)

how cultures modify, enhance, or suppress the emergence of moral intuitions (haidt)

1. selective loss of intuitions = a child is born prepared to develop moral intuitions, but cultural environment can stress certain ones over others

2. immersion in custom complexes = cultural knowledge is a complex web of explicit and implicit, sensory and propositional, affective, cognitive, and motoric knowledge; even though people in all cultures have the same bodies, they have different embodiments and end up with different minds

3. peer socialization = moral values are strongly shaped by the judgments of peers; peer groups have the most influence 

liu and ditto trolley dilemma experiment

• protocol = subjects read the trolley dilemma where a group can be saved by sacrificing a person to train tracks, then are asked how many workmen need to be saved in order to justify pushing the man

• results = subjects said no trade off in saved lives could justify pushing the man on the tracks; these subject believed pushing the man was significantly less likely to be effective at saving the workmen and would cause the one man more pain 

liu and ditto 4 moral issues experiment

• protocol = 4 moral issues are presented and subjects answer morality question (is it wrong) and a deontological question (is it wrong even if it is effective)

• results = the more participants believed an act was immoral even if it was beneficial, the less they believed it would actually produce those benefits and the more they believed it would have undesirable costs

• discussion = being well informed about an issue increases moral coherence/bias in aligning facts with morals

liu and ditto capital punishment experiment

• protocol = subjects read 4 issues and respond to questionnaires then read an essay presenting moral arguments either for or against capital punishment and re-answer the questionnaire

• results = subjects who read the anti-capital punishment essay judged the death penalty as more deontologically immoral and had weaker beliefs in the punishment’s efficacy

• discussion = this experiment, unlike the other 2, shows a causal relationship between moral evaluations and factual beliefs

liu and ditto conclusions

• we struggle to fit together deontological beliefs that an act is wrong regardless, and factual beliefs that an act could be beneficial to an extent

  • people end up shifting toward the deontological belief because they prefer morality and coherence between moral beliefs and fact

• when people view an act as inherently immoral, they experience dissonance when presented with the fact that the act can be beneficial or effective for a certain party

• to resolve this tension, they convince themselves the act will not be effective for said party, and will cause more harm than good

stanford, sarnecka, and thomas children left alone experiment

• protocol = subjects read 5 stories about a child being left alone for some time, with parental absence being either unintentional or intentional in each story; subjects estimate danger level of each child

• results = subjects said children were in most danger when they were left alone intentionally

  • statistically, children left alone unintentionally are in more danger

• discussion = people inflate their danger estimates to help justify their stronger moral disapproval of parents who intentionally leave their children unsupervised

stanford, sarnecka, and thomas blaming parents experiment

• protocol = subjects read stories about a child being left alone for some time, with parental absence being either unintentional or intentional in each story; subjects estimate danger level of each child + the extent to which the parent did something morally wrong

• results = estimates of danger became more inflated by moral disapproval; subjects blamed parents for involuntary absences

• discussion = people think leaving children alone is immoral, and therefore dangerous

moral coherence (liu and ditto)

• tendency to adjust factual beliefs about the consequences of actions so they align with moral evaluation of those actions

• if an acts feels immoral, people believe it will not be effective

• if an act feels moral, people believe it will be effective