INDOCHINA ESSAY PLANS COMPLETE

Assess the importance of nationalism to the Vietnamese up to 1965 [in achieving Communist victory] (HSC 2011)

Nationalism was of vital importance to the Vietnamese people, providing a movement of resistance against the ‘imperialist’ US for the North and an unwavering ideology of unity across the country.

1. Nationalism provided a cohesive doctrine of unification for the Vietnamese people across the country which Ho capitalised on to achieve an “independent and unified” Vietnam and resist teh ‘imperialist’ US.

● Used nationalism rather than communism for peasant

● ‘Ca do’ → appeal to hatred of colonisers + prepare for total war

● History of oppression “welded the North Vietnamese together”

● Relate on personal level

● ‘Doc lap’ to resist ‘puppet regime’

● US bombing(1964) and US troops (1965)

2. The NLF’s most significant driving force is arguably nationalism as teh diverse background of its members was not just limited to communists but was rather a nationalistic unit of Vietnamese people.

● Aim to get rid of Diem and unify the country, not establish communist state

● Wide demographic: vietminh, communists, teens, farmers

● “Passionately nationalistic and willing to make sacrifices”(Karnow)

● Wanted to rid the ‘imperialist’ US → nationalistic goal

● Freedom fighters against foreign oppressors and Diem

3. The compliance of the civilian population to aid NVA to move supplies and collect crucial intelligence was largely due to patriotic motivations to resist a foreign oppressor

● NLF not merely military, welcomed by SV peasants liberate from Diem

● Emphasis on land reforms → affected lower classes

● Influence over 80% of SV countryside by 1961

● Guerilla warfare → nat inspired to fight

● Involve peasants+farmers to spread nat in NV and liberate from french, US in SV

● Compliance → collect info

4. However, whilst nationalism was a significant factor in unifying Vietnam, communism provided organisation through brute force which allowed Vietnamese people to resist Diem regime and escalate US involvement.

● Necessary for structure of warfare → strikes

● Com party org +command → military operations + political strategies

● Propaganda gain community support

● Land reforms → those disillusioned with current soc+eco state in NV

What was the impact of communism in shaping the conflict in Vietnam?

Whilst communism significantly influenced the conflict in Vietnam, nationalism was just as important in both the US and Vietnam.

1. Anti-communist rhetoric proved to be the driving motivation of US policy, substantially shaping the conflict in Vietnam.

● Eis deepened US supporting anti-comm expanding military , no monolithic

● ‘Falling Domino Theory’ in April 1954 fall of vietthen asia → “like a set of dominoes” (Eis).

● "crusading against its foggy notion of an international Communist conspiracy"

● policy of containment, Kennedy escalate mil and eco → support anti-comm

● Kennedy’s motivated by fear of monolithic from USSR

● Kennedy’s admin take strong anti-’red’ stance, campaign quote “the enemy is the Communist system itself”.

● LBJ policy initially motivated by Cold Wa exacerbated by the strength of Hanoi.

2. However, anti-communism was not the only direct influence on foreign policy as US nationalism and pride promoted a focus on upholding the international prestige of the US.

● Prestige significant factor in policies, US National Security Council ‘the US must… restore its prestige… by a new initiative in South East Asia’.

● Kennedy heavily concerned with legitimising US could not backtrack without “jeopardising the American government’s prestige”(Karnow).

● Johnson’s changing concern for US national prestige and a determination to ensure his own political survival, nothing worse than losing to comm

● Nixon’s ‘peace with honour and ‘Vietnamisation’ withdrawal + close with USSR CCP to preserve the US’s prestige on the global stage.

3. Communism provided the organisation with brute force which allowed the Vietnamese people to resist the Diem regime and the escalating US presence.

● Necessary for structure of warfare → strikes

● Com party org +command → military operations + political strategies

● Propaganda gain community support

● Land reforms → those disillusioned with current soc+eco state in NV

4. Nationalism was of vital importance to the Vietnamese people, providing a movement of resistance against the USA for the North and an unwavering ideology for unity across the country.

● Cohesive doctrine to “independent and unified” Vietnam → Ho capitalised

● ‘Ca do’ gain peasant support against colonisers

● Force that “welded the North Vietnamese together”(Karnow)

● DiverseNLF rid Diem→”passionatley nationalistic and willing to make sacrifices”

● Compliance of civilians for moving supplies + collect intelligence

Explain why it took so long to achieve peace in Vietnam up to 1973

1. US nationalism and pride promoted a focus on upholding the international prestige of the US, influencing foreign policy and extending the war.

● Prestige significant factor in policies, US National Security Council ‘the US must… restore its prestige… by a new initiative in South East Asia’.

● Kennedy heavily concerned with legitimising US could not backtrack without “jeopardising the American government’s prestige”(Karnow).

● Johnson’s changing concern for US national prestige and a determination to ensure his own political survival, “nothing worse than losing to comm”

● Nixon’s ‘peace with honour and ‘Vietnamisation’ withdrawal + close with USSR CCP to preserve the US’s prestige on the global stage.

2. US anticommunism

3. Strats + Tactics

4. Viet nationalism

Evaluate the effectiveness of political, social, economic and military developments in North and South Vietnam

Despite the South having a stronger position in 1954, North Vietnam's rapid development proved more effective in preparing for the total, protracted nature of the Indochinese conflict.

1. Whilst both regimes were autocratic, Ho's consolidation served to build popular support, whilst the South became increasingly unstable.

● unsatisfactory Geneva, NV goal of "reunified and independent" Vietnam, inevitability of conflict.

● Ho strengthened grip through One Party dictatorship Lao Dong 'Uncle Ho,'

● opposition violently put down, 6000 people deported warning to 'Francophiles.'

● NV politically stable → enhance the existing morale

● Diem is US mouthpiece → unpopular, instability in the Southern State.

● near-identical system to the Lao Dong with Can Dao, its totalitarian made bad easier for the grassroots Vietcong to "promote civil disorder" (CIA Memorandum)

2. Economically, South Vietnam may have benefitted from US aid and naturally-favourable conditions, but the North's rapid economic recovery in the wake of widespread food and industrial shortages justifies their effectiveness over the completely dependent South.

● no fertile Mekong Delta, NV disadvantaged entering the 1960s.

● early periods of famine and overpopulation exacerbated by "hasty reform efforts" (Karnow) Agricultural Tribunals, develop economic self-sufficiency for a total war, counteracted economic setbacks, doubling of rice production by 1963.

● destroyed infrastructure from WWII - Ho "build [Vietnam] from the ground up," (Fall) w USSR aid

● successful construction of over 100 factories attributed to morale Vietnamese. $322 million US aid to SV was insufficient

● improved fo capitalist bourgeois in SV, the peasants no recompense for destruction of agriculturemass migration t cities and 50% unemployment rate.

3. The North also effectively improved social outcomes through land redistribution, reducing inequity which would continue to plague the South as it engaged in increasingly draconian persecution of religious minorities.

● comm policy, Ho redistributing 2.2million acres of land poor farmers, who had

● NV social effectiveness limited by the Agricultural Tribunals, a strategy to remove dangerous 'Francophiles' but "a repressive tool" (Fall) against land-owners.

● pretext to arrest ~100 000 French sympathisers, partially inhibited, still more effective in preparing for war than SV, where Diem prioritized the living conditions of a small, aristocratic, Catholic minority.

● 90% SV farmland f 2.2% of the population, Diem enhanced existing resentment towards the regime by compounding social inequality.

● SV ineffective social reforms worsened threat of the Vietcong, incentivising American 'advisors' relocate South Vietnamese civilians to Agrovilles,

● enlistment of 100 000 people to the Vietcong, undermining the AVRN's efforts as the guerrilla 'hide in plain sight' tactics of the NLF would become more effective

● Social instability was worsened persecution of non-Catholics, enlisting Buddhists and forcing them to destroy sacred temples which housed their families.

● Unsuccessful in turning religious minorities against their faith, turn the military against the government, increasing sympathetic towards NV in the leadup to an attritious conflict dependent on Homefront support.

4. Led by Machiavellian, Marxist-Leninist military strategist General Giap, the nationalistic Vietcong and NLF were more prepared for guerrilla warfare than the South - despite substantial military aid from the Americans.

● Building upon resentment invading paternalistic colonial power, Ho encouraged the enlistment of highly committed - and increasingly skilled - soldiers.

● instruction to treat civilians respectfully, ipropagandist re-education programs, Ho and Giap recognized the effectiveness of preparing, not for a conventional war, but a war that would be fought in the rugged terrain of the inhospitable jungle.

● construction of the NLF in 1960, NV capable of spreading unrest throughout SV, as resistance groups worked NV instruction to undermine Diem's leadership.

● Understanding the important of military subterfuge, the NLF extend their sphere of influence throughout 80% of the South Vietnamese countryside, despite - or perhaps in collaboration with - the continued military presence of the AVRN.

● Ultimately, whilst South Vietnam had access to almost unlimited supplies of conventional weaponry, helicopters, and eventually defoliants/napalm/bombs, these tools only served to further alienate villagers from the cause, and subsequently increasing the North's capacity for further infiltration.

To what extent did communism influence US policy toward Indochina between 1954-1964?

To a significant extent, anti-communism was the main driving force behind US policy towards Indochina between 1954-1964 as all presidents prioritised the prevention of the spread of communism to Indochina.

1. Extending Truman’s strategies, President Eisenhower deepened US involvement in Indochina by supporting anti-communists in Vietnam and expanding military presence due to his strong belief in preventing the spread of monolithic communism in Asia.

● ‘Falling Domino Theory’ in April 1954 fall of vietthen asia → “like a set of dominoes” (Eisenhower).

● fall Indo to ‘red’ would cost communication vital to US, →admin invest in Diem govt suppress comm US providing 80% of French military budget for Indochina.

● creation of(SEATO) under members agreed support indo → US’s desperation of intl support in preventing communist US $300 million secret war against the Pathet Lao from 1954-1959.

● "crusading against its foggy notion of an international Communist conspiracy"

2. In alignment with his predecessor’s preoccupation with the policy of containment, Kennedy continued to escalate involvement in Indochina, providing both military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and intensifying direct opposition to communist forces.

● Kennedy’s motivated by fear of monolithic from USSR

● Kennedy’s admin take strong anti-’red’ stance, campaign quote “the enemy is the Communist system itself”. + inheritance of anticomm pop

● policy of containment, Kennedy escalate mil and eco → support anti-comm

● Jan 1962 4,000 US advisers in RVN, 400 Green Berets train guerrilla and win peasantry, US commitment to comm containment in Vietnam “administration reiterated its resolve to stop Communism"(Karnow).

3. However, anti-communism was not the only direct influence on foreign policy as US nationalism and pride promoted a focus on upholding the international prestige of the US.

● prestige significant factor in policies, US National Security Council ‘the US must… restore its prestige… by a new initiative in South East Asia’.

● Kennedy heavily concerned legitimising American status Vietnam was the perfect place to ‘make our[American] power credible’.

● Kennedy heavily concerned with legitimising US could not backtrack without “jeopardising the American government’s prestige”(Karnow) main motive 1964

Assess the nature and consequences of US involvement in Indochina from 1960 to 1979. (HSC 2014)

US foreign policy under Johnson and Nixon was influenced by cold war communist beliefs to a certain extent, but other factors concerning US national prestige and personal political survival also had an influence on decision-making.

1. Add Eis+Ken policy to establish US anticommunist background

2. Johnson’s policy in Indochina was initially motivated by a combination of typical Cold War fears and was exacerbated by the growing strength of Hanoi.

● VP, believed US should fight communist ‘aggressors’ in SEA whatever the cost

● Believed in the domino theory

● Refused war bc scared of USSR + china involvement

● “he was especially sensitive to the jingoists who might brand him ‘soft on Communism’”(Karnow)

● “Nothing worse than”(johnson) losing to the communists

● initial policies motivated by cold war fears + strength of North, but consistent failures and resistance to his decisions resulted in a change in attitudes.

3. Johnson’s changing attitudes towards his policy making was due to concern for US national prestige and a determination to ensure his own political survival.

● Extremely patriotic in preserving US prestige →leaked pentagon papers revealed the motives in 1964 to wage war were 70% to preserve prestige with no humil

● Johnson’s changing concern for US national prestige and a determination to ensure his own political survival, nothing worse than losing to comm

● Didn’t want to be first president to lose war

● Divisions in admin with McNamara but Johnson kept escalating

● “defeat there would deal a blow to US ‘durability, resolution and trustworthiness”

4. Despite Nixon’s initial extreme anticommunism, a combination of factors changed his traditional stance, leading to the withdrawal of US troops and the establishment of a closer relationship to the Soviets and Chinese than any previous Cold War president had done.

● made his name as a politician because of his extreme anti-communism

● Tet was a shock to him and became a turning point → ‘Vietnamisation, withdraw

● ’war had to be ended ‘honourably’ for the sake of America’s global prestige

● emphasised that communism had changed no longer monolithic, → negotiation

● willingness to develop a relationshipUSSR and China to further divide the sino-soviet split that had emerged in place of monolithic communism in Asia

Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies and tactics used by the opposing sides during the Second Indochina War.

The strategies and tactics of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and National Liberation Front (NLF) were effectively executed, while US and South Vietnamese war strategies and tactics were flawed from the very beginning.

1. Johnson’s strategy to exert intensive military force on North Vietnam characterised by tactics such as ‘search and destroy’ missions to encourage abandonment of the insurgency in South Vietnam was largely ineffective in achieving its aims.

● ‘Search and destroy’ → unfamiliar terrain → easy to ambush

● Advanced tech → helicopter noises

● ARVN ‘clearing and holding’ questioning→ somewhat successful as VC would avoid without fight but eventually return

2. Alternatively, the NLF’s strategy to destabilise the Saigon government through exhaustion and internal collapse coupled with the tactic of attrition was significantly effective in pressuring the US into full withdrawal from Vietnam.

● Mostly guerilla but conventional when necessary → suited to exhaustion

● Agile offensives → ‘outmanoeuvre their opponents’ (Karnow

● Flexible structure of VC → “intimate knowledge of the terrain”(Karnow)

● attacking during the night effectively reduce fatalities → outlive in attrition

● ambush → underground tunnels which ran for over 1000 miles in SV sanctuary for troops, unexpected attacks → increasing weariness of enemy

3. The US strategy of intense military force with tactics such as extreme bombing campaigns counterproductively fortified opposition to the American cause.

● Rolling Thunder (75 mil L defoliants) → damage landscape +people

● Antipersonnel nature (unjust deaths) → sympatetic support for VC

● “Weren’t pro-Vietcong before… sure as hell were by the time {the US} left”

● Pit them against US/ARVN

4. However, the NLF’s strategy of subversion was effectively used, as it gained peasant support, thus achieving its aim of undermining the South Vietnamese government.

● Political propaganda and indoctrination through edu → freedom from colonial

● Peasant support through international outrage → domestic prop of ‘invaders’ → also erode support of US homefront

● Widely appealing to rural+urban → alienating”hearts and minds” from US

Assess the Impact of the Tet Offensive on the Outcome of the Second Indochina War

The Tet Offensive of 1968 was a pivotal turning point that disillusioned US public and administration towards the conflict, encouraging US withdrawal and ultimately leading to DRV victory in 19751. The unpredictable nature of the Offensive, although quickly suppressed and a failure militarily, allowed for a successful political victory which significantly contributed to the communist victory in 1975.

● 50000 NLF: 2600 US/ARVN fatalities →”stretched themselves thin”(Karnow)

● Showed capability to implement large campaign → shocked US

● 70000 communist invaded over 100 rural and urban(inpregnable)

● 13 provincial capitals of Mekong delta → seized political seats+disrupt paci prog

2. The political impacts of the Tet Offensive were immense, marking a dramatic change in US homefront public opinion

● Tet reached Saigon+US embassy → shocked US public

● ‘Credibility gap’ US admin claims and reality of losing war

● Newspapers+TV “unprecedented brutality”(Karnow)

● Execution of VC prisoner Gen Loan → contradictions in US policy

● Fuel antiwar sentiment

3. Tet eroded support within the Johnson administration, leading to disillusionment and divisions within the leadership causing change in policy and the beginning of peace negotiations.

● Gen Taylor, Sen McCarthy, shattered “the rosy picture of progress”(Foley)

● Long involvement → dec dem support, inc antiwar candidates

● Change in US policy to begin peace talks

● LBJ aim change from winning to “all favoured withdrawal in one form or another”

4. The aftermath of Tet was extremely significant as it shattered the belief of US/ARVN victory, encouraging Nixon to shift policymaking to ‘Vietnamisation and withdrawal

● 1967 won prep to escalate → shifted after Tet

● Deterioration of public+polmaking support “transformed the campaign”(McCarthy)

● Nixon want to “end the war ‘honourably’”(Karnow) → Kiss+Le paris peace 1973

5. Although the West saw Tet as a spectacular victory for the North, the Offensive was a serious setback for the NLF due to major military losses and its failure to spark uprisings in the South, leading to an ‘irretrievably weakened’ (Thompson) Vietcong.

● No more guerilla → shift to “conventional invasion”(Thompson) → saigon 1975

● Failed to achieve aim of sparking uprising

● Brutality met with bitter resistance “communst butchery in Hue”(Karnow)

Civilians in Vietnam

1. Impact on civilians in the North was that the leadership was able to mobilise the population against the USA and SV and thus strengthened and consolidated the communist regime established by Ho Chi Minh

● Established a one party state→civilian freedom reduced

● Continuing political propaganda → Indoctrination of civilians into the NVA

● Death of Ho in 1969→Pham Van Dong continued allegiance +commitment to communist regime

● Establishment of DRV and US involvement in SV→ NV paint Diem as puppet empire → unpopular, instability in the Southern State.

● able to present US involvement/invasion as a historic struggle against foreign oppression

● “If Mickey Mouse took power in Saigon, no-one would have noticed”(Fall)

● near-identical system to the Lao Dong with Can Dao, its totalitarian made bad easier for the grassroots Vietcong to "promote civil disorder" (CIA Memorandum)

● After the US withdrawal began, fearful of retribution/unwilling to live under communism, many thousands of South Vietnamese refugees fled. Many became the ‘boat people’ of 70s

2. Economic

● NV early periods of famine and overpopulation exacerbated by "hasty reform efforts" (Karnow) Agricultural Tribunals, develop economic self-sufficiency for a total war, counteracted economic setbacks, doubling of rice production by 1963.

● destroyed infrastructure from WWII - Ho "build [Vietnam] from the ground up," (Fall) w USSR aid

● successful construction of over 100 factories attributed to morale Vietnamese but $322 million US aid to SV was insufficient(Early 60s, SV net exporter of rice. 65, net importer)

● SV 5.8million peasants suffering from poverty after strategic hamlets,+ decline of US aid→ 33% unemployment + inflation

● Urbanisation grew 23% (1960-71) but industrial production decreased by 23% (so did agric. Production and yields per hectare)

● Returning to traditional export methods in 1975→ struggle to get it started → south indebted→ lower standard of living

● 1957, Diem called, ‘miracle man of Asia,’ by Eisenhower BUT by Second Indochina War, it was clear that the prosperity Diem was praised for was largely superficial and totally reliant on US aid, little of which reached rural areas.

● US “pumped Vietnam with more money than the country could absorb” (Karnow)

Mon’s notes from Meera’s Dorlan’s (Abigail’s) board notes!

1. Political

- Political indoctrination (tactics of the NLF) + mobilisation of population

- North - nationalism (communist allegiance despite death of HCM), political propaganda, est of one party state

- South - corruption (Mickey Mouse), Diem + instability = anti-US sentiment (rejection of leadership, incr support for North)

- Cambodia - state of perpetual fear (Heder)

- Both N + S relied on political oppression to keep power

- Foreign policy - Cambodia allowed US to drop bombs if they provided foreign aid - Comm forced King’s abdication (Laos)

- 3 faction political climate → always unstable therefore peace impossible 2. Social (short term + long term)

- Human cost - death rate, casualties

- Quote - Laos bombed back to the Stone Age (LAOS BOMBING) - Chronic illness (long term) - agent orange

- Relocation - strategic hamlets

- POWs + refugees

- Laotian refugees

3. Economic (+ environmental)

- 75M+ tonnes of defoliants dropped in Vietnam (damaged crops) - Laos bombing campaigns - “landscape resembled a moonscape” - Impact on farming = less economic yield (significant as was heavily agrarian) - SV dioxin levels are 100x normal

- 20M gallons of toxic herbicide spread on 6M areas of crops → - “Ecocide” (Olof Palme)

- Unexploded bombs - Cambodia

- allowed US to drop bombs if they provided foreign aid

- Abolished money + banks → reliance on the state for distribution and exchange only made through the state, so theoretically money had no use

4. Cultural

- Americanisation

- Cambodia - rejection of the West

OTHER

- Potential approach - Short term v long term in - Peoples Army

- Laos - supply route for the war

- N launched attack to help Pathet Lao

Anti-war movements in US and Aus

Anti War movements have traditionally been ascribed an inflated degree of credit for the US decision to withdraw from Vietnam given that there were many other factors and forms of opposition influencing US policy.

1. Awarding the anti-war movements credit for shaping US policy under Johnson, ignores a significant degree of powerful opposition within the establishment and the unpopularity of these movements within broader public opinion as it presented unpatriotic views and radical methods.

● 1964, antiwar had more distance themselves from radicals even if war worsened

● media “ungrateful, unpatriotic, foul-mouthed” (steigerwald) → initial minority

● Tet reevaluation of US policies as it “contributed to the growth of public

disaffection”(DeBenedetti).

● Johnson change bc divisions in admin opinion, not anti-war movements

2. Once in power, Nixon’s policies were not influenced by anti-war movements but he did take several political steps than can be linked to his desire to diffuse anti-war tension and maintain the support of broader public opinion.

● Nixon ‘peace with honour’ after Tet → exploited mass moratoriums, and turned public contempt for antiwar activists to his own political ends.

● antiwarsomewhat shape policies, yet, no direct change on admin policy “under no circumstances will I be affected whatever by it.”

● 1969‘Silent Majority’antiwar “vocal minority”humiliating US made hard for policies

● “had been successful - for the present, anyway - in containing antiwar movements”(Karnow) reveals the counterproductivity

● Kent state shooting in 1970

3. The geopolitical context of the Vietnam War meant that American intervention was limited from the outset making a withdrawal a strong possibility long before the anti-war movements gained momentum.

● Powerful figures “deeply skeptical” and “quietly opposed”(Steigerwald)

● Tru+ Eis viewed Ho worldwide communist aggression cautious from the start

● Hesitancy threat that China might enter Kennedy “balked at plunging into total war, a prospect he could not envision,” (Karnow).

● Full force never option not justify spreading thin for small country→risked ability USSR in Europ

● Nixon bombings increase American power by winning remain dominant →end monolithic communism

4. Whilst the anti-war movements did not significantly influence the policies of US withdrawal, it did keep the war from escalating at key points in the conflict’s history and pushing their government towards peace negotiations.

● Tet LBJ de-escalated as it exposed divisions highlighted flaws in his policy.

● Westmoreland 206000troops deny antiwar “it functioned as a veto force."(Gitlin).

● Nixon’escalation, Duckhook shelved, “tremendous influence”(secret) moratorium.

Why did the USA withdraw from Vietnam? (HSC 2022)

1. The geopolitical context of the Vietnam War meant that American intervention was limited from the outset making a withdrawal a strong possibility early into the beginnings of US involvement.

● Powerful figures “deeply skeptical” and “quietly opposed”(Steigerwald)

● Tru+ Eis viewed Ho worldwide communist aggression cautious from the start

● Hesitancy threat that China might enter Kennedy “balked at plunging into total war, a prospect he could not envision,” (Karnow).

● Full force never option not justify spreading itself so thin for insignificant country → risked ability to USSR in Europe

● Nixon bombings intention to increase American power by winning remain dominant →end of monolithic communism

2. Johnson’s strategy to exert intensive military force on North Vietnam was largely ineffective and counterproductively fortified opposition to the American cause in Vietnam, eventually leading to the withdrawal of US troops.

● ‘Search and destroy’ → unfamiliar terrain → easy to ambush

● Advanced tech → helicopter noises

● Rolling Thunder (75 mil L defoliants) → damage landscape +people

● Antipersonnel nature (unjust deaths) → sympatetic support for VC

● “Weren’t pro-Vietcong before… sure as hell were by the time {the US} left”

3. The political impacts of the Tet Offensive were immense, marking a dramatic change to US home front opinion and the subsequent disillusionment and division in the leadership contributed to the change in policy which led to the beginning of peace talks for US withdrawal.

● Tet reached Saigon+US embassy‘Credibility gap’ US admin claims and reality

● Newspapers+TV “unprecedented brutality”(Karnow) Execution of VC prisoner Gen Loan → Fuel antiwar sentiment

● shattered “the rosy picture of progress”(Foley)

● Long involvement → dec dem support, inc antiwar candidates

● LBJ aim change from winning to “all favoured withdrawal in one form or another” → peace talks

4. Although US failures were a significant factor, the competence of their North Vietnamese opponents also contributed to US withdrawal.

● United front through nat+com methodology

● Destabilise saigon through exhaustion+subversion→pressure US into withdrawal

● Flexible structure of VC → “intimate knowledge of the terrain”(Karnow)

● Peasant support through international outrage → domestic prop of ‘invaders’

● Widely appealing to rural+urban → alienating”hearts and minds” from US

- Fact that Nixon had to resort to illegal bombing - difficult to win within legal parameters

The failures of the US military were more significant than the Communist successes to the outcome of the conflict.

To what extent is this statement accurate? (HSC 2021)

To a moderate extent, the conflict in Indochina came to a close as a result of the failures of US military strategy but the North’s competency to capitalise off these failures led to communist success.

1. US strategy to exert intensive military force on North Vietnam was largely ineffective and counterproductively fortified opposition to the American cause, eventually contributing ot communist success.

● ‘Search and destroy’ → unfamiliar terrain → easy to ambush

● Advanced tech → helicopter noises

● Rolling Thunder (75 mil L defoliants) → damage landscape +people

● Antipersonnel nature (unjust deaths) → sympatetic support for VC

● “Weren’t pro-Vietcong before… sure as hell were by the time {the US} left”

2. North Vietnam was able to exploit these militaRy failures through guerilla warfare and gaining peasant support

● United front through nat+com methodology

● Destabilise saigon through exhaustion+subversion→pressure US into withdrawal

● Flexible structure of VC → “intimate knowledge of the terrain”(Karnow)

● Peasant support through international outrage → domestic prop of ‘invaders’

● Widely appealing to rural+urban → alienating”hearts and minds” from US

3. Despite the US’s efforts to provide military training, as well as arming them with modern American weaponry, ‘Vietnamisation’ could not suffice after US withdrawal, causing feelings of ‘betrayal’ in the South.

● Long involve → dec demo support, inc antiwar candidates

● Could also add info on US public antiwar leading to withdrawal

● Tet change to “all favoured withdrawal in one form or another”(Karnow)

● 1974 Hanoi doubled, US withdrawn, SV could not keep upSV reliant of US $$ → military operations compromised → Giap exploited

● Ford no uphold promise air aid “betrayed a trust the US had given Vietnam”Legro

● Air support →no necessary transport→no NVA counterattack

4. Nationalism was of vital importance to the VIetnamese people, providing a movement of resistance against ‘imperialist’ US and an unwavering ideology of unification which was further heartened and emboldened by US withdrawal.

● Cohesive doctrine to “independent and unified” Vietnam → Ho capitalised

● ‘Ca do’ gain peasant support against colonisers

● Force that “welded the North Vietnamese together”(Karnow)

● DiverseNLF rid Diem→”passionatley nationalistic and willing to make sacrifices”

● US withdrawal heartened if US unable”what hope was their for their puppet troops?”(Nguyen Van Ngh)

Impact on civilians in Cambodia and Laos

The conflict of the Second Indochina War and civil war in Cambodia greatly affected the civilians of cambodia and laos, compromising their lives, political freedom and quality of living

US involvement in the Second Indochina War aided the political destabilisation of Laos which subjected the citizens to death and political oppression.

● Although 3-faction political climate of Laos was consistently unstable, US intervention + NV’s through Ho Chi Minh trail → peace impossible

● 1962 Geneva agreement(called for ceasefire in Laos) → “proved that many other problems could be solved”(Khan Dan)

● But, US + NVA continued to use Laos as “more or less willing proxies”(Harpur) by bombing HCM trail

○ Laotian lives lost on vietnam conflict + political freedom and peace jeopardised

● Laos Son 719 in 1971(incursion into laos) → further jeopardisation of peace(US tried fighting NV in country not involved in conflict

● Pressures on rural peasants whose farms destroyed from incursions+ carpet bombing → rise of Laotian comm party

● Success of NV assisted emergence w comm taking power in 75 → 25% pop became refugees Furthermore, the conflict in Vietnam led to teh compromisation of Cambodian neutrality which protected the lives and freedoms of civilians and US bombing similarly destroyed lives and Cambodian farms

● Operation Menu 1969(100,000 bombs being dropped on Cambodia in secret missions codenamed ‘breakfast, lunch, dinner and snack’)

● Secrecy of operation →cvilian lives could be taken w/o retribution enabling continuous bombing of HCM

● Lon Nol coup against Sihanouk 1970(backed by US) established authoritative military regime → threatened civil liberties

● Continued US foreign aid during KR established dependency on US economy→famine after withdrawal

● 2 mil killed during war → reveals sheer extent of conflict on civilians causing loss of life that qould affect 3 gens of civilians

The Indochina conflict directly led to the establishment of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia ain the period from 1975-79 , who would cause even more loss of life, continued famine and impose a lock of political freedom on civilians.

● Dem Kampuchea declared 1975 ‘Year zero’ → implement radical Agrarian-Marxist model

● “We are building socialism without a model”(Pol Pot) → experimental nature of the regime → need for terror to maintain control + compensate for instability

● Evacuation of Phnom Penh led to 900K death + 20K patients wheeled out of hospital

● Western edicine banned → diseases, e.g. malaria, became rampant

● Implementation of 7 agri regions + eliminate classes → jeopardise indiv civilian freedom, however, conflict caused famine in Dem Kamp → reduced freedom response to need to produce rice

● 2mil cambodians died by 75(29% of pop mostly bc of famine/disease) → show lasting imapct of conflict

● Use of child soldiers(inspo from china 1966 cultural rev) exposed youth to conflict due to disillusionment with Sihanouk + US involvement in national affairs(dependent of economy)

● Rise of KR due to conflict → families split apart w some soldiers having to kill parents as ‘internal enemies’ that pressure KR’s rule

Account for the Communist victories in Cambodia and Laos

The Communist victories of the KR and Pathet Laos in Cambodia and Laos respectively were the aftermath of US involvement and political military blunders. The political and economic destabilisation of the former Lon Nol regime in Cambodia came from the struggle against American forces, and once exacerbated by their failures of leadership, the more competent Khmer Rouge saw a rise in influence and support.

The involvement of the US was a cornerstone in the destabilisation of the Lon Nol regime and hence, the radicalisation of the population to support the Communist movement of the Khmer Rouge.

● Secret bombing 69 promoted massive political dislocation in the country , ⅓ pop were refugees due to constant bombing

● 73 bombing devastated countryside + further radicalised pop to support KR due to anti-US sentiment

○ ¼ million tonnes dropped - KR ‘would not have won power without US economic + military destabilisation of Cambodia’ (Kiernan) + ‘used the bombing’s devastation and massacre of civilians as recruitment propaganda’

○ 1.85 billion US aid corrupted Cambodia gov (appear weak, puppet regime) - contrasted KR selfless image which identified with people’s interests

Lon Nol’s failure in leadership as well as his flawed response to further encroachments resulted in an erosion of his earlier support and contributed to growing support for the Khmer Rouge

● Early enthusiasm for Lon Nol regime

● Declining appeal - mistreatment of general pop, the expanding civil war caused massive social dislocation, hundred of thousands peasants forced from their lands

● Regime lost contact with people, under regime there was continual conflict (US interference)

● Low food prod + destruction of infrastructure led to more refugees, facilitating KR’s rise

Paragraph 3: Laos - US/SV involvement

● Laos subject to bombing to cut off HCM trail - Operation Barrel Roll begins 64

○ More bombs dropped on Laos than during the whole WWII - most bombed in world

○ Untriggered bombs continual threat to agricultural peasants, emotional + medical burden

○ ⅓ of bombs have failed to explode, kill about 500 people a year, only 1% Laotian land cleared

● Involvement of US and SV forces in Laos caused major damage and death, alienating country’s people away from supporting them

● ‘I hate Americans to this date. They bombed, burned and destroyed everything.’ (Laotian civilian)

Paragraph 4: Laos - NV assistance + political instability of Royal Lao gov

● 53 Pathet Lao initiated civil war in Laos, logistic support/training/supplies from Viet Minh

● Hostilities between pathet lao + gov increase - support decreases for Royal Lao as they are compliant with US air raids and bombings

● Intensification of US raids stalled some communist advances, however following 73 cessation of bombing the PL began to expand (aided with numbers + weaponry from Hanoi)

● Coalition gov established following 73 Paris PP - however PL acquires larger political support base in following years, in control over ⅔ of Laos

● PL position strengthened after SV + US defeat, rise of Khmer Rouge

● Cessation of US intervention - Lao People’s Democratic Republic formally established - consolidating PL political control of Laos with support of Vietnam’s People Army

Assess the impact on Cambodia of the Khmer Rouge’s attempt to implement its aims.

The Khmer Rouge’s attempt to implement its distorted communist ideology had a devastating and

all-pervasive impact on Cambodia as it enforced the brutal oppression of the entire nation

The act of severing contact with the Western world to achieve the Khmer Rouge’s vision of a purely communist society led to the eradication of essential modern influences, inhibiting Cambodia life.

● Rejection of international aid 4 self reliance and ‘purity’ of new Khmer society

● ‘Year zero’ which aimed to restore Cambodia to traditional past + maintain cultural purity

○ Electricity banned, primitive + hard manual labour NO machinery

● Removal of foreign influences and ideas - no trade, modern medicine (e.g. antibiotics) only natural remedies = poor standard of living

● 65% of teachers executed + half of high school students + French & English intellectual targeted = deterioration of intellectual life + cultural isolation

● Destroying of buildings (e.g. museums, cinemas, theatres) threatening to khmer culture

● “Cambodia was hermetically sealed off” (Lake)

While the Khmer Rouge aimed to achieve a self-reliant industrial society by increasing rice output, a real surplus was not achieved, instead having a devastating impact on civilian family and cultural life.

● Mass evacuation of Phnom Penh to force eradication of city life - 2 mil ppl forced out, those too slow shot - ½ mil ppl died of starvation

○ Terror - instillation of fear - opposition to KR unable to develop

● Aim: triple crop production to feed population + fund industrialisation - entire pop mobilised to build canals, embankments & grow rice using ancient methods with horrendous cost (thousands executed for not fulfilling obligations or dying due to lack of medical attention and exhaustion

● Families separated as work forces divided by gender and age, no private life as social activities were communal (e.g. sleep, eat, marriage) reinforcing state control and ownership

● Poor planning - mass failure of irrigation systems + drop in rice production = disease and famine e.g. cholera epidemic which killed more than 100 000

Pol Pot’s vision for Cambodia included a pure society and therefore sought to eliminate cultural and religious diversity to the detriment of civilian life and self-expression

● Everyone wore the same traditional black peasant garb, colourful symbol of westernisation and hence prohibited or death penalty - fear led to compliance

● Erosion of individualism, self only matters in context of rev and economic usefulness

● Minorities with religious + ethnic differences targeted - 114 mosques destroyed + Chinese arrivals killed

● ‘Both people and their way of life were subject to erasure’ (Tyner)

The Khmer Rouge’s determination to eliminate opposition led to paranoia regarding opposition to their goals, consequently devastating and terrorising the population.

● Soldiers ordered to assist rice production (showed discontent) exacerbated by failure of 1977 rice crops

● Purge first targeting soldiers + officials of old regime, neutralising them before attacking former allies

● Fear of disloyalty within KR - loyal party members captured in 67 purge to ensure political purity (indiscriminate, everyone suspect + subject to sudden arrest)

● Tuol Sleng tortures, more than 20 000 ppl with dehumanising methods (incl children) - prisoners confess supposed treason even if not responsible confirming KR suspicions + fuelling motivation to search for other traitors

● Confessions used to prove to KR leaders orders being carried out + results, used to placate insecurities

● Victims taken to Choeung Ek (killing fields) + clubbed to death, buried in mass graves - paranoia, pop governed by fear, many innocents died

● ‘The paranoia of the Party Centre had no limits’ (Chandler)

● 24% of population was purged

Though it cannot be disputed that the KR had brutal and destructive impacts on Cambodian society and its population, the instability of Indochina and the fragile economic, social and political situation should also be acknowledged.

● Military bombing conducted by the US - destruction of infrastructure + degradation of environment

● Nixon + Kissinger: “They chose to bomb Cambodia a neutral country back to the stone age” (Pilger)

● Illegal US bombing contributed to region’s instability and political uncertainty, resulting in KR takeover