“How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany” Reading

Who wrote: “How Authoritarian Governments Decide Who Emigrates: Evidence from East Germany” ?

Margaret Peters, Julian Michael, and Michael Miller

What is the main argument of the article regarding autocracies and emigration?

Autocracies strategically allow certain political opponents to emigrate to create a more loyal population, thus avoiding drawbacks of repression, co-optation, or economic decline

What unintended incentive does this emigration strategy create among citizens?

It incentivizes citizens to engage in opposition activities to secure permission to emigrate

How do autocracies respond to citizens applying for emigration based on opposition activities?

They punish dissidents who apply for emigration to screen out all but the most determined opponents

What dataset did the authors use to test their theory?

A dataset of over 500 randomly selected declassified emigration applications from east germanys state archives, ecompassing more than 20k pages

What was the likelihood of emigration approval for active opposition members in east Germany

Active opposition increased the likelihood of emigration approval but also led to punishment

How did East Germanys emigration policy treat pensioners and professionals?

Pensioners were more likely to secure exit, while professional were less likely, indication economic considerations in screenings

What is the targeted safety valve strategy in the context of autocracies?

It refers to regimes allowing political opponents to emigrate to reduce domestic opposition without relying solely on repression or co-optation

Why do regimes punish applicants before approving their emigration?

To prevent citizens from feigning dissent to secure exit, ensuring only the most determined opponents leave

What was the outcome for opposition applications in East Germay?

They were more likely to be granted exit, but faced punishment, such as surveillance or imprisonment, to prevent feigned dissent

How did the economic considerations shape East Germanys emigration policy?

The regime favored approving emigration for pensioners, who were seen as less economically valuable, while typically denying professionals to retain economically productive citizens

What is an example of the targeted safety valve strategy outside of East Germany?

Cubas 1980 Mariel Boatlift, where the government selectively allowed dissidents, criminals, and “undesirables” to leave

How does the state capacity influence the effectiveness of selective emigration policies?

Weak states may struggle to control borders, leading them to rely on passport restrictions, while low administrative capacity may result in group-based targeting rather than individual screening

How do global migration trends affect autocracies’ management of opposition?

Rising immigration restrictions in the global north are reducing emigration opportunities for dissidents, potentially altering how autocracies manage opposition

How did punishment for dissenters attempting to emigrate affect the remaining population?

Strategic emigration doest just remove dissidents; it intimidates others into compliance if they see opposition figures punished before departure