PLSC 117

Interests

What actors want to achieve from political action

3 basic categories of human interests

Power/Security, Economic/Material welfare, and ideological goals

Power/Security

Desire for power and ability to dominate others or as essential survival or human nature in a competitive international environment (means to an end)

Economic/Material Welfare

Political actors presumed to desire a higher standard of living or quality of life (long term goal)

Ideological Goals

Ideas often play a key role in shaping what actors want or believe to be good and desirable

State

Central authority that has ability to make and enforce laws, rules, and decisions within its territory

Failed State

When countries face breakdown of central authority

Sovereignty

Expectation that states have legal and political supremacy within its borders

Anarchy

No legal authority higher than or above the state to make and enforce laws that bind international actors

Interactions

Ways in which the choices of two or more actors combine to produce political outcomes

Two assumptions about interactions

(1) Actors behave with intention of producing a desired result
(2) Actors adopt strategies according to what they believe to be the interests/likely action of others

Strategic Interactions

Each actor's strategy depends on the anticipated strategy of another

Cooperation

When two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one actor better off without making any other actor worse (potential for mutual gain)

Cooperation Example

Example: A group of people decide to throw a party together because none can afford it on their own. This way they can enjoy the benefits of throwing a party. This is an example of what

Bargaining

Interaction in which actors must choose outcomes that make one better off at the expense of another (Incentive not to comply; zero-sum gain)

Bargaining Example

Example: two states want the same piece of territory. The more territory one side gets, the less the other side will get. This is an example of what

Coordination

Arises when actors coordinate their actions together and, once done, none receive any benefit from defecting

Coordination Example

Examples: All cars driving on the same side of the road to avoid crashing. This is an example of what

Collaboration

Arises if actors have an individual incentive to defect from cooperation, even though cooperation would be the most beneficial for everyone

Collaboration Example

Example: Prisoner's Dilemma, Nuclear Arms Race...these are examples of what

Public Goods

Products such as national defense, clean air and water, and eradication of communicable diseases

Two qualities of public goods

(1) others cannot be excluded from enjoying good if it is provided to one person
(2) quantity of good is not diminished if one person consumes or benefits from it

Private Goods

Products that only one person can possess and consume

Private Good Example

Example: A sandwich is available to you and not automatically to others and if you eat it it is not available to be eaten by others, making it what kind of good?

Collective Action Problem

When actors have incentives to collaborate but each acts with the expectation that others will pay the costs of cooperation

Collective Action Problem Example

Example: Everybody wants to save the Earth from further damage but only a small fraction of those people are willing to make a change in order to achieve that goal while others are willing to continue their environmentally damaging actions to serve their own interests

Free Ride

To fail to contribute to a public good while benefiting from the contributions of others. Leads public goods to be provided at lower level than what is desired by other actors

Factors that affect cooperation

Iteration, Linkage, and Information

Iteration

Repeated interactions with the same partner

Iteration Example

Example: Actors can prevent one another from cheating by threatening to withhold cooperation in the future

Linkage

Linking of cooperation on one issue to interactions on a second issue

Linkage Example

Example: Defection of military affairs might be punished by withdrawing cooperation on other issues

Information

When actors lack knowledge about the actions taken by another party

Information Example

A state might defect under the mistaken belief that it can get away with it because it doubts whether one party will abide by its terms

Power

The ability to get the other side to make concessions and to avoid having to make concessions oneself

Compulsory Power

Ability of an actor to compel an other in certain ways

Reversion Bargaining

Outcome that occurs when no bargain is reached

Reversion Bargaining Example

if a car buyer and prospective seller cannot make a deal, the buyer keeps her money and the seller keeps the car.

3 ways to shift the reversion outcome

Coercion, Outside Options, and Agenda Setting

Coercion

Use ability to impose costs on others to demand more favorable bargain than they would otherwise receive

Outside Options

The actor with the better outside option can use its leverage, the threat of leaving negotiations, to get a better deal (Used after bargaining fails)

Agenda Setting

Actions taken before or during bargaining that make the reversion outcome more favorable for one party

Agenda Setting Examples

Examples: Sponsoring legislative proposals, calling public attention to issue, and cajoling individual legislators

Institutions

Set of rules, known and shared by the relevant community, that structure interactions in a certain way.

International Economic Institutions

WTO (World Trade Organization), IMF (International Monetary Fund), and WB (World Bank)

Political Institutions

United States Congress and United Nations

War

An event by at least two parties that reaches a minimum threshold (1,000 deaths) of severity which uses the organized military force

Interstate War

A war where the main participants are states

Why wars happen

(1) War is inevitable result of international anarchy
(2) decision makers inaccurately estimate their chances of winning or the costs that will have to be paid
(3) war serves the interests of influential groups within the state

What do states fight over

(1) territory
(2) policies
(3) regime type

Crisis Bargaining

Interaction where at least one actor threatens to use force if its demands are not met

Coercive Bargaining

The use of threats to advance specific demands in a bargaining interaction

Bargaining Range

Set of deals that both parties in a bargaining interaction prefer over the reversion outcome

Bargaining Range Example

Example: If the reversion outcome is war, this is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war.

Status Quo

The factor which determines how much a state is willing to go to war or not

Status Quo Example

If a state is already getting as much as it expects to get through war, then nothing will be gained by threatening war to change this and vise versa

Compellence

Intended to coerce the target state into making a concession or changing current policy

Compellence Threats Example

Example: Threats which take the form of "give me y, or else" or "stop doing x, or else"

Deterrence

Used to preserve the status quo by threatening the other side with unacceptable costs if it seeks to alter the current relationship.

Deterrent Threats Example

Example: takes form of "don't do x, or else"..."don't attack me, or I'll fight back"

Extended Deterrence

Occurs when a state seeks to protect a friend

Extended Deterrence Example

Example: "Don't attack my ally X, or else"

General Deterrence

The effort to deter attacks on one's own country

Incomplete Information

Arises in crisis bargaining when states cannot readily observe or measure the key political and military factors that determine their adversaries' expected value for war

Capabilities

The states' physical abilities to prevail in war

Capabilities Example

Example: Number of troops a state can mobilize, number/quality of military equipment, economic resources it has to sustain the war effort, quality of a country's military leadership and strategies

Resolve

Determines whether a state is willing to fight and also how much of the state's potential capabilities would actually be mobilized in the event of war

Total War

States mobilize their entire military and economic resources

Limited War

States fight with something less than their full potential, often because their aims are limited or of relatively low value

Risk-Return Trade-Off

In crisis bargaining, the trade-off between trying to get a better deal and trying to avoid a war. Between these two extremes, a state can reduce the risk of war by making generous offers which stray further from their ideal outcome

Credible Threat

Threat that the recipient believes will be carried out

Credible Commitment

Commitment/Promise that the recipient believes will be honored

What makes credibility hard to achieve

(1) carrying out on threats is costly
(2) conflicting interests at the heart of a bargaining interaction

Brinkmanship

Strategy in which adversaries take actions that increase the risk of accidental war, with the hope that the other will lose its nerve first and make concessions

Brinkmanship Crisis

Each side bids up the risk of war until one side decides to give in or they both go down

Brinkmanship Strategy

States bid up the risk of accidental war to prove their resolve in hopes that the adversary will 'blink' and in doing so, war is avoided

Audience Cost

Negative repercussions which arise if a leader does not follow through on their threat

Two audiences which can impose costs

(1) international audience
(2) leader's own country

Military Mobilization

Gives states the material it needs to back up their threats. Could persuade adversary to yield, they can also provoke the other side to strike first

Preventative War

War fought with the intention of preventing an adversary from becoming stronger in the future. Arise because a state whose power grows stronger can't commit to not use that newfound power over the other state and demand new deals/promises

First Strike Advantage

Arises when military technology, strategies, and/or geography give a significant advantage to whichever state attacks first in war. Exists when there is considerable benefit to being the first to launch an attack

Preemptive War

War fought with the anticipation that an attack by the other side is imminent. Neither side will make concessions through bargaining and often both are eager to strike first after failed negotiations

Divisible Goods

A good is divisible if there are ways to split it into smaller shares

Divisible Goods Example

Examples: 100 pennies divided by a group of people; the pennies will still hold their value

Indivisible Goods

Cannot be divided without destroying its value

Indivisible Goods Example

Example: $1 bill divided by a group of people; the dollar bill will no longer hold its value

General Interest

Can be referred to as national interests or interests that are so widely shared that they could be attributed to that state as a whole

General Interest Example

Example: A country's security and economic well-being is an example of what

Narrow Interests

Particularistic interests. Interests held only by a relatively small number of actors within the country

Narrow Interest Example

Example: Particular business, ethnic minority group, individuals within the government are examples of what

Domestic Institutions

Help determine who runs government, how decisions are made, how disputes are resolved, how much power an individual leader has to make decisions, and which actors' interests are taken into account

4 categorical actors of domestic interests

(1) leaders who make foreign policy decisions
(2) organized groups which have enough information/resources to influence decisions made by political leaders
(3) interest groups
(4) general public

Interest Groups

can influence foreign policy in a manner that furthers their particular interests

Interest Groups Example

Example: Companies, groups with companies, and ethnic lobbies

Organized Groups Example

Example: military, diplomatic corps, and intelligence agencies

Diversionary Incentive

Temptation to spark an international crisis in order to rally public support at home

Diversionary Theory

Conflict is more likely to be initiated by leaders after an election as opposed to right before it

Net Cost

Total costs to both states minus the additional political benefit

Military-Industrial Complex

An alliance between military leaders and the industries that benefit from international conflict, such as arms manufacturers

Interest Groups

Interest groups can influence foreign policy in a manner that furthers their particular interests