Anomalous Monism and Multiple Realizability

This set of vocabulary flashcards covers the key concepts, philosophical accounts of causation, and major figures mentioned in the lecture on Donald Davidson’s anomalous monism.

Anomalous monism

Donald Davidson's view which holds that while every mental event is a physical event (monism), there are no lawful regularities relating mental and physical phenomena (anomalism).

Multiple realizability

The functionalist principle that mental phenomena, such as a memory or a smell, can be realized by many different possible physical states, including different brain states or even non-biological compositions.

Counterfactual account

A theory of causation where $x$ causes $y$ is interpreted to mean that were it not for $x$, $y$ would not have occurred.

Deductive nomological account

A theory of causation associated with Carl Hempel which suggests that given a cause $x$ and the laws of nature, the effect $y$ must necessarily follow through a lawful regularity.

Tokens

Particular events or specific instances, such as a specific belief or brain state held by an individual at a specific moment in time.

Types

Categories of events, properties, or universals, such as the general category of 'pain' or the 'belief that this is true' as opposed to a specific instance of it.

Substance monism

Also referred to as physicalism, it is the belief that every mental state token can be redescribed as a physical state token.

Epiphenomenalism

A view often attributed to Davidson by Jangwon Kim, suggesting that mental state types are not real because they lack causal powers and cannot cause physical events.

Alexander's dictum

A principle named by Jangwon Kim after Samuel Alexander, stating that for mental state types to be real is just for them to have causal powers.

Nearest possible world

A concept used in counterfactual causation to evaluate alternative possibilities by looking at the most realistic world where the cause $x$ does not hold to see if the effect $y$ also fails to occur.

Jangwon Kim

A philosopher who argues that Davidson's anomalous monism essentially embraces epiphenomenalism because causation requires lawful regularities that Davidson denies exist between mental and physical types.

Terry Gorgon

A philosopher who suggests that determining the nearest possible world can rely on contextual factors rather than strictly appealing to lawful regularities.