Anomalous Monism and Multiple Realizability

Introduction to Anomalous Monism and Multiple Realizability

• Context: Lecture 3.2 focuses on Anomalous Monism, a philosophical position held by Donald Davidson.

• Foundation: The view builds upon the concept of multiple realizability, which was discussed in previous sessions.

• Functionalist Perspective: Functionalists argue that mental phenomena are multiply realizable, meaning the same mental state can be produced by different physical substrates.

  • Analogy of Currency: Just as currency can be realized in various forms—such as gold, paper, or electronic digits—mental states can be realized by different physical states.

  • Brain States: A specific mental state, such as the smell of sweetness, might be realized by "brain state 1" at a specific time, but by a slightly different set of neurons at a later time.

  • Inter-Subjectivity: Memories (e.g., a memory of nine eleven) may be realized by different brain states in different individuals.

  • Alien Life Forms: It is conceivable that alien life forms could have identical experiences, thoughts, or beliefs as humans, even if their brains are composed of minerals rather than "squishy pink stuff."

  • Interspecies Variation: Pain might differ in its physical realization between humans and animals, or even between different humans, while remaining categorized as the same mental state (pain).

Functionalism: Role versus Realization

• Categorization: What defines a mental state (e.g., pain, a smell, a memory, or a belief) is the functional role it plays within a system, rather than the specific way it is physically realized.

• Implication: Taking multiple realizability seriously necessitates a deeper investigation into how this affects models of mental causation.

Two Accounts of Causal Explanation

To understand Davidson's view, one must distinguish between two dominant accounts of causal explanation used over the last fifty years.

1. The Counterfactual Account

• Definition: In this account, $x$ causes $y$ means that "were it not for $x$, $y$ would not have occurred."

• Examples:

  • Speech: Speaking causes a listener to hear something because, were the speaker not speaking, the listener would not hear anything.

  • Nature: The sun causes plants to grow because, were it not for the sun, the plants would not grow.

  • Household: Putting dishwasher liquid in a dishwasher causes dishes to get clean because, were it not for the liquid, the dishes would remain dirty.

• Intuition: Most ordinary cases of cause and effect can be rephrased in these counterfactual terms.

2. The Deductive Mammalogical (or Demological) Account

• Origin: This view is associated with Carl Hempel.

• Definition: Given $x$ (the cause) and the laws of nature, $y$ (the effect) necessarily follows.

• Requirement: Causation requires a lawful regularity or a specific law of nature that holds between the two events.

• Example (The Dishwasher):

  • Fact $x$: Putting in dishwasher liquid.

  • Background Conditions: The presence of a functioning dishwasher, water, and dirty dishes.

  • Laws of Nature: The chemical composition of the liquid and the grime on the dishes.

  • Output: On this account, the outcome of clean dishes follows necessarily because of these laws.

The Distinction Between Tokens and Types

• Tokens: Particular, individual events (e.g., the specific belief a person holds at this exact moment).

• Types: Properties, categories of events, or universals (e.g., the general category of "belief," "pain," or "experience").

• Mapping: Holders of multiple realizability believe:

  • Every mental state token can be redescriped as a physical state token (a specific brain state at a specific time).

  • Mental state types cannot be redescriped as physical state types because there is no natural pattern in the brain that perfectly corresponds to a general category like "belief."

Defining Anomalous Monism

• Donald Davidson's Theory: Davidson argues there are no laws holding between types of mental states and types of brain events.

• Absence of Lawful Connection: Because mental states are multiply realized in infinite ways, there is no lawful regularity relating the mental type (e.g., pain) to a specific brain state type.

• Structure of Laws:

  • There are laws relating mental event types to other mental event types.

  • There are laws relating different brain events to one another.

  • There are laws relating particular brain states to particular mental states.

  • Crucial Exclusion: There are no laws relating types of mental events to types of brain states.

• Terminology:

  • Monism: Refers to substance monism or physicalism (everything is physical).

  • Anomalism: Meaning "no laws" (specifically, no psychophysical laws).

The Problem of Epiphenomenalism

• The Challenge: If causation requires lawful regularities (as per the deductive account), and there are no laws relating the mental and the physical, it seems there can be no cause-and-effect relationship between them.

• Jangwon Kim's Critique: Jangwon Kim argues that this leads to epiphenomenalism—the view that mental states are real but have no causal power over the physical world.

  • Alexander's Dictum: Named after Samuel Alexander, this principle states that for mental state types to be considered "real," they must possess causal powers.

Defending Davidson: The Counterfactual Defense

• Premise: One can defend Davidson by arguing that the need for lawful regularities is only required by the deductive demological account.

• Counterfactual Alternative: If one adopts the counterfactual account, mental causation remains possible without laws.

  • Application: One could say, "Were it not for my belief and my desire, my action would not have occurred," without needing a law to dictate that the action must follow.

• Comparison of Plausibility:

  • Model A (Deductive): Belief + Desire + Law = Necessary Action (e.g., going to Vegas).

  • Model B (Counterfactual): Action depends on Belief/Desire (e.g., "If I didn't think I'd make money in Vegas, I wouldn't go").

The Problem with Counterfactuals and "Nearest Possible Worlds"

• Alternative Possibilities: To say "were it not for $x$, $y$ wouldn't happen," we must look at the nearest possible world where $x$ does not exist and see if $y$ still happens.

• Determining Nearness: We do not consider every logically possible world (e.g., an infinite amount), only "realistic possibilities."

  • Nearby World: A world where one simply lacks a belief or is more realistic about their chances in Vegas.

  • Distant World: A world where Godzilla destroys Las Vegas or the city disappears into a black hole. These are possible but not "nearby."

• The Role of Laws: Jangwon Kim and David Lewis argue that the "distance" to a possible world is determined by lawful regularities. A world that violates more laws of nature is considered further away.

• Conclusion of the Critique: If we need laws of nature to determine which worlds are "nearest," and Davidson claims there are no laws between the mental and physical, then we cannot determine the distance of worlds to validate counterfactual claims.

  • This implies that maintaining anomalous slowness (anomalous monism) while using a counterfactual account of causation remains problematic.

Questions & Discussion

• Note on Terry Gorgon: The lecturer mentions that some, like Terry Gorgon, argue we should consider contextual factors rather than lawful regularities to determine the nearest possible world, which might allow Davidson some room to maneuver.

• Looking Forward: The lecture concludes by transitioning to Jangwon Kim's exclusion argument, which is considered one of his most famous contributions to the field.