IR Final Exam Review

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177 Terms

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Anarchy

There is no authority above the state. Absence of a word government.

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Consequence of an Anarchy (realism)

Self-help, zero-sum game. International institutions are temporary and won’t last long

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How do states behave in an anarchy?

security/ power maximizes, balance of bandwagon, may initiate conflict. States are unitary actors and behave the same way to maximize survival.

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Is international system really anarchic?

states should exercise full sovereignty. Example of Pompeo calling for end to abuses in China

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Hierarchy

Alternative explanation to anarchy, the international system is hierarchical, not anarchical. Any system through which actors are organized into vertical relations of super (dominant) and subordination. Dominant states and subordinates exist

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How does a hierarchy work?

Dominant states provide a political order of value to the subordinate state sufficient to offset the subordinates loss of freedom. In return, the subordinate confers legitimacy on the dominant state to exert necessary restraints and punish compliance ( work order since WWII).

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Role of dominant states in a hierarchy

Providing an order (ex. Pursue free trade (WTO), international cooperation (IOs, treaties), and democratic values (UN)

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What are the measurements of dominance in a hierarchy?

Security (military bases, alliances), Economy (trade dependence, exchanging rates), authority (exchange freedom for social order)

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International Institutions

the formal and informal practices the constitutive appropriate behavior in world politics. Similar to the international regime.

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V. International Organizations

Ways states arrange themselves for promoting cooperative an collaborative practice. International institutions include military alliances, international law, treaties, agreements, guidelines

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V. Regime

A set of formal or informal rules and procedures that regularize behavior. International institutions are similar to international regimes

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What does pacta sunt servanda mean?

Pacts must be kept

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What does Rebus sic stantibus mean?

As things stand

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Pacta sunt servanda v. Rebus sic stantibus

International law vs domestic law. International law lacks a constitution and centralized government. Enforcement systems exist (UNSC,ISS,WTO) but their effectiveness can vary. States keep promises if it aligns with their interests (rebus sic stantibus)

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What are the problems of international institutions?

Weaker than domestic laws. States keep promises if keeping promises aligns with their interests.

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Collective Action problem

(multilateral prisoner’s dilemma): International order an cooperation in international institutions are collective goods (non-rivalry, non-exclusive), Collective action problems can arise, leading to free riding.

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Robert Axelrod’s tournament

Experiment in 1980 testing strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma, suggesting iteration makes defection difficult

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What is bargaining?

The process by which two or more parties attempt to settle on the terms of an exchange. Process of arriving at mutual agreement involving issues at stake.

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Bargaining issues related to war

Territorial disputes, policy disputes, and regime disputes.

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How does war relate to bargaining?

War is a continuation of bargaining; it ends when a deal is struck.

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What are the key assumptions for bargaining?

War is costly; there is always some peaceful deal preferable. Example: Mexican – American War.

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When does Bargaining fail?

Incomplete information,commitment problems, and issue indivisibilities.

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What is incomplete information?

States have poor information about one another’s willingness and ability to go to war. Can lead to yielding too little or demanding too much. Poker analogy, private information. Unknowns include Capabilities (physical ability to win) and Resolve (willingness to fight).

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What are commitment problems?

States may have difficulty in making credible promises not to revise the terms of a deal/treaty later. Common in the absence of enforcement. Reluctance to make concessions if adversary becomes stronger.

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What are issue indivisibilities?

A good that cannot be divided without destroying its value. Indivisibility is usually socially constructed. Example: Jerusalem.

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What are the 5 mechanisms provide by international institutions that solve bargaining failure?

Lowering transaction costs, monitoring, creating reputational costs, lengthening the time horizon, and issue linkage

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Lowering Transaction Costs

Institutions are centralized, members share information, economies of scale. Changes bargaining range.

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Monitoring

Combined with reputational costs, enforces commitment. Solves asymmetric information problems; states must provide information to enter institutions.

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Creating Reputational Costs

Providing information creates costs of violation. Addresses commitment problems.

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Lengthening the time horizon (shadow of the future)

Changes payoffs in commitment and invisibility outcomes. Iteration makes defection difficult/costly an creates opportunity to share future outcomes

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Issue Linkage

Links multiple issues (economy, social, military, political). Creates greater costs for defection. Can create collective identity.

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Types of IGO’s

General Purpose + Universal Membership (League of Nations, UN). General Purpose + Restricted Membership (EU, OAS, AU, British Commonwealth). Limited Purpose + Universal Membership (IMF, World Bank, WHO, ILO). Limited Purpose + Restricted Membership (NATO, CSTO, Mercosur, ASEAN).

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Military Alliance

states that behave as a coalition, formalized by a writtentreaty, for purposes of military security

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V. Alignment according to military alliance

States share the same interests and cooperate without signing a formal agreement.

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Types of military alliance

Defensive, Offensive, Neutral, Non-aggression, Consultation. Pacts are not mutually exclusive.

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Alliance-war relationships

conflicts within an alliance and conflicts with non-allies

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Conflicts within an alliance

Alliance makes war less likely (increased knowledge, lowers uncertainty, helps bargaining). Alliance makes war more likely (anticipated divergence in foreign policy, successful deterrence emboldens allies towards secondary concerns).

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Conflicts with non-allies

Alliances makes war less likely (Balance of power theory, deterrence, enhances credibility, changes bargaining range). Reliability and credibility are key to deterrence. Alliances serve as costly signals (sunk costs, audience costs). Allies do as promised 75% of the time. Alliances makes war more likely (Generate counter alliances, expand bilateral conflicts, embolden alliance partners towards aggression)

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League of Nations

WWI occurred because balance of power. Woodrow Wilson advocate for international institutions and a collective security system.

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United Nations

An example of a collective security organization. Institutions facilitate cooperation. All states have common interest in preventing war/aggression. Membership is universal. Members renounce the use of force to settle disputes. Promise to use force/punishments collectively on aggressor. Increases costs of war and reduces commitment problems. Do not form security alliances (for collective security purposes). Sought to prevent violence within states (e.g., genocide).

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What are the Missions and Policies of the UN

Peace-enforcement, peacekeeping, and conflict management.

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Peace- enforcement (UN)

Establishes peace among warring parties (Chapter VII operations). Example: Korean War (UNSC authorized assistance).

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Peacekeeping (UN)

Maintains peace after interstate or civil war. Good success record, especially post-Cold War. Reduces probability of ceasefire failure (by 85% in interstate, 60% less likely renewed fighting in civil wars). Higher number of peacekeepers reduces civilian deaths in civil wars.

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Conflict Management (UN)

Mediation, adjudication, etc.

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Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine

2005 UN initiative: State responsibility to protect population from atrocities; international community responsibility to assist state; international community responsibility to intervene if state fails and peaceful measures fail.

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USNC

10 non permanent members, 5 permanent members, Decisions require majority support, including unanimous support from the P5, Only the P5 nationals have veto power; resolutions require 9 yes votes to pass

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What are the 10 non permanent members of the USNC?

Rotating seats, two-year term, elected by UN General Assembly. Current members listed.

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Who are the 5 permanent members (P5) of USNC?

US, Britain, France, Soviet Union/Russia, and China.

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Advantage of USNC

Reduces costs of agreement, ensures strongest powers back it.

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Disadvantages of the USNC?

Status quo biased towards inaction or in favor of P5 allies. P5 vetoes hampered peacekeeping in the Cold War.

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Three pillars of Kantian peace (Kantian Tripod for Peace

Democracy (Democratic Peace): Republican forms of government domestically.

International Organizations: Federation of free states.

Economic interdependence/ Trade: Universal hospitality & a spirit of commerce.

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Francis Fukuyama End of History Thesis
Triumph of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.
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Democratic Peace
No two fully mature democracies have ever fought an interstate war against each other
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Democracy
A political system in which candidates compete for political office through frequent, fair elections in which a sizable portion of the adult population can vote. Includes contestation and participation. Liberal democracy often includes protections of civil/political rights
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Immanuel Kant theory of Perpetual Peace
Democracies won't fight each other because citizens must consent and they pay the costs of war. Interests of ruler and ruled are not always aligned. Democratic government aligns interests (ruler accountable to people via elections). Representative institutions can slow or stop war decisions
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Structural/institutional constraints model of Democratic Peace
Accountability (elections), Separation of powers slows war decision. Democratic leaders face higher costs from war. Selectorate theory suggests dem leaders are more selective about starting wars. Explains why democracies win wars more often (Lake 1988: 80.9%). Explains why democracies might target weaker adversaries.
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Normative explanation of Democratic Peace
Nations follow the same norms of conflict abroad as domestically, expect others to do the same. Findings support this: stable democracies with less domestic violence are less likely to engage in MIDs with other democracies; leaders seek negotiations for border disputes; democracies are open to legalistic dispute settlement tools, accept international court jurisdiction, turn to IOs to settle disputes.
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Informational Explanation of Democratic Peace
Democratic institutions reduce information problems, are more transparent, send credible signals in crises (targets back down). Transparency reduces risk of preemptive war between democracies because neither can mobilize forces in secret.
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Rational explanation of Democratic Peace
Democracies are satisfied states with similar interests. Common interests with hegemonic states (UK, US). Less likely to fight about territory. Strong economic ties (liberal peace), trade more. Democratic peace strongest among economically developed states.
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Monadic: Are democracies more peaceful overall?
Findings are mixed; some find no difference, others find democracies are more pacific overall.
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Dyadic: Are two democracies more peaceful in their relations with each other vs. non-democracies?
Findings are relatively clear: No two mature democracies have fought a war against each other. Much less likely to fight MIDs against each other than autocratic or mixed dyads.
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Systemic: Is a world with more democratic states more peaceful?
Increasing percentage of democratic states decreases the percentage of states fighting wars. Strong effect, pacifying effect strengthening over time. Some find an inverted U relationship.
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Criticism of the Democratic Peace

Democratizing states are more war-prone than established autocratic states.

Regime change (all types) increases states’ involvement in interstate conflict. Incomplete democratic transitions are more dangerous.

Democracies may have been peaceful due to shared interests during the Cold War.

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Should Democracy be Imposed?

Bush doctrine logic for invasion of Iraq.

Evidence is not favorable: Externally imposed democracies often fail. Military interventions often do not result in regime change. Economic sanctions do not improve democracy levels and may reduce them.

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International political economy (IPE)
The realm of combined political and economic behavior, as well as outcomes, taking place among state and nonstate international actors.I
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International political economy (IPE) topic
International trade and monetary system, international development.
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Interdependence
Globalization increases both sensitivity and vulnerability
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Sensitivity
How quickly changes by one actor bring about changes in another, and how great the effects are
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Vulnerability
Measured by the costs imposed on an actor by external events, which they must absorb because they cannot pursue alternative policies to minimize costs.
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Relationship between sensitivity, vulnerability, and interdependence
States with high sensitivity and vulnerability to each other have high interdependence
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Mercantilism
Exports > imports (trade surplus). Absolute gain < relative gain. Government interference and aid are indispensable
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Assumptions of Mercantilism
Rise of nation-states led to security focus; anarchy system is zero-sum, wealth equals power; states must protect their people from economic and political threats
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Key Scholar of Mercantilism
Hamilton
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Autarky
minimizing trade for domestic production
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Protectionism
restricting imports to protect domestic industries
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Methods of protectionism
Tariffs (taxes/duties on imported goods), Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) like quotas (control amount of imports). Current examples: US tariffs on China, retaliatory tariffs. Average tariff rates have been decreasing (1988-2015)
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Economic liberalism
Markets coordinate economic activities. Competition regulates, consumer self-interests motivate. Free trade should be allowed. Free trade leads to economic growth and efficiency. Division of labor (export what you're good at, import what you're not). Positive sum game, not zero-sum
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Assumptions of Economic Liberalism
Nations are best off when the role of the state in the economy is minimized. Fear of abusive state power. Individual freedom in the marketplace is the best alternative to abusive state power for resource allocation.
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Key Scholar of Economic Liberalism
Adam Smith (The Wealth of Nations)
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Absolute advantage v. comparative advantage
Better to buy a commodity cheaper from abroad with produce of own industry.
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International trade regime
Set of formal or informal rules and procedures that regularize behavior in world politics.
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First basic period of International Trade Regime
Rise (1846-1913, Mercantilism → economic liberalism)
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Second basic period of International Trade Regime
Fall (1919-1939, high protectionism)
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Third basic period of International Trade Regime
Rise (1950-, GATT/WTO)
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Inter war period of International Trade Regime
Beggar-thy-neighbor policies (extreme protectionism)
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Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (US, 1930)
Raised tariffs significantly, contributing to a large decline in international trade.
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Post WWII system for International Trade
Bretton Woods System (1944) aimed to restore stability and growth by creating international institutions with the US as hegemon
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GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 1948)
Backup plan after the International Trade Organization (ITO) was rejected by US Congress. Provided structure for regulating international trade system. Mechanism to prevent countries from reintroducing protectionism.
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Limitation of GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, 1948)
Toothless enforcement authority, compliance depended on responsibility.
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WTO (World Trade Organization, 1995-)
Permanent institution, more ambitious and wider coverage than GATT. Ensures compliance through the Disputes Settlement Panel (DSP). More legalized. Does trade negotiations, implementation/monitoring, dispute settlement.
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First possible relation between trade and peace
Trade promotes peace. Institutionalism (Neoliberal, Economic Liberalism). Trade raises the costs of war. States are deterred from conflict with trading partners due to fear of losing welfare gains from trade. Assumes states are rational and war disrupts trade/reduces profits. Expected utility of fighting declines as trade increases. Empirical finding: Economic interdependence has negative and significant effects on MID involvement
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Second possible relation between trade and peace
Symmetric trade causes peace, asymmetric trade causes conflicts. Neo-marxist view. Trade dependence can impoverish less powerful nations, decrease welfare, and exacerbate inequality. Asymmetric trade may heighten tensions
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Third possible relation between trade and peace
Trade causes conflicts. Marxist-Leninist, Realist theories. Colonialism/imperialism involved military force with trading strategies. Conflict occurs over scarce resources. Closer ties could exacerbate conflict (increased opportunity)
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Fourth possible relation between trade and peace
Trade is irrelevant to conflict and peace. Classic realist position. Trade gains could be used for military purposes
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Exchange rates
Price of some foreign currency expressed in terms of a home (or domestic) currency
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Appreciation (overvalued, risen, strengthened)
When the home exchange rate falls (fewer home units needed for foreign unit). Imports cheaper, exports more expensive
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Depreciation (devalued, undervalued, fallen, weakened)
When the home exchange rate rises (more home units needed for foreign unit). Exports cheaper, imports more expensive (can lead to high inflation).
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Floating (flexible) Exchange rate regime
Exchange rate fluctuates in a wider range, government makes no attempt to fix it.
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Fixed (pegged) Exchange rate regime
Exchange rate fluctuates in a narrow range or not at all against a base currency. Government must intervene in foreign exchange market.
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Gold Standard (pre WWII) hegemon
Hegemon was UK