MOD 9: GOV 312L: US Foreign Policy - The Origins of War

A set of flashcards reviewing the key concepts from the lecture on the origins of war and the bargaining model of war.

Bargaining Model of War

A theoretical framework used to analyze why wars occur and how they can be avoided through negotiation and compromise.

Private Information

Information that one party possesses but the other does not, leading to discrepancies in assessment and potential conflict.

Costs of War

Economic and social losses incurred during a conflict, which create an incentive for states to avoid war.

Costly Signaling

Actions taken by states to demonstrate commitment to a particular stance, thereby mitigating private information issues.

Commitment Problems

Challenges in maintaining agreements over time due to changing circumstances that could lead parties to renege on agreements.

Distributional Settlement

Agreement between conflicting parties on how to divide the disputed interests to avoid conflict.

Bargaining Failure

A situation where states are unable to reach an agreement, potentially leading to war.

Expected Utility for War

A calculation comparing the perceived benefits and costs of war versus peace, where rational leaders choose war only if its expected utility is greater than any peaceful settlement, considering victory probability and costs. War is avoided if a settlement exists that is preferable to war for all sides.

Political Conflict

A form of conflict that arises over distributional issues, such as territory or resources, between states.

Audience Costs

Negative consequences that leaders may face in their domestic politics if they fail to follow through on commitments in international conflicts.

Private Information and War

One party having information unknown to another (e.g., capabilities, resolve), leading to misjudgment. This causes war by making states overestimate victory, demand too much, or fail to find a bargaining range due to unclear opponent costs/resolve.

Costly Signaling and Peace

Actions (e.g., military spending, public threats) states take to credibly signal commitment, reduce private information issues, and clarify intentions. This helps avoid war by enabling states to find mutually acceptable settlements based on clearer understanding of resolve/capabilities.

Commitment Problems and War

Difficulties in upholding agreements over time due to potential changes, leading parties to renege. This causes war when states cannot credibly commit to future peaceful settlements, particularly with anticipated power shifts, making a costly war now seem preferable to future exploitation.

The Fundamental Puzzle of War

War is extremely costly, yet states often choose to fight rather than bargain for a settlement, despite the existence of settlements that both sides would prefer to fighting.

The Divide the Dollar Game

A theoretical game where two players share a dollar; failure to agree yields nothing. It illustrates how rational actors can use bargaining to reach a distributional settlement, avoiding costly outcomes like war.

Attributes of the Bargaining Model of War

Views war as a costly outcome of bargaining failure. Key components: disputed interests, war costs, the bargaining range (settlements preferable to war for both), and reasons for failure (private information, commitment problems).

Private Information in the First Persian Gulf War (1990-1991)

During the Gulf War, both Saddam Hussein and the U.S. misjudged each other's resolve and capabilities due to private information, leading to bargaining failure and war.

Home's First Offer in Prewar Bargaining

In prewar bargaining, Home's first offer for contested good x will make Foreign indifferent between accepting and going to war. It equals Foreign's expected value of war minus its war costs.

Impact of Military Capabilities and Costs on Bargaining

Increased military capabilities or decreased war costs for one side lead them to demand more, narrowing the bargaining range and increasing war risk. Conversely, higher war costs for either side expand the bargaining range, favoring peace.

Causes of Commitment Problems and Power Shifts

Commitment problems stem from: 1. Power shifts (e.g., economic growth, rearmament). 2. Incentives for future advantage (territory/weapons). 3. First-strike advantages. A declining power may launch preventive war fearing a rising power will exploit future strength, making current settlements non-credible.

Preventive War and Power Shifts

A declining state launches a preventive war to preempt a rising adversary from unilaterally revising agreements in the future, preferring a costly war now over a worse outcome later.

Commitment Problem in WWI (1914)

Germany's fear of Russia's rising power created a commitment problem in WWI, leading Germany to launch a preventive war in 1914, believing delay would make its security untenable and peaceful commitments unreliable.

Commitment Problem and U.S. Entry into WWI (1917)

Germany's unreliable commitments on unrestricted submarine warfare, after reneging on promises, created a commitment problem for the U.S. in WWI. Fearing threats to economic interests and influence, the U.S. chose intervention over neutrality.

Commitment Problem in WWII Europe (1939)

Britain and France's initial inability to credibly commit to stopping Hitler led to a commitment problem, encouraging his expansion. After Poland's invasion, they conversely could not commit to peace with Hitler and had to commit to force, fearing endless German aggression.

Great Power

A state with exceptionally strong military, economic, and political capabilities, enabling significant international influence. Characterized by large populations/territories, vast resources, advanced economies, strong military (often nuclear), and global power projection.

Great Powers Structuring International Politics Post-War

Victorious great powers restructure the international system post-war by redrawing borders, creating organizations (UN, League of Nations), setting economic norms (Bretton Woods), and imposing demands. Changes include shifts in power distribution, alliances, laws, and norms to prevent future wars and consolidate gains.

Pillars of Post-WWI Peace Settlement and Wilson's Influence

Key pillars of post-WWI peace were the Treaty of Versailles, national self-determination, and the League of Nations. Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' heavily influenced this, advocating for collective security, open diplomacy, and self-determination.

Elements of Post-WWII Peace Settlement and U.S. Influence

Post-WWII peace featured the UN, Bretton Woods, division of Germany/Europe, and decolonization. The U.S. fostered a liberal international order through global engagement, alliances (NATO), aid (Marshall Plan), and deterring Soviet expansion.

Polarity in International Relations

Polarity describes the number of great powers or 'poles' in the international system: Unipolarity (one hegemon, stable), Bipolarity (two dominant powers, intense competition like Cold War), and Multipolarity (three+ powers, shifting alliances, potentially unstable).

Bipolarity and Cold War Competition

Cold War bipolarity meant intense US-Soviet competition, resulting in: clear alliances (NATO/Warsaw Pact), ideological struggle, proxy wars (avoiding direct nuclear conflict), and a tense but stable balance of power.

Absence of Great Power War Post-Mid-20th Century

Factors preventing great power war post-mid-20th century: nuclear deterrence (MAD), economic interdependence (costly conflict), democratic peace, international institutions for dispute resolution, and U.S. hegemony post-Cold War.

Post-Cold War U.S.-Russian Relations and Outcomes

Post-Cold War, US-Russian relations went from rivalry to cooperation then tension. Russia 'lost' (Soviet collapse, influence/territory loss, economic decline, NATO expansion). The West 'won' (liberal democracy's triumph, NATO expansion, global leadership).

Alliances in International Relations

A formal pact for joint action or common defense. Attributes: treaties, specified obligations (mutual defense), often defensive. Challenges: Moral hazard (allies take risks), Chain-ganging (minor disputes escalate), Burden-sharing (resource disagreements), Abandonment (allies fail to commit).