MOD 9: GOV 312L: US Foreign Policy - The Origins of War

Violence and Bargaining in International Politics

War functions as the “outside” or exit option in bargaining between states.
States can use military force to:
- Impose a distributional settlement (force an opponent to accept unfavorable terms).
- Seize all disputed issues if they achieve military victory.

Military threats are limited by war’s high costs, which can outweigh potential gains.
- Example: Nuclear war—costs vastly exceed any possible benefit.
States must consider not just potential outcomes, but also the costs of fighting, regardless of who wins.

Resolve = the willingness to bear the costs of war.
A state’s ability to sustain costs affects its bargaining leverage.
Costs are paid irrespective of military outcome (both winners and losers incur losses).

Captures how states assess whether war is worth fighting.
Defines:
- Value of victory (gain full control of disputed issue).
- Value of defeat (lose everything).
Expected utility = weighted average of the utilities of both outcomes, each weighted by:
- Probability of victory (p) based on distribution of capabilities.
- Probability of defeat (1–p).
(Illustrated in Figures 8-5 and 8-6.)

Expected utility frames the choice between war and negotiated settlement.
States compare:
- Expected utility of war, versus
- Utility of peace (negotiated settlement).

Since wars are costly, there should always exist a peaceful settlement that leaves both sides better off than fighting.
Thus, a “peace range” exists — a set of agreements both sides would prefer to war.
Therefore:
- War should be avoidable.
- Yet, wars occur.
Core question: Why can’t states reach a deal within that peace range and avoid war?

The assumption of complete information is unrealistic.
States may disagree about:
- The distribution of military capabilities (who is stronger).
- The costs of war (how painful war would be).
Private information occurs when one state knows or believes something the other does not.
These discrepancies cause different perceptions of:
- Expected utilities.
- The point of indifference between war and peace.
Result: Both sides may think they can get a better deal through war, causing miscalculation and conflict.

States often have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities or resolve.
- Example: Bluffing strength to get better terms in negotiation.
Misrepresentation distorts expected utility calculations, making war more likely.

By exaggerating capabilities or resolve, a state may increase perceived bargaining power.
However, this can lead to false confidence and overestimation, causing both sides to reject peaceful deals.
Graphically: Shifts in expected utility curves reduce overlap in the peace range → increased risk of war.

States are not only trying to avoid war—they are trying to maximize their share of the disputed issue.
Misjudgments in this pursuit can push negotiations past the peace zone, resulting in conflict.

Wars from private information arise when states overestimate their bargaining leverage.
They make insufficient concessions, missing possible peaceful settlements.
Essentially, war results from miscalculation or communication failure.

Costly Signaling (Communication)
- States can reveal private information by taking actions that are costly to fake.
- Costly signals increase credibility and reduce uncertainty.
- Example: Mobilizing troops, forming alliances, or public commitments.
Audience Costs
- Democratic leaders face domestic political costs if they bluff and back down.
- Makes threats and promises more credible, reducing misperception.
Sunk Costs
- Actions that irreversibly commit resources (e.g. deploying forces, spending on mobilization).
- Demonstrate genuine resolve and help convey true intentions.