The Problem of Evil

What does the Problem of Evil argument aim to show?

Our observations of the world give us good reason to think it’s unlikely the theistic God exists.

What are the three properties of God the PoE argument objects?

That he is omnibenevolent (wholly good), omniscient (wholly knowing) and omnipotent (wholly powerful).

What is the general idea of the PoE argument?

1. An omnibenevolent being will not wish for his creations to suffer

2. Am omniscient being will know if his creations suffer

3. An omnipotent being will be able to prevent the suffering of his creations

What does Hume ask in his “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion”?

“Is he willing to prevent evil? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both willing and able? Whence then is evil?”

Define natural evil.

Evil associated with suffering rooted in things outside of human control, such as natural disaster or disease.

Define moral evil.

Evil associated with suffering rooted in human volition associated with the vices.

What is the Logical Problem?

The existence of an all-PKL God is logically inconsistent with the existence of any evil or suffering in our world.

Give a variant of the logical problem.

1. If God exists then God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent

2. A triple-omni being will prevent the occurrence of any evil whatsoever

3. SC: If God exists, there will be no evil

4. Evil exists

5. C: God does not exist

What is the sub-argument for Premise 2 of the Logical problem?

1. An omnibenevolent being will not wish for his creations to suffer

2. An omniscient being will know if his creations suffer

3. An omnipotent being will be able to prevent the suffering

4. C: Therefore, a triple-omni being will prevent the occurrence of any evil whatsoever

What does the Logical problem state?

God and evil existing together is a contradiction.

How could one undermine the Logical argument?

Show one instance of where God could logically co-exist with suffering.

What is wrong with P1 of the logical argument?

The claim is too strong; aren’t there situations where we acknowledge that good people allow objectively bad things to happen for the greater good? Perfect goodness seems compatible with wishing someone to suffer in certain circumstances. For any given evil, it is logically possible that it’s necessary for the greater good.

What is wrong with the Logical Problem?

It is unresolved because we haven’t discerned with certainty whether evil is or is not logically consistent with God’s existence.

What is the Evidential Problem?

The existence of evil, while logically consistent with the existence of an all-PKL God, provides rational support for atheism. The conclusion is that ‘probably’ God doesn’t exist.

What is meant by ‘probably’ in this context?

More than likely. Probable.

What question does the evidential problem ask?

Is every bit of suffering that occurs logically necessary for the greater good? Or does it seem likely there is some pointless evil in the world?

Define pointless evil.

Suffering and moral evil that is not needed in some way for the greater good. Any instance of pointless evil makes it unlikely that God exists.

Give a variant of the evidential problem.

1. If God exists then God is triple-omni

2. A triple-omni being will prevent the occurrence of any pointless evil whatsoever

3. SC: therefore, if God exists, there will be no pointless evil

4. Probably, pointless evil exists

5. C: therefore, probably, God does not exist

What is Rowe’s example of pointless evil?

A fawn was burned in a forest fire caused by a lightning strike and suffered for five days before dying.

What is the assertion being made by Rowe in his example of pointless evil?

It seems implausible that there is any good for which this particular bit of suffering is logically necessary in its entirety. Even if there is good reason for this suffering, surely a wholly good and powerful being would be willing to achieve it with 10% less agony on the fawn’s part.

What would be the theist response to the evidential problem?

They must show that the amount of suffering in this world does not make God’s existence improbable, that all evil is probably necessary in some way for the greater good. They will try to refute P2 that “probably pointless evil exists”.

How would the theist refute premise 2 of the evidential problem?

By either showing that there are not good grounds for the truth of P2 (skeptical theism), or there are good grounds to think P2 is false (theodicy).

What is a theodicy?

An attempt to account for what could feasibly be God’s purpose in allowing the profusion of evil in the world.

What does a theodicy try to do?

Undermine/demonstrate the falsity of P2 of the evidential problem of evil by giving justification for the nature and extent of evil that we observe.

What does a theodicy attempt to show?

That this world, with all its suffering, is actually the best possible world that God could have created. That suffering is unavoidable and God couldn’t have created a better world.

Define the Counterpart Theodicy.

Evil is a necessary counterpart to good; you can’t have one without the other. This is an ontological claim; there is something about the nature of good and evil that means they cannot exist in isolation to each other.

Give an example of the counterpart theodicy.

You can’t have green without non-green. A quality and its logical opposite.

What is the first problem with the counterpart theodicy?

There’s nothing impossible about a world that contains only good or only evil.

What is the second problem with the counterpart theodicy?

Even if its plausible that some evil has to exist for good to exist, is it really plausible that there has to be this much?

What is one response to the counterpart theodicy objections?

We may need evil to appreciate good. Turns the theodicy into an epistemic objection (knowledge) rather than an ontological objection (existence).

What is the general idea of the ‘Means to an End’ theodicy?

For God to create any nature, there must be laws of nature - pain is the inevitable result of a lawful universe.

Consider Rowe’s case in relation to the means theodicy.

The suffering is the unfortunate outcome of a set of natural laws, including pain, that are necessary for an ordered universe.

In relation to the means theodicy, couldn’t God have created a law-like system without pain?

God’s omnipotence is often somewhat restricted/can’t do the logically impossible. However, it isn’t usually so restricted that he’s subject to the causal laws of nature - he is not unable to intervene after creating the laws.

What do theists mean when they assert an omnipotent God would allow evil for the higher good?

An omnipotent God would allow evil as a necessary means to a higher good. God cannot logically achieve the greater good without the evil.

What is the first way a theist would show that God probably cannot achieve the higher good without the evil?

They would have to show that evil is logically necessary for the higher good - can’t have good without all the evil.

What is the second way a theist would show that God probably cannot achieve the higher good without the evil?

They would have to show that the world with the higher good and all evil is better than the world would be if it lacked the higher good and the evil. The theist must give good reason to suppose this is the best possible world.

What does the “Value of Evil” theodicy claim?

That a world containing evil like ours is better than a world containing no evil.

What are the two interpretations of the value theodicy?

1. Evil makes the world more valuable/beautiful in an aesthetic sense

2. Evil makes the world more valuable in a moral sense - the progressive overcoming of evil by good is valuable

How is the logical necessity requirement met in this theodicy?

Shows that; it’s not possible to have evil without having evil, and it’s not possible to have the overcoming of evil by good without having evil.

What are faults of the Aesthetic version of the value theodicy?

Does aesthetic value need an appreciator to be valuable? Is it assuming that God or the angels are the appreciators? Is this compatible with being all-good or does it make God somewhat sadistic - using our misfortunes as entertainment.

What are the distinctions Mackie makes in the Moral version of the value theodicy?

Pain and misery = 1st order evil. Pleasure and happiness = 1st order good. Virtue = 2nd order good. Vices = 2nd order evil. 1st orders are necessary for 2nd orders to exist.

What does the Moral version of the value theodicy claim?

1st order evil is necessary for 2nd order good - pain and suffering are necessary for courage, compassion. 2nd order good is so valuable that a world with it and 1st order evil is better than a world with neither.

How is natural evil justified in the moral version of the value theodicy?

It’s existence is justified since it allows for the existence of a more valuable good; virtue. A world with more sympathy and suffering is better than a world containing complacent, effortless pleasure.

What is an objection to the moral version? What is it’s reply?

Why suppose that virtue is more valuable than pleasure or happiness. Don’t we as a matter of fact consider virtue more valuable than hedonistic pleasure (think what you might say during someone’s eulogy).

What are some fault lines in the moral version?

Could there be another type of higher-order good for whose existence 1st order evil is necessary? Even if we are convinced that 2nd order good outweighs 1st order evil, what about 2nd order evil; the vices?

Is it plausible a world containing these orders is better than one without them?

One line of argument says yes, because such a world contains the 3rd order good of free will - the ability to choose virtue or vice (though it will inevitably be misused).