The Problem of Evil

The argument aims to show our observations of the world give us good reason to think it’s unlikely that the theistic God exists - omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent.

Arguments from the problem of evil aim to show that these three properties of God are not reconcilable with the existence of evil in the world.

The general idea is that;

  • An omnibenevolent being will not wish for His creations to suffer

  • An omniscient being will know if His creations suffer

  • An omnipotent being will be able to prevent the suffering of his creations

Yet evil still exists; there’s a tension between the simultaneous existence of such a God and the existence of evil in the world.

Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: “Is he willing to prevent evil? Then he is impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?

Can God’s existence be reconciled with the existence of evil, and if so, how?

Evil, in this context, means ‘bad things’

  • Natural Evil: associated with suffering rooted in such things as natural disaster, disease, deformity. Outside of human control.

  • Moral Evil: associated with suffering rooter in human volition associated with the vices.

Neither argument applies to other conceptions of God other than all powerful, knowing and loving (PKL).

The Logical Problem

  • The existence of an all-PKL God is logically inconsistent with the existence of any evil in our world. It is logically impossible for there to exist both evil and God - a posteriori evidence. Conclusions is God doesn’t exist.

Variant of the Problem:

  1. If God exists then God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent

  2. An omnibenevolent, omniscient and omnipotent being will prevent the occurrence of any evil whatsoever

  3. SC: If God exists, there will be no evil

  4. Evil exists

  5. C: God does not exist

Sub-argument for Premise 2:

  1. An omnibenevolent being will not wish for His creations to suffer

  2. An omniscient being will know if His creations suffer

  3. An omnipotent being will be able to prevent the suffering

  4. C: therefore, a triple-omni being will prevent the occurrence of any evil whatsoever

The argument states that God’s existence is logically incompatible with any suffering

  • I.e., God and evil existing together is a contradiction

  • All it takes to undermine this is to show one instance of where God could logically co-exist with suffering

Premise 1 seems questionable…

  • Aren’t there situations where we acknowledge that good people allow objectively bad things to allow a greater good, or to prevent greater evils? Might God work in mysterious ways?

  • P1 - and so the argument - seems to make too strong a claim; perfect goodness seems compatible with wishing someone to suffer in certain circumstances

  • For all we know, it could turn out that the evil which exists is a necessary - logically unavoidable - component of creation

    • E.g., a part of God’s wider plan for the greater good that we cannot understand

  • For any given evil we can describe, it is logically possible - not self-contradictory or incoherent - that it is necessary for the greater good

  • Since we haven’t figured out with certainty whether evil is or is not logically consistent with God’s existence, the logical problem remains unresolved

The Evidential Problem

  • The existence of evil, while perhaps logically consistent with the existence of an all-PKL God, provides rational support for atheism. Conclusion is probably God doesn’t exist.

  • Even if it turns out that some evil is logically incompatible with God’s existence there remains a serious problem for the theist

  • We can ask: is every bit of suffering that occurs logically necessary for the greater good?

  • Or does it seem likely there is some pointless evil in the world - evil that a wholly good being would have no reason to allow?

    • Suffering and moral evil that is not needed in some way for the greater good

  • If we can point to any instance of what is probably pointless or gratuitous suffering then that will make it unlikely that God exists

  • It may thus give us good reason to be an atheist

The Problem Formalized

  1. If God exists then God is triple-omni

  2. A triple-omni being will prevent the occurrence of any pointless evil whatsoever

  3. SC: therefore, if God exists, there will be no pointless evil

  4. Probably, pointless evil exists

  5. C: therefore, probably, God does not exist

The Problem Distilled

  1. If an all-PKL God exists, then pointless evil does not exist

  2. Probably, pointless evil exists

  3. C: therefore, probably, and all-PKL God does not exist

Rowe’s example of pointless evil; a fawn that is burned horribly in a forest fire started by lightning suffers in agony for five days before dying.

  • It seems implausible that there is any good for which this particular bit of suffering is logically necessary in its entirety

  • Surely, even if there is any good for which this suffering is needed, a wholly good and omnipotent being would be willing and able to achieve that good with 5 or 10% less agony on the fawn’s part

In response to the evidential problem, the theist must show that the amount of suffering in this world does not make God’s existence improbable, that all evil is probably necessary in some way for the greater god.

They will try to refute P2 that ‘probably pointless evil exists’ - P1 seems plausible to both theists and atheists.

Could do this by showing that;

  1. There are not good grounds for the truth of P2 - skeptical theism

  2. There are good grounds to think P2 is false - theodicy

Theodicies

Try to undermine P2 of the evidential problem of evil by giving justification for the nature and extent of evil that we observe - demonstrate that it’s false.

A theodicy is an attempt to account for what could feasibly be God’s purpose in allowing the profusion of evil in the world.

Theodicies attempt to show that this world, with all its suffering, is actually the best possible world that God could have created. In other words, the suffering is unavoidable: God could not have created a better world than this one.

The Counterpart Theodicy

  • Evil is a necessary counterpart to good; you can’t have one without the other.

  • This is an ontological claim - there is something about the nature of good and evil that means they cannot exist in isolation to one another

  • Counterparts in the same way as a quality and its logical opposite

    • E.g., you can’t have green without non-green

Problem One

  • Nothing is impossible about a world being green all over

  • Similarly, there’s nothing impossible about a world that contains only good just as a world that contains only evil

Problem Two

  • Even if some evil was necessary, why not just have a speck of it instead of the great amount that there is

  • Even if its plausible that some evil has to exist for good to exist, is it really plausible that there has to be this much?

Possible Response

  • That we might need evil to appreciate good - Mackie’s version

  • It would turn the counterpart theodicy into an epistemic objection rather than an ontological objection

    • Ontological: refers to a state of being or existing. Conceived of a priori in regards to the universe.

    • Epistemic: of or relating to knowledge/belief

The “Means to an End” Theodicy

  • For God to create any nature, there must be laws of nature (can’t be chaotic) - pain is the inevitable result of a lawful universe

    • “Pain is nature’s warning system that the body is in danger”

  • Consider Rowe’s case of seemingly pointless evil: the burned fawn

    • In this case, the suffering is the unfortunate outcome of a set of natural laws, even including pain, that are necessary for an ordered universe

  • It seems that an omnipotent God could have created a law-like system without the creations needing to suffer pain - think Heaven

  • Could God not have ended the fawn’s suffering in a forest fire by violating natural laws - i.e., is God not omnipotent or all-good

  • True, the assertion of God’s omnipotence is often somewhat restricted/qualified - e.g., can’t do the logically impossible

  • But it isn’t usually so restricted that he’s subject to causal laws of nature - that seems far from omnipotence - once he’s created the orderly, law-driven universe, he is unable to intervene in the laws

  • So what do theists normally mean when they assert that an omnipotent God would allow evil as a necessary means to a higher good

    • They usually mean that God cannot logically achieve the greater good without the evil

    • In other words, for God to create the higher good without the evil it would be logically impossible - like a round square.

  • What would it take for the theist to show that God, probably, cannot logically achieve the higher good without all the evil

    • First, they would have to show that evil is logically necessary for the higher good - can’t have good without the evil

    • Second, they would show that the world with the higher good and all evil is better than the world would be if it lacked the higher good and the evil

  • The theist must give good reason to suppose that this is the best possible world

The “Value of Evil” Theodicy

Claims that a world containing evil like ours, is better than a world containing no evil

Two Interpretations

  1. Evil makes the world more valuable/beautiful in an aesthetic sense

  2. Evil makes the world more valuable in a moral sense (the progressive overcoming of evil by good is valuable)

In both cases the logical necessity requirement seems to be met;

  • Not possible to have evil without having evil

  • Not possible to have the overcoming of evil by good without having evil

Aesthetic Version

  • Does aesthetic value need an appreciator to be valuable? Who would be the appreciator? God or angels?

  • Might the ‘higher good’ be the cumulative entertainment that angels get from watching this giant reality show?

  • Is this compatible with God being all-good? Or does it make God somewhat sadistic, using our misfortunes as a course of celestial entertainment?

Moral Version

  • Mackie makes these distinctions:

    • Pain and misery = 1st order evil

    • Pleasure and happiness = 1st order good

    • Virtue = 2nd order good

  • Claims:

    • 1st order evil is necessary for 2nd order good (e.g., pain and suffering are necessary for courage, compassion, etc.)

    • 2nd order good is so valuable that a world with it and 1st order evil is better than a world with neither

  • On this version the natural evil that exists is justified since it allows for the existence of a more valuable good: virtue

    • E.g., a world with more sympathy and suffering is better than a world containing complacent, effortless pleasure

    • Does this line of reasoning make heaven a ‘worse’ world?

  • Objection: why suppose that virtue is more valuable than pleasure or happiness

  • Reply: don’t we as a matter of fact consider virtue more valuable than hedonistic pleasure? Think what you might say at someone’s eulogy…

  • Question: could there be another type of higher-order good for whose existence 1st order evil is necessary?

  • Even if we are convinced that 2nd order good outweighs 1st order evil, what about 2nd order evil: the vices?

    • Is it plausible a world containing these is better than one without them?

    • One line of argument says yes, because such a world contains the 3rd order good of free will - the ability to chose virtue or vice, which will be inevitably misused