5.US containment in action in Asia

Reconstructing post-war Japan was based on...

the 'reverse course' policy

What is reverse course?

The USA wasn’t focused on punishing Japan (e.g., reparations) but instead wanted firm democratic institutions and practices towards an emphasis on economic reconstruction.
The USA would dedicate time targeting Communists and their sympathisers as opposed to Japanese war criminals.
This was a pragmatic (sensible and realistic) approach.

Why reverse course?

Japan’s recovery was seen by the USA as an essential element of its power base in Asia, specifically Eastern Asia.
There was an undisguised strategy aimed at ensuring Japan remained aligned to the USA and less vulnerable to Communist influences in the Far East.

Japan's economic stabilisation programme

This was a programme based on control and austerity (stern and strict), in order to align Japan with the USA and its Capitalist economic system.
Joseph Dodge, a former banker, was appointed economic advisor for the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP, who was MacArthur) and given responsibility for implementing the plan.
Dodge worked with Japan’s Finance Minister, Ikeda, and they produced a ‘super balanced budget’.
This set a target of surplus (excess) nearly 157 yen/just over $4 million.
However, initially the budget led to unemployment due to many business closures.

Factors in Japan's economic stabilisation

Increased regulation of trade, price controls, more efficient taxation system, wage controls, stricter lending criteria, a balanced budget, and increased regulation of foreign exchange.
Also, Japan, wanting to become an active member of the world institutions (particularly those linked with the West), was demanded by the USA to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This strengthened Japan’s access to Western trade but also banned trade with Communist China from late 1950.

US-Japanese relations

In February 1950, when Communist China’s leader Mao Zedong formed a military alliance with the USSR, Japan’s geopolitical significance for the USA entered a new phase. It became crucial in the USA’s quest to contain Communism in the Far East.
Furthermore, in November China joined North Korea in the war against Capitalist South Korea.
Such involvement led to the globalisation of containment and an increasing commitment on the USA’s part to see its role as a global policeman.

When was The San Francisco Peace Treaty?

September 1951

The San Francisco Peace Treaty

This peace treaty, between Japan and the Allied Powers, was an opportunity for Japan to restore its sovereignty (power and control) and security. Of the Allied Powers the USSR was the only one to refuse to sign the agreement, the People’s Republic of China (USSR’s ally) also refused.

What did the treaty do?

-Recognise the sovereignty of Japanese people.
-Force Japan to renounce any claims to a wide range of neighbouring territories, including Korea, Taiwan and more.

What did the treaty not do?

-Place significant restrictions of Japan’s economy.
-Place significant restrictions on Japan’s future political model.
-Identify Japan’s responsibility for the war.
-Restrict Japan’s future rearmament.
-Impose reparations for those Southeast Asian states occupied by Japan during the war.

The US-Japan Security Treaty

In return for this treaty, the USA made Japan sign a bilateral security agreement – the US-Japan Security treaty 1951.
USA had unrestricted use of military bases in Japan, administrative control of Owkinawa (a Japanese island separate from mainland Japan), the right to use military force to intervene in any internal disorder in Japan and the right to veto Japan offering military bases to other states.

Rearmament of Japan

Macarthur ordered Japan to establish a 75k-strong National Police Reserve (NPR) to be trained by a US military advisory team. Seemingly its purpose was defensive.
In August 1952 Japan established a force of 110k ground troops and 7.6k maritime personnel – these were known as the National Safety Agency (NSA).
The Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953 and John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, wanted an enlarged ground force in Japan, and by July 1954 it was agreed to create a new 140k-strong Self-Defence Force (supported by $240 million in US funding).
(This rearmament, while being an economic asset to Japan, had caused some internal instability within the country due to differing attitudes toward rearmament).
The US policy towards Japan up until 1954 was driven by the threat of Communism in Korea, which had been abated by then.

US policy towards China and Taiwan

At the start of 1949 a Communist victory over Jiang Jieshi’s Nationalist forces (KMT) in the Chinese Civil War seemed inevitable, and Mao Zedong considered the possibility of US intervention. However, he reached the conclusion that this wouldn’t happen as the USA were too occupied with Europe, and Mao’s real concern became the USA potentially supporting Jiang Jieshi from Taiwan.
In 1949 the Chinese Communist Part (CCP) announced its allegiance to the USSR.
The USA’s strategy toward China was defined in the China White Paper in July 1949, Dean G. Acheson, new Secretary of State, was committed to supporting the KMT secretly as to not appear as an ‘imperialist menace’.
It was also made clear that nothing should be done that could reinforce a Sino-Soviet alliance.

The Defensive Perimeter Strategy

Acheson argued that the military defence of Japan was the responsibility of the USA and would be achieved with a ‘defensive perimeter’, his thinking was focused on the military security of the Pacific, his speech in January 1950 says:

“This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands… to the Philippine Islands. So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.”

NSC-68

In September 1949 the USSR tested its own atomic bomb, this, in addition to Trumans ‘loss of China’, triggered a fundamental review of the USA’s strategic objectives and priorities. This review emerged in the form of the National Security Council Resolution 68 (NSC-68).
The NSC-68 report was issued in April 1950, and approved in September:

“The United States must have substantially increased general air, ground and sea strength, atomic capabilities and air and civilian defences to deter war. The United States must develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression”.

This report stressed the urgency of improving US military, political and economic power, and there was a powerful military emphasis on the application of containment.