Vietnam War - Finals

What core argument does Gartner make about body counts?

Body counts were not unique to Vietnam; the U.S. used them extensively in Korea as a main metric of success.

Why do many scholars think Vietnam was unique?

They argue Vietnam’s guerrilla environment made body counts the only way to measure progress.

How does the Gartner article challenge the view that Vietnam was unique?

It shows body counts began in Korea, not Vietnam.

Why were body counts used in Korea?

When Truman abandoned plans to occupy the North and instead sought a return to the prewar border, territorial gains stopped mattering.

What did the shift in Korean strategy require?

A new metric for progress—body counts.

How were success metrics traditionally measured in earlier wars?

By territory gained or lost.

Why didn’t territorial measurement work in Vietnam?

Guerrilla warfare and shifting battle spaces meant ground gained was quickly lost.

Did the Korean War have clearer territorial boundaries?

Yes—Korea had linear front lines.

What does Gartner argue about U.S. military culture?

The Army was already comfortable with body-count metrics before Vietnam.

What does the rejection of using body counts mean for interpreting the Vietnam War?

Vietnam’s failures can’t be blamed solely on body counts—they were a continuation of earlier strategic habits.

What misconception about Vietnam does the Gartner article correct?

That body counts were invented because Vietnam was uniquely difficult.

According to Gartner, what shaped the reliance on body counts?

Strategic limitations and presidential decisions, not battlefield conditions.

What is the broader scholarly narrative the Gartner article challenges?

That Vietnam was a “unique third-world quagmire” unlike earlier wars.

What did many Vietnam historians claim body counts caused?

Misleading assessments that crippled U.S. strategy.

What is Gartner’s counterpoint?

The problem begin in Korea—Vietnam inherited a flawed system.

Why is the Korean precedent important?

It shows institutional continuity, not Vietnam exceptionalism.

How does the focus on political views rather than body counts reframe the criticism of Vietnam strategy?

It shifts blame from Vietnam’s terrain to broader U.S. military doctrine.

What do body counts reveal about American strategy?

A preference for attrition-based assessments.

How did U.S. goals shape metrics in Korea?

Without territorial objectives, success reverted to enemy attrition.

What is Gartner’s larger theoretical contribution?

Showing how evaluation systems evolve from political, not battlefield, realities.

Who was Walt Rostow?

An MIT economic historian and the most aggressive civilian advocate of bombing North Vietnam.

What theory shaped Rostow’s strategy?

Economic determinism—belief that economic growth drives political decisions.

What did Rostow believe about North Vietnam’s economy?

That it was modernizing and thus vulnerable to industrial destruction.

What did Rostow think bombing would achieve?

Coerce Hanoi to negotiate by raising the economic costs of war.

What famous claim did Rostow make about Ho Chi Minh?

“Ho has an industrial complex to protect; he is no longer a guerrilla fighter.”

How did Rostow view bombing strategically?

As “our equivalent of guerrilla warfare”—slow pressure that wears down the enemy.

What was Rostow’s role under Kennedy?

Key advisor on Far Eastern policy but often ignored by JFK.

Why did Kennedy distrust Rostow?

He thought he was too extreme and overly hawkish.

What changed under Johnson?

Johnson loved Rostow’s aggressiveness and loyalty, giving him enormous influence.

What was Rostow’s stance after Lansdale’s report?

Believed pacification wouldn’t work—war’s true source was in the North.

What did Rostow recommend the U.S. do?

Bomb the North, send combat troops, and pressure Hanoi.

What flaw undermined Rostow’s analysis?

CIA reported northern support to Viet Cong as only a “trickle.”

How did Rostow misread Viet Cong motivation?

Saw them as aspiring modernizers, not nationalists resisting foreign intervention.

Why is Rostow’s misinterpretation for Viet Cong motivation important?

It led to escalation instead of political/pacification strategies.

How did Rolling Thunder come about?

It was essentially Rostow’s “Plan C” of graduated pressure, adopted by McNamara in 1965.

Why did Johnson continue bombing even pessimistic?

Bombing was politically “safe,” antiseptic, and seemed like action.

What was the POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant) strike?

Rostow’s push to bomb Hanoi’s oil depots in 1966.

Did the POL bombing work?

No—China and USSR easily replaced fuel.

What happened to McNamara?

Became disillusioned, emotionally broke down, and was removed by Johnson.

Why was Rostow’s idea of invading the North rejected?

It risked massive Chinese intervention—another Korea.

What did Rostow underestimate about North Vietnam?

Their willingness to endure massive casualties and destruction.

What did Rostow overestimate?

The size and importance of North Vietnam’s industrial economy.

What strategic mistake did Rostow repeatedly make?

Believing airpower alone could coerce political change.

What legacy does Milne assign to Rostow?

A key architect of the failed escalation strategy in Vietnam.

What does Rostow symbolize in U.S. foreign policy?

Technocratic overconfidence and the misuse of modernization theory.