pm and executive

executive

branch of govt responsible for the implementation of laws / policies made by parliament

political executive

• government = elected ministers

• take responsibility for direction / coordination of govt policy

official executive / bureaucracy

• administrative machinery of govt

• rule by officials

• senior civil servants

• provide policy advice / implement govt policy

structure of executive

pm → cabinet → government departments → civil servants

pm

head of executive

cabinet

• heads of depts that form govt

• make official government policy

• aka secretaries of state

• health secretary, education sec etc

govt depts / ministers

• mp / member of lords appointed to a position in the govt

• work in a specific dept under cabinet minister

civil servants

• appointed govt officials

• provide ministers with policy advice

• permanent, neutral, anonymous

powers of the pm

• forming/organising govt

• directing govt policy

• managing cabinet

• controlling parliament

• national leadership

roles of the executive

• proposing legislation

• international relations / treaties / trade deals

• military defence

• annual budget (chancellor)

prerogative powers / royal prerogative

• powers the pm has inherited from monarch

• patronage, treaties, troop deployment / dissolving parliament

• eg 2018 may launch airstrikes in syria without vote in commons = unchecked power

patronage

power to appoint and dismiss members of govt / make recs to lords

cabinet committees

groups of ministers that help reduce burden on full cabinet by allowing smaller groups of ministers to take decisions on specific policy areas

secondary legislation

powers given to the executive by parliament to reinterpret laws passed by previous parliaments

eg exec could introduce new regs on sick pay / maternity leave / universal credit during COVID without passing new leg

inner cabinet

• informal group of policy advisers consulted by pm outside formal cabinet

• include senior ministers, officials and spads

example of difference between cabinet minister and govt minister

• gillian keegan was secretary of state for education (all of education)

• damian hinds was minister for schools (more specific)

factors that affect ministerial appts

• key allies

• rivals

• high-profile ‘big beasts’

• balance different wings of party = party unity

• socially balanced cabinet

• competence

examples of key allies appts

• thatcher → tebbit (employment)

• may broke up allies osborne/cameron to get rid of elitism/’chumocracy’

• brown → blair

examples of rivals appts

• makes them bound to agree with govt = CMR / ‘silences’ them

• may appted johnson as foreign sec after he led leave campaign to victory → keep most likely challenger close

• thatcher / heseltine

examples of big beasts

• influential/senior figures who are well known/respected within party/public

• may → philip hammond, johnson

examples balancing ‘wings’ of party

• blair → prescott (deputy pm) - more working class left w/career in merchant navy

• thatcher → hurd/clarke (one nation)

• may post referendum → (leavers/remainers) → raab after david davis quit → keep leave vs remain composition the same

examples of socially balanced cabinet

• 2011, cameron only 2 female members in cabinet

• sunak 7/23 = women

• 2024 → starmer’s cabinet

• reeves 1st ever female chancellor

• lammy as foreign sec → afro-caribbean descent

theories of executive power

• cabinet govt

• prime ministerial govt

• presidential model

cabinet govt

• power collectively held in cabinet with pm ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals)

• all ministers can shape govt policy/decisions equally

• collective ministerial responsibility

• pm nothing without support of cabinet e.g. thatcher in 1990 ‘treachery with a smile on its face’ // 2019 may summoned entire cabinet to chequers to discuss policy

prime ministerial govt

• crossman (cabinet minister under wilson post-war) suggested this replaced cabinet govt

• pm dominates executive/parliament

• cabinet not key policy making body < source of advice for pm

presidential model

• increasing tendency for political leaders to act like executive presidents through rise of personalised leadership (spads e.g. campbell/cummings)

• foley - rise in british presidency 1990s

reasons for increasing presidentialism in uk

• foley spatial leadership: pms develop space/distance from party/appeal directly to public (populist outreach)

• head of states (blair ‘mourner in chief’ after diana died / drove foreign policy in iraq)

• personalised election campaigns / rise of media focus on pm (blair courting support from sun / flew to see murdoch, high personal pop at start)

• wider use of spads → (major had 8 / blair = 30 / johnson + cummings)

eg of pms acting more presidentially

• usually pms with large commons majority / dictate policy

• 2021 cancellation of gcse / a-level exams → williamson (edu sec) not present in meeting where johnson cancelled gcse / a-levels

• 2003 iraq war → blair made decision to join invasion of iraq w/alastair campbell, rest of cabinet not informed

egs of pms influenced by cabinet

• smaller majority / significant opposition

• quad 2010 → major decisions agreed by quad (2 leading cons / 2 leading lib dems)

• 2019 gaukward squad → 2 commons defeats over brexit deal, may forced to extend deadline (gauke, rudd, perry threatened to resign)

• 2024 ECHR → sunak wanted to leave ECHR to reduce legal challenges to govt policies, stopped → cabinet backlash

egs of cabinet causing resignations

• 1990 thatcher → resignation of deputy PM howe / heseltine

• 2022 johnson → sunak / javid resigned in protest of pincher appt → nearly 60 ministers resigned total

sofa government

• informal decision-making style within govt

• politicians sat on sofas when making decisions

• popularised by blair

bilateral meetings

1 to 1 meeting between pm and cabinet minister to discuss policy

arguments that the cabinet is very important

• needs to approve all policies

• makes key decisions (snap election 2017)

• big beasts are hard to silence

• no pm can survive without cabinet support (thatcher 1990, treachery with smile)

• patronage powers must be handled carefully to maintain authority (hunt refused to move to health in may’s reshuffle)

• help manage emergencies (covid)

arguments that the cabinet is not very important

• rubber stamp for decisions made elsewhere

• pms can manipulate//bypass cabinet through bilateral meetings/sofa politics

• pm controls workings of cabinet/use cmr effectively

• pm has significant powers of patronage

• pms use cabinet committees - predetermines cabinet outcomes, control proposals that committee gives to full cabinet

limits of patronage/other prerogative powers

• big beasts have to be included

• both wings of party included

• rivals included

• botched reshuffles → problems

prime minister’s office

• collection of senior officials/political advisors (over 100)

• advise pm about policy/communication/party management

pm’s power over party

• party, cabinet and parliament = loyal to pm as leader

• usually has majority in the commons

limits to pm’s power over party

• loyalty dependent on possibility of electoral success, can’t be electoral liability

• backbench rebellions in commons possible (cameron’s tiny majority in 2015 → make many adjustments to keep all of party happy, lost 2016 sunday trading vote)

• risk of leadership challenge

pm’s power over cabinet/govt

• calls, chairs, sets agenda for cabinet meetings

• established cabinet committees, bilaterals, sofa-government/can bypass cabinet

• cmr

limits of pm’s power over cab/govt

• requires cabinet support on major/controversial issues

• big beasts have own authority

• threat of resignation can damage pm

• pm needs cabinet support

institutional support

• growth of pm’s office (no 10 policy unit, press office and cabinet office)

• increased use of spads

limits on institutional support

• no formal pm dept

• power of other large, rival depts

• small compared to office of us pres

variable factors that impact power of pm

• personality of pm

• cabinet

• size of majority

• party

• popularity

• strength of opposition

• media

• pressure of events

arguments that pms are still as powerful as they once were

• significant powers of patronage (popular pms w/large majorities use this - blair/thatcher)

• control cabinet

• party naturally loyal to leader

• institutional support: good ‘spin doctors’ can ensure good media support → enhance power

arguments that pms are not as powerful as they once were

• careful to consider many factors when appointing cabinet: weaker pms (brown/may) must balance cabinet to ensure support

• need support of cabinet: even once strong pms forced out by cab (thatcher)

• loyalty of party dependent on electoral success

• institutional support is less than other world leaders

individual ministerial responsibility

ministers are responsible for their personal conduct/their dept

examples of ministers resigning over individual responsibility

• 2018 rudd: misled parliament over targets on windrush scandal figures (not ‘sufficiently aware’) = legal res

• 2024 louise haigh: resigned as transport sec → convicted of fraud before coming MP

egs of ministers not resigning even when violating imr

• 2019 priti patel: home sec = bullying civil servants accusations, refused to resign / johnson didn’t sack her (investigation found she broke ministerial code)

• 2022 boris johnson: refused to resign as pm even after he misled parliament over partygate

collective ministerial responsibility

ministers must support cabinet decisions or leave executive

egs of ministers resigning over cmr

• 2016 iain duncan smith → work/pensions sec, resigned to protest osborne’s cuts to disability benefits / capital gains tax)

• 2024 robert jenrick → immigration, resigned over rwanda plan

egs of ministers not resigning over cmr

• 2016 michael gove → opposed cameron over brexit, leave, suspension of cmr

• 2022 penny mordaunt → disagreed w/truss not increasing benefits in line with inflation, truss too weak to enforce cmr

payroll vote

• mps who hold senior positions in govt which they would have to resign from in order to oppose the govt

• 2020 sajid javid resigned as chancellor - refused to dismiss advisers in 2020 reshuffle

arguments that conventions of ministerial responsibility are still important

• cmr / imr = key elements of govt unity/cabinet is held to account through it (2016 duncan smith)

• cmr is flexible convention that can be suspended for issue transcending parties (2016, cameron suspended cmr for brexit)

• imr = ministers are focused on actions of dept/maintain correct quality of behaviour

arguments that conventions of ministerial res are NOT important anymore

• cmr = under strain, ministers disagreeing but not resigning (2019, 13 tory frontbenchers abstained from vote on no-deal brexit despite 3 line whip to oppose)

• if cmr can be suspended = rule enforced by pm/discarded when it doesn’t suit them, leaving party unity issues unresolved

• only conventions

• imr = clear, ministers shift blame to avoid bad publicity (2020, williamson blamed exam fiasco on ofqual > him)

arguments that pm has too much power

• most have large maj → legislative power

• whips keep backbenchers in check / ensure agreement (blair undefeated for 8 yrs)

• lords = limited in its scrutiny (2024 safety of rwanda act passed without lords amendments)

• powers of patronage = appt of key allies to senior ministerial positions

• sc rulings can be overridden by acts of parliament (safety of rwanda act 2024)

• prerogative powers = bypass parliament (may airstrikes)

arguments that pm isn’t overpowerful

• checks from cabinet (have rivals, thatcher / johnson forced to resign by pressure from cabinet)

• rely on cabinet in times of crisis

• media scrutiny (2020 partygate / 2003 iraq invasion problems w/evidence blair had given, andrew gilligan)

• sc ruled against pms → johnson prorogation of parliament 2019 / 2024 sunak / rwanda act