14.President Nixon's Policies in Vietnam

Nixon's plan for Vietnam

When Nixon took office in January 1969 he promised to end the war in Vietnam fast.
The USA's credibility as a global power was under threat as it couldn't achieve a military victory in Vietnam, but a premature withdrawal (with no success at all) would be a disaster.
Nixon wanted 'peace with honour'.
He knew that he has to accept how things were and not engage the USA in unwinnable conflicts.
He just needed to ensure the South remained independent and non-communist.

Vietnamisation

Johnson's Americanisation policy in Vietnam was a failure and so Nixon ended it.
He replaced this with Vietnamisation - withdrawing US forces from the South and replacing them with South Vietnamese forces to decrease opposition and therefore strengthen his security and strengthen the South's military machine to convince the North that the South were safe from threats.
This would also strengthen his position to negotiate with the North and reach an outcome that wouldn't make him appear a failure.
This negotiation tactic was reinforced when Nixon reintroduced bombing and invaded both Cambodia and Laos.

Strengthening the South's military machine

US troops in Vietnam:
June 1969 - 543k
January 1972 - 156.8k
June 1972 -47k
South Vietnamese Army:
1968 - 82k
1970 - 1 million
Nixon poured resources into the South; troops were paid more, career structures improved, benefits increased and service conditions modernised, the South Vietnamese Army equipment was updated (introduced M-16 Armalite rifle, increased military vehicles, planes and helicopters).

Impact of Vietnamisation

The ARVN (the South Vietnamese Army) became an effective fighting force and preserved the South's stability.
The North's 1972 Spring offensive tested the ARVN/Vietnamisation but they resisted it, and although they faced around 8k casualties the North faced many more.
ARVN morale was boosted further with the Operation Linebacker I which saw the North and their troops bombed.
This further indicated to the North that they were secure and the US weren't backing down in regard to the South.

Was Vietnamisation a success?

The reality was however; the ARVN's morale was still relatively low, and the ARVN were still assuming a secondary role compared to US forces - the building up of the South's military was a facade and left the South dependant on the USA.
The ARVN actually remained an ineffective fighting force, as the focus was on fighting a political war and officers were picked based on loyalty and not ability.
Eventually ARVN casualties increased greatly, but US declined.
Overall, Vietnamisation did aid Nixon and the US in many ways, but at the cost of the South.
Peace with honour was a failure therefore a failure.

Cambodia

In March 1969 Nixon initiated Operation Menu in Cambodia.
This was a bombing offensive that targeted areas in Cambodia regarded as 'safe' by North Vietnam in order to further pressure the North to negotiate, compensate for the Vietnamisation and gain back the support of the South and sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail supply.
In March 1970 Cambodia's Head of State, Sihanouk, was overthrown by a pro-US general, but therefore the North increased their presence to support the Khmer Rouge (Cambodia's Communist Party).
As the Khmer Rouge and the North pushed toward the capital Nixon feared a Communist regime would be established in Cambodia.

As a result

A show of US force in Cambodia would reinforce Nixon's intention to prove to the North that the US was still committed to the South, pressuring them into a diplomatic compromise and strengthen the US negotiating position.
So the South Vietnamese forces carried out cross-border raids into Cambodia - in April 1970 the US committed 70k troops to Cambodia, but later the same month he began decreasing his support for the South by claiming to remove 150k US troops from the South in a year.

Consequences of extending the war into Cambodia

-Lots of jungle destroyed so Vietcong's ability to operate in Cambodia was undermined.
-Lots of Vietcong supplies/equipment were taken or destroyed.
-The US achieved no strategic gains.
-Chances of a major North offensive against the South was undermined due to the losses faced by the North.
-The North moved deeper into Cambodia and strengthened their support for the Khmer Rouge, therefore the US worked to safeguard the opposition (Lon Nol).
-US commitment increased meanwhile they were able to withdraw forces and pressure the North into diplomatic cooperation - peace with honour.
-Opposition to Nixon/the war increased in the US. Protests erupted - for example at Kent State University, Ohio, 4 students were shot by US national guards. This catalysed more protests.
-In June the US Senate voted to remove the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

Laos

Nixon was still determined to not lose in Vietnam, and this meant extending the war further by attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
Disabiling the Ho Chi Minh Trail on its route through Laos could stall the support that the North were dependant on.
This assault on Laos had to be carried out by the ARVN with US air support, as Congress had banned US ground troops from entering Laos or Cambodia.
In February 1971 Nixon initiated Operation Lam Son 719 with an inadequate force of around 30k ARVN troops.

The invasion

The ARVN faced resistance from a superior Northern Vietnamese force and so they withdrew.
This only served to highlight the weaknesses of the ARVN and its leadership.
Like mentioned, the leaders were focused on loyalty and not winning battles.
This proved that the ARVN only was strong enough to prove a threat to the North when with US air support, and this was only just.
The North were spurred onto a offensive position at this point.

Why improving relations with China?

The advantages of Sino-American relations became clear to Nixon, while the Chinese realised that isolationism wasn't of any benefit to them either.
Nixon realised that China had great nuclear power and political/strategic force in Asia, and was a Communist power soon to be independent from the USSR,
Furthermore, the worsening Sino-Soviet relations encouraged China to ease relations with the West - from 1960 tensions were public and a Sino-Soviet split occurred in the late 1960s, after clashes occurred between Soviets and Chinese at their border.

Improving the relations with China

The first steps came in July 1969 when the US removed some trade controls and relaxed travel restrictions.
This was the artichoke approach - gradually 'peeling off' restrictions layer by layer.
Nixon also wanted to use France, Pakistan and Romania to show China that he was willing to improve Sino-American relations, as these countries had diplomatic connections with China.
In September 1970 Enlai, China's prime minister, achieved a victory against those opposed to relations with the US.
Enlai also realised that the USSR was becoming more of a threat, and although the US also posed some threat it made sense to form an alliance with the US to deal with the bigger threat.

Major improvements

In July 1971 Kissinger visited Beijing - this established a presidential visit and a Sino-American summit meeting for early 1972.
Kissinger made a second visit to Beijing in October 1971.
Furthermore, when Mao's designated successor died in September 1972, Lin Biao, (who was opposed to improving Sino-American relations) this brought China and US closer .

Paris Peace Talks

It was suggested that in order to bring the war in Vietnam to a close negotiations had to occur.
In May 1968 preliminary talks began in Paris surrounding stopping bombing of the North.
The talks quickly stalled over whether the USA would commit to completely stopping all bombing - Johnson wasn't convinced that the North were committed to negotiating and may use the removal of bombing to prepare for an offensive on the South.
By October the talks had reached a stalemate.
The South were also opposed to negotiating.

No outcomes

The North would not commit themselves to anything that made them seem weak, like de-escalation.
In return, the USA would not agree to a blanket end of it's bombing of the North.

The solutions

In February 1970 Kissinger met secretly with a Communist politician who served as an advisor to the North, who advised that any peace settlement must encompass both a military and political solution, a coalition government with Vietcong representatives, and a replacement of the Saigon regime.
This was unrealistic, the USA couldn't betray the South on such an extreme scale.
The North began demanding the removal of Thieu in the South, but the South would collapse into chaos and see this as a US betrayal, but in October 1972 the North changed their position regarding this to allow for the end of the war.