Nina Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo: The US and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use”

Nuclear Weapons

What is the main argument?

In essence, the argument reframes the non-use of nuclear weapons not solely as a result of external power balancing (deterrence), but as a function of an evolving, shared moral understanding (the nuclear taboo) that delegitimizes the weapons and constrains the self-help behavior of states.

What is the norm of the nuclear taboo?

Nuclear weapons are stigmatized as unacceptable.

What are the empirical anomalies challenging deterrence (mutually assured destruction)?

1. Nuclear weapons have remained unused in cases where the adversary cannot retaliate.

   1. When US had nuclear monopoly over USSR

   2. US nuclear non-use in Vietnam

   3. Britain’s non-use in the Falklands and USSR non-use in Afghanistan

2. Nuclear weapons have not deterred attacks by non-nuclear states against nuclear states.

   1. China attacking US in Korean War/Iraq attacking US forces and Israel in the Gulf War

3. Many states that are nuclear-capable have not developed nuclear weapons

How does the nuclear taboo influence state behavior through three normative effects?

1. Regulative (Constraining) Effects

   1. There is an injunction against using nuclear weapons first. It is an external constraint in the self-interested calculations of decision makers.

2. Constitutive effects

   1. Constitutive effects refer to how the nuclear taboo defines or creates specific forms of behavior, roles, and identities, fundamentally shaping the context in which actors operate.

      1. This taboo helps define nuclear weapons as category of unacceptable “weapons of mass destruction.”

      2. The taboo has become integrated into the discourse of “civilized” membership in the International community. You must uphold the taboo to be validate your moral identity.

3. Permissive (shadow) effects

   1. Permissive effects are secondary, indirect, or "shadow" consequences where the nuclear taboo acts as a focal point that selectively diverts our normative gaze. Consequently, this effect may shield or legitimize other practices, such as the use of destructive conventional weapons, from moral disapproval.

What is the evidence from U.S. decision making?

1. 1945 (Japan): No taboo existed 

2. Korean War: Emerging taboo

   1. operated instrumentally (political leaders worried that using atomic weapons would destroy support)

   2. Decision makers recognized the emerging taboo as an unwelcome constraint

3. Vietnam War: Deepening taboo

   1. High cost and high frustration

   2. Yet, non-use

   3. Non-use due to moral reasons and taboo operated substantively/constitutively reflecting beliefs that use was “simply wrong

4. Gulf War: Taken for granted taboo

   1. Nuclear use was ruled out quickly, reflecting a deeply internalized norm

   2. Constructive; placed nuclear use outside the bounds of behavior for a civilized nation