🤒 Guest Lecture 1

Why Does Canada Go For the Nuclear Option for Avian Influenza?

• Protects Canadian poultry industry

• CFIA (Canadian Food Inspection Agency) uses Health of Animals Act to quarantine farms, order destruction, oversee C&D (cleaning and disinfection) before lifting quarantine

• Similar approach to other countries handling Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs)

• HPAI legislation affects only avian species

• Question: What happens if it’s found in other species (e.g. ostriches)?

• Vaccination isn’t ideal for HPAI due to trade concerns

• Receiving countries can't differentiate vaccine vs wild strain with PRC test, so they banned imports from Canada

• Poultry is supply-managed, Canada doesn’t export it except for:

  • Exported genetics: Turkeys and layers

  • Non-supply managed exports: Ducks

• Vaccine used on certain birds like ducks to protect against HPAI

HPAI Also Affects Wildlife

• Wild Birds: Ducks, geese, swans, colonial nesters

• Scavenger Birds: Hawks, eagles, owls, turkey vultures, crows, ravens

• Scavenger Mammals: Skunks, foxes, raccoons, mink, otters, coyotes, wolves, bears, seals, cougars, bobcats

• USDA Added Black Rat to HPAI Mammal List (2 weeks ago)

• 4 HPAI H5 Cases Found in Black Rats in California

HPAI Also Infects Non-Avian Livestock

• Dog and numerous cats infected by H5

  • Mostly feral cats infected, but some cats got H5 from eating infected cat food

• Farmed mink were infected by eating poultry protein

• March 2024: Goats, alpacas, then dairy cows in USA

• As of March 12, 2025: USDA reports influenza A(H5N1) in 985 dairy herds across 17 states

• States affected: Arizona, Wyoming, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Kansas, South Dakota, Nevada, Minnesota, New Mexico, Iowa, Utah, Texas, Michigan, Idaho, Colorado, California

• Recent outbreaks reported in Nevada, Arizona, California

HPAI and Cows

• Latest developments in dairy:

• Last 2 incursions (in last 4 weeks) in Nevada and Arizona are D1.1 strain, different from the B3.13 Bovine strain

• D1.1 strain means any dairy farm in North America could be at risk, unlike cow movement infections of B3.13

• H5N1 research project is tracking these developments

• Significant wildlife mortality in Ontario is being monitored

HPAI and Cats

• Cats have died in households in the USA with no outside exposure

• Source of infection:

  • Some cats got H5N1 from raw milk

  • Others got it from commercially produced raw pet food

• Cases reported in areas like Santa Barbara County, California, Oregon, etc.

HPAI and Swine

• In Oregon, a small flock of chickens tested positive, including  2 pigs

• February 24, 2025: CDC confirmed 70 human cases of influenza A(H5), with 7 additional probable cases

• First H5N1 case in Canada: BC teenager (recovering)

• First North American H5N1 fatality: Louisiana man exposed to infected small flock

• Get your flu shot!

New HPAI Strains: H5N2, H5N5, H7N9

• One HPAI case in BC: H5N2 in commercial layers, rest (i.e.g broilers, breeders, etc.) are H5N1

• H5N2 LPAI (Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza) found in turkeys in PQ

• Dead Turkey Vulture in Ontario tested positive for H5N5

• H5N5 also found in other provinces

• Iceland reported H5N5 in commercial turkey flock (December)

• H5N5 found in Norway and the UK (November)

• H5N5 case in NFLD 2 weekends ago

• We are currently in a high-risk period for avian influenza, lots of wildlife mortality is happening

• H7N9 detected in poultry flock in the USA today

Government Agencies Involved in Controlling HPAI

• Federal:

  • CFIA (Canadian Food Inspection Agency)

  • ECCC (Environment and Climate Change Canada)

  • CWS (Canadian Wildlife Service)

  • AAFC (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada)

  • PHAC (Public Health Agency of Canada)

• Provincial:

  • OMAFRA (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs)

  • MECP (Ministry of the Environment, Conservation and Parks)

  • NDMNRF (Ministry of Northern Development, Mines, Natural Resources and Forestry)

  • MoH (Ministry of Health)

  • PHU’s (Public Health Units)

  • SolGen (Attorney General) – PAWS (Provincial Animal Welfare Services)

  • MoL (Ministry of Labour)

  • MTO (Ministry of Transportation)

  • EMO (Emergency Management Ontario)

• Municipal:

  • Local police forces

  • Municipal authorities

Domestic Players

• 4 Supply Managed (SM) Feather Boards

• Feather Board Command Centre (SM Boards)

• For non-supply managed poultry: Waterfowl, Gamebirds, Squab

• For small flock: Family Food & Artisanal program, exhibition (show poultry), backyard, pet birds, etc. (estimated around 25,000)

• For wild birds: Wildlife rehabbers, zoos, birds raised with aviculture permits

HPAI Process

1. Sick bird call comes in

2. Testing: Samples taken for testing

3. Confirmation: Confirmation of HPAI (includes export implications)

4. Quarantine and Traceback: Quarantine of affected farm and tracing potential spread

5. Zoning:

   • 3-10 km zone around affected area

   • Zones on premise: Hot, Warm, Cold

6. Destruction:

   • Options for destruction of infected birds (paid for by CFIA)

7. Disposal:

   • On-farm composting of deceased birds, manure, feed, eggs (paid for by CFIA)

8. Primary Disinfection:

   • Can take weeks (CFIA does not pay)

   • Use of approved disinfectants

9. 28-Day Surveillance:

   • Ongoing surveillance for 28 days before the infected premises (IP) is cleared

Wild Bird Deterrence

• Do not make your property attractive to wild birds

• Deterrence methods may include harassment and other measures

• Migratory Birds (including waterfowl): Requires permits from Canadian Wildlife Services (CWS)

• Non-Migratory Native Species (includes wild turkeys): Contact Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR)

• OMAFA provides a factsheet on wild bird deterrence

Biosecurity Measures in the Winter/Spring

• Do not let disease into your barn or yard/run

• Follow proper biosecurity SOPs and use of PPE

• Use a visitor log book

• Sick bird and high mortality concerns: Contact local CFIA District Office or private veterinarian, self-quarantine until diagnosis confirmed

• Deadstock management: Scavengers can bring in disease, or deadstock can spread HPAI to wildlife and other farms

• Pick up spilled feed

• Rodent control: Rats live outside the barn and can come into feed

• If you see dead wild birds, contact CWHC (Canadian Wildlife Health Cooperative)

• Keep birds inside until after Fall Migration (end of Aug to mid-Dec or until late Spring)

• If you get sick, see your doctor or contact your local PHU (testing for H5N1 with human influenza cases)

• OMAFRA/PIC/FBCC/CFIA/??? will continue to reach out to small flock holders and non-quota poultry production

• Industry updates provided regularly

• Flu shot recommended for poultry and swine holders due to zoonotic potential

• One last reminder: Wild bird exclusion and proper biosecurity are crucial

  • You are the last line of defense in preventing disease from entering your barn

Does Hunting Pose a Risk to Your Flock?

• It can pose a risk if traffic is not managed properly

• However, hunting can actually benefit biosecurity if controlled, by reducing wild bird populations near poultry farms

What To Do If You Find Dead Birds on Your Farm

• Contact CWHC at 1-866-673-4781

• Visit CWHC Website

• Report clusters of 3 small birds or one large bird found dead

The Eureka Moment

• In May 2022, OMAFRA, CFIA, and Canadian Wildlife Services met for a "Networking Opportunity"

• Key questions raised:

  • How does H5N1 reach commercial operations?

  • What are the differences in farmed species, management practices, barns, geographic location, or density that make farms more or less prone to infection?

  • The need for a risk management tool to help manage the risk of H5N1 spread

Collaboration on Steroids

• Three parts:

1. Ecology Study:

• Understand typical wildlife traffic on poultry farms (both infected and control premises) using camera traps, observations, and song recordings

2. Case Control Study:

• Evaluate farm SOPs (biosecurity and farm management practices) on infected farms

• Compare these practices to other farms within and outside Primary Control Zones

3. Epidemiological Risk Study on an Infected Farm:

• Test animals and equipment on infected premises

• Identify pathways for infection both onto and off the farm

Collaboration with Everyone

• Unprecedented level of collaboration between wildlife and agriculture

• Not seen before in North America/Canada

• Local research is necessary

• Some parts of the plan are moving forward, others are retrospective

• Need for partners, especially non-IP (infected premises) farms