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Scope: In Gahiden [2004]
The House of Lords confirmed that courts may “read in,” “read down” and “read out” statutory words, even where the legislative language is clear
Scope: Lord Nicholls
Emphasised that s.3 requires a departure from traditional interpretation and permits courts to adopt meaning that parliament did not expressly intend, providing they do not alter a fundamental feature of legislation.
Scope: Kavanagh and Elliot
Have described this approach as ”radical” and “constitutional in nature,” noting that it signals a sufficient shift in the role of the judiciary
Scope:This expansive interpretive method was also affirmed in
R v A (no.2) [2001], where the court took an aggressive approach to safeguard the right to a fair trial (art 6 ECHR)
Scope: however, in sheldrake [2004]
The court recognised the constitutional limits of of section 3, emphasising that while interpretation may be strained, they must not be judicially illegitimate or inconsistent with the statutes core purpose.
Scope: As Loveland states
This shows “a careful judicial attempt to balance human rights protection with respect for parliamentary supremacy” reinforcing while s.3 is powerfully, it remains bounded by constitutional principles.
Limits: section 3 must not rewrite legislation or alter a fundamental feature of the statutory scheme. This principle has been consistently affirmed in cases such as
Bellinger [2003], , Re S and Re W [2002], and Sheldrake [2004]
Limits: As Lord Nicholls noted in Ghaidan
section 3 does not permit courts to make decisions that properly fall within the remit of Parliament.
limits: Kavanagh (2009) similarly cautions against judges becoming
“legislators in robes,” warning that this risks undermining democratic legitimacy and the constitutional separation of powers
Limits: Section 3, therefore, requires what Kavanagh calls
“constitutional restraint,” ensuring that judicial creativity remains tethered to the statutory framework and does not displace Parliament’s legislative function.