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Duty of Care
A duty of care shows fault if the harm was something that a reasonable person could see coming. TIn Kent v Griffiths, the ambulance took too long when someone was having an asthma attack. The harm was foreseeable, so the ambulance service was at fault.
In Bourhill v Young, a pregnant woman saw a crash and lost her baby. But the rider couldn’t have foreseen her being affected, so he wasn’t at fault.
In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, the police weren’t at fault for not catching the Yorkshire Ripper earlier, even though the victim’s family wanted to sue.
Breach of Duty
Fault happens when someone doesn’t meet the standard of care expected. The test is: what would a reasonable person do?
In Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks, the water company wasn’t at fault because they acted reasonably.
In Nettleship v Weston, a learner driver was at fault even though she was new—she was judged by the same standard as any other driver.
Bolton v Stone shows fault depends on risk. The cricket club wasn’t at fault because the chance of harm was very small and they had taken precautions.
Causation
Fault only leads to liability if it causes the damage.
In Barnett v Chelsea, the hospital wasn’t at fault because the man would’ve died anyway, even with treatment.
In The Wagon Mound, D was not liable for damage that wasn’t foreseeable.
Smith v Leech Brain said if some harm is foreseeable, you are liable for all the harm—even if it's worse than expected.
Damages
Damages aim to put the claimant back to the position before the accident.
But if the harm is only financial (pure economic loss), like in Spartan Steel, the defendant may not be liable; even if at fault.
In Treadaway v West Midlands Police, the police were at great fault for torturing a man. He got extra (exemplary) damages.
If the claimant is partly at fault, the damages are reduced—like in Froom v Butcher (not wearing seatbelt).
Defences
If the claimant is also at fault, damages can be reduced (contributory negligence) - Froom v Butcher.
If the claimant agrees to take the risk, D may not be liable at all (consent) - Morris v Murray.
Occupiers’ Liability 1957
Fault in these cases is about how careful the occupier was.
- Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. This Act covers lawful visitors (people who have permission to be on the land).
Section 2(2): The occupier must take reasonable care to make sure visitors are reasonably safe while using the premises for the allowed purpose. In Martin v Middlesbrough (1965), the council was liable because they didn’t safely manage litter, and a child was injured. This links to fault, because it asks whether the occupier failed to act reasonably (a form of blame or responsibility). If the occupier didn’t take sensible steps (like repairing a broken step, clearing water, or putting up a warning sign), then they are at fault and liable.
Section 2(3)(a): Extra care should be taken when the visitor is a child, as they may be less careful. If an occupier leaves a sharp object in a playground, they may be seen as blameworthy because they didn’t act reasonably to protect children. Like in Glasgow Corp where, the berries here were held to be an allurement to kids. Liability was imposed.
Section 2(3)(b): Professionals (like electricians) are expected to guard against risks related to their job — they are owed a lower duty of care. In Roles v Nathan (1963) – Chimney sweeps ignored warnings and died from fumes. The occupier wasn’t at fault.
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984. This Act covers unlawful visitors or trespassers.
Section 1(3): A duty only arises if. Rhind shows that there is no liability if the occupier did not know:
The occupier knows of the danger,
Knows (or should know) that someone may come near it, and
The danger is something they should guard against.
More protection is given to child trespassers. For Example, in British Rail v Herrington (1972) – A child trespasser was hurt on a railway line. The court said there was a ‘common duty of humanity’, and British Rail was liable.
But courts often find no fault for adult trespassers if the occupier took reasonable steps. For example, Tomlinson v Congleton (2003) – A man dived into a lake despite warning signs. The council was not at fault.
Psychiatric Harm
Recognised Psychiatric Harm reflects fault because the law only holds someone liable if the harm is serious and medically recognized. This prevents people from being blamed (or at fault) for minor emotional reactions. It ensures that D is only found at fault if their actions caused real psychological harm.
Primary or Secondary Victim reflects fault because the law distinguishes between those directly affected (primary victims) and indirectly affected (secondary victims) to limit liability. The closer the connection and danger, the more fault is placed on D, as their actions are more likely to have caused serious distress.
Duty of Care eflects fault because a duty is only owed if harm is reasonably foreseeable (Page v Smith). This links fault to the idea that D should have anticipated their actions might cause harm. If D couldn’t foresee the harm, they’re not considered at fault.
Proximity (Alcock Criteria for Secondary Victims) reflects fault because the strict tests (close ties of love, witnessing the event in person, immediate aftermath, own senses) all limit fault to those cases where D’s actions are more directly responsible for C’s suffering. The more removed someone is, the less D is to blame.
Negligent Misstatement
Foreseeability reflects fault because D is only at fault if they could reasonably foresee that giving the statement or advice might cause economic loss to someone like C. If there was no way D could see this coming, it wouldn’t be fair to hold them responsible. (Hedley Byrne v Heller)
Special Relationship (Proximity). This includes a group of elements showing whether D assumed responsibility. Each one builds fault by increasing how closely D is tied to the loss:
Special Skill or Expertise reflects fault because if D has relevant expertise (or holds themselves out as having it), then they should know better. They’re more at fault if their statement is careless in a field they claim to know well. (Esso v Mardon, Mutual Life v Evatt)
Purpose Known to D reflects fault because D is more to blame if they knew exactly why C needed the advice. Knowing the purpose increases D’s responsibility to be accurate and careful. (Caparo v Dickman)
C Highly Likely to Rely reflects fault because D is at fault if they know (or should know) that C is likely to rely on their advice. If they don’t clarify or give a disclaimer, they’re accepting responsibility. (Smith v Eric S Bush)
C Actually Relied on the Statement reflects fault because D can’t be blamed unless C actually used the advice and made a decision based on it. No reliance = no causation = no fault. (JEB Fasteners v Marks Bloom)
C’s Reliance Was Reasonable reflects fault because even if C relied, D is only at fault if that reliance was reasonable. If the advice was vague, informal, or given in a casual/social setting, it’s less reasonable to blame D. (Goodwill v BPAS, Chaudhry v Prabhaker, James McNaughton v Hicks, Patchett v SPATA)
Vicarious Liability
Here, someone else is made liable even if they weren’t at fault.
In Century Insurance, the employer was liable when a worker caused an explosion.
In Mohamud v Morrisons, the company was liable when a worker assaulted a customer—even though it seemed unrelated.
This type of liability helps victims get compensation, even if it seems unfair on employers.
If the worker was doing something personal (a “frolic of his own”), like in Beard v LGOC, the employer isn’t at fault or liable.
Rylands v Fletcher
This is strict liability—fault doesn’t need to be shown.
In Rylands v Fletcher, a reservoir flooded a neighbour’s land. Even though D wasn’t careless, he was still liable.
But in newer cases like Cambridge Water and Transco, courts said there must be some foreseeability of harm, so the rule isn’t totally no-fault anymore.
Nuisance
Private nuisance means someone is at fault for unreasonably interfering with someone else’s use of their land.
Who Can Sue element of nuisance reflects fault because only someone with a proprietary interest in the land (like an owner or tenant) can sue. This limits D’s liability and fault only to cases where someone’s legal rights are truly affected. If C has no legal stake, D isn’t at fault because there’s no right to protect. (Hunter v Canary Wharf)
Who Can Be Sued element reflects fault because D is only liable if they create, authorise, or adopt the nuisance. This ties fault directly to D’s actions or omissions. Passive landlords usually aren’t at fault unless they permitted or continued the nuisance. (Page Motors v Epsom)
Indirect Unlawful Interference element reflects fault because Nuisance must be indirect—this separates it from trespass. D is at fault only if their activities spill over and interfere with C’s land without direct contact. (Halsey v Esso, Bone v Seale)
Type of Harm (Physical Damage or Loss of Enjoyment) reflects fault because Fault is only present if D’s interference is serious—either damaging land (like acid rain in St Helens Smelting) or disrupting enjoyment (like sleep disruption in Halsey v Esso). Trivial or purely recreational impacts (e.g., TV signal in Hunter) don’t show enough fault.
Unreasonableness (The Core Fault Element) reflects fault because this is where fault is judged most clearly. Courts balance both sides to decide if D went too far.
The court looks at Reasonableness of:
Locality reflects fault because what counts as a nuisance depends on the area. D isn’t at fault if their actions suit the location (e.g., industry in industrial areas). But doing industrial things in a residential area? That’s unreasonable. (Sturges v Bridgman, Leeman v Montague, Halsey v Esso)
Seriousness reflects fault because minor annoyances don’t count. D is only at fault if their interference is substantial—especially at sensitive times (like night). (Walter v Selfe)
Duration reflects fault because the longer the interference lasts, the more blameworthy it becomes. Persistent or repeated actions show disregard for C’s rights. (De Keyser’s Royal Hotel, Crown River Cruises)
Sensitivity of the Claimant reflects fault because D isn’t at fault if the problem only affects unusually sensitive uses of land. They’re only blamed if a reasonable person would be affected. (Robinson v Kilvert, McKinnon v Walker)
Utility of D’s Conduct reflects fault because if D’s actions serve the public or have social value, they may be less blameworthy. But utility doesn’t excuse all harm. (Harrison v Southwark, Adams v Ursell)
Malice reflects fault because if D acted with bad intent (spite or revenge), it shows clear fault. Malice can turn an otherwise lawful act into an unlawful nuisance. (Christie v Davey)