philosophy of the Mind: Test 2

Identity theory

mental states are identical to physical states in the brain

• minds are identical to brains

• mental experience corresponds to a specific neurological process.

Ockhams Razor

among competing hypotheses: the one with the fewest assumptions should be selected

• the simplest explanation is the most likely one

The logic of scientific discovery

• scientific theories should be based on falsifiability rather than verification

• scientific theories should be disproved with empircal evidance

• diffrent than metaphysics that lack testable implications

Failure of Dualism

• cannot explain causal causation between mental and physical states such as physical actions based on the non-physical mind

  identity theory:

  • suggests that mental states are NOT separate from brain but are identical to neural processes

objections to identity theory

•1) The different kinds objection

•2) Problem of mental images

•3) Leibniz’s Law problems

•4) Species chauvinism

The problem of mental imaging

• Imagining an object= mental image in mind

  • but there is no actual apple in the brain- just neural activity

    • problem: neural activity does not contain pictures just electrical and chemical signals. therefore mental images are not IDENTICAL to brain states

phenomenological fallacy

the error of describing the feelings of subjective personal experiences as the same as telling the literal objective literal properties

Leibniz’s Law

“ If 2 entities are identical, then they share the same problems”

• eg: if superman and Jimmy olsen are the same person, they must have all the same properties

Problems with Identity theory:

therefore: mental states and brain states do not share all properties

• mental states have subjective qualitative properties (qualia)

  • brain states have physical/measurable properties (eg: fibers, nerves)

species chauvinism

• the belief in the superiority of one's own species (humans) over others, leading to a disregard for their rights

objection to identity theory;

• identity theory is too narrow because it assumes that only human brains can have certain mental states.

• because other species (octopus) which have different neural structures would NOT feel pain

functionalism

• mental states are defined by their function not their makeup

• role in a system

• the brain is like a computer, where mental states are software running on the hardware (the brain)

• “matter dosen’t matter”

• result/output/behavoir is only important

pain

• results in function of discomfort in all animals even though the brains are physically different

multiple realizability thesis

the same mental state, like pain or belief, can be realized in different physical systems, such as human brains, artificial intelligence, or even hypothetical alien brain

• eg: intelligence could be realized by human brain, computer, AI, or animal

• supports functionalism

• if multiple realizability is true, identity theory is false

the turing machine

• behaviour operates on a set of rules

• A machine is considered intelligent if it can engage in human-like conversation well enough to fool a human judge.

• critique of functionalism: even though a machine can pass- the behaviour demonstrates it does not have human understanding

chinease room searle

• argues against the possibility of true artificial intelligence by demonstrating that a computer, even if it can manipulate symbols like Chinese characters, doesn't understand them

qualia

• phenomena

• what is like feel quality feel in experince

• eg: tasting chocolate, feeling pain, hearing favourite song, getting high

  • hard to give a scientific account of qualia

  • mental states are accompanies by a phenomenal consiousness

Leibniz Mill

• if we walked around the brain it isnt the same as walking around a factory and mill

• to go inside the brain would look like a series of mills,

  • wouldn't see the first person POV

Mary thought Room experiment

Jacksons argument agaisnt physicalism

• she knows all about colour vision in the brain, expert in neuroscience of colour vision, understands all about surface refractnat properties and its interaction with eyes etc.

• mary has only seen grey, black and white for her entire life

• one day she is released and sees bright red

  • actually experiences the qualia of red, therefore learning something new

  • proving that physicalism is false

Philosophical zombies

• Look and behave like conscious beings but do not experience qualia

• functions like humans but has no consciousness (dark on inside)

• lacks conscious experience

• logically possible eg: drug addicts, dementia patients, infantasia,

Epiphenomenalism

• there are consciousness experiences that are caused by physical processes but dont have influence on the physical process

  • eg: pain is an “After effect” of brain activity- dosen’t cause behaviour

Physicalism

Everything that exists is ultimately physical or reducible to physical processes.

priming experiments: what we can do without consciousness

• participants are unconsciously processing information about the prim and stimulus

• affects behavior subsequently even though unaware of stimulus

  • eg: seeing a prime so fast u are unaware of a hammer ,then seeing a screwdriver, you will categorize the image faster as a tool

neurological disorders

• blindsighted individuals have damage to visual feild

  • cannot see obstacles in the front etc

• spatial neglect

  • people who cannot see on a lateral side eg: right eye

• demonstrates we are capable of alot without being conscious

Epiphenomenal Qualia- Frank Jackson

• challenge to physicalism

• “There are aspects of consciousness (qualia) that cannot be fully explained by physical science.”

  • supported by marys room thought expirament

• does not have any affect on the real world

mysterianism

• we dont know how to explain consiouness and we cant know

chombers view

• view consciousness as a basic fundamental building block of the universe

• such as space and time

  • unexplainble

nomological danglers

• something that cant be easily accountable by the normal rules or laws

• “consciousness as a brain process” is forced onto us by scientific study

• JC SMART uses to critique dualism and epiphenomenalism

  • suggest consciousness is separate from physical processes

transitivity of identity

t if two things are identical to a third thing, then they are identical to each other

• if a=b, b=c, then a=c

Arguments Against identity theory

• strict definition- NOT the “is” of definition

  • “is” predication

  • “is: of identity

• possible to know 2 identities without knowing they are identical

  • eg: know about butler and murder but not the same

  • eg: know pain and brain but not that pain is identical with brain states

The Chinese Room Argument

• person in the room can use the rules to produce responses in Chinese

• illustrates that a computer can process and respond to inputs in a way that seems intelligent- doesn't understand the meaning behind those inputs.

• searle- pushes back on functionalism

The "China Brain" Thought Experiment

• Block challenge functionalism

  • all people in china replicate the functions of a human brain

  • according to functionalism this should be a conscious mind

• problem with functionalism: it may allow for the existence of systems that function like brains but don’t possess genuine consciousness

Distinction between Syntax and Semantics:

Searle argues that computers operate on syntax (rules for manipulating symbols) but lack semantics (meaning)

intentionality

thoughts, beliefs, desires, and other mental phenomena are always directed at, or about, something

• AI and machines do not have

• distinguishes mental states from purely physical phenomena

• searle

The Systems Reply:

• critique of chinese room (searle)

• says the entire system can understand chinese as it creates meaningful answers

  • (the person, the rules, and the symbol)

  • aruges that chinese room puts too much emphasis on the individual