electoral reform

multi member districts and welfare

more political parties need to be appeases, create incentives for more generous welfare policies

2 ways pr increases government expenditures

1. coalition governments must appease more interests

2. logic of pr means bonding strategies over bridging strategies

2 ways majoritarian systems decrease government expenditure

1. single party governments mean less need for accommodation

2. geographic appeal of elections mean targeted spending to select blocks

broad consequences of electoral change (mechanical vs psychological effects)

mechanical: formula, number of votes needed to win, choices on ballot, etc.

psychological: menu-driven theory, etc.

rational choice institutionalism

idea that rules have an impact on parties, politicians, and citizens

rules create incentives that shape behaviour (can be both formal and informal)

rational choice assumptions

rules shape incentives facing political actors

actors are rational vote-maximizers in pursuit of electoral office who respond strategically to electoral incentives

how motivations affect political actors (rational choice)

threshold: parties adopt bridging or bonding strategies (reinforce or weaken political salience of partisan identities)

ballot structure: candidate centred, preference ballots, dual ballots, party ballots, homogeneous or heterogeneous candidates

cultural modernization

rules don’t drive behaviour, but social norms do

social modernization → political culture → socialization → limited effects of electoral rule change

assumptions about rules and behaviour need to be embedded in historical context

do rules matter in cultural modernization theories?

depends on assumptions

• rational choice → change rules, change behaviour

• path dependency → idea that the reason why you chose to do something today is because you did something yesterday

• culture and history

electoral systems are both causes and consequences