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eliminative materialism
common sense understanding of mental states are radically mistaken - mental states/properties do not exist, reduce to anything, nor are identical to anything else, hence should be eliminated
- a complete analysis of mental states can be provided by neuroscience
what does em say about folk psychology
- pejoratively contrieved, every day way one talks about mental states, this does not reduce to anything, nor mean anything so it should be eliminated
- fp does not exist, and eventually neuroscience will be able to explain this better
ways churchland THEN demonstrated how folk psychology fails as a scientific theory : low predictive power
- fp provides own rules and laws however they are not always accurate, they can be wrong
- for example someone may run away if they are nervous, may run away for other reasons
-not a perfect scientific theory , scientific theories are always able to make accurate predictions when they are correct
fp should not be eliminated altogether
- would not be practical to eliminate it altogether since it is everyday language
- it is quick to use and understand workings of the brain rather than using a brain scan each time
- fp will sitll provide accurate, though less detailed analysis
- if one wishes to entirely accurately describe reality then one should eliminiate fp in favour of neuroscientfifc explanation
why are fp concepts not an accurate way of talking about the mind
- fp concepts do not reduce to anything , are not identical to anything so should be elininated
response, fp does have good predictive power
" when he feels nervous, he will talk fast" "if she has a belief that eating animals is wrong, she won't order the chicken"
- neuroscience in contrast, is complex, and difficulty to predict simple behaviours
response to predictive power of fp being good
fp gets predictions wrong while physics theories will always make accurate predictions
- there are gaps inability to explain certain things
- em say correct theori must be equally accurate, only neuroscience can achieve such accuracy
response - our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations, counterinuitive
- em goes againts intuition
- to think, is a fp concept, and if em is true then this basic certainty is to be doubted
- direct certainty over propositions should take priority over physicalist considerations
response, em is self refuting
- claim that beliefs do not exist and they are mistaken for fp concepts, in arguing for ep, one expresses a belief
- since why would anyone argue with something that they did not believe was true
- churchland proves that beliefs exist by claiming that they do not
response , em cannot explain intentionality -means that em collapses into incoherency
- even if one still argued that em and beliefs can still exist
- em still proves that intentionality, an fp concept, exists
- impossible to disprove this
- the "abouteness of a mental state
- intetionality must be presupposed, since we must understand what the statements are about.
- self refuting objection emerges, to be able to even talk of em = intentionality, an fp concept
- not clear how nueroscience could offer an alternate account of intentionality
- fp can never be fully eliminated
folk psychology
- every day, intuitive way of explaining and understanding mental states and behaviour
"he ran away because he was scared"
- pejorative term used by em
how eliminativist argue that folk psychology is a scientific theory
- if a new theory that better explains is derived, then it should be replaced
- has own rules and laws
fp fails as a scientific theory - incomprehensive
cannot explain learning processes, sleep, mental illnesses
fp fails as a scientific theory - stagnant
fp has not advanced or changed, same words have always been used to describe fp
scientific theories advance over time by being proven wrong
- fp does not do this
fp fails as a scientific theory - intentionality, does not cohere with other theories
- does not allign with science
- fp talks about having a thought about something or a belief about something, a belied about a frog
- this is incompatible with a physicalist position, which claims that mental states are physical things, since physical things do not have aboutness, intentionality in this way
- either fp is an outlier from other physicalist theories, or it is mistaken in its analysis
intentionality
the aboutness, of certain mental states
responnse to violates direct intuition
- objection misunderstands theory
- em does not deny the existence that mental pheonomena do not exist
- fp is the wrong account of these mental phen, the reality of thinking is instead a neuroscientific alternative
response to self refuting
begs the question , by assuming beliefs exist
- does not deny that beliefs do not exist, just that fp is the wrong explanation
+ intuitive
- focus on brain, know that minds are in the brain (rebuke functionalism, which essential renders anything with a functional state as minded)
- more intuitive than other theories of mind, avoiding the multiple relisability objection (rebuke behave, tipe identity theoryetc)
assumes fp is useless
- anything immaterial has no value whcih is not true
- cbt therapy proven affective which requires conjuring and examining beliefs, those same beliefs that em wishes to eliminate
- reasonable to accept that mental states have value, especially since em does not exhibit this same value
+vitalism analogy, supporting belief begging question resposne
- a theory that suggested there was a special force that gave life to physical things, living things contain a special sibstance that brings it life
- a vitalist says to a non vitalist 'we can't take your theory seriously since if it was true, we would all be dead'
- problem arises is that the vitalist assumes the truth of vitalism. we know vitalism is false and this force is not needed to explain life
- analogy in that when we come to learn that fp is false, and we will no longer require a belief to explain anything about why we change theories
response to vitalism analogy
- while vitalism was replaced by a better theory of life , em does not
- em also posits no other theory of mind,
- merely predicts what may happen in the future, so not a good analogy
em would have to prove that it can expain certain behaviours better using neuroscience which appears unlikely
fp is stronger based on current knowledge.
someone thirsty, they will grab drink, how can neuroscience predict this any better?
how is folk psychology supposed to be empircle
mental concepts, desires beliefs are thought to predict and explain behaviour
