Nuclear Politics

How many countries posess nuclear weapons today? Is the world headed toward nuclear disarmament today?

9 . United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.

Most countries are modernizing not disarming and keeping the weapons secret

Explain the role of Truman in his decision to use nukes

It wasn’t Truman’s choice. Decided by the military and Secretary of War

In what ways are nukes different from conventional weapons

Nukes kill immediately and long-term. radiation poisoning. Conventional weapons are one-time attacks

Truman argues that w/o nukes, the US would have had to ground invade Japan and lose 500k US soldiers. Y or N

No. Estimated tens of thousands of deaths. Japan surrendered because of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. The emperor surrendered to keep power

If FDR didn’t die, what could've happened with nuke control? Sherwin

FDR was more flexible. A cautious approach = more international control of nukes

What did American leaders hope to achieve by building nukes? What country were they worried about? Sherwin

Diplomatic tool. Originally Germany then USSR

What is the nuclear revolution in war operations? Jervis

Nukes make total victory impossible. Mutually Assured Destruction with second strike

Political consequences of Nuke Revolution? jervis

• Peace between nuclear-armed major powers

• status quo maintained

• crisis: rare

• Chicken games: neither side pushing advantage

Why won't deterrence work between the US and Russia over Ukraine? Lewis and Stein

Deterrence can fail if leaders push too hard. Both sides must believe nuclear war is a risk

What are the requirements for “ the power to hurt” is a successful strategy? Schelling

• know what the opponent values

• communicate what behavior will cause violence

• the pain has to be dependent on opponents behavior

How did the role of the military and how it fights war change after 1945? Schelling

states should use nukes to achieve political goals before a war starts or in wartime, bargaining tool

Western perception of irrational North Korean leaders is an asset for DPRK. How? Terry Roehrig

Boosts deterrence and bargaining power - if they seem unpredictable with nukes, other states act cautiously.

To make commitments more credible, what are some of the measures the defender typically takes?

Extended deterrence is always less credible than primary because a defender might hesitate to risk war. Especially nuclear war with another state. 

• formal treaties

• military hesitate

• economic political ties

What does brinkmanship mean? Schelling

• engaging in risky behavior to manipulate the shared risk of war. Pushing the other side to the brink of war before stopping

Contrast a chess game to crisis diplomacy. Schelling

In chess, players control all moves with clear rules and outcomes. In crisis, leaders face uncertainty. Hard to predict the other sides response

Benefits of threatening limited war. Schelling

• better in low-intensity conflicts

  • Threatening limited war still threatens all-out war

• If we threaten all-out war, thinking it is too late to stop, and it is, we have to go through with it or have our threat discredited

Roulette wheel black box scenario. Schelling

creates an ongoing risk of uncontrollable escalation. Because war could happen anytime, the opponent feels time pressure to comply quickly

3 reasons why coercive nuclear threats are often ineffective

1. Credibility problem—Nuke use too costly so threats not believed—Korean War

2. Lack of usability—nukes are too destructive for limited goals - Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

3. Reputational + International Costs - global backlash - India Pakistan Kargill Crisis

Crisis stability definition

Zero incentiive to strike first with nuclear weapons

Strategic Stability

encompasses crisis stability but more of a long term relationship between nuke-armed states. neither side wants to risk escalation

Escalation dominance

The ability to give one side leverage over the other

Summary of SIOP - 62. Sagan

US nuclear war plan for a massive strike on the USSR and China. Even a first strike couldnt prevent Soviet retaliation

Did Siop - 62 have seperate operational prcedures for preemption and retaliation? Sagan

No. Both led to the same massive strike on USSR and China. possibly withholding attacks on some satellites

What changes did McNamara make to the war plan?

Promoted flexible response. Limited nuclear response and stronger conventional forces, shift more political than real

Reasons why the new strategy implemented during the Kennedy admin failed to be implemented

The US lacked the technology for limited nuclear strikes and resisted costly conventional buildup. The admin kept the facade to reassure Natio and ease German tensions

Is the US president obligated for nuclear consoltation.

No. The president can act alone, as long as it legal

Consequences of an officer resisting a nuclear launch order

Create uncertainty about US deterrence, risking miscalculation abroad.

Values weight in the Radiolab Podcast

1. Civilian Control of the Military

2. Preventing catastrophic destruction ****

Advocacy for limits on strategic missile dfenses

Unlimited defenses fuel arms races by making rivals fear US first strike. Systmes costly and unreliable

What developments in the Cuban missile crisis can’t be explained by the rational policy model? Allison

The Air Force pushed for an airstrike because of its routines, not rational analysis. The Navy ran a blockade its own way

Reasons for retiring all ICBMs. Perry and Colina

Vulnerable, create use-or-lose pressure, unnecessary with submarines. Retiring thme reduces risk + saves money

What crucial info was missing during Cuban missile crisis? McNamara

The US didnt know 162 warheads were already in Cuba. ANy lsight advance could have causes all out war