2.) Widening of the Cold War 1949-1955

Japan

1947- US introduced policy of ‘reverse course’- meant US focused on the development of democracy in Japan rather than punishment and reparations

Japan recovery seen as essential to power base in Asia- wanted Japan to be aligned to US

brought in measures for economic stability and restored right wing leaders

USSR/China alliance + K war brought containment global- Japan became crucial in containment in Asia

Japan rearmed, helped by the US- gave money and training

Japan key agreements

San Francisco Peace Treaty Sep 1951- recognised Japan’s sovereignty and forced Japan to renounce claims to neighbouring nations, and didn’t restrict rearmament or identify Japanese responsibility for the war

US/Japan Security Treaty 1951

gave US use of Japanese military bases and the right to use force to intervene in internal disorder

US support for Jiang Jieshi and policy towards China/Taiwan

Jiang Jieshi- Chinese nationalist, anti communist

1949, communist victory in Chinese civil war

exiled Jieshi to Taiwan

Mao concerned that the US would support Jieshi

June 1949, Mao announced allegiance to the USSR

US wasn’t especially concerned about Asia, but didn’t want China to be under USSR influence

US wanted to support Jieshi secretly, so the US didn’t ruin Sino/US relations or reinforce a Sino Soviet alliance

Truman had tried to resolve the Chinese civil war by uniting the communists and nationalists rather than aiding the nationalists

loss of China

1949 Communists won civil war

1950 Sino Soviet Treaty of Friendship

China turning Communist and becoming allies with USSR caused Truman to be blamed for the ‘loss of China’

McCarthy’s anti communist rhetoric coincided with Truman’s reluctance to support Jiang Jieshi in the face of growing communist power in the civil war - Truman was heavily criticised for the loss of China

Defensive Perimeter Strategy

new thinking in the early 1950s, focused on the military security of the Pacific and that the US should protect it

saw the military defence of Japan as US responsibility

policy criticised for not including Korea, but US was still committed to protecting Korea from communism

NSC-68 Sep 1949

US nuclear monopoly ended when USSR tested nuclear bomb

triggered a fundamental review of US strategy

review was the NSC-68 (national security council)

stressed urgency of building US political, economic and military power

focused on the globalisation of the CW and military emphasis on containment

Korean war background

Korea divided into two zones of occupation at Potsdam- USSR N and USA S

limited interest in the area initially

USA created the Republic of Korea (capitalism) Aug 1948 and USSR created the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (communist) Sep 1948

both powers to avoid a coalition that the other controlled, but both wanted a united K under single leader

Syngman Rhee

leader of SK

wanted a united Korea under a single leader

nationalist anti communist

wanted to remove communism from NK and create a strong K

wanted a guarantee from US that they would give the SK protection and military support

believed an attack on NK would be successful

Kim Il Sung

leader of NK

wanted a united Korea under a single leader

prepared to use force to unify K, developed guerrilla action that aimed to destabilise the S

wanted to persuade the USSR to support NK

tried to convince Stalin it would be a swift victory, there was hardcore support for communism in the S, as well as a well organised guerrilla movement and the US wouldn’t have time to intervene

did the same thing with Mao

USSR position on Korea

March 1949 Sung asked Stalin for support

Stalin aware of US military presence in SK and rejected Sung’s request

Stalin suggested that Sung strengthen guerrilla forces in the S in order to undermine the gov

by Feb 1950, position changed - Chinese communists won and US defensive perimeter strategy didn’t include K

Stalin provided NK with 1600 pieces of artillery, aircrafts and tanks- but wasn’t prepared to commit troops

why

* war in K may bring in the US which could lead to US/USSR conflict
* united K that was allied to USSR would be good as would provide influence in Asia and economic opportunities
* if he didn’t help, Sung may turn to China which would undermine Soviet power
* USSR had nuclear technology

Stalin made it clear that USSR wouldn’t provide troops if the US got in military conflict with NK

indirect military support for NK was best

wanted to avoid conflict with the US

China position on Korea

priority was to consolidate Communism in China and regain control of Taiwan from nationalists

not particularly concerned about the future of K

initially didn’t offer NK support as didn’t want to anger US

China got involved as the US started to protecting Taiwan

still significant internal opposition to supporting K as they wanted to focus on domestic issues

Mao argued that if the US imperialists won the war, this would be a threat to China

committed to sending ‘military volunteers’ to K

believed that US wouldn’t use nuclear weapons because it was too close to the USSR, and would place US forces at risk

China had to be seen to support fellow communist struggles

Stalin was also pressuring China to help NK

USA position on Korea

Japan initial security priority- K not as important

the invasion of NK changed US priorities as US saw this as an attempt to destabilise Japan and Asia

UN position on Korea

US requested special session of security council as soon as NK invaded

USSR was boycotting (because Chinese nationalists were still representing China in UN, rather than communists) which prevented them from vetoing the UN

resolution demanding a ceasefire was passed

Truman was able to legitimise intervention because of this- which stopped the US from looking like unilateral decision makers

removed responsibility from US and ensured an international response

Military involvement in Korea

immediate US intervention stopped a rapid NK victory

UN forces led by General MacArthur

4 stages:

* Phase 1- June- Sep 1950 (offensive)

NK forces advanced into SK

Chinese troops amassed in Manchuria ready to move to K

29 states committed to military, economic or medical aid

* Phase 2- Sep- Nov 1950 (counter-offensive/offensive

UN forces forced NK forces back across the 38th parallel

Mao sent 300,000 troops into NK

led to major counter attack on UN forces

* Phase 3- Dec 1950-June 1951 (stabilisation and negotiation)

Chinese forces pushed back across 38th parallel and captured Seoul

UN condemned China as the aggressor

MacArthur dismissed for being too aggressive- Truman wanted end to the war

US indication of wanting ceasefire

* Stage 4- June 1951-July 1953 (stalemate and peace)

neither side had significant military advancements

lack of UN action convinced Mao and Stalin that they wanted peace

US consolidated relationship with Japan and felt more secure

natural disinclination to work together plus long negotiations of POW exchanges led to long delays in settlement

Peace settlement

negotiations started July 1951 but only reached agreement in July 1953

Rhee obstructed negotiations as he wanted the US to commit to greater ties with SK

Stalin’s death sped up the process, replaced with Malenkov (more compliant)

Panmunjom Armistice Agreement:

* military demarcation line with demilitarised zone
* all military forces to withdraw
* exchange of POW

Impact of Korean War

long term security of NK and SK was protected- agreed on no future warfare

uneasy stability

long term stability of Taiwan as a democracy guaranteed by US

war put huge economic pressure on the USSR - led to Stalin accelerating the industrialisation of EE which led to a reduction in availability of i consumer goods

K war was ‘limited war’ because its purpose was to restore the status quo through prevention of the spread of communism

US was committed to preventing the further spread of communism in the far East

led to a strengthening in military resources in WE- WG allowed to rearm

led to a deepening of CW uncertainty in E

McCarthy

McCarthy- Republican senator who ruthlessly exploited the anti communist anxieties

McCarthy put pressure on Truman’s gov and promoted the idea that there was an army of communists working within the US gov and society

McCarthy targeted people in the state department and the film industry

McCarthy discredited in 1954 after accusing the US army of being soft on communism

McCarthyism

growing mood of anti-communism amongst the public

the House of UnAmerican Activities Committee -purpose was to investigate communist infiltration

people started to believe that communists had infiltrated US society

committee investigated high profile targets, especially in Hollywood

Alger Hiss Affair- prominent US politician, accused in 1948 of being a communist- convicted of perjury as lied about passing information to the USSR whilst working at the US State Department

sparked a wave of criticism of Truman- accused of being soft on communism

J Edgar Hoover. director of the FBI- referred to teachers as Reducators (Red=communists)

Influence of McCarthyism on Europe

McCathyism coincided with the shift in US attention from E to the Far East

McCarthy encouraged an ‘Asia first’ viewpoint - containment had consolidated E against threat of communism but Asia was less secure

B could no longer maintain its role as the US’ main partner in E- becoming concerned about the US’ aggressive CW thinking

concerned that (e.g.) the US aggressive stance over K may lead to the USSR destabilising E whilst the international focus was on Asia

USA Asia first thinking was dangerous for B and necessitated increased defense spending in a time of continuing austerity

globalisation of US role was not in B best interests, but B primary aim still to remain a close ally with US

US dominance in the UN

HQ in New York- symbolic

UN created 1945, composition didn’t reflect the E/W split

but the US had many pro US states- Middle Eastern, WE, India, Canada, Australia etc

US insisted that communist China couldn’t take China’s seat in the UN- remained the nationalist regime based in Taiwan, which removed a potential challenge

membership was weighed in favour of W- only EE state in 1945 was Poland

Security Council made up of USA, UK, USSR, France and China (permanent members)

power of veto prevented total US domination- between 1946-1955 the US didn’t use its veto, and the USSR used its veto 75 times

US saw the UN as a vehicle for intervention on a global scale (as seen in K) and a way to achieve its foreign policy aims

initial US policy towards China

no US guarantee of continued support for nationalists once the communists won the civil war

Truman favoured avoiding military conflict

B recognised Mao’s regime in 1950

McCarthyism influenced Truman- saw China as significant in the Far East, especially after the Sino Soviet alliance in 1950

US worried about the mutual security guarantee- reinforced the need to develop its own power base in that part of the world (Japan became more important)

Stalin wanted the 1950 alliance to benefit the USSR rather than increasing China’s global opportunities - brought China into the communist camp and consolidated Soviet interests in the Far East

forced the US to reevaluate priorities and focus less on E (to USSR advantage as CW tensions in E reduced)

US relations with China after K war

K war increased China’s isolation- USSR refused to commit its own troops but was willing to see Chinese troops involved, which weakened China’s status

K war changed the extent to which the US was willing to go to prevent the spread of communism

isolation of China was critical to this- mainly achieved diplomatically

e.g. US refused to accept China’s entry to the UN, enhanced US commitment to protecting Taiwan and the development of SEATO

expansion of alliance systems

Eisenhower put greater importance on developing allies than Truman

this shift in emphasis is likely a way of compensating for the lack of development in US conventional forces

Eisenhower wanted to create a global network of pro US alliances

US forces would be replaced with those of US allies

this would reduce military presence in WE whilst ensuring containment

US would provide nuclear protection for allies, whilst allies would provide ground forces

Southeast Asia collective defence treaty 1954

SEATO created 1954 was a response to the growing threat from the Sino Soviet alliance

members: Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan, UK, France, US, Australia, NZ

many of these not in SE Asia and had few common borders

plus many members that could have benefitted from SEATO protection weren’t in it e.g. SV, Laos and Cambodia

FRG and NATO

Adenauer (chancellor of the FRG) saw allying with the W as the best way of strengthening the FRG

regeneration of G supported by the US who saw a strong WG as a safeguard against communist expansion- and a reliance on the US would prevent G nationalism and militarism

1949 FRG joined the council of europe- could establish consulates in other countries

1952 General Treaty abolished US occupation and recognised full WG sovereignty

Adenauer agreed to renounce nuclear weapons and keep military limited in order to placate the French

1955 WG joined NATO- US had put pressure on France

showed the commitment of US to Germany and the importance of regional alliance systems

Stalin recognised sovereignty of GDR and started Warsaw Pact

Warsaw Pact May 1955

triggered by FRG joining NATO- prompted the USSR to seek closer alliance with satellite states

already had significant influence in EE due to pro-Soviet communist governments

Warsaw Pact seen as a way of legitimising its influence in EE- just as NATO had legitimised US influence in WE

members: Czechoslovakia, USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, EG, Poland, Hungary

seen as collective security strategy- and therefore non-threatening

consolidated the military, political and economic relationship between the USSR and its satellites

Eisenhower background

Dulles- Eisenhower’s secretary of state

some continuity from Truman

ideas taken over:

* USA must retain sufficient influence in WE and there should be a collective W defence strategy
* US must retain influence in Asia
* threat from USSR was significant and containment was fundamental
* US must have strong nuclear arsenal and conventional forces to counter USSR expansionism

however Eisenhower rejected Truman’s commitment to a major expansion of conventional forces, regardless of cost

believed containment was limited and its effectiveness was insufficient for the base of US foreign policy

his alternative was the New Look policy

New Look policies

* rollback
* massive retaliation
* brinkmanship

Rollback

containment had created a stalemate

Dulles wanted to roll back communism as part of a strategy to win the CW

convinced that the security of the US and international peace were dependent on reducing the USSR’s power globally

fundamental to the New Look policy

still wanted to achieve this through peaceful means

Massive retaliation

containment required a global reaction to any communist expansion

necessitated a significant and expensive military expansion in K

nuclear weapons became more important as the basis for US strategy

presented as the most cost efficient method of guaranteeing US security

NSC 162 report Oct 1953 emphasised this as the most effective way to deter aggression against WE

Brinkmanship

nuclear arsenal a diplomatic tool

US could use nuclear strength to force agreements- up to the point where nuclear war breaks out

Dulles referred to this as brinkmanship- believed that the the ability to reach the verge of nuclear war without actually reaching it, was essential in effective foreign policy

believed that the failure to do this would result in defeat

US attitude to French Indochina

Indochina- Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam occupied by French until 1954

in 1950 Ho Chi Minh- the popular communist nationalist in V- declared the existence of Vietnam

V forces put increased pressure on the French, who sustained heavy casualties

US commitment to V was part of wider SE Asian containment strategy

V was geostrategically important in SE Asia- was useful for trade with Japan

by 1954, US was paying 75% of the costs of the war, although no US conventional forces were involved

diplomatic solution preferable to Eisenhower- although it must protect V from communist control

USSR also wanted a diplomatic solution, and China wanted to appear moderate so put pressure on Minh to negotiate the end of the war

by April 1954 France was on brink of defeat at Dien Bien Phu

Viet Minh- nationalist/ communist military in V- supported by China from 1949, controlled most of rural V

Domino Theory

emerged in the mid 1950s, placed huge importance on Indochina

idea that if one nation fell to communism, others around it would

used to justify involvement in V

Geneva Conference July 1954

in response to V

paved way for a ceasefire rather than a long term solution to the question of a unified, independent V

agreed on two zones- split on the 17th parallel

French forces to move out of the N and nationalist forces to move out of the S

division not intended to be permanent- elections to take place in two years (1956)

USA and SV refused to sign the agreement

Ngo Dinh Diem new P of V- US pledged to support him