Metaphysics of Mind - Dualist theories

Monism

There is only one fundamental substance that exists.

Physicalism

The only thing that exists is physical substance

Dualism

There are two fundamental substances or properties that exist

Substance

Has ontological independence, it is not subject to change, if is the possessor of properties.

Property

Depend on a substance to exist, they are subject to change, describe the features of something.

What do substance dualists believe?

There are two kinds of foundational substance in the universe. Matter - physical, mind - non-physical. The mind and mental states cannot be reduced to or understood in terms of anything physical. They are an entirely separate 'thing' to our physical bodies. Each of these has distinct properties, so like your body has physical properties, your kind and mental states will have non-physical properties. Substance dualists believe these two substances are linked together in some way though there are many different understandings of this relationship. As they are totally separate the destruction of one does not necessitate the destruction of the other.

What are examples of physical properties?

Height, weight, solidity

What are examples of non-physical properties?

Qualia, intentionality

Leibniz law

A is B if and only if everything true of A is true of B and vice versa.

What does Descartes say about the mind in meditation 6?

For we are not able to conceive of the half of a kind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies; so that not only are their nature's different but even in some respects contrary to one another.

What is the short version of Descartes' indivisibility argument?

P1- My mind is indivisible.
P2- My body is divisible.
C- My mind and body are distinct substances.

What is the full version of Descartes' indivisibility argument?

P1- The body is physical, works like a machine, has material properties of extension and motion and follows laws of physics. Body is extended in space and consequently had parts.
P2- The mind is nonphysical and therefore lacks extension, motion and does not follow the laws of physics. It is not extended in space and so has no 'parts'.
IC- Therefore body is divisible and mind is not.
P3- Leibniz law states that A is B if and only if everything true of A is true of B and vice versa.
C- Applying LL if the mind has the property of indivisibility and the body does not then cannot be the same thing and therefore must be two separate substances.

What does Descartes point out about the indivisibility argument?

Not only is it that the mind has a property that the body does not, which would alone be sufficient to show they could not be one thing, but also that the mind and body have contrast properties, the mind is indivisible and the body is divisible.

What is criticism one of the indivisibility argument?

The mental is divisible. Hume argues that it is wrong to think of ourselves as a thinking 'thing' - all we are aware of is individual thoughts, ideas, perceptions, etc. We have no evidence of one thinking 'thing' or entity, what we do have is simply a 'bundle of perceptions'. We have no evidence for a single thing that joins or contains these separate aspects.

What could Descartes argue in response to criticism one of his indivisibility argument?

The way in which the mind is divisible is completely different from the way in which a physical object is divisible. Physical objects (e.g. bodies) are spatially divisible, whereas minds are merely functionally divisible. The parts do different things but they are not in different locations. So his divisibility argument is still valid as the properties are still different, and therefore LL stands.

What is criticism two of the indivisibility argument?

Not everything physical is divisible. It is a matter of great debate whether physical objects can be infinitely divided. If, for example, the smallest physical particles are best understood as packets of energy or force fields, then can we further divide these - surely you can't have half a force field. There are physical processes such as running, it does not make sense to think of the action of running as being divisible. The implication is that just because the mind is not divisible does not mean it is not physical - it could be a non-divisible physical entity. Descartes could be right that the mind is not divisible without being right that it is a non-physical entity.

What is criticism three of the indivisibility argument?

The argument assumes that the mind exists as a substance. If minds do not exist as substances then we cannot talk about their properties. Therefore indivisibility depends upon the conceivability argument to first establish the mind is a substance. something with ontological independence. If we reject the conceivabiliry argument then the divisibility argument doesn't stand.

What is the full version of Descartes' conceivability argument?

I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as something that thinks and isn't extended.
I have a clear and distinct idea of body as something that is extended and does not think.
Therefore, mind and body can exist independently of one another.
Therefore, mind and body are two distinct substances.

What is the short version of Descartes' conceivability argument?

It is conceivable that the mind can exist without body.
Therefore, it is possible that mind can exist without body.
Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances.

What is criticism one of Descartes' conceivability argument?

Mind without body is not conceivable. Is Descartes right to claim that we can clearly and distinctly conceive of a mind without a body? Descartes claims that through introspection alone he can know what he thinks, but what makes it possible for him to think? What does it mean to think? What is a thought? Surely until these questions are answered we can object to this conclusion. We may think it is conceivable that the mind can exist without the body when actually it isn't conceivable. We could be confused or simply lack the relevant information. For a Mind-Brain Identity Theorist it is not possible to conceive of a mind without a body because the mind is the brain (a part of the body). There is modern scientific evidence to support the notion that minds cannot exist without brains from both a neuroscientific standpoint and an evolutionary one.

What is criticism two of Descartes' conceivability argument?

What is conceivable may not be possible. Some philosophers argue that Descartes infers possibility from conceivability.

What is the masked man fallacy?

My concept of batman is a masked crusader.
My concept of Bruce Wayne is not a masked crusader.
Therefore, Bruce Wayne cannot be Batman.

What is Descartes' response to the criticism of 'what is conceivable may not be possible' of his conceivability argument?

We cannot in general infer what is possible from what is conceivable, but in the case of clear and distinct ideas the inference is justified. When we clearly and distinctly conceive of two things as distinct, we can infer that they are distinct. Clear and distinct conception can establish possibility.

What is criticism three of Descartes' conceivability argument?

What is logically possible tells us nothing about reality. Suppose we accept that it is possible for the mind to exist without the body. Does it necessarily follow that the mind does exist as a distinct substance? Let us accept that a mind is something that thinks, and a body is something that is extended. It doesn't necessarily follow that a mind is something that 'thinks but is not extended' and a body is something that is 'extended but does not think'. There is nothing in the initial concepts that necessarily oppose each other. Therefore, we could with equal validity conceive of one substance that has both the property of thought and the property of extension. We should accept that what is logically impossible tells us something about reality. If something is logically impossible it cannot exist. Therefore, if Descartes could demonstrate that it is logically impossible for the mind and the body to be the same substance this would tell us something about reality, that the mind and the body are separate substances. However, simply telling us that it is logically possible that they are distinct substances is not sufficient to prove that they are distinct in reality.

Substance dualism

Minds are not bodies nor parts of bodies, but distinct substances

Cartesian dualism

Minds can exist independent of bodies, and mental properties are properties of a mental substance

Property dualism

There is just one sort of substance, physical substance, but at least some mental properties are a fundamentally new kind of property that are not fixed by physical properties.

Qualia

Properties of phenomenal consciousness

Physicalism

Everything that exists is physical or depends on what is physical. The only kind of substance is physical, the only properties that are fundamental are physical properties - all other properties depend on physical properties

What is the difference between the way physicalism and property dualism view properties?

Physicalism states that the only properties that are fundamental are physical properties, all other properties depend on physical properties. Property dualism says that some properties of consciousness are not ontologically dependent on physical properties. (P says that non-physical properties must depend on physical properties, PD says that some non-physical properties aren’t dependent on physical properties)

What does property dualism claim about some properties of consciousness not being ontologically dependent on physical properties?

There are natural laws that correlate mental properties with physical ones, but it is metaphysically possible for these correlations to be different.

Supervenience

Properties of type A supervene on properties of type B where any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties.

What is an example of supervenience?

A painting has various aesthetic properties, such as being elegant or balanced. It also has various physical properties, such as the distribution of paint on the canvas. The aesthetic properties supervene on the physical ones. We cannot change the painting’s being elegant or balanced without changing the distribution of pain on the canvas. There can be no change in aesthetic properties without a change in physical properties. And two paintings exactly alike in their physical properties (duplicates) will have the same aesthetic properties.

How do physical properties fix all other properties according to physicalism?

Physical properties fix all the other properties in such a way that it is not possible for the other properties to change without changing the physical properties.

What are the two concepts of mind for property dualism?

Phenomenal concept and psychological concept

What is the phenomenal concept for property dualism?

The subjective quality of experience

Is the phenomenal concept for property dualism first or third-person?

First-person

What is the psychological concept for property dualism?

What the mind does, how we explain behaviour.

Is the psychological concept for property dualism first or third-person?

Third-person

Can the phenomenal concept be reduced to or explained in terms of the psychological concept?

No. There is no deep mystery about brains processing information, but all that gives us no understanding of subjective conscious experience.

What is an example of talking of phenomenal and psychological concepts of mental states?

Pain. Phenomenal - how it feels. Psychological - caused by damage, leads to aversion behaviour. These go together so we don’t have two words (e.g. for pain), but they are, strictly speaking, distinct.

What does property dualism argue about the properties identified by physics not forming the complete fundamental nature of the universe?

The properties identified by physics do not form the complete fundamental nature of the universe, because in addition, there are properties of consciousness.

What do some property dualists argue about mental properties having their own causal powers?

Mental properties have their own causal powers, which can affect physical events.

What does Chalmers claim that the easy problem of consciousness involve?

Analysing and explaining the functions of consciousness

What are examples of the easy problem of consciousness?

The fact that we can consciously control our behaviour, report on our mental states, and focus our attention.

What does Chalmers think will solve the easy problem of consciousness?

Understanding how the brain works.

What does Chalmers claim that the hard problem of consciousness relates to?

The phenomenal properties of consciousness, what it is like to undergo conscious experiences. How and why are certain physical processes in the brain associated with such experiences?

What does Chalmers claim about physicalism and the hard problem of consciousness?

Physicalism cannot provide an answer / solution for the hard problem of consciousness

What is the knowledge / Mary argument (Jackson)?

P1. Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing colours before being released from her black and white room.

P2. On being released, she learns new facts about seeing colours.

IC. Therefore, not all facts are physical facts.

C. Therefore, phenomenal properties are non-physical and physicalism is false.

What does Jackson mean by ‘all physical facts’?

Not only what we already know about physics and neurophysiology, but all the physical facts as discovered by a completed physics and neuroscience.

What is the first objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Mary gains ability knowledge.

What is the Mary gains ability knowledge objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Mary doesn’t learn knowledge of some knew fact (knowledge that), but she gains a new ability, e.g. to imagine or recognise red. She is able to do things that she couldn’t do before but she hasn’t gained any new information.

What is a strength of the ‘Mary gains ability knowledge’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

It shouldn’t be surprising that we cannot learn how to do things just from learning all the relevant facts.

What is Jackson’s response to the ‘Mary gains ability knowledge’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

She does gain new abilities but she also gains factual beliefs about the mental lives of others. Mary can now debate with herself whether others experience the world in the same way that she does. This is a factual question. Before coming out of the black and white room, she lacks knowledge of others’ experiences. So some information about other people’s experiences escapes the physical account.

What is an analogy to Mary gaining ability knowledge?

We can imagine Mary learning all there is about how to ride a bike, the mass distribution and balance, the gyroscopic effects and so on, but not being able to ride herself. If she learnt to ride a bike would she learn something new about what happens physically? Surely not. She has simply gained a new skill.

What is the second objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Mary gains acquaintance knowledge

What is the ‘Mary gains acquantance knowledge’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Mary doesn’t learn about a new fact, but becomes directly aware of colour. Suppose what it is like to see red is some property of the brain. Mary knows about this property, but her brain has never had this property, so she isn’t acquainted with it.

What is an analogy to Mary becoming acquainted with colour?

Suppose you are a massive fan of a particular celebrity, you have followed their career and know everything about them personally and professionally. Imagine one day you meet them, do you learn anything new? In one sense no, you already know their eye colour and their height etc but in another sense yes as you are now acquainted with them.

What is Jackson’s response to the ‘Mary gains acquaintance knowledge’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

The new knowledge gained is not confined to simply acquaintance or practical knowledge. Now she is able to know facts about what it is like for humans to see colours.

What is the third objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

There is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact.

What is the ‘there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

When Mary comes out of the room and sees red, she acquires the phenomenal concept of red for the first time. But we can claim that the phenomenal concept of red is a concept of the same thing that her physical concept is a concept of - they are two different concepts of a physical property of the brain (like water and H2O are two concepts of the same physical substance). Mary gains knowledge of a new fact in one sense (because she gains a new concept) but not in the other sense (since she already knew about the property).

What is a response to the ‘there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Let us accept that the knowledge argument shows that there are different ways of thinking about physical things, some of which depend on experiencing, rather than describing. To know what it is like to see red, you need to have the phenomenal concept of red, and this you can only gain from experience. So Mary gains knowledge of a new fact, in the sense of fact that relates to concepts.

What is a response to the response to the ‘there is more than one way of knowing the same physical fact’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

Physicalism and property dualism are claims about what exists. They are claims about properties, not concepts. The knowledge argument does not show that Mary gains knowledge of a new property. It doesn’t show that Mary gains knowledge of a new fact in the sense of learning about something in the world she didn’t know about before. It doesn’t show that what it is liek to see red cannot be a physical property. So the argument fails to show that there are any non-physical properties. So it fails to show that physicalism is false.

What is the fourth objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

All physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia.

What is the ‘all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

If Mary really did know everything about seeing colour, she would not learn anything when she first sees colour. The experience of seeing colour is nothing more than highly detailed knowledge of what it is to see colour, and Mary already has this highly detailed knowledge.

What is an issue with the ‘all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

It is counter-intuitive. It requires that Mary is able to work out what it is like to experience a colour without ever having seen one. But we might argue that we cannot describe such experiences so fully as to know what it is like to experience them without actually doing so. No one can know what it is like to see red without actually ever having seen red.

What is a response to the issue of the ‘all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument being counter-intuitive?

This is our intuition, but is there an argument to support it? We don’t really know what knowing all the physical facts about seeing colours would involve. Perhaps Mary will be entirely unsurprised at seeing red - she already knew what it would be like. This objection claims that there is, in principle. a complete analysis of phenomenal properties in physical and functional terms.

What does Patricia Churchland say on the ‘all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia’ objection to the knowledge / Mary argument?

How can I assess what Mary will know and understand if she knows everything there is to know about the brain? Everything is a lot, and it means, in all likelihood that Mary has a radically different and deeper understanding of the brain that anything barely conceivable in our wildest flights of fancy.

Which objection to the knowledge / Mary argument led Jackson to conclude that the argument doesn’t work?

All physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia.

What does Jackson say in relation to the ‘all physical knowledge would include knowledge of qualia’ (Patricia Churchland) objection?

An experience is simply highly complex functional information. It doesn’t seem like this, which is why we think that what Mary learns is non-physical. Sensory experience gives us information in a highly unusual way - remarkably quickly and easily. So it doesn’t seem like functional information, but knowledge of some intrinsic property of the experience - qualia. However, appearances are misleading, and this is knowledge of a physical and functional property.

Physical possibility

What is physically possible given the laws of nature as they are in the actual world.

Logical possibility

What is logically impossible is described by a false analytic proposition. What is logically possible is anything that is not logically impossible. What is logically possible is what makes sense, what is not self-contradictory, what is conceivable.

Can things that are physically impossible be logically possible?

Yes, e.g. the laws of nature could have been different.

Metaphysical possibility

What is possible given the real nature of identity of things.

Can analytic truths and necessary truths come apart?

Yes

Why is it logically possible that water is not H2O?

Water and H2O are different concepts. People can coherently wonder whether water is H2O.

What type of truth is ‘water is H2O’?

‘Water is H2O’ is not a contingent truth (physical possibility), it is a necessary truth (metaphyscial possibility). Water wouldn’t be water if it wasn’t H2O.

What is a ‘possible world’?

A way of talking about how things could be (or could have been).

Can we talk of possible worlds that are physically impossible?

Yes. Different laws of nature.

Could there be a possible world in which water is not H2O?

No, because water and H2O are one and the same thing, there is no possible world in which water exists but is not H2O.

If physicalism is true, what will a possible world that is an exact physical duplicate of our world be?

An exact duplicate of our world in all respects.

Is it metaphysically impossible for two worlds to have the same physical properties and different mental properties if physicalism is true?

Yes

What is a philosophical zombie?

A physical replica / duplicate of a person, but with no phenomenal consciousness.

Are zomies possible in the actual world?

No, the laws of nature correlate physical properties with consciousness.A

What is the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?

P1. It is conceivable that there are zombies (the idea of a zombie isn’t a logical contradiction).

P2. If it is conceivable that there are zombies, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.

IC1. Therefore, it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies.

P4. If it is metaphysically possible that there are zombies, then phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.

IC2. Therefore, phenomenal properties of consciousness are neither physical properties nor supervene on physical properties.

C. Therefore, physicalism is false and property dualism is true.

What is the ‘a zombie world is not conceivable’ criticism of the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument?

We are not thinking clearly when we try to conceive of zombies (or we lack relevant information). If physicalism is true, then a physical duplicate is a functional duplicate. Can we coherently conceive of a physical and functional duplicate of a person, but without phenomenal consciousness? If we had a complete analysis of consciousness, we would see that consciousness can be completely explained in physical and functional terms. In presenting the zombie argument, we cannot assume that physicalism is false, since we are trying to argue that physicalism is false.

What is an objection to the ‘a zombie world is not conceivable’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument?

The criticism assumes that there is a complete physical and functional analysis of consciousness, but we have no good reason to accept this. We can know all about something’s physical structure and function without being able to explain consciousness. So we can conceive of the same physical thing as having consciousness or not.

What is the ‘zombies are conceivable, but not metaphysically possible’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument?

It is not an analytic truth that water is H2O. People can meaningfully ask ‘is water H2O'?’ It is conceivable that water is not H2O. From this it would be easy - but mistaken - to think that it is metaphysically possible that water is not H2O. Identity is necessary. It isn’t possible for water to not be water. If physicalism is true, zombies are impossible. Just because zombies are conceivable, that doesn’t show that they are possible.

What is a response to the ‘zombies are conceivable, but not metaphysically possible’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument?

The analogy between scientific identities and phenomenal consciousness doesn’t work. H2O is the ‘essence’ of water. The concept ‘water’ is a concept of something that has a particular structure and causal role, water is the kind of thing that could be, and is, identical with a chemical property. The essence of phenomenal properties is what it feels like to experience them. Because phenomenal, and physical and functional properties have different essences, why think they can’t exist independently? It is only the essential properties of something that can’t change in different possible worlds, the contingent properties can. Because phenomenal properties have a different essence from physical properties, each can exist without the other. So zombies are possible.

What is the essence of a physical and functional property?

Not how it feels, but its physical structure; and the essence of a functional property is what causes it and what it causes.

What is a response to the ‘what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument?

This objection misunderstands identity and physicalism.

How does the ‘what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument misunderstand identity?

Identity is necessary. Water can’t be H2O in this world, but something else in a different world. Likewise, phenomenal properties cannot be physical-functional properties in this world and not be the same properties in another world. Because identity is necessary, what is possible tells us about what is actual.

How does the ‘what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about reality’ criticism of the philosophical zombie argument misunderstand physicalism?

Physicalism defends supervenience: any two things that are exactly alike in their physical properties cannot have different mental properties.

What does Churchland say on thought experiments?

Thought experiments about what is conceivable or ‘metaphysically possible’ are unhelpful. Conceivability isn’t a good guide to actuality (let alone possibility). What things are is what they are in the actual world, not what ‘metaphysic essence’ they have. Science tells us what things are, and we can’t predict or second-guess this. Metaphysics must give way to experimental science.

What did ‘Deadbies’ say?

200 years ago, someone says ‘I just can’t imagine how living things could really be composed of dead molecules - how can life arise out of the interactions of things that are not alive?’

Interactionist dualism

The view that there is two way causal interaction between the mind and body

What is a conceptual argument?

Based on understanding.

What is an empirical argument?

Based on experience / evidence.

What is the conceptual problem of interaction put simply?

Given that the mind is not in space and has no physical force, how is it possible that it could affect the body, which is in space and moved by physical forces.

What is the conceptual problem of interaction as presented by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia?

P1. Physical things only move if they are pushed.

P2. Only something that is extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force.

P3. But the mind has no extension, so it can’t touch the body.

C. Therefore, the mind cannot move the body.