epistemology

what is direct realism?

• the idea is that the immediate objects of perception are mind-independent objects and their properties

• objects exist independant of the mind and have properties such as size, smell, taste and colour

• these objects and their properties continue to exist and obey the laws of nature even when we are not percieving them

• we percieve them directly as they are in their MI state

• our awareness of the o and their p is unmediated

• in direct realism, we percieve the EW exacctly as it exists 

what is the argument from illusion against Direct Realism?

• illusions are distortions of the senses

• what we perceive is different from what exists in the external world

• if illusions are possible, then our perceptions of objects are distinct from the objects as they exist in the external world

• e.g stick in water - appears to bend despite the fact that it doesn’t

• therefore, direct realists claim that we directly perceive mind independent objects and their properties exactly as they are in the external world, they can’t explain why illusions occur

What’s the response to the argument of illusions, for direct realism - stick and barn

• science can explain how apparent ‘illusions’ are not tricks of the mind, but can be explained as genuine properties of the external world

• in the stick example, I directly perceive the process of refraction

• thus illusions are not really tricks that prevent me from directly perceiving mind independent objects

• J.L Austin - church disguised as a barn - you will come to know the object as a camouflaged church (the reality) rather than just a barn (the appearance)

• Therefore, the fact that appearance can be different from reality doesn’t stop me from having direct access to reality

What’s the problem from hallucinations - against direct realism - pink elephant

• a hallucination is a perception of an object in the absence of the object (seeing something that isn’t there, but feels no qualitatively different from a genuine perception - often multi sensory

• p1) in a hallucination, I directly perceive an object (a pink elephant)

• p2) when I hallucinate, there is no mind independent object of my perception (the pink elephant I perceive isn’t a physical pink elephant)

• c1) therefore, the object I directly perceive in a hallucination isn’t a mind independent object

• c2) therefore, direct realisms claim that I directly perceive mind independent objects and their properties is false

what is the argument against hallucinations - for direct realism - veridical perception argument 

• hallucinations are separate causes from ordinary (veridical) perception

• during a hallucination, we are directly perceiving the contents of our own mind, rather than the external world

• how can we tell if they’re indistinguishable from ordinary perception?

• P1) if they were indistinguishable, then we wouldn’t be able to recognise experiences as hallucinatory

• P2) we can identify experiences that are hallucinatory and those that aren’t

• C1) therefore, we must be able to distinguish hallucinations from genuine perceptions of mind independent objects, once we accept this the problem of hallucinations can be dismissed as we can separate hallucinations from ordinary perception and explain them as perceptions of our own minds

what is the counter argument for the veridical perception argument - against both hallucinations and illusions, vison blind spot

• anil seth

• science suggests that what we perceive is constantly affected by our mind and its expectations 

• this means that our mind changes our perception in a way that is indistinguishable from normal perception 

• example - our vision has a blind spot, meaning there is a gap in our veridical perception, we don’t percieve this gap because our minds fill it in with what it expects us to see based on our surroundings, therefore a portion of our vision (perception) is mind dependent

• argument against illusions as well as hallucinations - for example, the Muller Lyer illusions of the lines that look different lengths but are the same, there is nothing out there in the physical world causing this distortion, but it’s based on how our mind interprets things

• therefore, our mind’s expectations of what we will perceive affects what we actually perceive and that therefore we aren’t perceiving an external world directly but our interpretation of that world

the argument from perceptual variation - against direct realism - bertrand russle - table

• our perception of an object is always bound to our perspective

• there is no neutral vantage point from which to perceive reality

• p1) my perception of the table changes depending on the conditions under which it is perceived (e.g the angle changes the size, the light changes the colour)

• p2) the table itself always remains constant 

• c1) therefore, my perception of the table must be distinct and separate from the table itself

• the world cannot be exactly how it appears to us if it constantly changes depending on our perception of it - no two people will ever perceive the world the same way

argument against bertrand russle’s perceptual variation

• we can accept that our perception of the world is always different depending on how we perceieve it, but that doesn’t mean that the world we’re perceiving is distinct and seperate from us 

• we can see things such as our angle changing the size of an object or the light from which we view it changing the color as relational properties

• relational properties are properties that depend on the relationship between the object and the perciever 

• in russles table argument, we can say that the table looks darker under dim light, and that this is one of the properties that the table has

• we can directly perceive the object and its relational properties and even explain them using facts about light and vision 

what is the time lag argument - against direct realism

• our perception of objects depends on light being reflected from these objects and detected by our visual system (eyes)

• there is a time delay in the process of the light meeting our eyes, may be very small but could be extremely large in the case of objects that are very distant

• in case of some stars, for example, they will no longer exist by the time the light reaches our eyes

• we cannot perceive something that doesn’t exist, and yet we are percieving something in case of the star - must be something other than the star itself 

• therefore, direct realism is false, as it states that we percieve everything exactly as it is in the external world 

what is indirect realism? 

give an example of direct realism

• our perception of an apple is that it has the properties, small, round, red, crispy and sweet

• if our perception of an apple matches the properties of the object, we know that it must be real and mind independent

• the properties we perceive must in the apple itself, meaning if we didn’t perceive it it would still have those properties and would continue to exist

what is realism and anti realism?

r - the view that objects are mind independent - X appears outside of all human perception

a - the view that objects are mind dependant - X doesn’t exist out of human perception and neither does its properties

what is indirect realism?

• realist theory of perception, immediate obejcts of perception are MD objects that are caused by and represent MI objects

• objects in the world exist independantly of the mind, but these MI objects are not immediate objects of perception

• instead, we directly percieve sense data, which acts as a mediator between us and the EW 

• sense data is caused by and represents MI objects in the EW, gi,ves me an internal picture of the way the EW is 

• there is no guarantee that sense data is indenticle to the objects in the EW

• sense data creates a veil of perception between the EW and the perciver 

what is an example of indirect realism?

• you view a cat on the sofa

• you perceive a ‘sense datum’ of the image of the cat in your mind, but not the mind independent object that is the cat and the sofa

• they believe that the cat and the sofa exists independent of the mind but our perception of it is mediated by mental sense data

• therefore, the mental sense data gives us an image of the mind independent object, but doesn’t perfectly resemble it

give qualities of sense data

• it’s subjective to the perciver

• mind dependent - exists in the mind of the perciver

• private - only accesible by the perciver

• infalliable - not subject to doubt - you cannot doubt that you are experiencing those kinds of properties and objects, wether or not they are representative of what exists in the EW

problem for indirect realism - indirect realism leads to scepticism about MI objects 

• sense data allows us to infer the existence of objects that they accuratley represent, and this allows us to infer that the EW exists 

• however, this assumption that our sense data and therefore our perceptions are casually related to an EW cannot be supported from the perspective of an  indirect realist 

• the only way we can verify wether our perceptions are caused by external objects in the EW is by somehow checking this correspondence 

• however, i only ever experience my own sense data, so i cannot acess the EW, therefore i cannot verify that my sense data is caused by and accurately represents MI objects in the EW

coherence of various sense - lock and cockburn

• our sense data provides a complete and coherent picture in which all different senses all agree with each other

• locke - the different senses bearing witness to the truth of each others report concerning the existence of things without us, e.g - i see a mug of coffee with steam coming off it, when i drink it, it burns my tounge, these 2 senses are coherent with eachother, they match up to make a clear picture of the MI objects in the EW that sense data is caused by and represents

• cockburn - if a single sense changes, we cannot confirm that this change represents a real change in the EW, but if more than one sense changes similtaneously in a connected manner, this is likely to be caused by an underlying reality (the EW)

• experience teaches us that a change in one sense will lead to a change in another, if i sharpen a pencil it’ll both look and feel different - this correlation is consistent and suggests the existence of an underlying reality causing these changes, which we then experience through sense data

locke - involuntary nature of perception

• if all our perceptions are mind dependent, then we must have control over our perceptions

• however, we cannot simply bring perceptions/sense data into existence when we wish

• nor can we avoid having certain sense data

• we seem to be a passive recipient of sense data

• for example, i cannot taste chocolate cake whenever i want to, yet i can think about these things, and i cannot avoid percieving a rainy day and instead percieve a sunny one beacuse it is what i wish to percieve

• therefore, perception is not mind dependant and is more likely to come from a MI source, such as the EW

russell - the external world is the best hypothesis 

• russell accepts that the existence of sense data doesn’t prove the existence of the external world with complete certainty 

• there may be slight hypothetical doubt about the existence of the external world 

• however, the existence of the EW is the best hypothesis because of 3 points - it explains where my perceptions come from, how objects appear to exist and change without being percieved (cat walks across room and gets hungrier over time), and our ability to communicate about our perceptions with others, suggesting that we percieve the same things as them q

• therefore, we should not reject the existence of the EW, as our belief in it is instinctive, and we don’t have a better explanation to replace it with 

explain locke’s idea of primary qualities

• do not depend on human perception

• exist within the objects themselves and are inseparable from the object

• include properties such as size (extension), shape, motion, quantity

• essential to the object

• no matter how the object changes these properties will stay the same - therefore our experience of them accurately resemble them

• behave in the same way as they would in a world without percievers

• accesed by more than one sense

• have the power to create the perciever to experience secondary qualities

explains locke’s idea of secondary qualities 

• depend on the perceiver 

• not essential to the object 

• examples, colour, smell, taste

• represent but dont resemble the object 

• acessed by one sense 

• not ‘in’ the object 

• in a world without percievers, these properties wouldn’t exist 

what was berkeley’s attack on pq and sq?

• argued that the distinction between locke’s primary and secondary qualities didn’t hold up

• he argued that all qualities are mind dependant

• for example, size changes depending on perspective

• argues that all qualities are known to us through perception

we cannot know the nature of MI objects, because MD ideas cannot be like MI objects - berkeley

• attacking the indirect realist claim that sense data can represent the EW

• he claims that mind independant objects are too unlike mind dependant ideas, and that they cannot accuratley represent MI objects

• the MD ideas we perceive (sense data for indirect realists) are always changing, variable and in a state of flux, whereas physical objects would be fixed and constant

• how can circular sense data and oval sense data both represent an object that only has one shape?

• he’s employing his ‘likeness principle’- things can only tell us about other things that they are like

• therefore, sense data can only tell us about other sense data, they cannot tell us about MI objects that exist in the EW

locke, cockburn, russell and berkely - direct or indirect realistits?

locke - indirect

cockburn - indirect

russell - inidrect

berkely - direct

what is Idealism?

realist theory of perception, involves rejecting the existence of a mind-independent reality to which our perceptions relate. Instead, the only reality is the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects (ideas), there is no external world for us to experience indirectly.

what is berkley’s attack on primary and secondary qualities? 

attack 1 - primary and secondary qualities are inseparable 

• it is absurd to say that there is anything left if we strip an object of its secondary qualities 

• apple - if we strip away colour, taste and texture, are we really left with an apple? 

• can try and argue apple still has primary qualities (size and shape) but these cannot be thought of without being connected to some secondary qualities

• to insit that there is something in addition to all these ideas that somehow exists beyond sense experience is mysterious

• therefore, p and s are insepareable, so there must be no distinction between them

attack 2 - primary and secondary qualities are both MD 

• b insits that primary qualities are also ideas, and are therefore MD just like secondary qualities 

• locke says secondary qualities are relative to the person perceiving them, b argues that this is the same of primary qualities 

• example - shape can look bigger depending on what point you percieve an obejct - ties to perceptual variation by russel 

• therefore, primary qualities can have the same features of secondary qualities, and also depend on the perciever, so are mind dependant, so there must be no disctinction between them

response to b attack on p and s qualities

• just because it is impossible to conceieve of an object existing without secondary qualities doesn’t mean it cannot exist in this state

• locke states that secondary qualities are caused my primary, therefore they are inseparable with regards to our perception of them - can’t have secondary qualities without primary

• apple - must imagine with some secondary qualities, doesn’t mean p and s qualities are indentical in external reality - fresh cut grass - molecules that cause the smell may not be MD in the same way the smell is

• pv point - p qualities appear to change depending on our perception, we are actually perciving the s qualities caused by the p qualities, this doesn’t mean p qualities are changing in the same way as s qualities

berkley’s master argument

• b argues that you cannot imagine an object existing independant of it being percieved 

• i can easily imagine a tree existing without anyone around to percieve it, however all that is happening is you imagining the idea of a tree, therefore by doing this you are imagining perceiving these things - so you cannot imagine an object existing independant of perception

• to do this, you must be able to imagine them outside of all human perception - impossible 

•  if we can’t form the idea of objects existing entirely outside of perception, to talk about it is meaningless 

• apple - if there is no mind to perceieve the apple, it would not exist, no sense data so no colour, texture, shape, smell ect, to insist there is something in addition that exists beyond all sense data is mysterious, so therefore meaningless for berkley

response to the master argument

• b confuses the thought with what the thought is about

• thoughts cannot exist outside the mind, therefore my thinking of a tree is not MI

• but what the thoughts is about is not the same ass the thought itself

• just because my thinking of a tree is MD doesn’t mean what i am thinking of is MD

• therefore, we can conceive of Mi objects through MD thought

what is the problem of illusions and hallucinations

• idealism is unable to explain the difference between truthful perception and instances of perceptual error - illusions and hallucinations

• natural way to tell - truthful perceptions match to the way the world is independant of our minds, perceptual error occur when perceptions misrepresent this reality

• idealists cannot do this as they deny the existence of a MI reality on which to base true perceptions

• therefore, a stick bent in water is, in reality, bent because appearence is reality, but this is abusurd

what is the problem of the objectivity of space and time

• the idealist claim ‘to be is to be percieved’, suggest that things no longer exist when they’re not being perceived

• example - when i put my milk in the fridge, the milk ceases to exist, yet when i open the fridge it exists again, similarily, the milk has no smell, taste, colour ect until i open the fridge and smell, taste or see the milk - this seems absurd

• seems absurd because events seem to occur wether or not they are being perceived - suggesting space and time have objective qualities beyond what can be perceived - when i run a bath and leave the room, it continues to fill up

• idealists cannot explain any of this, as according to them, things cease to exist when they’re not being percieved

response 1 - god perceives all things 

• b suggests that all minds and objects are continuously percieved in a mind of a greater being - God 

• although we have control over some perception (imagination), most are out of our control (sensory perceptions) - therefore, they must be caused by something outside of us

• must be another mind as nothing can exist outside of perception and the only mind powerful enough to sustain all perception would have to be God’s 

• this guarantees the existence of objects in space and time and explains the origin and regularity of experience 

response 2 - the 3 points against god

• b says god percieves all - means all objects + ideas exist within god’s mind

• this creates 3 issues:

• 1 - what i percieve exists in my mind and not god’s, it’s difficult to see how things can exist in both our minds, unless we understand both minds to be the same in some sense

• 2 - god cannot have the same type of perceptual experiences as i do, it’s absurd to argue god can feel pain when he is omnipotent, if he cannot feel it he cannot perceive it, which can be said for all sensations

• 3 - ordinary objects of existence seem to change and go out of existence, god’s mind is said to be unchanging and eternal, so how could a mind like that perceive a world full of changing objects

response 3 - b’s consideration of these issues 

1 - what you perceive exists in your mind, but it is a copy of the ideas that exist in god’s mind  

2 - ideas of objects and sensations exist in the mind of God based on understanding rather than perceptions, he may not be able to feel pain but he understands what it is like for us to experience pain

3 - for b, the whole of creation exists in God’s mind, therefore God does not perceive a changing world, but this is an element of human perception 

response 4 - further problems with the use of God 

• b claims that God perceives all, but gives no independant proof of God 

• b may insist that idealism itself is independant proof of God, but since this his theory relies on God, it creates circular reasoning which is logically invalid 

• it appears we must accept the existence of God to secure idealism, but we must accept idealism to secure the existence of God 

what is solopsism?

• the view that the only thing i can be certain of is the existence of my own mind

• there are no Mi objects and no other minds but my own

• idealism leads to solopsism - other people are simple objects i percieve (collections of ideas) so therefore they must exist MD

what is the problem of solopsism?

• idealism leads to solopsism

• solopsism makes you skeptical about the existence of other minds, as idealists reject the existence of a MI reality, therefore people are just objects i perceive, objects are just collections of ideas, therefore they must be MD just like all objects

• this is absurd

• this form of argument is called reductio ad absurdum - to reduce absurdity

response to solopsism

• b claims it is true I have no idea of other minds, but that I have an understanding of what minds are that doesn’t derive from objects that i percieve but from the fact that I myself am a perciever

• the mind is what actively thinks, ideas (objects of perception) are passive

• I am aware that I can think, will and percieve

• therefore, I am aware that I am not an idea

• being a mind myself, I have an understanding of what a mind is

• based on this understanding, I can understand that other minds exist

• My perceptions do not originate in my mind or are based on an external reality

• therefore, my perceptions are based on some other mind, and the complexity and regularity of my experience suggests it is God’s mind