International Politics: States, Sovereignty, and Cooperation in IR

🌍 8/25 Lecture - How Do We Think About International Politics?

: State (definition in IR)

: A central authority with the ability to make and enforce laws within a given territory.

: Sovereignty

: Ultimate authority over people and territory; no higher power can tell the state what to do.

: Is Rice University a state?

: No — it is subject to higher state authorities (Houston, Texas, U.S.).

: Is the UN a state?

: No — the UN cannot enforce laws; it only coordinates state action and makes recommendations.

: International Anarchy

: The absence of a central authority above states; no world government to enforce rules.

: Central IR Puzzle

: Can states cooperate under anarchy (without a higher authority)?

: Example of Anarchy - South China Sea

: Competing claims over resource-rich sea; China ignored UNCLOS ruling, showing limits of international authority.

: Model in International Politics

: A simplified representation of political processes and interactions to understand and test theories.

: Actors

: Individuals or groups with interests — e.g., states, politicians, firms, organizations.

: Interests (examples)

: Security and power, economic welfare, moral or ideological goals.

: Rational Choice Framework

: Actors weigh costs and benefits to choose actions that best achieve their interests.

: Strategic Interactions

: An actor's best choice depends on what they think others will do.

🔒 9/3 - Prisoner's Dilemma & Cooperation

: Prisoner's Dilemma (PD)

: A game showing why two rational actors might not cooperate even if it's in their best interest.

: PD Equilibrium

: Both defect (go to jail for 5 years) — even though mutual cooperation is better.

: Cooperation (definition)

: When two or more actors adopt policies that make at least one better off without making others worse off.

: IR Application of PD

: Explains why states struggle to cooperate (like China and the Philippines in the South China Sea).

🏛 9/8 - Institutions & Cooperation

: Institution (definition)

: A set of rules that structure interactions in specific ways (formal or informal).

: Examples of Institutions

: Congress, treaties, UN, NATO, NPT.

: Why Institutions Exist

: To facilitate cooperation and help states overcome collective action problems.

: How Institutions Promote Cooperation

:

Create standards of behavior

Verify compliance

Reduce costs of decision-making

Resolve disputes

: Example - NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)

: Prevents spread of nuclear weapons; offers nuclear tech to non-nuclear states in return.

: Why Institutions Don't Always Work

:

No enforcement power under anarchy

Biased toward powerful states

: Why States Comply Anyway

: Cooperation brings long-term gains and using existing institutions is cheaper than creating new ones.

⚔️ 9/10 - What Causes War?

: War (definition)

: Organized use of military force between at least two parties, with 1,000+ battle deaths.

: Types of War

: Interstate (state vs state) and Civil/Intrastate (govt vs rebel).

: Crisis Bargaining

: Using threats or coercive diplomacy to gain concessions ("comply, or else").

: Bargaining Range

: Set of deals both sides prefer to war; exists if war is costly and the good is divisible.

: Security Dilemma

: Defensive measures by one state make others feel insecure, leading to arms races.

: Deterrence

: Threat of force to preserve the status quo ("don't do X, or else").

💣 9/15-9/17 - Why Bargaining Fails

: Incomplete Information

: States lack info about opponents' capabilities or resolve, leading to miscalculation and war.

: Capabilities

: A state's military strength or likelihood of victory.

: Resolve

: A state's willingness to fight for an issue.

: Credible Commitment Problem

: No authority to enforce agreements; states can't trust each other to stick to deals.

: Preventive War

: War fought to stop an adversary from growing stronger.

: Preemptive War

: War started to prevent an imminent attack.

: Indivisible Goods

: Goods that cannot be divided without losing value (rare).

🏠 9/22 - Domestic Actors and War

: Rally Effect

: Public support for the government increases after a dramatic event like war.

: Why Leaders Go to War

: To maintain power, distract from domestic issues, or boost legitimacy.

: Bureaucratic Interests

: Bureaucrats (esp. military) may push for war to gain budget or influence.

: Interest Groups

: Private actors that lobby for wars that serve their interests (e.g., oil companies).

: Hawkish vs Dovish Leaders

: Hawks favor aggressive policies; Doves prefer peaceful solutions.

🕊 9/24 - Why Don't Democracies Fight Each Other?

: Democratic Peace Hypothesis

: Democracies are less likely to go to war with one another.

: Democracy (definition)

: A political system with fair, regular elections and significant popular participation.

: Why Democracies Avoid War (4 Reasons)

:

High audience costs increase bargaining range.

Greater transparency reduces misinformation.

Credible communication reduces escalation.

Shared norms favor peaceful dispute resolution.

: Limits of Democratic Peace Theory

:

Not all democracies are stable

Publics don't always want peace

Correlation doesn't equal causation

9/29 - Why Do States Form Alliances?

: Alliance (definition)

: Institution where members promise military cooperation in case of war.

: Types of Alliances

:

Defensive (help if attacked)

Offensive (ally to attack another)

Symmetrical (equal contributions)

Asymmetrical (unequal contributions)

: Reasons to Join Alliances

: Shared interests, increased capabilities, credible signaling, sphere of influence.

: Entrapment

: Being dragged into an unwanted war by an ally's actions.

: Abandonment

: Failing to help an ally when promised.

: Effective Alliances Require

: Willingness to fight and credible commitment.

🇺🇳 10/1 - Can the UN Keep the Peace?

: Collective Security Organization

: Broad institution promoting peace among all members (e.g., the UN).

: Alliance vs Collective Security Org

: Alliances address specific threats; CSOs address all aggression broadly.

: UN Charter

: Members promise not to use force and to seek UN help in resolving disputes.

: UN Security Council

: 15 members (5 permanent with veto power); makes decisions on peace and security.

: Collective Action Problem (UN)

: All benefit from peace, but not all contribute to maintaining it (free rider problem).

: When Does the UN Work Best?

:

When P5 powers agree.

When members are willing to pay costs of enforcement.

: Peacekeeping vs Peace-Enforcement

:

Peacekeeping: After conflict, prevent restart.

Peace-Enforcement: Intervene during conflict to impose peace.

📘 10/6 - Midterm Review Highlights

: Bargaining Model Variables

: Cost of war, probability of victory, and value of the good affect the bargaining range.

: Domestic Actors in War

: Leaders, public, bureaucrats, interest groups — all affect decisions differently.

: Alliances vs Collective Security

: Alliances ensure mutual defense; CSOs promote general world peace.

: Key Takeaway

: Institutions and cooperation only work when states want them to — IR is built on incentives, not enforcement.