metaphysics of mind 5 markers

explain the empirical interaction problem facing interactionist dualism

P1) By the law of conservation of energy, the total amount of energy in the universe remains constantP2) Any non-physical to physical causation would have to be involve an addition of energy to the physical worldC1) non-physical to physical causation is not empirically possibleC2) substance dualism is false

explain Elizabeth, princess of Bohemia's conceptual interaction problem

-> it is inconceivable for one object to move another without contact-> if it is inconceivable that one object can move another without contact then it is impossible for one object to move another without contact-> for two objects to be in contact with one another they must both be extended in space-> the mind is not extended , the body is extended-> the body is extended, it is impossible for non-extended mind to move an extended body so substance dualism is false

explain the response to substance dualism that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world

-> Descartes argues that because it is metaphysically possible for mind to exist without body, it must be the case that mind and body are distinct substances-> however there are plenty of situations that are metaphysically possible that are not the case in reality, so even if it were metaphysically possible for mind to exist without body, that wouldn't show it definitely is the cas

explain the response to the conceivability argument, what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possibl

->the masked man fallacy goes as follows;P1) I know that batman is the caped crusaderP2) I know that Bruce Wayne is a playboy millionaireP3) Batman is not Bruce Wayne-> this shows I can conceive of Batman and Bruce Wayne being different people, however it is the case that in reality they are the same, so it is not metaphysically possible they are different-> this shows we can conceive of things that are metaphysically impossible

explain the response to the conceivability argument that mind without body is not conceivable

-> Descartes argues that it is conceivable a mind could exist without a body-> however, according to Ayer's verification principle a statement is only meaningful if it is a tautology or empirically verifiable as we cannot experience the mind without the body-> Descartes claims it is not empirically verifiable so Ayer would say it is meaningless to claim the mind can exist without the body.

outline the conceivability argument from substance dualism

->I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my extended physical body existing-> anything that I can clearly and distinctly conceive of is metaphysically possible-> so my mind existing without my physical body is metaphysically possible-> by Leibnitz's law if it is metaphysically possible for X to exist without Y then X is not identical to Y-> so my mind is not identical with my extended physical body, so they are distinct substances

explain the response to the indivisibility argument that not everything thought of as physical is divisible

-> Descartes argues that a feature of physical substance is that it can be divided, however this may not be the case at the quantum level-> the smallest physical components like quarks and electrons are not known to be divisible so we can't say that we know that all physical objects are divisible

explain a response to the indivisibility argument that the mental is divisible

-> Descartes argues that the mental is an indivisible substance-> However we do not experience the mind as a single unified object-> we only have impressions of distinct thoughts and feelings-> Hume argues that what we call the mind is a bundle of different impressions and experiences and so it is divisible

outline Descartes' indivisibility argument for substance dualism

The body has parts and can be divided (res extensa)-> the mind is singular and I cannot conceive of it being divided, it is not extended (res cogitans)-> by Leibnitz's law for two things to be the same they must share all the same properties-> therefore the mind and body cannot be identical, they are ontologically distinct substances

what is the distinction Descartes makes between mind and body (3)

Descartes argues that mind exists as a thinking substance (res cogitans) which has mental states and isn't extended, and the body exists as a physical substance (res extensa) which is extended in space and time

what is substance dualism (3)

-> substance dualism is the view that mind and body are distinct substances-> the physical substance (body) can be moved by the mental substance mind and the mind responds to events in the physical world like pain

what are intentional properties of mind (3)

Intrinsic (what it is like to experience something) phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessibly. The non-intentional experiential quality of sense data

what are the two features of mental states (3)

Mental state are defined as having the features of intentionality ( they are directed towards another object) and qualia (the non-intentional experiential quality of sense-data)

Outline Descartes indivisibility argument for substance dualism (5 marker).

Descartes was a substance dualist, meaning he believed that the mind and body were two separate and distinct things that could exist independently of one another. Descartes uses his indivisibility argument to show the differences between the mind and body employing Leibniz's law that if two things do not share the same properties then they cannot be the same thing to argue that my mind is not my body. His argument follows as such: my mind is indivisible, my body is divisible, therefore my mind is not my body.

Outline Descartes conceivability argument for substance dualism (5 marker).

Descartes' conceivability argument, without reference to God, is another argument he uses for substance dualism to argue that the mind and body are different substances. The argument uses layers of possibility to reach the conclusion of the mind and body being different substances, something that doesn't depend on anything else to exist. For something to be logically possible there must be no logical contradiction involved in imagining it and for something to be metaphysically possible it is conceivable that a world exists where that is the case. In his argument Descarte seems to interpret logical possibility and metaphysical possibility as one. His argument follows as such: it is conceivable (logically possible) that the mind can exist without the body, therefore it is metaphysically possible that the mind can exist without the body, subsequently the mind and body are different substances because according to Leibniz's law if two things don't share the same properties than they cannot be the same thing. His argument works because Descartes has clear and distinct ideas about the nature of the mind and the body.

Define property dualism (3 marks)

- dualist theory- there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties- there is only ONE type of substance in the world (matter) but there are TWO types of properties (mental and physical) both depending on the physical substance to exist- mental properties are a special kind of property, emergent from physical matter but which cannot be reduced to physical terms

What is a philosophical zombie? (3 marks)

philosophical zombie is an EXACT DUPLICATE of a human, they have the EXACT SAME substances and properties....BUT they lack the EXPERIENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MENTAL PROPERTIES that a human attainsPhilosophical zombies lack any PHENOMENAL PROPERTIES or QUALIA

Define interactionist dualism. (3 marks)

Interactionalist dualism is the view that the mind and body - or mental events and physical events - CAUSALLY INFLUENCE each other i.e. they interact. So, the non-physical interacts causally with the physical (vice versa) but they are two distinct substances E.g. - hand on hot plate causes mind to have the thought pain. mind causes hand to move away from the hot plate.

Define epiphenomenalism. (3 marks)

- a dualist theory- argument that the mind does not have causal powers, it does not cause any physical events- physical events can cause mental states but mental states do not cause physical effects- mental states are epiphenomena (by-product of the physical but do not cause (or produce) anything else)

Outline the Philosophical zombie argument for property dualism (5 marks)

Philosophical zombie argument devised by David Chalmers in favour of Property Dualism which argues there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties (one substance [physical], two properties)Philosophical zombies are an exact duplicate of us, they have the exact same physical substances and properties but they lack experiential consciousness and mental properties, they lack phenomenal experience or qualia

SIGNIFICANCE OF ARGUMENT:- Philosophical zombie argument proves property dualism to be correct because it shows that it is possible for a world to exist where there are physical substances but no qualia. This shows that qualia, phenomenal properties etc., are irreducible to the physical which is what Property Dualism argues

Outline the Knowledge/ Mary argument for property dualism (5 marks)

The Knowledge/ Mary argument devised by Frank Jackson for Property Dualism which argues there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties (one substance [physical], two properties)

- Shows Property Dualism to be correct because fact that Mary gains new propositional knowledge shows phenomenal properties are irreducible/ cannot be reduced to the physical (because she had already learnt all the physical facts) which is exactly what Property Dualism argues

Outline the response that a 'philosophical zombie'/a 'zombie' world is not conceivable (5 marks)

- objection attacks P2 of philosophical zombie argument "a philosophical zombie is conceivable" because actually, a philosophical zombie is INCONCEIVABLE
- (P1) Zombies are physical duplicates
- (P2) A physical duplicate is a FUNCTIONAL duplicate.
- (P3) MBTIT claims that consciousness is just a physical functional property of a being.
- (P4) Physical duplicates will have the same consciousness
- (C1) Therefore, zombies are not conceivable
Property Dualism faces an issue where P3 and P4 are articulated. If zombies are a functional duplicate, they must have the same functional properties as that which they are copied from i.e., they cannot LACK consciousness. It is inconceivable to separate the physical and consciousness because consciousness (as PD argues) is a property of the physical substance

Outline the the response that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. (5 marks)

OBJECTION TO ARGUMENT
This objection attacks P3 - physicalists argue that you cannot go from the conceivability of zombies to the metaphysical possibility of zombies
conceivability concerns CONCEPTS, whereas possibility relates to MODAL REALITY; it is metaphysical
e.g., water and H2O are two concepts that refer to same substance. We may CONCEIVE of water not being H2O but it is not POSSIBLE for water to not be H2O.
This is because water is NECESSARILY H2O (H2O is water's essence, it is what makes water its essence).
So, you can have two concepts for one entity and think it is POSSIBLE to have one without the other, but it ISN'T (even if you can conceive of it)
Applying this argument to Philosophical zombies, while I can conceive of a human without consciousness (a zombie), it is simply NOT POSSIBLE. A being PHYSICALLY IDENTICAL to a me, could not lack consciousness, so we can conceive of the zombie not being me, but it is not
So, again, what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible.

Outline the response that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. (5 marks)

Issue is even IF it was logically and metaphysically possible for a philosophical zombie to exist, such possibility tells us nothing about actuality.Even if it's possible in ANOTHER POSSIBLE WORLD that mental and physical properties are DISTINCT (which is what Property Dualism is arguing), this doesn't then mean that in the ACTUAL WORLD this is the case. So it's possible that in THIS world mental properties are IDENTICAL to physicals properties but in ANOTHER POSSIBLE WORLD they are not. Still, we are talking about OUR ACTUALITY - the ACTUAL WORLD not another POSSIBLE WORLD - so, logical and metaphysical possibility doesn't entail actual possibility. So, Philosophical zombie argument doesn't prove Property Dualism.

Outline the response that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the 'ability knowledge' response). (5 marks)

Mary gains ability knowledge - learns HOW to recognise blue via the naked eye (without using equipment/ graphs in her room). Learns how to imagine/ remember blue.

Outline the Knowledge/Mary argument for property dualism (5 marks)

The Knowledge/ Mary argument devised by Frank Jackson for Property Dualism which argues there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties (one substance [physical], two properties)

- Shows Property Dualism to be correct because fact that Mary gains new propositional knowledge shows phenomenal properties are irreducible/ cannot be reduced to the physical (because she had already learnt all the physical facts) which is exactly what Property Dualism argues

Explain the difference between Psychological behaviourism and philosophical behaviourism

Psychological Behaviourism is a way of doing psychology without making reference to non-observable things such as mental states. There is no scientific way to establish the existence of these inner mental states and therefore should no be used in psychological research. Whereas philosophical behaviourism is actually a theory of language. When we are talking about the mind and mental states we are actually talking about behaviour. E.g. when we say that someone is sad what we are actually saying is that someone is crying etc

Explain what is meant by a category mistake

A category mistake is putting something in the wrong logical category. An example of a category mistake is this: A person goes to Oxford to visit the university. They are given a tour f the library, the lecture theatres etc. After the tour the person asks 'but where is the university?'. They have made a category mistake in thinking that the university is something separate to these things. Behaviourism says that when we are talking about mental states we are putting them into the wrong logical category, the category that we should be putting them in is behaviour.

Explain the difference between Hard and Soft Behaviourism

Hard Behaviourism states that all proposition about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states. It makes 2 claims. The first that all mental states can be made into a finite list of verification conditions. The second is that your verification conditions can have no reference to psychological events. Whereas soft behaviourism claims that propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions.

Explain the symmetry obj to hard Behaviourism

Behaviourism implies that there is symmetry in terms of self-knowledge. This implies that I know just as Mach about you and your mental states as you do simply based on your behaviour.

Explain the Circularity obj to hard Behaviourism

A definition is circular when the term we want to define appears in the definition. Behaviourism says that for any mental states I can define it in terms of physics. It's not clear that you can give mental state which doesn't include are reference to mental states. E.g. mental state: fear of snakes. If someone sees a snake and believes the snake is dangerous, they will run away. Belief is a mental state, we then need to verify belief. If someone believes that a snake is dangerous, they think that the snake can cause them hard. Thinking is a mental state. It's hard to see how we will ever escape from this

Explain the obj of multiple realisation of mental states to hard behaviourism

The first claim of a finite list of verification condition is objected through the argument of multiple realisation of mental states. This argument claims that there are huge varieties of behaviours that can express the same behaviour. For example two people expressing the emotion of anger, one person may shout and slam doors whereas the other person will cry. These behaviours differ greatly yet they are meant to represent the same mental state of anger. Due to this there is no possible way of creating a finite list of verification conditions. This argument creates the question 'what is unifying these behaviours?' The answer is the mental state of anger, but this seems to contradict hard behaviourism's claims that mental states are identical to dispositions to behaviour in a certain way. This is such strong argument against hard behaviourism because it has a second part which strengthens it even further. This is the idea that the same behaviour can express several different mental states. For example the behaviour of crying can express one person's mental state of anger, another's of sadness and another's of happiness. How can we then say that they are behaviours are identical to mental state when one behaviour is identical to three different mental states.

Explain how soft Behaviourism solves the objs against guard Behaviourism

Soft behaviourism manages to solve the issue of multiple realisation by changing the claim of a finite list of verification conditions to all mental states can be translated into disposition. This then means that it doesn't matter if there is an infinite list of dispositions and it no longer requires the certainty of conditions which hard behaviourism carried. In addition, soft behaviourism claims that these dispositions can be done with ordinary language, including mental states, which solves the issue of circularity

Explain the issue of asymmetry against soft behaviourism

P1. The analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions rules it an asymmetry between self knowledge and knowledge of other people's mental states.P2. Yet it seems obvious from experience that there is such an asymmetryC1. Therefore philosophical Behaviourism is false.An example of asymmetry between our experience and other people's experience is that of access. I have full access to my own mind though introspection whereas our access for others minds is inferred though behaviour. Or certainty, its impossible for me to doubt claims about my own mind but that is not the case for other people's minds

Explain the response to the issue of asymmetry

The only reason that we think there is asymmetry is because we pay more attention to our own behaviour and we have access to our own internal monologue. However this is a very weak response as it completely goes against the whole theory of Behaviourism. Internal monologue is not a part of our behaviour ad as such we shouldn't b paying attention to

Explain the objection that mental states are distinct from behaviour

This objection claims that mental states are distinct from behaviour otherwise known as the Super Spartan objection. According to soft behaviourism, pain is the exact disposition to show behaviour. Spartans are an objection to this because they do not. Have a disposition to show pain, even in cases where it is clear that pain is occurring. A response to this objection is that in private, a spartan would show a disposition of pain, just in a more limited situation. However this does not account for super Spartans who have been so brainwashed that they will never show pain. Whilst there is a response of physiological behaviours in the brain, c. Fibres. This falls completely flat as this then simply turns behaviourism into a form of mind-identity theory.

Define Functionalism

'All mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised'

Explain how functionalism solves the issue of multiple realisation

Functionalism solves the problem of multiple realisation as according to this theory it doesn't matter what set of neurone form that belief. The mental state is whatever brain state that fulfils the mental states functional role. Functionalism is neutral about what particular realisation any belief has as long as the realisation has the right functional role. As such it doesn't matter if the belief is realised in several ways.

Explain how consciousness can be displayed as a machine table

Functionalism claims that it's possible to display everyone's consciousness as a really complex machine table. For example:Input: Ask parent for some moneyMental state-stress. Output: noMental state-related. Output: okThis can be extended to every input and mental state that a person has meaning that for a person's consciousness you can make a massive complex machine table with inputs and outputs

Explain the computational theory of mind

The computational theory of the mind claims that it's possible that computers could be conscious. Computers receive an input, follow rules and convert them into behavioural outputs. Similarly according to functionalism it is possible to display a person's consciousness as a complex machine table. this shows a parallel between compute hardware and our physical make-up and as such implies that it is possible for a machine to be considered conscious.

Explain the Turning Test

The Turing Test is set to solve the computational theory of the mid that its possible that computers could be conscious. If a computer can fool humans into think that they're having a conversation with a consciousness, only then are they considered conscious.

Explain the China Thought Experiment

P1. You give a radio to every Chinese person which is wants to simulate the neuron connections in your brainP2.Now you take away X's consciousness, hook X up to the population of China, all inputs now go to the population of China and they give the right output.C1. Therefore functionalism is false because also though the population of China is functional to X, X experiences qualia but its not possible that the whole of the Chinese population experiences qualia

Explain the China Thought Experiment OBJS

Minor:The Chinese system is not identical to you as it can be disrupted by things that your mind can't such as how radios can run out of battery.(Response: but if the is desn't happen then there is still functional duplication)Major:I the Chinese's system is trues, not everything can be explained in terms of functionalism

Explain the Inverted Qualia OBJ

P1. Functionalism claims that 2 mental states that have the same functional role are the same mental stateP2. In the case of inverted Qualia the functional role of an inverted person's perception of green would be identical to the functional role of the mental state of the non-inverted person's perception of red. (e.g. we both stop at a red light)P3. Functionalism therefore implies that these perceptions would be the same mental state - but they are not. The two people are experiencing different qualiaC1. Therefore functionalism is false.

Explain the responses that inverted qualia are not empirical

Inverted qulia are undetectable and therefore not empirical. So far scientists have never found that 2 people who are having the same expereince but experiencing different Qualia. In principle it's undetectable. There's no way to verify it and therefore its meaningless. So if the inverted qualia obj were empirical then it ether also or bad science.

Explain the response that inverted qualia are not possible

Inverted qualia are not possible considering the colour spectrum (ROY G BIV). What we're saying is that red has switched with green and that there's now way to tell his. This Response objects to the idea that there could be a functionally identical switch through two ways.1. There is a way to tell that they are different e.g. through interior design. In an orange room, one person suggests a red couch, then person with the inverted colour spectrum with red and green switched, suggests a green couch. Therefore there is a functional difference (Response: flip the entire colour spectrum)2. Our ability to tell the difference between different colours is not uniform. E.g.green and yellow have a lot more fine discriminations that we can see than Luke does. Therefore there is a functional difference in their ability to distinguish colours

Compare functionalism with other theories of the mind

-Behaviourism: avoids the super spartan obj bc you can say that he has a mental state to suppress pain.-Mind Identity:Solves the problem of multiple realisation

What does Mind Brain Identity Theory claim about mental states?

All mental states are identical to brain states through ontological reduction but 'mental states' and 'brain states' are not synonymous (not an analytic reduction).

What is the difference between an analytical reduction and an ontological reduction?

An analytic reduction is when the language of one thing can be reduced to the language of another thing without a loss of meaning as the meaning is the same. For example, 'a 3 sided shape' is analytically reducible to 'a triangle'. An ontological reduction is when things of one kind are the same as those of another but have different meanings. Smart fives the example of the 'morning star' and 'evening star' which refer to the same entity, but are not synonymous.

What is the difference between Mind Brain Type Identity Theory and Mind Brain Token Identity Theory.

Mind Brain Type Identity Theory is when one mental states is identical to one brain state across only the human species as 'type' where as Mind Brain Token Identity Theory claims that a mental state can be identical to different types of mental states irrespective of the time / individual / species. This is because 'Type' refers to a general class ('I wish it was raining') and 'Token' refers to a particular type of class ('I wish it was raining on Monday')

What are the arguments for Mind Brain Type Identity Theory?

Science has proven that aspects of reality can be given physicalist explanations and so can be ontologically reduced. In the same way that 'lightning' can be reduced to 'the discharge of built-up electricity', mental states can be reduced to brain states. Smart argues that if states of consciousness couldn't be reduced to they physical they would be 'nomological danglers'- something that doesn't fit into the physical system of laws that govern everything else. There is no interaction problem as the mind is reduced to the brain. There is no problem of other minds as someone can be said to be minded if their brain works in the same way. The theory allows mental states a causal role in producing behaviour which fits with our common-sense understanding.

(Dualist Response) How does the evidence of introspection cause an issue for MBTIT?

MBTIT claims that while mental sates are ontologically reducible to brain states, 'mental states' and 'brain states' are not synonymous (not an analytical reduction). However, dualists claim that mental states are irreducible to the physical as a complete physicalist account cannot explain phenomenal experience which is essential to understanding concepts.

(Dualist Response) How does the Spatial Location Problem cause an issue for MBTIT?

MBTIT claims that 'mental states' are identical to 'brain states', an ontological reduction, but are not synonymous. If mental sates are identical to physical states, they must have the same properties. This is because Leibniz Law states that if x and y share all the same properties then they are identical, but of not they are distinctly different. However, mental states and brain states have different properties: physical states have the property of having spatial location whereas mental sates do not. This is because mental states cannot be located. For example, a thought about what I should wear does not exist in the material world. Therefore, mental states cannot be the same as physical states.

(Dualist Response) How does the irreducibility of intentionality cause an issue for MBTIT?

Intentionality is seen as central to most mental states as it is what makes a mental state go beyond themselves and into the world - they are 'about something'. This cannot be a property of a purely physical system as an arrangement of matter cannot be more than itself in virtue - it isn't 'about' something. This means that mental states cannot be ontologically reduced, and therefore identical to brain states as the intentional properties cannot be reduced to the physical

(Dualist Response) How does talk about the brain being not identical to talk of the brain cause an issue for MBTIT?

The folk-psychological talk of mental states is not identical to brain states, with Putnam giving the example that the common-sense talk of a headache is not identical to a neurone pathway being activated. There is an essence that is lost in the translation of which Dualists would claim to be phenomenal properties or qualia. Therefore, mental states cannot be ontologically reduced to brain states.

How does the issue of multiple realisability cause an issue for MBTIT?(Issue of proving type identities)

MBTIT assumes that it is not possible for the same type of mental state to be realized by a different brain state or brain type as MBTIT claims that 'mental states' are identical to a single 'brain state' of the same type of brain through ontological reduction. This doesn't allow for individuals who are different to experience the same mental sates as someone with the typical brain. For example, if the brain is destroyed, the implication would be that it would be impossible to have the corresponding mental state as the brain state will be different. However, this is untrue as the recovery of stroke victims, whose brains are changed afterwards, disproves this. This is because of the plasticity of the brain, meaning a different area s used to create the same mental state. To add, animals, who have different brain structures to mental states, are also see to experience mental sates such as pain. Therefore, mental states are not identical to a particular brain state, and therefore MBTIT fails to the issue of multiple realizability.

How can MBTIT be seen as Chauvinistic? How is this an issue?

Chauvinism is the undergrounded belief that ones sex/ nationality/race/species is superior to others. MBTIT claims that 'mental sates' are ontologically reducible to 'brain states' with the inference being that this can only be applied to human beings and therefore, brains. However, it is implausible and counter-intuitive to believe the animals do not have mental states. For example, animals can be seen to experience pain if they are injured. Therefore, MBTIT doesn't allow for the multiple realisability of mental sates - that mental states can occur in different structures of the brain, and hence different organisms other than humans

Explain why MBTIT is a form of physicalism

MBTIT is a form of physicalism as it claims that talk of mental states can be ontologically reduced to talk of brain processes. This means that saying 'I am in pain' is identical to saying 'I have a c-fibre firing'. This shows that MBIT is physicalist as the mental can be reduced and explained in terms of a complete physicalist account.

Explain why MBTIT is a reductive theory

MBTIT is a reductive theory as it claims that the talk of mental states can be reduced ontologically to the talk of brain processes. This means that saying 'I am in pain' is identical to saying 'I have a c-fibre firing'.

Conceivability against mbtit

Furthermore, arguments put forward by dualists aim to demonstrate that we must believe in an immaterial mind, such as the Descartes' argument from Conceivability.
He defines 'logically possible' as something which can be described without self-contradiction, and 'physically possible' as something which can exist in our world.
We may discover what is logically possible by considering what is conceivable in our minds.
For example, if we can conceive of two things as separate, it is logically possible for them to be separate.
If we can conceive ourselves as bodiless minds, for example, the mind and body are, in principle, separable.
From this, Descartes concludes that the mind and body must be distinct substances.

mary/hard consciousness against mbtit

Despite this, the hard problem of consciousness highlights MBIT's explanatory weaknesses.
Chalmers explains that we cannot have a reductive explanation of consciousness because consciousness has no functional role.
This is demonstrated by the conceivability of philosophical zombies, which are creatures physically and functionally identical to us, but without consciousness.
Chalmers claims that the only solutions are to deny consciousness' existence or add consciousness to our ontology as an unreduced feature of reality.
This problem is further demonstrated by the explanatory gap between the mind and brain, as explained by McGinn when he asked "How do you get from the water of the brain to the wine of consciousness?".
Jackson's thought experiment considers a neuroscientist named Mary who has been confined to a black and white room for her whole life.
She has never seen colour, but knows every physical fact about colour vision.
Upon leaving the room and seeing colour, Jackson claims it is clear that she will learn something new about the nature of colour.
It follows that, knowledge of the physical world cannot be a complete account of what exists. Any theory of mind which denies a non-physical mental substance or property, such as MBIT, must fail because it does not account for qualia.

Define Eliminative Materialism

"Some or all common sense ('folk psychological') mental states/properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken."

Explain Ontoloogical reduction and elimination

Ontological reduction is when you take a macrophenomena and you explain it in terms of micro phenomena. E.g. lightening is the movement of free elections using maxwell equation. It's important because it has amazing explanatory power and a strong explanatory space.Ontological elimination is when cases of ontological reductions have eliminated our beliefs.E.g. the Middle Ages used to explain the travelling of heat as a spinning liquid, caloric fluid, but this was proved wrong where actually heat was to do with energy in chemical bonds and the theory of caloric fluid was completely abandoned

Explain folk psychology

Folk psychology is the everyday psychological concepts and explanations of behaviour we use. E.g. she cried because she was sad. It;s an integral part of our language

Explain how folk psychology is a scientific theory

Churchland sees folk psychology as a scientific theory. This is because scientific theories have laws and rules which are used to make predictions. E.g. gravity can predict where mars will be in the sky on august 10th. Folk psychology has reasonable predictive power. E.g. we can predict that when people get angry they will shout

Explain the objs to folk psychology

-Folk Psycholoy can't explain things like mental illness-FP seems so be quite stagnant-Intentionality in FP doesn't fit well with other ares of science

Explain the objection about the certainty about our own mental states

Our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations. E.g. Descartes took 'i think' to be his very firt certainty. We could argue that the direct certainty over our own mental states should take priority over physicalist considerations

Explain the objection in favour of folk psychology

-It has re;actively good predictive and explanatory power. Although it doesn't explain things like sleep or mental illness, this isn't important because it's not designed to do this. It may boot be stagnant as it has been claimed, but couldn't stagnant also be a good thing.

The articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting

- P1: According to folk psychology, belief is a (genuine) mental state/there are and can be such things as beliefs.- P2: The eliminative materialists (sincerely) assert that folk psychology is false.- P3: (Sincere) assertions are the expressions of belief.- C1: The eliminative materialist believes that folk psychology is false- C2: The eliminative materialist believes that belief is not a genuine mental state/the eliminative materialist believes there are and can be no such things as beliefs