ConLaw MBE Practice Questions

A state statute provides for a reduction in the property tax assessed against any residential dwelling located in a particular economically depressed area of the largest city in the state.  The purpose of the statute is to encourage homeownership in the designated area and thereby improve the economic well-being of the residents living there.  The statute provides that, in order to qualify for this tax break, the homeowner must be a citizen of the United States.

Is the statute likely constitutional?

Answer: No, because the state cannot demonstrate that the citizenship requirement is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.

State laws imposing citizenship requirements are discriminatory because they deny resident noncitizens benefits or opportunities that are generally available to U.S. citizens.  As a result, these laws can be challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause.  And since citizenship is a suspect class, these laws are typically unconstitutional unless they survive strict scrutiny.  This requires the state to prove that the law is necessary (i.e., the least restrictive means) to achieve a compelling state interest.

Here, the citizenship requirement for property tax breaks cannot survive strict scrutiny.  Although the property tax break is designed to increase home ownership and improve the economic well-being of communities, the state cannot demonstrate that a citizenship requirement is necessary to further those interests.  That is because the state can use less restrictive means to achieve those interests—e.g., by providing loans with low interest rates to first-time homeowners.  Therefore, the citizenship requirement is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.

A state law imposes civil liability for the intentional publication of communications by individuals who know or have reason to know that the communications were unlawfully obtained.

An animal rights blogger investigated a corporation for testing its salon products on animals.  A subscriber of the blog unlawfully obtained a trove of the corporation's documents, which revealed that the corporation had concealed its testing on animals from the public.  The subscriber sent the documents to the blogger for use in her investigation and told the blogger that he had hacked into the corporation's internal server to access the documents remotely, without the corporation's knowledge or permission.  After receiving the documents, the blogger posted a blog post on the internet that exposed the corporation's testing on animals.  The blog post included links to the corporation's documents that had been obtained by the subscriber.  As a result of the blog post, the corporation's sales dropped significantly.

The corporation has filed suit against the blogger and seeks damages for publishing the corporation's documents in violation of the state law.

Can the corporation recover damages from the blogger?

Answer: No, because the blogger did not unlawfully obtain the corporation's documents.

The First Amendment shields the media from criminal and civil liability for publishing lawfully obtained private facts (e.g., crime victim's identity) and other truthful information involving matters of public concern (i.e., newsworthy events).  This amendment also shields the media from liability for publishing truthful information that was unlawfully obtained by a third party if:

• the information involves a matter of public concern and

• the publisher obtained it lawfully.

Here, the blogger knew that the subscriber unlawfully obtained the corporation's documents because he told her that he had hacked into the corporation's internal server without the corporation's knowledge or permission.  However, the documents involve a matter of public concern because they relate to the corporation's testing of its salon products on animals.  And the blogger obtained them lawfully from the subscriber, so the First Amendment shields the blogger from liability (Choice C).  Therefore, the corporation cannot recover damages from the blogger.

Motivated by a desire to prevent animal cruelty, an animal-rights group frequently broke into the facilities of companies that conducted testing on animals.  These break-ins usually occurred after the animal-rights group had picketed a company's facility.  To prevent this type of criminal activism, a city enacted an ordinance that prohibited picketing against animal testing on public sidewalks.  After the ordinance was enacted, the animal-rights group picketed on a public sidewalk outside the facility of a company that conducted testing on animals for beauty products.  Members of the animal-rights group who were arrested for violating the ordinance have challenged its constitutionality.

Assuming no federal law is applicable and the members have standing, are they likely to succeed in their challenge?

Answer: Yes, because the city cannot demonstrate that the ordinance was necessary to serve a compelling government interest.

The First Amendment protects the right to free expression and encourages the free flow of ideas—even on government property.  As a result, speech that occurs in a public forum cannot be regulated based on its message, subject, or ideas (i.e., content-based restriction) unless that regulation meets strict scrutiny.  This standard of constitutional review gives the government the nearly impossible burden of proving that the restriction is necessary and narrowly tailored (i.e., the least restrictive means) to serve a compelling government interest.

Here, the ordinance targets speech based on its content since the ordinance prohibits picketing against animal testing on public sidewalks.  And though the city may have a compelling interest in preventing criminal activism, it cannot demonstrate that the ordinance is necessary or narrowly tailored to further that interest (Choice A).  That is because there are less restrictive means to prevent criminal activism—e.g., having police present when picketing occurs.  As a result, the members' challenge is likely to succeed.

The United States Department of Defense entered into a contract with a state-owned weapons manufacturer.  The contract called for the production of defense equipment to be used by the military.  The Department of Defense agreed to purchase all of the defense equipment produced by the state-owned weapons manufacturer for a period of one year.  The weapons manufacturer is located in a state that levies a tax on all purchases of the defense equipment produced by the manufacturer.  The state seeks to tax the Department of Defense on its purchases pursuant to state law.

The Department of Defense has filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the state tax applied to its purchases under the contract.

Is the Department of Defense subject to the state tax for its purchases?

Answer: No, because the Department of Defense is immune from state taxation.

Under the supremacy clause, the federal government is immune (i.e., exempt) from any direct taxation by the states—including taxes on its commercial activities.  As a result, states may not impose taxes on the federal government, or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, without the express consent of Congress.

Here, the state levies a tax on all purchases of defense equipment produced by the state-owned weapons manufacturer.  And the state seeks to impose that tax on the Department of Defense, a federal agency.  But since the agency is immune from direct state taxation, it is not subject to the state tax for its purchases.

A state statute provides that municipalities within the state may adopt an ordinance prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages within the municipality's borders.  Pursuant to this statute, a municipality adopted an ordinance that banned the sale of alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 10%.

Which of the following is the best source of authority for enacting this ordinance?

Answer: The Twenty-first Amendment.

The Twenty-first Amendment grants states broad authority to regulate the use of alcohol within their borders.  This authority permits a state to prohibit the importation, transportation, or sale of alcohol within the state and to delegate such authority to local governments (e.g., municipalities).  As a result, the Twenty-first Amendment provides the best source of authority for enacting an ordinance that bans the sale of alcoholic beverages with an alcohol content in excess of 10%.

After a trademarked cartoon character was almost elected as mayor of a small town as a write-in candidate, the state in which the town is located enacted a statute that bans write-in candidates for local elective office.  The statute also requires candidates for local elective office to obtain a specified number of voter signatures in order to appear on the official election ballot.  The purpose of the statute is to ensure that only candidates who have strong support among the voters are placed on the ballot.

A man who was a candidate for local elective office failed to obtain enough voter signatures to appear on the ballot.  The man has brought an action in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the statute.

Is the statute constitutional?

Answer: Yes, because it is a reasonable restriction to further the state's legitimate interest

States may regulate their own elections by requiring voters and candidates to abide by certain requirements.  But these regulations must comply with the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, which together secure an individual's right to vote and freely associate—e.g., the right to access the ballot.  If an electoral regulation is challenged under either constitutional provision, the standard for evaluating that regulation depends on the severity of the burden imposed.  A court will apply either:

• rational basis review – applies to reasonable, nondiscriminatory burdens and requires the challenger to prove that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest or

• strict scrutiny – applies to severe or discriminatory burdens and requires the state to prove that its regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.

Here, the statute requires candidates for local elective office to obtain a specified number of voter signatures to appear on the official election ballot.  Although this infringed upon the man's right to access the ballot as a political candidate, the petition-signature requirement is subject to rational basis review because it is an ordinary burden that applies to all candidates (Choice B).  And since the requirement is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in ensuring that candidates have strong support among voters, the requirement is constitutional.

Congress recently enacted a federal statute creating a five-member commission whose purpose is to identify and prevent threats to national security.  The statute grants the members of the commission broad discretion and administrative and enforcement powers to conduct investigations into possible security threats.  Commission members are required to report the results of their investigations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, who was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Upon receiving the investigation results, the Secretary advises the President on what, if any, action should be taken to address potential national security threats.  The statute permits the President to appoint the members of the commission, which she did without seeking Senate approval.

Was the appointment of the commission members by the President constitutionally permissible?

Answer: Yes, because Congress can delegate these appointments to the President without Senate approval.

The Article II appointments clause grants the President the power to appoint principal federal officers with the Senate's advice and consent (i.e., approval).  But Senate approval is not required for the President's appointment of inferior federal officers—i.e., federal officers who are supervised by principal federal officers.  That is because Congress may delegate the appointment of inferior federal officers to the President alone (i.e., without Senate approval), the heads of executive-branch agencies, or the federal courts.

Here, the federal statute created a five-member commission whose members are inferior federal officers because their work is supervised by the Secretary of Homeland Security, a principal federal officer.  Since the appointments clause permits Congress to delegate the appointment of inferior federal officers to the President alone, the President's appointment of the commission members without Senate approval was constitutionally permissible (Choices A & B).

A state statute regulates the homeschooling of a child by the child's parent or guardian.  The statute specifies the academic subjects that must be taught and the number of hours of educational instruction the child must receive during an academic year.  In addition, the statute requires that the child's instructor possess at least a high school diploma or its equivalent.

The parents of an elementary-school-age child who is homeschooled have challenged these requirements in federal court as violating their due process rights regarding their child's education.

How should the court rule on the parents' challenge to these requirements?

Answer: The court must uphold them, because they impose reasonable educational standards on homeschooling.

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause generally prohibits states from enacting laws that substantially impair the right to privacy, which includes parents' right to control their children's upbringing and education (Choice A).  However, this fundamental right is not absolute.  SCOTUS has stated that states may impose reasonable educational standards on public and private schools—including homeschooling—that:

• require children to attend school—e.g., by specifying the number of hours of educational instruction a child must receive during an academic year

• establish minimum competency requirements for instructors—e.g., by requiring them to possess at least a high school diploma and

• define academic curriculum and content—e.g., by specifying the academic subjects that must be taught.

Therefore, the court must uphold the statute's requirements since they impose reasonable educational standards on homeschooling.

A U.S. senator introduced a legislative act that provides a federal civil remedy for children who are victims of violence.  The purpose of the legislation is to reduce violence against children.  The act includes specific findings that violence against children has long-term social costs and is disruptive to family life.

If the act is enacted into law, which of the following is the strongest basis to find it unconstitutional?

Answer: The act regulates a noneconomic activity in an area of traditional state concern.

The commerce clause grants Congress broad power to regulate interstate commerce—including activities (even in-state activities) that substantially affect interstate commerce.  When determining if activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce that warrants regulation by Congress, courts consider whether:

• the activities are economic in nature (if so, a substantial effect is presumed)

• the regulation has a jurisdictional element that limits its reach to activities with a direct connection to or effect on interstate commerce

• there are express congressional findings concerning the activities' effect on interstate commerce and

• there is a strong link between the regulated activities and that effect.

Here, the proposed act provides a federal civil remedy for children who are victims of violence.  Congress found that this noneconomic activity has long-term social costs—not that it affects interstate commerce.  And there is no indication that the civil remedy was established pursuant to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce or that violence against children has a direct connection with interstate commerce.  Therefore, the strongest basis to find the act unconstitutional is that it regulates a noneconomic activity.

A patient at a government-licensed, private nursing facility received financial assistance from the government for the medical care he received.  The patient's status was reviewed by a committee of physicians working at the facility to determine whether his level of care was appropriate and whether his continued stay in the facility was justified.  The committee determined that the patient no longer needed the level of care provided by the facility and ordered his transfer to another nursing facility that offered a lower level of care.

Since the patient received financial support through a government-funded program, the committee notified the appropriate governmental official who administered the program.  The official in turn contacted the patient and informed him that due to the decision of the committee of physicians, his medical financial assistance would be terminated unless he accepted the transfer.  The patient was properly notified of an administrative hearing by the governmental agency that administered the program, and the hearing confirmed the official's decision to terminate the patient's medical financial assistance unless he accepted the transfer.

The patient sued the nursing facility for injunctive relief, contending that he was unconstitutionally denied his procedural due process rights with regard to the initial review of his status by the committee of physicians because he did not receive notice of the review or an opportunity to be heard.

Is the court likely to rule in favor of the patient?

Answer: No, because the decision was made by a committee of physicians working at a private nursing facility.

Constitutional requirements (excluding the Thirteenth Amendment) only apply to government conduct.  But under the state-action doctrine, a private actor is considered a government actor (and bound by the Constitution) when:

• the private actor performs a traditional and exclusive government function or

• the government is significantly involved in the private actor's activities (more than funding or licensing).

Therefore, the patient can only challenge the private nursing facility's decision to transfer him to another facility on procedural due process grounds if the state-action doctrine applies.

Here, the nursing facility does not perform a traditional and exclusive government function since residential elderly care has long been undertaken by private entities.  Additionally, the state's licensing and funding of the nursing facility do not involve the state in the committee's decisions to continue care.  Even if they did, state funding (however substantial) or licensing does not make private conduct state action (Choices C & D).  Therefore, the court will deny the patient's request for injunctive relief because the state-action doctrine does not apply.

State A derived much of its business from tourism based upon privately owned cruise lines incorporated in State A.  State B, which is located just north of State A, recently enacted a statute creating an annual licensing requirement for any cruise line not incorporated in State B that uses State B's ports.  The licensing process was costly, and the licenses were difficult to obtain.  There was no similar licensing requirement for State B cruise lines using the ports in State B.  The cruise lines in State A typically travel north and must use the State B ports in order to maintain the facilities and services they offer.

Congress has not enacted legislation regarding the regulation of cruise lines using out-of-state ports.

If a cruise line located in State A challenges the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement, which of the following would provide the strongest argument against the requirement?

Answer: The Article I commerce clause.

The Article I commerce clause empowers Congress to regulate interstate commerce.  It also carries a negative implication (i.e., the dormant commerce clause), which prohibits states from (1) discriminating against out-of-state commerce or (2) otherwise unduly burdening interstate commerce.  A discriminatory state law—i.e., one that favors in-state over out-of-state interests—will be deemed unconstitutional unless the state proves that:

• the law furthers an important or legitimate noneconomic state interest (e.g., health, safety) and

• there is no reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternative to achieve that interest.

Here, the State B statute discriminates against out-of-state commerce by imposing an annual licensing requirement on cruise lines that are not incorporated in State B but use its ports.  And there is no indication that the statute furthers a legitimate noneconomic interest—e.g., ensuring the competency and safety of cruise lines that operate in State B.  Therefore, the Article I commerce clause provides the strongest argument against the constitutionality of the State B licensing requirement.

A federal law provides that a U.S. citizen who votes in a foreign election forfeits U.S. citizenship.  An individual who is a naturalized citizen of the United States votes in a national election held in her birth country.  Based on the law, the State Department has refused to renew the individual's passport.  The individual has filed an action in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the law is unconstitutional because it deprives her of U.S. citizenship.

Is the court likely to find that the law is constitutional?

Answer: No, because Congress may not revoke the citizenship of a U.S. citizen that is obtained in good faith and without fraud.

Article I of the Constitution grants Congress plenary (i.e., exclusive) authority to enact laws that regulate naturalization—i.e., the process through which any noncitizen may obtain U.S. citizenship (Choice C).  But Congress must comply with other constitutional provisions when exercising this authority.  This includes the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits Congress from revoking the U.S. citizenship of any U.S. citizen without his/her consent unless that citizenship was obtained by fraud or in bad faith.

Here, the federal law requires U.S. citizens who vote in foreign elections to forfeit their U.S. citizenship.  As a result, the State Department refused to renew the individual's passport because she had voted in an election in her birth country.  The individual did not consent to her citizenship being revoked, and there is no indication that it was obtained by fraud or in bad faith.  Therefore, the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and the court will likely find that it is unconstitutional.

U.S. armed forces seized a noncitizen engaged in combat against them in a foreign country.  The noncitizen was taken to a territory outside the United States but over which the United States had sovereign control.  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed a law denying federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals who were designated as enemy combatants, but the law did not suspend the privilege of filing habeas corpus petitions.  Subsequently, the noncitizen, who was designated an enemy combatant by the President, filed a habeas corpus petition in a federal court.

May the court hear this petition?

Answer: Yes, because the law violates the suspension clause

Article III grants Congress the power to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts (Choice C).  But when exercising this power, Congress cannot violate:

• the separation-of-powers doctrine (e.g., usurping judicial power to decide cases) or

• other constitutional provisions (e.g., the Article I suspension clause).

Under the Article I suspension clause, a person in federal custody can challenge his/her detention by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court unless Congress has explicitly suspended the writ.  This clause applies to noncitizens classified and detained as enemy combatants in territories over which the United States has sovereign control (e.g., the noncitizen here).

The noncitizen here filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district court.  The federal statute denies federal courts jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by individuals who were designated as enemy combatants (Choice A).  However, Congress did not explicitly suspend the writ of habeas corpus.  This means that the statute violates the suspension clause by preventing the noncitizen from challenging his detention by having his habeas corpus petition heard in federal court.  Therefore, the court may hear the noncitizen's petition.

Congress has proposed repealing a federal statute that exempts the payment of federal income tax on the interest earned by the holders of state bonds.  State bonds are the primary method by which many states finance public works projects, such as highways and educational facilities.  Repealing the exemption would increase the interest that a state must pay to bondholders, which would have a substantial adverse economic impact on the cost of these projects to the state.  The holders of private bonds are not eligible to receive the tax exemption.

Would the repeal of the tax exemption be constitutional?

Answer: Yes, because the tax would not be imposed directly on the states

Under the Tenth Amendment, the federal government cannot impose federal taxes directly on states that unduly interfere with their essential functions.  But the Tenth Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from imposing federal taxes on states indirectly through their affiliates—i.e., persons doing business with state governments—so long as the taxes are nondiscriminatory (Choice B).  This is true even if the cost of the tax is ultimately passed on to the states.

Here, the bondholders (state government affiliates) would be responsible for paying income tax on the bond interest if the federal statutory exemption were repealed.  Although the exemption's repeal would have a substantial adverse effect on the states by forcing them to pay higher interest rates, the resulting tax would not be imposed directly on the states (Choice A).  And since the tax already applies to the holders of private bonds, the tax would be nondiscriminatory.  Therefore, repeal of the federal statutory exemption would be constitutional.

Public schools within a state are managed by local school boards, which have the authority to impose taxes on real-property owners within a school district.  The members of each local school board are elected.  To promote voter responsibility in school-board elections, a state law provides that the eligible voters for school-board elections are the property owners in the county whose property-tax revenue supports public school districts.

Of the following, which is the most likely constitutional basis on which this method of electing the local school board can be challenged?

Answer: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A state law that treats similarly situated people differently (e.g., property owners v. nonproperty owners) violates the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause if it lacks sufficient justification.  A discriminatory law that substantially impacts a fundamental right (e.g., right to vote) is justified only if it passes strict scrutiny.  This requires the state to prove that the law is the least restrictive means (i.e., necessary) to achieve a compelling state interest.

Here, the discriminatory property-ownership requirement substantially impacts a fundamental right by prohibiting persons who are not property owners from voting.  Although states have a compelling interest in promoting voter responsibility, a property-ownership requirement is not the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.  That is because public school districts can provide information about school-board elections to nonproperty owners so they vote responsibly.  As a result, the equal protection clause is the most likely basis for challenging this law.

A state law created legislative districts for both houses of the state's legislature based on the total population of the state.  The variation in people assigned to a district between the largest and smallest districts for the state senate was 8%.  A voter in the district with the largest population filed suit contending that the legislative districts violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Is the voter's challenge likely to succeed?

Answer: No, because the districts do not violate the equal protection clause.

The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause ensures that each citizen is given equal voting power (i.e., one person, one vote) by requiring state legislative districts (e.g., state senate districts) to have largely equal populations (Choice A).  This "one person, one vote" principle means that the populations in each voting district must be approximately equal.  A deviation of 10% or less between the populations of legislative districts is considered minor and does not violate the equal protection clause absent evidence of discrimination.

Here, the deviation between the populations of the largest and smallest state senate districts was 8%.  Since this deviation was less than 10% and there is no evidence of discrimination, the districts comport with the "one person, one vote" principle (Choice D).  Therefore, the districts do not violate the equal protection clause, so the voter's challenge is unlikely to succeed.

The dean of the architecture department at a state university informed a graduate-level architecture student that if she did not improve her academic performance, she would not be allowed to remain a student at the university.  When the student's grades did not improve the following semester, a faculty committee recommended that she be dismissed after careful review of her academic record.  The student was not allowed to present evidence to the committee or attend the committee meeting.  The dean accepted the committee's recommendation and subsequently dismissed the student.  The student filed a constitutional challenge to her dismissal in federal court, contending that she had been deprived of her procedural due process rights.

Is the court likely to rule in favor of the student?

Answer: No, because she was not entitled to a hearing since she was dismissed for academic reasons.

The student's claim raises the right to procedural due process, which requires public colleges and universities to follow certain procedures before they intentionally deprive students of their education by dismissing them.  To determine the process due, the court must determine whether the dismissal was for disciplinary or academic reasons.  When a student is dismissed for disciplinary reasons (e.g., misconduct), due process typically requires that the student receive:

• adequate notice of the charges or proceedings against him/her and

• a meaningful opportunity to be heard (e.g., a hearing) before the college's or university's decision-making body.

However, when a student is dismissed for academic reasons (e.g., failure to attain passing grades), a public college or university may do so without providing him/her a meaningful opportunity to be heard.  That is because, unlike disciplinary actions, decisions based on a student's academic performance are not adversarial in nature and therefore do not require the tools of judicial decision-making (e.g., presentation of evidence).

A police officer made a controversial video that he marketed on the Internet.  The video, which was made while the officer was off-duty, correctly identified the maker of the video as a police officer for the city in which the officer lived.  The video depicted the officer engaged in indecent acts while wearing a police officer's uniform and brandishing a badge and toy gun, all of which he had purchased from a Halloween costume shop.

When the chief of police learned of the video, she requested that the officer remove the video from the Internet because the video significantly undermined the police force's morale and harmony, with a marked effect on the department's efficiency.  The officer, asserting that the video was intended as a parody of police misconduct, refused to remove the video from the Internet and was fired as a consequence.

The officer brought an action against the police chief, seeking reinstatement to the police force.  The officer contended that he had been dismissed for exercising his free-speech rights.

If the court finds in favor of the police chief, what is the most likely reason?

Answer: The video impeded the police force's efficiency.

The First Amendment right to free speech, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not extend to public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties (i.e., within the scope of employment).  But this right does extend to public employees who, as here, speak as private citizens about matters of public concern (e.g., police misconduct) (Choice A).

However, the government can regulate the content of that speech if its interest in efficient government function outweighs the employee's free-speech right.  Here, the video impeded the police force's efficiency by significantly undermining its harmony and morale.  Therefore, the government's interest in ensuring that the police force operate efficiently outweighs the officer's right to free speech.

A city police officer sought and received an anticipatory warrant to search the defendant's premises for evidence of a crime.  The defendant sought to suppress the evidence seized by the officer during the search.  The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant on the basis that it violated the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a similar warrant provision of the state constitution.  The state's highest court noted that the U.S. Constitution permits anticipatory search warrants, while the state constitution clearly does not.  The state has appealed this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Which of the following actions must the U.S. Supreme Court take?

Answer: Refuse to hear the appeal

The U.S. Supreme Court (SCOTUS) has appellate jurisdiction over most final state-court decisions that present a federal question.  But SCOTUS cannot exercise jurisdiction over, and must refuse to hear the appeal of, such decisions if they are based on adequate and independent state grounds.  This occurs when:

• state law completely resolves the matter, such that the application of federal law would not affect the outcome of the case (adequate) and

• the state court did not rely on federal law to decide the state-law issue (independent).

Here, the state's highest court ruling rests on an adequate state ground because the court found that the warrant was invalid under the state constitution.  So even if SCOTUS reversed the state court's ruling based on the U.S. Constitution, the case's outcome would remain the same because the warrant would still violate the state constitution.  The ruling also rests on an independent state ground because the state court did not rely on federal law to decide the state constitutional issue.*  SCOTUS must therefore refuse to hear the appeal.

Under a federal statute, a business had a valid, mature claim for compensation against a corporation, which the corporation refused to pay.  The business properly assigned all rights to this claim to an assignee who agreed to litigate the claim in exchange for a fee and return any recovery received to the business.  In the subsequent lawsuit filed by the assignee in federal court, the defendant corporation filed a motion to dismiss the action.

Should the court grant this motion?

Answer: No, because the assignee has standing to litigate this claim

Article III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power to actual cases or controversies—i.e., disputes that are capable of judicial resolution.  This case-or-controversy requirement is met only if the plaintiff has standing—i.e., a personal stake in the outcome of the case.  To have standing, the plaintiff must allege three elements:

• injury-in-fact – actual or imminent harm that is concrete and particularized

• causation – the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct

• redressability – a favorable judicial decision will likely remedy or prevent the alleged injury

When the plaintiff is an assignee, he/she steps into the shoes of the assignor and assumes all of the assignor's contractual rights.  As a result, an assignee has standing to sue to enforce the rights of the assignor provided that the assignment was made for ordinary business purposes (e.g., debt collection) and in good faith.

Here, the business properly assigned its rights to the claim against the corporation to the assignee, who agreed to return any recovery received to the business.  The assignee has standing to litigate the claim because the corporation's refusal (causation) to pay the claim (injury-in-fact) will be remedied if the court grants the assignee a favorable decision (redressability) (Choices C & D).  And since the assignment was for an ordinary business purpose and there is no indication that it was made in bad faith, the corporation's motion should be denied.

Compared to traditional incandescent light bulbs, energy-efficient light bulbs typically use approximately 25% to 80% less energy.  Although most manufacturers of light bulbs have switched to making energy-efficient light bulbs, manufacturers of light bulbs in 10 states still only make traditional incandescent light bulbs.  In order to discourage the use of traditional incandescent bulbs, which accelerates the negative consequences of climate change and results in more waste in landfills, Congress imposed a tax on the sale of traditional light bulbs by any manufacturer.  The stated purpose of the tax is to generate revenue to help further research to prevent climate change.

Is this tax likely constitutional?

Answer: Yes, because there is geographical uniformity in the application of the tax.

The taxing and spending clause gives Congress exclusive power to raise federal revenue by imposing taxes.  But Congress can only impose an indirect federal tax (e.g., sales tax) if it is:

• imposed identically in every state where the taxed goods are found (i.e., geographically uniform) and

• reasonably related to revenue production (i.e., no provision extraneous to tax purposes).

Here, Congress imposed a sales tax on traditional light bulbs sold by manufacturers in the U.S.  The application of this indirect tax is geographically uniform since the tax applies to every sale of a traditional light bulb, regardless of where it is sold.  And the tax is reasonably related to raising revenue to help further research to prevent climate change.  Therefore, the tax is likely constitutional because it complies with the taxing and spending clause.

Congress passed legislation authorizing an appropriation of $5 million to purchase land adjacent to a national historic battlefield to preserve the area's historic nature by preventing commercial development on the land.

Of the following, which provides the best constitutional justification for this congressional action?

Answer: The taxing and spending clause of Article I.

The taxing and spending clause of Article I gives Congress the power to spend federal revenue for the general welfare—i.e., for any public purpose.  Here, Congress passed legislation that appropriates $5 million in federal funds to buy land adjacent to a national historic battlefield for the public purpose of preserving the area's historic nature.  Therefore, the taxing and spending clause provides the best constitutional justification for this congressional action.