Cognitive Approach to Understanding Human Behavior

Declarative memory

 is memory of facts and events, and refers to those (explicit) memories that can be consciously recalled

Episodic memory

contains memory of events and experiences (graduation day, your first kiss,etc.) that have occurred at a given time and in a given place.

Semantic memory

contains general knowledge of facts, ideas, concepts, language, math, and people - not linked to time and place

Procedural memory

is the unconscious (implicit) memory of skills, how to do things, habits, muscle memory

memory

the process by which information is encoded, stored and retrieved

model of memory

an outline of the different stores and processes indicating how memory might work according to available evidence

Short Term Memory

(Working memory): If sensory information is recognized or considered important it is coded and sent to short-term memory, which has limited capacity and is supported to last only around 12 seconds

Long-term memory

If the information is rehearsed or attended to in some way it is transferred into long term memory, which has unlimited capacity and may last forever

Multi-store Model of Memory

• Sensory Memory

  • temporary store holding information from the environment very briefly in the form in which it is received:

    • Visual - Auditory - Tactile - Olfactory - Gustatory information

    • A storage system holds sensory input in a relatively unprocessed form for fractions of a second after the physical stimulus is no longer available

  • Plays a vital role in filtering out useless information, enabling us to focus our attention on important details.

  • Information needs to receive attention if it is going to begin the process of being transferred to long term memory.

• Short Term Memory (STM)

  • Information enters STM from the sensory store only if attention is paid to the stimuli.

  • limited to around 7 items and a duration of 6-12 seconds.

  • a temporary storage depot for incoming information after it receives and encodes information from the sensory memory.

  • If new information enters the STM then the information in the store may be displaced and lost

    • when you are rehearsing that phone number for ordering the pizza and then someone calls out your name.  When your attention is taken away from the information in your STM, it is then displaced and no longer available.

  • when we recall something it moves from LTM and enters STM so that decisions can be made and problems can be solved.

  • Coding: Acoustically - Information is lost unless it is rehearsed (via repetition)

• Long Term Memory (LTM)

  • Rehearsal helps transfer information into long-term memory store.

  • Holds a vast (unlimited?) quantity of information, which can be stored for long periods of time (a lifetime?).

  • Information includes personal memories, general knowledge and beliefs, future plans, skills and expertise

  • Coding: Primarily semantic, but also acoustic and visual

  • Information in the LTM can also be recalled back to the STM

Working Memory Model

• argues that STM is not a single store - instead there are different stores for visual and auditory processing

• suggested that working memory should be seen as a kind of mental workspace, which provides a temporary platform to hold relevant information for use in any cognitive task. 

• Once the task is completed, the information can quickly disappear and make space for a new round of information processing.

• We cannot multitask efficiently if both tasks involve the same store (audio or visual)

• We multitask better if the tasks involve different stores (audio and visual)

• central executive

  • an attention control system that monitors and coordinates the operations of the subordinate components

  • has the capacity to focus attention, divide attention between two or more sources, or switch attention between tasks

  • limited capacity -  cannot attend to a lot of things at the same time

  • most important job of the central executive is attention control.  This happens in two ways.

    • automatic level: based on habits that rely on schemas in LTM and controlled more or less automatically by stimuli from the environment (includes routine actions such as cycling to school and places only limited demand on attention)

    • supervisory attention level: deals with planning and decision making. It creates new strategies when the old ones are no longer sufficient. It is also active in emergency situations - for example, when a car is suddenly coming at you when you are cycling. The system is also involved in situations that require self-regulation such as trying to avoid eating that lovely chocolate dessert when you are trying to eat a more healthy diet.

• phonological loop - the auditory component of STM is divided into two components:

  • articulatory control system (inner voice) can hold information in a verbal form. This happens when you try to remember a telephone number and repeat it to yourself. The articulatory loop is also believed to hold words ready for cognitive tasks, for example as you prepare to speak.

• phonological store (inner ear) holds auditory memory traces. Research shows that a memory trace can only last from 1.5 to 2 seconds if it is not rehearsed by the articulatory control system. The phonological store can receive information directly from sensory memory in the form of auditory material, from LTM in the form of verbal information, and from the articulatory control system.

• visuospatial sketchpad

  • visual component of STM  (inner eye)

  • a temporary store for visual and spatial information from either sensory memory or LTM

  • Visual processing includes storage and manipulation of visual patterns and spatial movements in two or three dimensions

  • helps us remember not only what visual information is important, but also where it is

  • important when we have to find our way around the house and when trying to remember where we left our phone

• episodic buffer

  • If all this information is being processed in separate short-term memory stores, how are we actually able to be consciously aware of the world around us? 

  • This buffer temporarily holds several sources of information (auditory, visual, and info from LTM) active at the same time, while we consider what is needed in the present situation

  • When consciously trying to recall the details of a landscape or the sound of a favorite band while telling somebody else about it, the buffer acts as a temporary and passive display store (like a TV screen) until the information is needed, but has limited capacity

Schema Theory

Schemas are mental representations that are derived from prior experience and knowledge, three main stages of memory: Encoding, Storage, Retrieval

Brewer and Treyens

• Aim:

  • to study the role of schema in the encoding and retrieval of memory

• Procedure:

  • room consisted of typical office objects: a typewriter, paper, shelves, posters, calendar, and a coffee pot - also a table with tools and electronics

  • objects not typically in an office: a skull and a toy top 

  • items that were omitted: books, telephone

  • Each participant was asked to have a seat in the professor's office while the researcher "checked to make sure that the previous participant had completed the experiment."

  • All of the chairs except for one had objects on them so all participants would have the same vantage point in the office.

  • After 35 seconds the participants were called into another room and then asked what they remembered from the office.

  • When they finished the experiment, they were given a questionnaire. The important question was "Did you think that you would be asked to remember the objects in the room?" 93% said "no."

  • sample of 86 university psychology students randomly allocated to one of three conditions.

  • recall condition:

    • asked to write down the location, shape, size and color of as many objects as they could remember from the office

    • "Write your description as if you were describing the room for someone who had never seen it."

    • then given a booklet containing a list of objects

      • asked to rate each item: "1" meant that they were sure it was not in the room; "6" meant that they were absolutely sure it was in the room

      • questionnaire consisted of 131 objects: 61 were in the room; 70 were not.

  • drawing condition:

    • given an outline of the room and asked to draw in the objects they could remember

  • verbal recognition condition: 

    • were read a list of objects and simply asked whether they were in the room or not

• Results:

  • recall and drawing conditions:

    • "expected items" that were congruent with their schema of an office were more often recalled

    • items that were incongruent with their schema of an office - e.g. the skull, a piece of bark or the screwdriver - were not often recalled

    • also tended to change the nature of the objects to match their schema

      • pad of yellow paper that was on a chair was remembered as being on the desk

      • trapezoidal work table was recalled as square

  • verbal recognition condition:

    • more likely to identify the incongruent items (didn't remember the skull during free recall, but gave it a 6 on this)

    • also had a higher rate of identifying objects which were schema congruent but not actually in the room

• Findings:

  • It appears that schema played a role in both the encoding and recall of the objects in the office.

  • There is no way to verify the schema of the participants prior to the experiment, but the researchers did a pilot study by using a questionnaire with students to determine schema consistent objects.
    

Darley and Gross

• Aim: to investigate how stereotypes of wealth and poverty affect academic perceptions of a child

• Procedure:

  • participants saw a video of the school and neighborhood of a girl named Hannah in the 4th grade

  • One group saw a video of a wealthier neighborhood; the other group saw a poorer neighborhood

  • then saw video of girl taking an oral IQ test with ambiguous results - missed some and got some correct

  • participants were asked to judge the performance of the girl on a scale of 1 (well below average) to 11 (well above average) and to predict her future academic prospects

• Results:

  • participants in the low-SES condition rated both Hannah’s performance and future academic prospects lower than participants in the high-SES condition

• Findings:

  • participants used schema (stereotype) of wealth being correlated with high academic performance to make quick judgments 

Dual Process Model of Thinking and Decision Making

• System 1 is an automatic, intuitive and effortless way of thinking.

  • often employs heuristics - that is, a ‘rule’ used to make decisions or form judgments - mental shortcuts that involve focusing on one aspect of a complex problem and ignoring others

  • This ‘fast’ mode of thinking allows for efficient processing of the often complex world around us but may be prone to errors when our assumptions do not match the reality of a specific situation. These errors may have greater consequence in our day to day lives because system 1 thinking is expected to create a greater feeling of certitude – certainty that our initial response is correct.

  • We become more likely to use System 1 thinking when our cognitive load is high - that is, when we have lots of different things to think about at the same time, or we have to process information and make a decision quickly.

• System 2 is a slower, conscious, controlled and rational mode of thinking. 

  • assumed to require more effort - starts by thinking carefully about all of the possible ways we could interpret a situation and gradually eliminates possibilities based on sensory evidence until we arrive at a solution.

  • Rational thinking allows us to analyze the world around us and think carefully about what is happening, why it is happening, what is most likely to happen next and how we might influence the situation.

  • This mode of thinking is less likely to create feelings of certitude and confidence.

Stroop

• Aim:

  • to test the interference of conflicting word stimuli upon the time for naming 100 colors ("Naming color or word test where the color of the print and the word are different")  

• Procedure:

  • the colors used were red, blue, green, brown, and purple

  • the colors of the words were to be called in succession ignoring the colors named by the words

    • e.g. where the word 'red' was printed in blue it was to be called 'blue,' where it was printed in green it was to be called 'green,' where the word 'brown' was printed in red it was to be called 'red,' etc.

  • Thus color of the print was to be the controlling stimulus and not the name of the color spelled by the word.

  • One hundred students (88 college undergraduates, 29 males and 59 females, and 12 graduate students, all females) served as subjects.

  • Every subject read two whole sheets  of 100 words each (the two forms) of each test at one sitting; counterbalancing was used to control for order effects

  • The instructions were to name the colors as they appeared in regular reading line as quickly as possible and to correct all errors.

  • The errors were recorded and for each error not corrected, twice the average time per word for the reading of the sheet on which the error was made was added to the time taken by the stop watch. 

• Results:

  • time taken to name color of 100 words where color matched the word

    • mean = 63.3 seconds

    • standard deviation = 10.8

  • time taken to name color of 100 words where color does not match the word

    • mean = 110.3 seconds

    • standard deviation = 18.8

  • The mean time increased 74 percent 

• Findings:

  • when a word stimulus and a color stimulus both are presented simultaneously, the results demonstrate the strength of the interference of the habit of calling words upon the activity of naming colors

  • System 1 Thinking can help us fly through the test when the colors and words match

  • System 2 Thinking must kick in when the colors and words do not match, causing us to slow down in order to avoid errors

Goel

• Aim: 

  • to find biological evidence to support the Dual Process Model by showing that different types of processing may be located in different parts of the brain. 

• Procedure:

  • participants were required to determine whether the conclusion followed logically from the premises (i.e. whether the argument was valid)

  • IV: the presence or absence of content in logical reasoning

    • Half of the arguments contained content sentences such as: All dogs are pets. All poodles are dogs. All poodles are pets.

    • the other half contained “no content” versions of these sentences such as: All P are B. All C are P. All C are B. 

  • DV: part of the brain being used as revealed by the fMRI

• Results:

  • Although there were many common areas of the brain that were active in solving the problems, there was a clear difference. 

    • When the task was abstract, the parietal lobe (associated with spatial processing) was active

    • when the task included content, the left hemisphere temporal lobe was active

• Findings:

  • indicates that the brain processes these two types of information differently - and thus may be seen as support for the model

  • dual neural pathways for human reasoning

    • parietal pathway (visuospatial) corresponds to the “universal” system - processes unfamiliar, nonconceptual or incoherent material - takes over when no heuristics are available (as in reasoning about unfamiliar situations) [System 2]

    • left frontal-temporal pathway (language and long-term memory)  corresponds to the “heuristic” system - processes familiar, conceptually coherent material - basic and effortless - utilizes situation-specific heuristics, which are based on background knowledge and experience [System 1]

Reconstructive Memory

when we reconstruct memory, we are activating schema that are relevant to an event. In this process we may distort memories. When I remember a day at school, I am activating several schema: the schema of my classroom, my students, a schema about test taking, of group discussions, of my boss.... And putting those schema together, I have an "impression" of what happened today. Not a photograph.

Loftus and Palmer

• Aim: to investigate whether leading questions would affect recall when participants were asked to estimate speed

• Procedure:

  • student participants saw videos of traffic accidents

  • 5 groups of 9 students - each group was asked the same question with a different verb

  • asked to estimate speed of the cars based on a critical question:

    • How fast were the cars going when they smashed into each other?

    • How fast were the cars going when they collided into each other?

    • How fast were the cars going when they bumped into each other?

    • How fast were the cars going when they hit each other?

    • How fast were the cars going when they contacted each other?

• Results:

  • The more severe sounding verb produced the higher speed estimates.

  • Mean estimates of speed:

    • smashed = 40.8 mph

    • collided = 39.3 mph

    • bumped = 38.1 mph

    • hit = 34.0 mph

    • contacted = 31.8 mph

  • In one version of the experiment, participants were asked (one week later) if they saw broken glass in the video

    • if verb was “smashed” = 32% of participants remembered seeing (non-existent) broken glass 

    • if verb was “hit” = 14% remembered (non-existent) broken glass 

• Findings:

  • The researchers argued that the participant is uncertain about the exact speed and therefore a verb like "smashed" biases his or her response towards a higher estimate. 

  • The verb "smashed" activates a cognitive schema of a severe accident that may change the participant’s memory of the accident. 

  • This distortion of memory is based on reconstruction so that it is not the actual details of the accident that are remembered but rather what is in line with a cognitive schema of a severe accident (including broken glass).

Cognitive Biases

• patterns of thinking and decision making which are consistent, but inaccurate; systematic patterns of deviation from rationality in judgment

• some are a result of heuristics – ‘mental shortcuts’ - simple rules which are applied with little or no thought and quickly generate a ‘probable’ answer

  • heuristics usually involve focusing on one aspect of a complex problem and ignoring others

• some cognitive biases are not dependent on a heuristic

  • the bias may be the result of an individual trying to protect self-esteem or trying to fit into a group

Anchoring Bias

the tendency to rely too heavily on the first piece of information offered when making decisions

Englich and Mussweiler

• Aim: to investigate whether anchoring bias could play a significant role in determining sentencing in courtrooms

• Procedure:

  • used 44 senior German law students

  • They were given a scenario of a rape case, including the demand from the prosecutor for either a 34 month sentence, or a 12 month sentence.

  • They were to determine a recommendation for sentencing

• Results:

  • When told that the prosecutor recommended a sentence of 34 months, participants recommended on average eight months longer in prison than when told that the sentence should be 12 months – for the same crime.

• Findings:

  • these were law students in their last year of school

  • In a real trial, the juror would not have a lot of experience in making these decisions, so the maximum sentence as stated by the judge or prosecutor could heavily influence the decision for how long the accused should be in prison.

Peak-End Rule

• a heuristic in which people judge an experience largely based on how they felt at its peak (i.e., its most intense point) and at its end, rather than based on the total sum or average of every moment of the experience

  • occurs regardless of whether the experience is pleasant or unpleasant

  • information aside from that of the peak and end of the experience is not forgotten, but it is not used in reaching a decision or judgement

Kahneman (1983)

• Aim: to investigate whether the peak-end rule will influence participants’ decisions about a painful experience

• Procedure:

  • asked participants to hold their hand up to the wrist in painfully cold water until they are invited to remove it.

  • With their free hand, participants recorded how strong the pain was with 1 finger being little to no pain and 5 fingers being strong pain.  The researchers used a repeated measures design.  The two conditions were:

    • Condition 1: 60 seconds of immersion in water at 14 degrees celsius.  After 60 seconds the experimenter instructed them to take their hand out and gave them a warm towel.

    • Condition 2: 90 seconds of immersion.  The first 60 seconds the same as Condition 1. At the end of 60 seconds the researcher opened a valve that allowed slightly warmer water to flow into the tub. The water temperature rose about 1 degree Celsius.

  • The participants were then told that there would be one more trial - either a repeat of Condition 1 or repeat of Condition 2.  Now, if you look at the two conditions, it makes sense that Condition 1 is the smarter choice.  Both conditions have the same level of pain for 60 seconds - but after that time, Condition 1 gets a warm towel while Condition 2 gets a slight decrease in pain for an extra 30 seconds.

• Results:

  • 80% of the participants chose the second condition! 

• Findings:

  • This is a clear example of peak-end rule.  The fact that the second trial was longer was not taken into account by the participants (something called duration neglect).  They were basing their choice on how the condition ended, rather than making an overall assessment of the pain

Framing Effect

• Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) describes the way people choose between alternatives that involve risk, where the probabilities of outcomes are known. The theory states that people evaluate these losses and gains using heuristics.  

• One of those heuristics is the framing effect, in which people react to choices depending on how they are presented or "framed." 

  • People prefer certain outcomes when information is framed in positive language, but prefer less certain outcomes when the same information is framed in negative language. 

  • In simple terms, when we expect success we prefer a definite win rather than a possible win, but when things look bad we will gamble on an uncertain defeat rather than a definite loss.

The goal is to avoid loss - a position called loss aversion.

Tversky and Kahneman

• Aim: to test the influence of positive and negative frames on decision making

• Procedure:

  • The researchers used a self-selected (volunteer) sample of 307 US undergraduate students.

  • Participants were asked to make a decision between one of two options in a hypothetical scenario:

    • Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows.

  • In condition 1, the participants were given the "positive frame."  Their choices were the following:

    • If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.

    • If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.

  • Results: In this condition, 72% of the participants chose Program A, whereas only 28% chose program B.

  • In condition 2, the participants were given the "negative frame."  Their choices were the following:

    • If Program C is adopted 400 people will die.

    • If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.

  • Results: In this condition, 22% of the participants choice Program C and 78% choice Program D.

• Findings:

  • It is important to note that all four options, (A, B, C and D) are effectively the same; 200 people will survive and 400 people will not.

  • The results clearly demonstrate the influence of the frame. Where information was phrased positively, (the number of people who would be saved) people took the certain outcome, (option A) and avoided the possibility of a loss in the less certain option (option B). 

  • By contrast, when information was phrased in terms of people dying (a negative frame) people avoided the certain loss (option C) and took a chance on the less certain option D.

  • It is important to consider cultural differences in thinking and decision making. For example, a recent meta-analysis (Wang et al, 2016) of research on loss aversion tasks like the one above has shown that people from more individualistic cultures are more risk averse than those from a collectivist culture.

Flashbulb Memory Theory

• a highly detailed, exceptionally vivid "snapshot" of the moment when a surprising and emotionally arousing event happened

  • type of episodic (explicit) memory - vivid and detailed memories of highly emotional events that appear to be recorded in the brain as though with the help of a camera’s flash

  • Unexpected, emotional events are better remembered because the amygdala is activated along with the hippocampus

  • FBM theory also have unique features distinguishing/that differ them from other memories in that they are more vivid, detailed, accurate, long-lasting, consistent and easy to remember. This is in contrast to normal memories, which most researchers are believed to be selective, unreliable and malleable (easily changed or distorted).

Sharot

• Aim: to determine the potential role of biological factors on flashbulb memories

• Procedure:

  • Quasi experiment conducted three years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Manhattan with 24 participants who were in New York City on that day

  • Participants’ brain activity was observed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).

  • While in the scanner, they were presented with word cues on a screen (weather, lunch, walking, food, building, etc.)

  • the word "Summer" or "September" was projected along with this word in order to have the participant link the word to either summer holidays or to the events of 9-11.

  • Participants’ brain activity was observed while they recalled the event.

  • The memories of personal events from the summer served as a baseline of brain activity for evaluating the nature of 9/11 memories.

  • After the brain scanning session, participants were asked to rate their memories for vividness, detail, confidence in accuracy and arousal. Participants were also asked to write down their personal memories.

• Results:

  • Only half of the participants actually reported having what would be called "flashbulb memories" of the event - that is, a greater sense of detail and a strong confidence in the accuracy of the memory.

  • Participants closer to the World Trade Center did report having flashbulb memories and included more specific details in their written memories.

  • activation of the amygdala for the participants who were downtown was higher when they recalled memories of the terrorist attack than when they recalled events from the preceding summer

  • those participants who were further away from the event had equal levels of response in the amygdala when recalling both events.

  • The strength of amygdala activation at retrieval was shown to correlate with flashbulb memories.

• Findings:

  • These results suggest that close personal experience may be critical in engaging the neural mechanisms that produce the vivid memories characteristic of flashbulb memory.

  • Although this study demonstrates the role of the amygdala as a result of proximity to the event, it does not explain why someone who simply saw it on television may claim to have a flashbulb memory.

  • The study is correlational in nature and does not establish a cause and effect relationship which explains how the memory is actually attributed to activity in the amygdala.
    

Neisser and Harsch

• Follow up:

  • The researchers were surprised to see the extent of the discrepancies between the original questionnaire and the follow-up 2 ½ years later. Here is a typical example:

    • 24 hours after the accident: I was in my religion class and some people walked in and started talking about it. I didn’t know any details except that it had exploded and the schoolteacher’s students had all been watching which I thought was so sad. Then after class, I went to my room and watched the TV program talking about it and I got all the details from that.

    • 2.5 years later: When I first heard about the explosion I was sitting I my freshman dorm room with my roommate and we were watching TV. It came on a news flash and we were both totally shocked. I was really upset and I went upstairs to talk to a friend of mine and then I called my parents.

  • semi-structured interviews were carried out a few months later, and the interviewer presented a prepared retrieval cue with the hope of prompting the original memories. For example, the interviewer might ask “Is it possible that you already knew about the explosion before seeing it on television?”

  • For the most part, participants stuck to their new version. Additional cues had little effect on accuracy. 

  • When the participants were shown their original answers from 1986, they could not account for the discrepancies.

• Findings:

  • questions FBM and the reliability of memory in general - supports reconstructive memory theories

  • natural environment of study gives it high ecological validity

  • perhaps emotional arousal of a public event is not the same as a personal event - could influence how it is remembered

  • argues that the memory is vivid because the event is rehearsed, discussed, and reconstructed afterward 

  • FBM may simply be a narrative convention, a storytelling schema, following a specific structure. We recount important events by stating where we were, what we were doing, who told us, and how we felt.

  • FBMs are subject to the same types of inaccuracy and forgetting as any other memories.