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PASSAGE 13 71-75
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Passage 13 (Questions 71–75)
Nature is extraordinarily fertile and ingenious in devising means, but it has no ends that the human mind has been able to discover or comprehend. Perhaps, indeed, the very conception of an end or ultimate purpose is exclusively human; but at least it must be said that the most characteristically human effort is to transform a means into an end.
Sensibility and intelligence arose in the animal in order to serve animal purposes, for through the first, it was able to distinguish those things that favor the survival of it and its race, and through the second, it was able to go about in a more efficient manner to secure them. Both were, like all things in nature, merely means toward the achievement of that humanly incomprehensible end, mere survival. But the philosopher-artist has detached both from their natural places.
When sensibility has been detached from its animal setting, it may develop into a quest for that self-justifying beauty which is humanly valuable but biologically useless. When intelligence is detached, it not only tends to paralyze natural impulse by criticizing natural aims but develops certain intellectual virtues which are biological vices. We are, for example, inclined to regard skepticism, irony, and above all, the power of dispassionate analysis as the marks of the most distinctly human intelligence. We admire anyone whose reason is capable of more than scheming, whose logic is not the mere rationalization of desires.
But intelligence as detached as this is a vital liability. It puts its possessor at a disadvantage in dealing with those whose intelligence faithfully serves their purpose by enabling them to scheme for their ends and to justify to themselves their desires. Such is the animal function of intelligence, and whenever it develops beyond this level, it inhibits rather than aids that effective action in the pursuit of natural ends which was the original function of mind.
The same process occurs in every nation that has developed a national mind capable of detachment and has passed beyond that stage of invigorating delusion which could make it fancy itself master by right of an inherent superiority. One after another, the great nations of history have founded on aggression the civilization that then supported for a time, but for a time only, great periods of human culture, that flourished at their height just as the substructure crumbled. Animals made humans possible, and conquerors prepared the way for poets and philosophers, but neither poet nor philosopher can survive long after the conquest.
Nor need we be surprised to see nations enfeebled by civilization as though by vice. That detachment of mind from its function which makes philosophy possible and which encourages dispassionate analysis is exactly parallel to the detachment of the sexual functions from their purposes, which results in the cult of the senses. Thought for thought’s sake is a kind of perversion. Civilizations die from philosophical calm, irony, and the sense of fair play quite as surely as they die of debauchery.
Nor can it be said that to understand this paradox of humanism helps us in any way to solve it. The analysis that we perform is, indeed, itself an example of one of those exercises of the mind that is perverse because it does not serve as a means toward a natural end. And when we have admitted that the human ideal is one that the human animal cannot even approach without tending to destroy itself, we have, by that very admission, diminished our biological fitness.
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Which of the following statements best summarizes the central problem addressed by the passage?
A
Truth and beauty are unattainable illusions.
Answer choice eliminated
B
Sensibility and intelligence are biologically useless.
Answer choice eliminated
C
Unbiased thought is inconsistent with human survival.
D
We are most fully human when we behave like animals.
Solution: The correct answer is C.
The author does not assert that these are unattainable, suggesting rather that they are attained and at the expense of biological fitness. See rationale C.
The author asserts the opposite—sensibility and intelligence are biologically useful, that is, until detached from human animal nature. See rationale C.
This is a theme repeated throughout the passage. The author notes: “Sensibility and intelligence arose in . . . [humans] to serve animal purposes, for through the first, it was able to distinguish those things that favor the survival of it and its race, and through the second, it was able to go about in a more efficient manner to secure them.” The author then notes the consequences of intellectual detachment: “When sensibility has been detached from its animal setting, it may develop into a quest for that self-justifying beauty which is humanly valuable but biologically useless. When intelligence is detached, it not only tends to paralyze natural impulse by criticizing natural aims but develops certain intellectual virtues which are biological vices.”
This assertion represents an oversimplification of the author’s argument, which is more nuanced and does not raise the issue of what makes humans more fully human. The author asserts that humans are a kind of animal endowed with unique capacities for sensibility and intelligence that have enabled their survival, but, paradoxically, also reach a point at which sensibility and intelligence no longer do so. The issue is not so much whether humans become human by behaving like animals so much as whether they are using the “animal function of intelligence” and whether these capacities are exercised in ways that are biologically useful or useless. See rationale C.
got wrong selected d was very unsure was between the two options c and D
Which of the following statements, if true, would most directly undermine the author’s central argument?
A
Some highly developed civilizations are peaceable.
B
Aggressive people are often much admired.
C
Nonhuman animals often behave altruistically.
D
Logic is not always the mere rationalization of desires.
Solution: The correct answer is C.
This could potentially lend further support to the author’s argument that civilizations at their height paradoxically begin to crumble for the very reason that they develop intellectual virtues, such as peaceableness. These intellectual virtues, in the author’s estimation, are biological vices: “One after another, the great nations of history have founded on aggression the civilization that then supported for a time, but for a time only, great periods of human culture, that flourished at their height just as the substructure crumbled.”
This would tend more to support rather than undermine the author’s argument because aggression serves the animal purpose and biological fitness of humans. The author notes: “We admire anyone whose reason is capable of more than scheming, whose logic is not the mere rationalization of desires.” The author explains how this is problematic: “But intelligence as detached as this is a vital liability. It puts its possessor at a disadvantage in dealing with those whose intelligence faithfully serves their purpose by enabling them to scheme for their ends and to justify to themselves their desires. Such is the animal function of intelligence, and whenever it develops beyond this level, it inhibits rather than aids that effective action in pursuit of natural ends. . . . ”
The author seems to privilege aggression as the means of ensuring survival and argues that calling this into question causes civilizations founded on aggression to crumble. The author criticizes the development of intellectual virtues which become biological vices. Presumably, these intellectual virtues and biological vices include altruism—and the author does later point this out: “Civilizations die from . . . the sense of fair play quite as surely as they die of debauchery.”
This would support rather than undermine the author’s argument. The author acknowledges that logic is already seen as more than the rationalizing of desires, which the author considers problematic. See rationale B.
Suppose that persons of average intelligence tend to have higher incomes than those of very intelligent persons. The author would be most likely to argue that this difference exists because:
A
competitive success reduces one’s interest in art and philosophy.
B
intelligence and competitive success are unrelated.
Answer choice eliminated
C
the more intelligent one is, the more one despises material success.
Answer choice eliminated
D
a highly developed intelligence inhibits competitive action.
was between a and D went with d was correct
The author actually suggests the opposite, namely, that competitive success leads to art and philosophy, in turn, causing the society to crumble: “One after another, the great nations of history have founded on aggression the civilization that then supported for a time, but for a time only, great periods of human culture, that flourished at their height just as the substructure crumbled. . . . [A]nd conquerors prepared the way for poets and philosophers, but neither poet nor philosopher can survive long after the conquest.”
The author argues that intelligence along with sensibility is one of the keys to human competitive success.
The author does not necessarily see a person with higher intelligence as despising material success, so much as assert that having a higher intelligence inhibits the kinds of activities that lead to material success. See rationale D.
The author views higher or “detached” intelligence as a liability, placing people at a disadvantage: “It puts its possessor at a disadvantage in dealing with those whose intelligence faithfully serves their purpose by enabling them to scheme for their ends and to justify to themselves their desires. Such is the animal function of intelligence, and whenever it develops beyond this level, it inhibits rather than aids that effective action in the pursuit of natural ends which was the original function of the mind.
Which of the following passage contentions might it be possible to refute by clear counterexamples?
The intelligence of poets tends to paralyze natural impulse.
Transforming means into ends is the most characteristically human effort.
The great nations of history were founded on aggression.
A
II only
B
III only
C
I and II only
D
I and III only.
olution: The correct answer is B.
The truth of this statement would prove much more difficult to refute because the preponderance of evidence would have to show that humans do not undertake an endeavor to accomplish a goal and that much human activity is not purposeful. The other problem would be to establish counterexamples that determine exactly what constitutes the “most characteristically human effort.”
Concrete evidence refuting this statement could be found by research into the historical record, which could potentially reveal that factors other than aggression were instrumental in the founding of great nations.
The daunting problem here would be to study the lives of poets and investigate their motives to establish clear examples of the relationship between their intelligence and their natural impulses.
Only Option III is the correct answer. See rationales B and C.
selected answer choice a when i meant to select for only I. whihc is still incorrect i thought that one would be hardest to refute
need to read answer choices more carefully and for these types knock off answer choices one by one
Some research into unconscious motivation suggests that even apparently impartial thought processes may be deeply self-serving. What is the relevance of this consideration to the author’s argument?
A
It weakens the distinction drawn between “animal” and “human” uses of intelligence.
B
It challenges the assumption that humans value dispassionate analysis.
C
It supports the observation that intellectual detachment is biologically useless.
D
It strengthens the contention that some uses of intelligence are biological vices.
Solution: The correct answer is A.
One of the key passage arguments is that impartial thought is characteristically human and separates human intelligence from its self-serving animal function. The finding that even impartial thought processes are self-serving blurs perhaps even eliminates this distinction.
Instead of challenging this assumption, this research could actually provide further insight into why humans might value impartial thought processes because it is reasonable to assume that self-serving ends could increase the value to humans.
This research would refute the observation that intellectual detachment is biologically useless because the author asserts that biologically useful intelligence is self-serving.
This research would weaken this contention because self-serving intelligence, whatever form it takes, would be considered a biologically useful way of using intelligence. See rationale C.