History Questions Guide

Interaction of levels of war

-Strategic

-Operational

-Tactical

Perseverance impact on LTs Heath and McGee at Chipyong-ni

They were outnumbered and not in a favorable position at first, but they held on and won the battle. They were able to keep their position until their artillery got there and supported them.

Perseverance impact on the US during and after Wanat

The US did not persevere with Wanat, they withdrew from the valley which ended up hurting US legitimacy with the locals.

Perseverance impact on Southern Tories after Kings Mountain

Bad British policy incite anger and increases support for patriots. Loss of Tory support, morale for Tories decreased.

Perseverance impact on Sherman’s March to the Sea

Sherman’s (Union) aim was to destroy southern will power. He destroyed homes and crops to hurt Rebel ability and willingness to support the war. Crushed southern perseverance and increased desertion rates in the Rebels.

Impact of emotion and/or policy of Britain’s 1780-81 Southern Campaign

Impacted the emotions by hurting the locals, burned crops, and pushed support to the Patriots

Impact of emotion and/or policy of Sherman’s March to the Sea

Sherman’s (Union) aim was to destroy southern will power. He destroyed homes and crops to hurt Rebel ability and willingness to support the war. Crushed southern perseverance and increased desertion rates in the Rebels.

Impact of emotion and/or policy of the US and the Modoc War

Initial US public support was against the army beating up the Modoc Indians until they killed the civil war hero negotiator. No policy kept emotions from influencing outcomes.

Impact of emotion and/or policy of the US and Somalia

Negatively impacted emotion due to the US civilians seeing US soldiers dead bodies being dragged on camera.

Impact on enemy CGs from Britain’s 1776 New York City Campaign

The British misjudged the CG for Washington. Washington’s CG was his army. The British took over the city and won tactically

Impact on enemy CGs from the US Army’s post-Little Big Horn ops against the Sioux

The US struck the Sioux CG, food and willpower, which compelled them to surrender, especially in the winter

Impact on enemy CGs from the communists’ Tet Offensive

Communists attack in a major campaign to create an uprising inside of SVN. The offensive failed and did not create the support they were looking for. This was a tactical and operational success for the US but a strategic failure. After this the American will to continue this fight decreased.

Impact on enemy CGs in the US and its Iraqi town battles in 2004

The US did not strike the enemy CG, due to it being an ideology which is impossible to destory.

Crete

Crete was a risky operation that was very costly to the Germans. There was a great amount of friction and there were lots of Germans killed. They achieved their aim of taking the island but decided against further airborne operations. The impact was upon the US seeing this and learning how to do it better. Aviation tech did not eliminate risk in the operation.

Normandy

The US airborne operation of Normandy was a success but not as effective as they had hoped. They achieved surprise and offensive but encountered a great deal of friction.

Market-Garden

Operation Market Garden was a partial success. Allies achieved surprise and Offensive but there were too many objectives and too many moving parts which resulted in many issues such as supplies and radios. This was a high cost operation that only achieved part of its goals. Outside air support was unable to prevent heavy losses before they arrived.

la Drang

At both LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany, LTC Moore would not have been able to survive without the CAS and artillery fires.

The interaction of technology and doctrine in Hardee’s Tactics

They used double quick with skirmishers. Since rifles were more accurate at long ranges they crossed the killzone faster.

The interaction of technology and doctrine in the Blitzkrieg Concept

a. Gives freedom to lower leadership to execute the mission. They are looking for a fast tempo. Mission oriented initiative. Using maneuver and tempo. Surround and isolate the strong spots.

b. Doctrine was effective at coupling air and armor technology. This allows mission oriented oversight instead of rigid top level. Similar leadership philosophy as Hutier tactics, but blitzkrieg was operational level instead of tactical level. Both emphasized quick wins and optimized their capabilities. Both stressed subordinate leader initiative to exploit maneuver opportunities.

The interaction of technology and doctrine in the AirLand Battle

The Big 5 weapons supported the AirLand doctrine surrounding fires and maneuvers.

The interaction of technology and doctrine in BCTs through 2010s

They added more fires to doctrine and expanded women’s roles in the military. Modified for more conventional operations.

Combined-arms use of mounted-dismounted forces by the US Army at Cowpens and Buena Vista.

Morgan effectively uses combined arms of cavalry and infantry to complete the double envelopment. Taylors uses his mobile artillery to support his infantry and defend their placement.

Combined-arms use of mounted-dismounted forces by Kilpatrick at Gettysburg and Sheridan in the Shenandoah.

a. Kilpatrick does not use combined arms at Gettysburg and believes his cavalry alone will achieve results. He gets a lot of soldiers killed.

b. Sheridan combined infantry, cavalry, and artillery at Shenandoah. Sheridan had his cavalry condensed and ready to employ when he commanded them to.

Combined-arms use of mounted-dismounted forces in Meuse-Argonne and Aachen

New tech did not make things easier, greater capability but harder to use.

Combined-arms use of mounted-dismounted forces by the US Army at Chipyong-ni and An Najaf in 2004

They did not use any combined-arms use of mounted-dismounted forces at CYN and Najaf.

Improvements of COIN/ Indian War in the Old Northwest, 1791-94.

St. Claire’s expedition suffered huge losses due to lack of security and discipline. Congress’ support increased and troops were given more training with Wayne’s expedition. This resulted in greater use of combined arms and led to the decrease in Indian resistance. Disunity of the tribes increased as the US won more battles.

Improvements of COIN/ Indian War in the Second Seminole War.

a. Divide & Conquer. The US Army increasingly used Seminole and non-Seminole Indians as scouts and even as combatant Soldiers. Army leaders also used allied Seminoles to convince the holdouts to quit.

b. Appropriate Tactics. Rather than plod around in large regiments chasing elusive Seminole guerillas, the Army used smaller, more flexible units equipped and trained for jungle/swamp fighting.

Improvements of COIN in Vietnam 1961-1971.

Good policy and reforms, but could not fix all of South Vietnam’s problems nor improve US domestic support/ perseverence

Improvements of COIN/ in OIF through the Surge

Adopted kinetic as well as civil affairs, changing their strategy to clear, hold, build.

Indian War situations by the US Army in the Second Seminole War

US perseverance and campaign timing shifted to year around operations which yielded better results because the Seminoles did not have outside resources to fulfill their needs, but not enough perseverance to see all of the Indians removed.

COIN/Indian War situations in the Post-Civil War Reconstruction

a lack of restraint by KKK actions in the south hurt their legitimacy because they were upsetting the locals. US forces focused on hot spots to counteract the KKK actions. US were unable to achieve all Reconstruction aims due to policy interference.

US COIN in Vietnam’s III Corps

Legitimacy is impacted negatively due to the US leaving, and the locals are unhappy with the US pulling out. There was also no perseverance due to us leaving.

US COIN in El Salvador

Used more restraint and brought peace between government and guerillas

METT-TC at Lake Champlain

British used new inexperienced sailors. The lake was Key Terrain because it was a critical LOC

METT-TC at New Orleans

It was Key Terrain because of the Mississippi River Avenue of Approach. Jackson uses the Mississippi River and the cypress swamp to force the British into position.

METT-TC at St. Mihiel

Muddy terrain made it difficult to maneuver. Germans put up obstacles that impacted maneuver as well. US forces did not have enough resources for the size of the army.

METT-TC at Meuse- Argonne

The terrain was unfavorable and made it hard to maneuver through.

METT-TC at Cassino

The hill was key terrain due to it overlooking the entire city. It gave whoever had it the advantage of high ground.

METT-TC at Anzio

Secured the beach and hoped to enable the seizure of the inland rail-lines key terrain

METT-TC at TF Smith

Did not have trained troops and underestimated their enemy heavily.

METT-TC at 73 Easting

Well trained troops and well prepared for the battle.

Logistical the Rebels’ Gettysburg Campaign logistics

They did not have a LOC to supply them. Relied on food from locals. Running on limited ammunition.

Logistical issues in the Spanish-American War South Cuban Theater

The US was not prepared well enough to supply troops. They failed to label containers. Merchant ships did not want to get close and dumped horses into the water.

Logistical issues in the Battle of Meuse-Argonne

Limited movement and obstacles impacted their ability to get logistics to the battle. US LOCs were in bad condition and very vulnerable. Demands were high for supplies.

Logistical issues in the European deployments in the 2010s

Overextended and had long LOC, and did not employ and supply depots

Amphibious Ops at Salerno

Succeeded with the use of combined arms helping hold the defense; ships fire support on tanks, paratroopers, bombers diverted route to come assist

Amphibious Ops at Tarawa & Kwajalein

Tarawa was more costly than Kwajalein. Tarawa was not well planned and the logisitcs were bad. Kwajalein they learned from their mistakes, had a better plan, and was way less costly.

Amphibious Ops at Inchon

They landed in harsh terrain and surprised the enemy due to them not thinking the US would come from that side and defeated the Vietnamese.

Newburgh Affair & Patton in Sicily

Washington has good rapport with his subordinates and got them to stop from revolting, but Patton had bad rapport with subordinates and would hit them.

Truman and MacArthur

Truman told MacArthur not to go to the media and talk about the President and the war, but MacArthur did anyways and got fired.

Vietnam War body counts and ticket punching

Body counts was the reporting of false increased numbers of those who were killed to show progress. While ticket punching was Officers were being put in combat roles for short amounts of time to get medals, but left the combat role with inexperienced leadership.

Greene at Guilford Courthouse and Jackson in the Creek War

Green was cautious and Jackson was aggressive

McClellan at Seven Days Battles and Grant in the Overland Campaign

Grant kept up the Offensive to prevent Lee from doing Offensive- Defensive maneuvers. McClellan was timid and allowed Lee to remain on the offensive.

Ridgway in Korea and Petraeus in OIF

Ridgway was more offensive minded and talked more to the troops, and Petraeus was more into COIN and interacting with the locals (civil affairs)

Abrams in the Deep South and in Vietnam.

Abrams exercised restraint in both the Deep South and Vietnam

Mass

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time

Unity of Command

For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander

Penetration

Striking an enemy through the middle of their lines to create a hole in their defenses and drive to the rear

Envelopment

Few forces as necessary to tie down the enemy, look your direction, then take the main force and push forward at an angle

Key Terrain

gives the force holding it distinct advantage. It accounts for the rest of OAKOC, among many other things.

Obstacles

Jackson’s use of the Mississippi River and the Cypress swamp during the Battle of New Orleans.

Operational value of Thames

Indian leader was killed and stifled Indian support. Large operational value.

Operational value of Horseshoe Bend

This denies the British key allies. Large Strategic value as it ended the war.

Operational value of Manila

The seizure of Manila was very bloody. This was operationally important for the US. Considering the political value, it restored the sovereignty

Posse Comitatus Act with the 1894 Railroad strike

The Posse Comitatus Act prevented the use of army troops in domestic law enforcement. The 1894 RR strike exploited a loop hole from a previous court order that allowed the President to use troops against the unions. The PCA and the loopholes used reflected American ambivalence.

1960-1970s domestic unrest

The CIA had the COINTELPRO that watched the public and the military left it due to the public outcry and belief that the government was spying on them.

Hutier Tactics and Blitzkrieg

Doctrine was effective at coupling air and armor technology. Blitzkrieg allows mission-oriented oversight instead of rigid top level. Similar leadership philosophy as Hutier tactics, but blitzkrieg was operational level instead of tactical level. Both emphasized quick wins and optimized their capabilities. Both stressed subordinate leader initiative to exploit maneuver opportunities.

Explain how the Big 5 weapons supported AirLand Battle.

Introduced new, more high tech tanks and helicopters that allowed them to have more fire power with less people. There was better maneuvers, timing, and tempo.

Commo problems in Chickamauga

Rosencrans had a massive comms skills error, and his orders were misinterpreted resulting in him creating a hole in their defensive lines. The rebels commanded by Bragg were able to exploit this by attacking the gap and forcing Rosencrans from the battlefield.

Commo problems in Chipyong-ni

During the battle at Chipyong-ni the Americans suffered commo problems which hurt US operations. Poor personal and radio comms confused combined arms efforts during the 23rd RCT initial counterattack.

Commo problems in COP Ranch House

COP Ranch house has commo problems as their equipment became damaged during the assault, but their PACE plan allowed them to have redundancies to keep them operational.

Describe the political, POW, ground and air war interaction in the Korean War stalemate.

The Korean war stalemate arose in part due to POW issues. The protracted negotiations did not affect the ground and air combat. Although, politically driven arguments over POW exchanges did extend the peace talks. To punish the communists for the delays the US conducted less ambitious ground offensives.

Political impact of Saratoga

After seeing the Patriots win, the French now see the potential and Ally with the Patriots. This creates a bigger problem around the world for the British.

Political impact of Gettysburg

The Union victory at Getty did not inspire any big political impact.

Ridgeway in Korea and Linebacker 1

Both struck the enemy CGs and stopped enemy offensives. They both caused the enemies’ offenses to fail, but did not compel immediate peace treaties.

Scotts understanding of METT-TC affects his choice of maneuvers at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, and Chapultepec

a. Scott was resourceful with his troops at Cerro Gordo and were able to envelop Santa Anna’s roadblock using the mountains and gullies.

b. Scott’s good use of terrain (lava bed) allowed him to flank around and complete another envelopment of his enemy.

c. Scott correctly judged Chapultepec’s terrain and enemy well after considering the vulnerabilities of his LOCs and successfully attacked using a penetration maneuver.

Joint ops at Yorktown

The French navy provided an interdiction force against the British at Yorktown.

Joint ops at Vicksburg

Grant used the navy to ferry his troops across the Mississippi river as an indirect Avenue of Approach.

Strategic bombings in Germany

Initially in 1943 strategic bombing vs. Germany was very costly for the Allies. German air defenses were very effective at spotting bombers and sending fighter aircraft to intercept them. Additionally, the US was not as accurate as they had hoped to be in targeting German assets. By 1944, the US had dramatically improved it abilities and now had better long range escorts to accompany the bombers in order to protect the bombers from German fighters. This had an impact on the Germans and forced them to divert assets and focus on the skies. Secondly, US bombers became more effective at striking oil and transportation refineries after gaining air superiority.

Strategic bombings in Japan

The US bombings in Japan critically hurt the Japanese by targeting their CGs related to industries, focusing on causing more debilitating industrial harm. These bombings alone did not force the Japanese to surrender.

Guerilla operations in Revolutionary war

Bad British policy policies helped the guerillas gain support from the locals. Patriot guerillas had strong local support. The patriots achieved success in both guerilla and conventional operations resulting in more support. Locals provided intel which supported troop preparedness and strategy preparedness.

Guerilla operations in the Civil war

Civil war guerilla operations were not well controlled and resulted in banditry at times. There were Union sympathizers that did not support the secession. Union reprisals from guerilla tactics further broke support of the operations.

Guerilla operations summary

Patriots had better support against the British when compared to Rebels against the Union. Union army successes hurt the Southern Govt legitimacy and the generous surrender terms further undercut armed conflict.

Sheridan and Wilson’s mastery of combined-arms

1. Sheridan and Wilson both concentrated their Cavalry and Infantry units to mass the effects of their attacks. This created success in their ability to maintain control of the fight and defeat the enemy.

2. Both campaigns were late in the war and both utilized veteran soldiers. Sheridan organized his cavalry well and held it in reserve to use it at his command. Wilson had his entire army mobilized with horses.

Principles of War in Jackson’s success and Union defeat in the Valley in 1862.

1. Maneuver: uses his terrain familiarity to move fast and hide his forces

2. Offensive: Moves fast to hit where he wants to hit

3. Surprise: moves fast and strike at weak points catching the Union unprepared

4. Unity of Command: Jackson is the sole commander calling the shots

The role of enemy errors, leadership, and airpower in the Battle of the Bulge.

The Germans made several errors regarding logistics and leadership in the Battle of the Bulge. They had planned on a quick speed of advance originally but became slowed due to the avenue of approach being heavily wooded and unfriendly terrain for armor. Germans had poorly assessed US leadership, McAuliffe, who had no intention of surrendering Bastogne. The key terrain of the city and its roads were vital to sustain the German advance on the southern side of the bugle. Once the weather cleared and allowed US airpower to resume CAS and resupply, the Germans were pushed out of the Bulge, and the allies regained all terrain while inflicting heavy casualties against the Germans.

Maneuver, Enemy, Mission and Offensive in British performance at Bunker Hill.

1. Maneuver: British had poor use of maneuver

2. Enemy: British disrespected and underestimated their enemy

3. Mission: British mission was to take the hill and destroy the rebellion

4. Offensive: British maintained the Offensive and seized the hill

Washington at Monmouth

Washington reversed a combat misfortune by personally taking control of his army. This resulted in putting the British in a stalemate.

LT Ferrara at Ranch House

LT Ferrara delegated command to his NCOs while staying in contact with higher via radio. He did not micromanage his soldiers while calling in air support. He was able to prevent the COP from being overrun.

Washington at Monmouth and LT Ferrera at COP Ranch House

In both cases, they barely avoid disaster while handling their leadership in different ways.

GEN Petraeus’ actions in OIF

Gen Petraeus handled the OIF surge per the new COIN doctrine. He choose not to abandon kinetic operations to focus on civil affairs via dispersed forces in population center.

GEN Petraeus’ actions in OEF

In Afghanistan he replaced General McChrystal and his kinetic strategy with a balanced approach. As ISAF commander, Petraeus used violence of action to secure Kandahar from the Taliban. He did not negotiate.

Anaconda Plan vs US Submarine Campaign against Japan

Both campaigns were designed to hurt US enemies critically. The anaconda plan included a blockade and amphibious landings to help wreck the Rebel finances. The union capture of Vicksburg did not seal the South’s fate. Vicksburg was not a coastal city, it was inland. The campaign against Japan followed the same economic crippling aims.

Usage of M4 tanks by Patton’s initital France ops at Arracourt and Achen

The M4 Sherman tank was intended to be used in the role of breakthrough and exploitation. Regarding Patton’s initial France operations, Patton helped lead the way for the infantry in a large turning movement. Regarding Arracourt, gently rolling hills east of Paris provided ideal terrain for the M4 tanks. Combined with artillery and air strikes but without infantry support, the allies were able to defeat the better German tanks. At Aachen, armor and infantry teams cooperated to overcome the German defenses in the Hedgerows.

Pork Chop Hill

The US army fought hard for Pork Chop Hill but ended up abandoning the hill. It was a costly fight for the army and was a tactical victory. But the cost was not the reason to abandon. We held the hill for political reasons.

Hamburger Hill

The army took hamburger hill to support search and destroy missions. This was a costly battle for the army. The army abandoned the hill and it increased public outcry against such actions.

Wanat

The COP at Wanat was built in order to support the COIN aims in Afghanistan. Even though the army won tactically, they eventually abandoned it. Although, the high cost alone was not the reason for abandoning it.

US Army fights for Pork Chop Hill, Hamburger Hill, and Wanat.

In all three places the army fought hard for these locations but for a variety of reasons. Inevitably the army abandoned all three locations despite the costly fights for them.