US Constitution Exam 2

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84 Terms

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How many people are on the Supreme Court?

9; one chief and eight associates; this number is set by a law and not in the Constitution

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How to justices end up in the Supreme Court?

appointed by president and confirmed by the Senate

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Types of jurisdiction

original and appellate

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Original Jurisdiction 

cases involving “Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party”

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Appellate Jurisdiction

everything else stated in Article 3 and what Congress shall determine

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When is the Court in session?

beginning of October through late June

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About how many cases get accepted by the Supreme Court per year?

Less than 100 (about 1%)

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What is the “Rule of Four”?

four justices have to agree to put a case on the “Merit Docket”

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What is the process for a case once it’a on the Merit Docket?

Parties supply written briefs and 30 minute oral argument

Decision-Making: secret discussions and a vote

Chief Justice assigns writing opinion if in majority or senior associate in majority

Any justice may write concurring or dissenting opinion

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Shadow Docket

Break from ordinary procedure with very limited briefings, no oral arguments, and typically result in unsigned rulings

Quick judgments to avoid irreparable harm: stays (stop orders), injunctions (relief action), and summary judgments

Historically very rare until last decade sharp increase (spring of 2025 court stays lower court rulings on public employee firings, funding cuts, immigration enforcement)

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Original intent interpretation

What did the framers intend?

  Way to ensure democratic legitimacy

  Problem: How to determine this? What about Framers disagreeing about intent? How to adapt to change?

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Precedents interpretation

apply stare decisis (let decision stand)

  Stable and consistent application (common law)

  Problem: What if no precedents? What if precedents bad?

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Logical formulation interpretation

read legal text like a philosophical treatise

  Start from basic premises and follow chain of reasoning

  Problem: logic limited by premises that may be flawed

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Living constitution interpretation

Court adapts meaning of text to reflect change

  Way to deal with changing technology and attitudes

 Problem: Why privilege judges’ point of view? Imposing on text?

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Marbury v. Madison

Facts: After 1800 Election Marbury does not receive his judicial appointment letter and sues Secretary of State Madison under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789

 Legal Issues:

1)Does Marbury have a right to the Commission he demands?

2)If right violated, is there a remedy?

3)If remedy exists, is it a writ of mandamus under sec 13 of Judiciary Act?

4)Is sec 13 of Judiciary Act constitutional?

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Marshall decision on Marbury v. Madison

Marbury has right to this commission and remedy is writ of mandamus

Real issue is the law in question which allows political officers to go directly to Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus

Judiciary Act alters original jurisdiction of Supreme Court, therefore unconstitutional (would need to amend the Constitution)

       “The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts…alterable when the legislature shall please” (34) 

: the Supreme Court has unique role interpreting the Constitution to preserve limited constitution

   “It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is…If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each” and give priority to the Constitution (34).

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Executive branch traits

1)Unified (not plural or shared power)

2)Long terms and re-eligible indefinitely

3)Election independent of Congress

4)Major explicit grants of Power

i)Legislative sphere: veto, state of the union, calling joint sessions of congress

ii)Executive sphere: commander-in-chief, appoint officers, grant pardons, negotiate treaties

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Expansion of Presidential Power

•1) Detailed legislative agenda in 20th century

•2) Extensive use of the veto power

•3) Presidential control over budget process

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Presidential implied powres

executive privilege, immunity, and prerogative

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Executive Privilege

power to refuse to provide information requested by other branches of government justified on grounds of national security, confidentiality or claim that the president controls all executive branch communications

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Executive Immunity

no lawsuits for public acts (but not private acts)

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Executive Prerogative

purely discretionary power depending on circumstances (Supreme Court loath to recognize)

the President's constitutionally based authority to declare policy, take action, and make law without congressional support for the public good

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Youngstown v. Sawyer Facts (1952)

during the Korean War President Truman seeks to avoid a nation-wide steel strike and authorizes Federal Government to seize control of all ofthe steel mills

Truman accepts he has no statutory authority but claims inherent in executive power (he rejects remedy available in Taft-Hartley Act)

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Youngstown v Sawyer decision+Justice Black opinion

6: 3 Decision that the President does not have the inherent power to seize property (in this case, steel mills)

inherent powers only apply to military command and Ohio not a theatre of war

“Even though ‘theater of war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.” (55)

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Concurring opinions in Youngstown v Sawyer

1)Frankfurter: Truman circumventing Taft-Hartley in order to avoid alienating labor supporters

2)Jackson: develops rational standards test for executive discretionary power

(i) express or implied authorization by congress

(ii) solely executive power or concurrent with congress

(iii) president takes measures incompatible with express or implied will of congress

Conclusion: (i) the strongest claim and (iii) the weakest

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Dissent in Youngstown v Sawyer

Vinson Dissent:  “theatre of war” an expanded concept in the Cold War context

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US v Nixon Facts (1974)

June 1972 burglary of Democratic National Committee office in Watergate complex. In March 1974 federal grand jury indicts seven former Nixon administration officials and orders President Nixon to hand over taped conversations

President Nixon refuses citing executive privilege and the Special Prosecutor appeals directly to Supreme Court

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US v Nixon decision

Unanimous decision that the President must hand over the tapes

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Special Prosecutor

term to note in US v Nixon; office appointed by the Attorney-General to investigate potential wrongdoing in the executive branch

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Unindicted co-conspirator

term to note in US v Nixon; person who is named in an indictment as one who took part in a conspiracy to commit a crime but who is not charged in the indictment.

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President Nixon’s argument in US v Nixon

1)Case not justiciable because “intra-executive branch” dispute

2)Separation of powers requires president to have absolute privilege

3)Confidentiality: even if not absolute privilege, the court must recognize the need for confidentiality for president’s advisors

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Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in US v Nixon

1)Justiciable because Special Prosecutor delegated power by Congress

2)Court rejects any claim of absolute privilege beyond judicial review

  “We therefore affirm that it is the province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’ with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case” (59)

3) Confidentiality: Court does recognize the principle of executive privilege but rejects broad separation of powers claim and does not extend to subpoenas for evidence in possible criminal trial  

Legacy: Clinton v Jones (1997) unanimous court rules sitting president cannot use privilege to avoid testifying in a civil suit

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Clinton v City of New York Facts (1998)

1996 Congress passes Line-Item Veto Act giving the President the power to strike down specific spending items. New York hospitals sue the federal government claiming the Act violates the “Presentment clause” in Article 1, section 7 of the Constitution

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Clinton v City of New York decision+Justice Stevens opinion

6:3 decision Court rules to overturn the Line- Item Veto Act

vConstitution gives President power to veto bill or sign it: “Presentment Clause” Art. 1, sec 7 says President must sign or not sign a bill presented by Congress

vInterprets constitutional power narrowly so that if Constitution gives prescribed method it means you cannot deviate from that method

“If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role in determining the final text of what may ‘become a law,’ such change must come not by legislation, but through the amendment procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution” (61)

 

vImpoundment does not violate separation of powers because the president is authorized by congress to spend funds but can refuse to do so (i.e., not the same as a veto)

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Breyer dissent in Clinton v City of New York

1) Interprets line-item issue in terms of “necessary and proper” clause such that laying out one procedure to do something does not prohibit others

 2) Line-item veto does not violate the separation of powers because Congress can reverse the law and Congress can override decisions 

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Presidential War Power in the Constitution

•Article 2, section 2: President is commander-in-chief and top diplomat

But…

•Article 1, section 8: Congress given power to declare war and “to raise and support Armies” and a Navy

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US v Curtiss Wright Export Corp Facts (1936)

Context isolationist mood in US as Congress authorizes President to prohibit arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay. Curtiss-Wright company charged with violating embargo and files suit claiming that congressional delegation of power unconstitutional

Issue: Can congress delegate power in foreign policy to President to exercise with discretion?

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US v Curtiss Wright Export Corp decision+Justice Sutherland opinion

7:1 decision the Supreme Court rules in favor of granting broad discretionary power.

•Dismisses technical question about whether resolution improperly activated by President

•Focus is on question of delegation of power:

•Generally courts suspicious about delegation on internal matters but foreign policy President already has enormous power

•Difference between internal and external matters is that President’s power in external not dependent on enumerated powers or power delegated from the states and/or the people

•Where does President derive foreign affairs and war power?

  From the very nature of sovereignty:

“Rulers come and go; governments end and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When therefore the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union” (228)

Notice the President’s war power precedes even the Constitution.

War power is inherent in government of every independent people

What then did Article 2, section 2 of the Constitution actually do? Turns out not much!

“The investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of government…inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved” (229)

Point: war power inherent in sovereignty and located in executive branch out of necessity

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Legacy of Curtiss-Wright

Supreme Court granted enormous discretionary power to the President over foreign affairs. But debate:

•1) Recognition of extra-constitutional power in President: Comfortable with this?

•2) What about congress’ enumerated powers in war and foreign affairs, e.g. declare war, ratify treaties?

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Korematsu v US Facts (1944)

During WWII President Roosevelt authorizes creation of military zones with restricted movement and congress passes laws establishing penalties for violating restrictions. In 1942 Gen DeWitt in Western Defense Command (California) imposes a curfew and later evacuation of Japanese-Americans to detention camps. An American citizen Fred Korematsu refuses to leave and is convicted of a federal crime. He appeals in federal court.

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Korematsu v US Decision+Justice Black opinion

6:3 decision the Supreme Court upholds the evacuation and de facto detention of Japanese-Americans

1)Exclusion zones not same as Detention

2)War Power key: “We uphold the exclusion order [and] in doing so, we are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of American citizens…But hardships are a part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardship.” (236)

3) Issue of race: Black rejects idea that racial discrimination is the issue—it is purely military necessity

  “To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire.” (236)

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Dissent from Justice Murphy in Korematsu v US

It is racism not military necessity because based on race not citizenship “the ugly abyss of racism”

No reasonable basis to intern 100,000 people of one race:

British example with Germans more rational and deliberate security measure (e.g., 74,000 examined, 64,000 released immediately and 2,000 interned indefinitely)

Murphy dissent: assumption of disloyalty based on race

“The exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of all persons with Japanese blood in their veins…necessarily must rely for its reasonableness upon the assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage and espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy in other ways” (237) 

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Concurring opinions in Korematsu v US

•Frankfurter: accept sweeping war powers as part of the Constitution

Jackson: dissents arguing better to recognize military necessity as extra-constitutional

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Hamdi v Rumsfeld facts (2004)

•Weeks after 911 US forces invade Afghanistan to destroy Al-Qaeda. Afghan allies capture Saudi national Yaser Esam Hamdi and hand him over to American military. Quickly determined that Hamdi is a US citizen and he is transferred to Norfolk Naval Station (not Gitmo). Hamdi held as “unlawful enemy combatant,” but Hamdi family sue for habeas corpus

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unlawful enemy combatant

not a prisoner of war under Geneva Convention and no due process rights of normal legal system

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Hamdi v Rumsfeld decision+Justice O’Connor opinion

•6:3 decision Supreme Court recognize government’s right to detain enemy combatants including US citizens but US citizens also have a right to challenge enemy combatant status in lawful process 

•1) Rejects claim that Hamdi’s capture in a combat zone waves habeas corpus right

•2) rejects claim that Court violating separation of powers if it asserts due process rights

   “While the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator” (67)

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Justice Thomas dissent in Hamdi v Rumsfeld

Channels the spirit of Hamilton in Federalist #23 “power to protect ought to exist without limitation”

Congress can add extra due process rights for citizens designated as unlawful enemy combatants but the Supreme Court cannot insist on them

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Article 1 Powers of Congress

1)Specific powers: taxes, army, declare war, impeach, interstate commerce, etc.

2)General principles: “necessary and proper”

3)Explicit restrictions: no religious tests, titles of nobility, etc.

4)General Restrictions: Either explicit or implicit, 9th and 10th Amendment

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Historical Shift in 20th Century in Congress

•Congress delegates more and more authority to the other branches, especially the president

•“Legislative veto”: congress grants discretionary power to the president but with requirement that congress can override (or veto) if it disapproves.

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Schechter v US facts (1935) “The Sick Chicken” case

Context is New Deal depression-era National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA) tries to stimulate economy by allowing the President to create trade associations that establish price controls for the sector. Schechter brothers of New York convicted of violating industrial code for safe handling of live poultry. They challenge arguing that congressional delegation of power to the president is unconstitutional and they were not involved in interstate commerce.

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Schechter v US decision+Justice Hughes opinion

Unanimous decision Supreme Court decides that key elements of NIRA are unconstitutional

Principle of delegation is fine but there are limits

1)10th Amendment general ban on extra-constitutional power

2)Nature of a limited constitution

3)Only congress can make laws with penalties

•Problem with NIRA is that is gives the President the power to establish regulations and the penalties

“Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress…the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity…We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power” (159)  

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Legacy of Schechter

•President Roosevelt is outraged and threatens to pack the court which leads to the Supreme Court switching course about New Deal (the “switch in time that saved nine”)

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Mistretta v US facts (1989)

In 1984 Congress passes a law creating a body called the US Sentencing Commission tasked with establishing new guidelines for federal sentencing. There are seven members on the commission appointed by the President, three of whom must be sitting federal judges. John Mistretta is convicted of drug dealing and sentenced under new guidelines, and challenges the 1984 law as unconstitutional delegation of authority by Congress.

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Mistretta v US decision+Justice Blackmun Opinion

8:1 decision the Supreme Court votes to uphold the Sentencing Commission Act

1)Not excessive delegation of power because nothing prevents congress from drawing on expertise of other branches (e.g. federal judges)

2)Separation of powers does not mean that the branches of government are prohibited from working together in coordination

“In creating the Sentencing Commission—an unusual hybrid in structure and authority—Congress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated balance of powers among the coordinated Branches” (163).

3) Location in judicial branch unusual but not unreasonable

4) Composition of the Sentencing Commission not unconstitutional because “incompatibility clause” only applies to legislators not serving in other branches

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Mistretta v US major constitutional issues

•1) Can the Sentencing Commission appointed by the President set penalties?

•2) Can a body in the judicial branch make legally enforceable rules?

Point: Does the Sentencing Commission violate the separation of powers?

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Scalia dissent in Mistretta

Strict reading of separation of power means only congress can make laws with penalties

“The power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than congress, except in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power” (163)

Point: commission offering recommendations is fine but not enforceable rules

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Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha facts (1983)

The legislative veto became a regular feature of American government from 1930-70’s (over 200 laws with legislative veto provision). The Immigration Act allows the Attorney-General to deport or not deport individuals subject to override by a majority vote in the House of Representatives. Mr Chadha’s deportation to Kenya suspended by the Attorney-General but decision overriden by congress. Chadha challenges the Immigration Act legislative veto as unconstitutional delegation of power.

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Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha decision+Justice Burger opinion

•7:2 decision the Supreme Court strikes down the legislative veto as unconstitutional with implications for hundreds of laws

1)Separation of Powers: the “presentment clause” in Article 1, section 7 clearly gives the veto power only to the President, not to Congress

“The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted” (166)

•2) Bicameralism: why give veto only to the House of Representatives?

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Justice White dissent in INS v Chadha

Emphasizes the negative practical effect of eliminating the legislative veto: “the death knell of over 200 other statutory provisions”

“Without the legislative veto Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice of either try to make laws so specific that they cover every conceivable possibility or so general that they simply have to trust discretion of executive and judicial branches” (167)

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Legacy of Legislative Power cases:

The Supreme Court has left a mixed legacy of allowing delegation in some respects but striking down in others depending on the extent of the delegation and to whom authority is delegated.

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Federalism in the Constitution

•Madison in Federalist #39: the Constitution “is partly federal and partly national”

•Enumerated and Unenumerated Powers: explicit powers Article 1, section 8 and explicit limits Article 1, section 9

•Congress’ power to “regulate interstate commerce” (Art. 1, sec 8)

•Debate over “implied powers”

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Historical shifts in Court’s position on federalism

•Marshall Court early 1800’s: Court tends to favor national government

•Late 19th and early 20th century: Court tends to favor state governments

against Interstate Commerce Act 1887 and Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890

•Since the 1960’s: the Court’s record is more mixed with favoring national government in some areas such as civil rights but also more restrictive in other uses of the commerce clause

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McCulloch v Maryland facts (1819)

•Second Bank of the United States chartered in 1816, but many states oppose it because it competes with state banks. Maryland imposes a tax on the US Bank. US Bank official is convicted for refusing to pay the tax and appeals all the way to the Supreme Court.

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McCulloch v Maryland decision+Chief Justice Marshall opinion

Unanimous decision the Supreme Court declares Maryland tax unconstitutional

1) Reject compact theory of the Constitution

2) Assert national supremacy:

   “The Government of the United States though limited in its powers, is supreme, and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land” (80).

3) The 10th Amendment does not limit implied powers

4) Rejects a narrow interpretation of the “necessary and proper” clause

5) Concurrent powers not allowed to undermine national government

  “If states may tax one instrument, employed by the Government in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail, they may tax the mint…” (82).

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Maryland’s position

•Question the constitutionality of the Bank (Compact Theory)

•Assert state’s concurrent tax power

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Gibbons v Ogden facts (1824)

A steamboat operator Ogden is given the exclusive right by NY state to operate a certain passage of water, and another Gibbons is given a federal license to operate in same water passage.  Ogden sues in state court arguing commerce clause does not extend to navigation. Eventually appealed to US Supreme Court.

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Gibbons decision+Marshall opinion

Unanimous decision the Supreme Court sides with the federal license.

1)National supremacy

2)Broad definition of “commerce”

“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more—it is intercourse…All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce’ to comprehend navigation” (335)

3)      State “police” power: the states’ role in public health and safety is not rooted in commerce

There is an “immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general government, [including] inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description” (337).

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US v E.C. Knight Co. facts (1895)

The American Sugar Refining Company owns 98% refining capacity in the United States. The federal government files suit under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 making it illegal to restrain interstate commerce through monopolies.

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US v E.C. Knight Co. decision+Chief Justice Fuller opinion

8:1 decision the Supreme Court sides with the Company against the federal government.

1)Manufacturing is not commerce

“Commerce succeeds tomanufacture, andis not part of it. The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed, and it is a power independent of the power to suppress monopoly” (339)

2) “Dual Federalism”: conception of federalism that preserves robust power for state governments and limits on federal government

       “Slight reflection will show that if the national power extends to all contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining and other productive industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little business would be left for state control” (340).

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US v E.C. Knight Co. legislative context

Era of Big Monopolies in railroads, oil and “Robber Barons”

1) Interstate Commerce Act (1887):established the federal government's authority to regulate interstate commerce, primarily by requiring railroads to charge "just and reasonable" rates and prohibiting price discrimination.

Also, created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to enforce rules and investigate railroad company abuses (in 1995 becomes the Surface Transportation Board).

Progressive era of “Trust busting”

2) The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890):prohibits anticompetitive business practices, including illegal monopolies and conspiracies in restraint of trade, with the goal of preserving free competition.

Allows Department of Justice to impose fines and even order breakup of conglomerates.

It remains a key tool in U.S. antitrust law (e.g., Microsoft in 2001, Google ongoing, and AT&T 1982 “Baby Bells”)

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act: the court does not question its constitutionality.

Real issue is does it apply to manufacturing? (i.e., is manufacturing “commerce”?)

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Federalism in the 19th Century:

We see the movement from the “nationalist” decisions of the Marshall Court in the first decades to a more “federalist” position of the court in the latter part of the 19th century.

Shift from commerce as “locatedness” to “process”

In the 20th century we will see further, sometimes conflicting, developments in the court’s thinking on federalism.

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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U. S. (1964) Facts

•Heart of Atlanta Motel discriminates against African American people

•Title 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination or segregation in public accommodation (hotels, restaurants, etc.)

•The Motel is located near interstate highways and most of its visitors are from out of state (75%)

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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U. S. Claims of Appellant and Appellees

Appellant (Heart of Atlanta Motel)

• Title 2 of the Civil Rights Act goes beyond powers granted by Commerce Clause (matter of State “police power”)

•Violates the 5th amendment

•Violates the 13th amendment

Appellees (U.S.)

• Congress may remove obstructions that significantly impact interstate travel

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Court Decision Unanimously upholds provisions of the Civil Rights Act pertaining to hotels

•Three issues:

1)Civil Rights Act does not exceed power of commerce clause (civil rights not matter of state “police power”)

2)Motel owners not deprived of liberty or property rights (13th Amendment)

3)Compelling reason to ensure no discrimination in public accommodations

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Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.Majority Opinion (By Justice Clark)

Civil Rights Act of 1964

•Congress passed the Civil Rights act because segregation has a significant negative impact on interstate commerce, thereby rejecting "purely local character" claim

•Title 1 (Voting), Title 2 (Public Accommodations), Title 3 (Public Facilities), Title 4 (Public Education), Title 6 (Federal Programs) , Title 7 (Equal Employment Opportunity-Private Sector), Title 9 (prohibits sex discrimination in education-added 1972)

•Title 2: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges and advantages…without discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin” (84)

Justice Clark: What is meant by “commerce” in the Commerce Clause?

•Appeal to precedent of Gibbons v Ogden (1824): “The power of congress to deal with these obstructions depends on the meaning of the commerce clause…first enunciated 140 years ago by the great Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden” (1824).

•Based on court precedent, “commerce” includes relations between states

•Congress can regulate commerce to prevent "immoral and injurious uses"

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South Dakota v Dole facts (1987)

•Congress amends legislation, requiring states to raise the drinking age to 21 to get full federal highway funding

•South Dakota allows 19 year-olds to buy beer containing less than 3.2% alcohol

•South Dakota argues that the amended legislation violates the Spending Clause and the 21st Amendment (repealing Prohibition)

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SD v Dole decision+Rehnquest opiniom

•7-2 decision, the Supreme Court upholds Congress’s amendment to the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984: Court rules not exceed spending power or violate 21st Amendment

21st Amendment: Does repeal of Prohibition mean federal government not allowed to establish minimum drinking age?

Court: 21st Amendment not counter commerce power because (1) congress not setting national standard and (2) a minimum drinking age is not inherently unconstitutional

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Limits on Spending Power

•1. Must serve the general welfare

•2. Conditions must be unambiguous

•3. Federal grants should relate to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs

•4. It must not contradict another part of the constitution

•5. Are the conditions coercive?

National Minimum Drinking Age law satisfies these limits on “Reasonable Basis” test

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O’Connor’s Dissent in SD v Dole

•Not a disagreement about principles but the application of one principle

•Raising the drinking age to 21 is “not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose.”

•Most alcohol related car accidents don’t involve someone under the age of 21

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US v Lopez facts (1995)

•1990: Congress enacts Gun-Free School Zones Act, banning firearms in school zones

•Congress relied on the Commerce Clause

•Lopez is a San Antonio high school student found with a firearm at school

•Does the Commerce Clause give Congress the authority to ban firearms in schools?

•5-4 decision, the Court says “No”

•First time since the 1930's that the Court decides Congress has exceeded its Commerce Clause power

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US v Lopez decision+Chief Justice Rehnquist opinion

Government claims:

(1)the economic cost of violent crime is substantial, and

(2)gun violence poses a substantial threat to educational process

Court Response (Rehnquist)

•Turn to “first principles” and original meaning of the Constitution

•The Court has deviated from the original meaning of the Commerce Clause by expanding Congress’s power

•Gun control and educational institutions not “reasonable basis” of connection

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Substantial Effects Doctrine (US v Lopez)

•Congress has the power to regulate activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce or that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce

•Reject the Aggregated Effects Doctrine: permits extension of commerce clause into any action that affects commerce in aggregation with other actions (“National Productivity” too vague)

•“Under the government’s ‘national productivity’ reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens…if we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that congress is without power to regulate.” (350)

•E.g., family law, infrastructure, local zoning rules, etc.

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Justice Thomas concurring opinion in US v Lopez

original intent supports state police power

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Breyer dissent in US v Lopez

Commerce Clause does give Congress authority to ban firearms in school zones because education "significantly affects" commerce

Did Congress have a “rational basis” for thinking that firearms in school zones have an effect on interstate commerce? Yes!

•“Having found that guns in schools significantly undermine the quality of education in our Nation’s classrooms, Congress could also have found, given the effect of education upon interstate and foreign commerce, that gun-related violence in and around schools is a commercial, as well as a human, problem” (352)

The Court should defer to the judgment of Congress