Substance Dualism

Phenomenal properties ‘qualia’

what it is like, experience which gives it its distinctive experiential quality eg. the smell of coffee doesn’t need to be caused by coffee

Difference between substances and properties

Substances exist without reliance on another for existence whilst properties rely on substance. The properties may change over time but the substance persists in these changes.

Descartes Conceivability argument

1. I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as something that thinks and isn’t extended

2. I have a clear and distinct idea of body as something that is extended and does not think

3. If I have a clear and distinct thought of something, God can create it in a way that corresponds to my thoughts

4. Therefore God can create mind as something that thinks and isnt extended and body as something that is extended but does not think

5. Therefore mind and body can exist independently of one another

6. Therefore mind and body are two substances

Explain what theory if true goes against Descartes conceivability argument?

Behaviorism states that the mind should be analyzed in terms of behaviors. If this theory is correct then it means we cannot understand the mind without a body, it is inconceivable. We can make mistakes over what we think is conceivable and therefore challenging his clear and distinct ideas.

Explain what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible?

analytic statements are statements true within virtue of themselves, but water is not H2O within itself. This was discovered through science at a later date. Because the concepts are not synonymous it is conceivable that water is not H2O which indicates that Water is H2O is not analytic

But water and H2O are the same thing, the two concepts refer to just one thing in the world. Water is identical to H2O. So the property of being water and the property of being H2O are the same. If A is the same thing B, then A and B can’t be separated there is just one thing here. So while there are two concepts there is only one property! So although it is logically possible for water to not be H2O it is metaphysically impossible for water to be anything other H2O.

Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and Descartes response

1. Physical things only move if they are pushed

2. Only something that is extended and can touch the thing that is moved can exert such a force

3. But the mind has no extension so it can’t touch the body

4. Therefore the mind cannot move the body

Objects to this understanding, for example something falls in terms of its weight, but weight doesn’t push the object whose weight it is. Gravity is a force of attraction that operates without needing contact between two physical objects.

But this response doesn’t seem satisfactory, Princess Elisabeth further claims that from her experience her mind causes the body to move. Suggesting the Mind body problem in which either dualism is false or the mind cannot cause the body to move.

Empirical interaction problem with Dualism 2 key points

• Energy cannot be destroyed or created (law of conservation), if the mind as a nonphysical substance moved the body the total amount of energy would increase which

• Current neuroscience indicates that movements of the body are caused by physical events in the brain.

  • at the same time we have no evidence against he mind changing what happens in the brain. We still don’t have a clear idea of complicated causation involved in making a choice.

  • However it could be suggested that the progression of neuroscience could explain the full store.

  • If Interactionalist dualism is true then it must discover some event in the brain with no physical cause because they are caused by the mind.

What is epiphenomenalism substance dualism?

The view that the mind has no causal powers, the mind does not cause any physical events or mental events either - mental events are all caused by physical events eg. the brain (this is more commonly accepted by property dualists.

3 objections against Epiphenomenalism?

• Causal redundancy - experience indicates that we experience causal connection between mental state and our behaviour

• Introspection - Hard to understand how we would have knowledge of our own mental states. For example how do I know I am in pain? Because my belief is that I am in pain is caused by my pain itself, I can tell this through introspection.

  • But if epiphenomalism is true they must deny this, that both my belief that I feel pain and saying what I think are caused by physical processes. If my thoughts and feelings don’t cause my beliefs about my mind then I would have those same beliefs about my mind whatever my mental state. Whatever causes the belief of pain could cause me to believe I’m in pain even when I’m not in pain then I can’t know my own mind. This is unjustifiable and unreliable.

• Free will and responsibility - We need mental causation to be free and take responsibility for our actions. If what you do is caused not by your choice but by something physical over which you have no influence then you are not free. Choices are mental events

The problem of other minds (Solipsism)

• Questions of how we can know that there are minds other than our own

  • We cannot experience other peoples mental states (private) we can only see behavior (3rd person)

  • If mind and bodies are entirely independent then how can I infer from seeing a body that there is a mind attached

Argument from analogy used against the problem of other minds?

We can use the behavior of other people to infer they have minds too. Using our experience of having a mind and experiencing mental states that cause our behavior seeing others with similar bodies and behave similarly to me would suggest they have the same type of cause of behavior, mental states.

Two objections to Argument from analogy used against the problem of other minds?

• Although many behaviors of which I experience have mental causes not all of them do, sometimes I do something without being aware of a mental cause. As such the claim that others must have a similar cause isn’t strong enough to support the claim that they have mental causes.

• Argument relies on contentious claim that similar effects have similar causes. But perhaps those instances of other peoples behavior that are similar to my behavior have different non mental causes

Substance dualism category mistake

Ryle calls substance dualism ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the machine’. Suppose someone is shown around Oxford, they see the colleges, the buildings and faculty but then they ask “I’ve seen the colleges the faculties and the administration but where is the University?” They have misunderstood the concept of university.

This person has made a category mistake which is to treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs to