KCL criminal law Cases to review

Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396

 A defendant is reckless if they subjectively appreciate a risk and then, having appreciated said risk, continue with the act

Fagan v MPC [1969] 1 QB 439

An act can be a "continuing act" — where D accidentally drove onto a policeman's foot and then refused to move, the court held the actus reus continued, allowing it to coincide with later-formed mens rea.

Thabo Meli v R [1954] 1 All ER 373 (PC)

It is impossible to divide what is "really one series of acts" — where Ds attacked V believing they killed him, then disposed of the body (which was the actual cause of death), this was treated as a single transaction.

Miller [1983] 2 AC 161

Where D creates a source of danger (accidentally setting fire to a mattress), D has a duty to take reasonable steps to avert the danger, whether or not the danger was created wittingly or voluntarily.

R v White [1910] 2 KB 124

Establishes the "but for" test: D laced his mother's drink with cyanide, but she died of a heart attack. Since the poison was not a but-for cause of death, D could not be convicted of murder (though liable for attempt).

R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56

Confirms that but-for causation alone is insufficient; there must be a legally effective cause. D's conduct must be more than merely "setting the stage" for the consequence. (Such as crashing into someone but not being at fault for the crash)

Cato [1976] 1 WLR 110

D's conduct need not be the sole cause, but must be more than merely de minimis — it must be "outside the de minimis range" and effectively bearing upon the acceleration of the victim's death.

Dalloway (1847) 2 Cox CC 273

D's conduct must be a "salient culpable cause" — if D could not have saved the child even by using the reins properly, there is no causation attributable to the negligent aspect of his conduct

Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279

The reasonable and predictable defensive reaction of a third party (police returning fire) does not break the causal chain.

Kennedy (No 2) [2007] UKHL 38

A free, deliberate, and informed act by a human agent breaks the chain of causation. Where V voluntarily self-injected heroin prepared by D, D had not "caused" V's death.

R v Williams; R v Davis [1992] 2 All ER 183

The chain of causation is not broken by V's reaction (jumping from a moving car) if it was within the range of responses reasonably foreseeable from a victim in V's situation (such as being a victim of robbery and threatened with violence)

Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411

D must take his victim as he finds them (the "thin skull" rule extends to the "whole man," including religious beliefs). V's refusal of a blood transfusion as a Jehovah's Witness did not break the chain.

Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152

"Palpably wrong" medical treatment (grossly negligent) can break the chain of causation where the original wound had virtually healed (such as a stab wound victim who’s wound had healed but then was mistreated by medical profesionals).

Smith [1959] 2 QB 35

If at the time of death the original wound is still "an operating cause and a substantial cause," D remains liable even where medical treatment was "thoroughly bad."

Cheshire [1991] 3 All ER 670

acts need not be the sole or even the main cause of death — it is sufficient that they "contributed significantly" to the result. Only if negligent treatment is "so independent" and "so potent in causing death" (such as accidentally leaving out a poriton of a uterues) will it break the chain

R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95

Where V's reaction (jumping from a car) is within the range of responses expected from a victim in that situation, the chain is not broken. V's response must not be "so daft" as to be a novus actus.

R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82

The Jury has the discretion to conclude intention by "oblique intention" if the prohibited consequence was a virtual certainty of D's actions and D appreciated that consequence

R v Stephenson [1979] QB 695

Knowledge or appreciation of a risk must have entered D's mind — D's schizophrenia, which prevented him from perceiving the risk, negated recklessness.

Vickers [1957]

Confirms that an intention to cause GBH is sufficient mens rea for murder (the GBH rule).

Jewell [2014] EWCA Crim 414

Loss of self-control involves D's "loss of ability to maintain his actions in accordance with considered judgment" or loss of "normal powers of reasoning.

Clinton [2012] EWCA Crim 2

Sexual infidelity is excluded as a qualifying trigger under s.55(6)(c) but may still be considered as part of D's "circumstances" if its an integral factor to the triggering event rather than just the sole triggering event (objective standard).

Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim 322

Loss of self-control does not apply in cases where D acted out of a desire for revenge. (such as catching your partner being sexually unfaithful)

Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889

In regards to Voluntary Manslaughter, Under provocation (now relevant context for loss of control), the whole course of marital abuse was admissible, and the loss of control need not be sudden under the new statue.

Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396

D's perverted sexual desires, which were much harder to resist than normal desires, constituted an abnormality of mind. Established that the defence extends to impairment of the ability to exercise self-control.

Dietschmann [2003] 1 AC 1209

The fact that D would not have killed but for drink does not disentitle him from raising diminished responsibility based on another condition if it contributed to the act (e.g., extreme grief).

Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281

Voluntary acute intoxication is not a "recognised medical condition" for the purposes of diminished responsibility manslaughter, (for actions like drunekly stabing your partner 60 times) even though it is listed in medical diagnostic manuals.

DPP v Majewski [1976] UKHL 2

Voluntary intoxication is not a defence for mens rea

DPP v Newbury and Jones [1977] AC 500

For constructive (unlawful act) manslaughter, the test for wether the unlaw act would cause forseeably cause harm is objective.

R v Lamb [1967] 3 W.L.R. 888

The base offence for constructive manslaughter must be a criminal unlawful act, not merely a civil wrong; and it must be accompanied by the mens rea of that act. (such as pointing a revolver at someone without any intent to fire it)

Church [1966] 1 QB 59

For Constructive Manslaughter, The unlawful act must be one that "all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm" (such as throwing an unconsciousnes body in a river even though you subjectively believe it is dead) (the dangerousness test — objective).

Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171

Test for Gross neggligence manslaughter: 

1. There must be a duty of care

2. D must have breached that duty

3. D's actions must have caused the death

4. D's negigence was so gross it warrants criminal charges

R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8

For D to warrant a Gross Negligence Manslaughter conviction D's action must have gone "beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment."

Venna [1975]

The mens rea of battery is intention to apply unlawful force on another, or subjective (Cunningham) recklessness as to the application of unlawful force.

Ireland [1998] AC 147

Silent telephone calls can constitute assault (apprehension of immediate unlawful violence); GBH includes recognised psychiatric injury; "inflict" under s.20 does not require an assault.

Savage; Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699

For s.20 OAPA (malicious wounding/GBH), D need only foresee that some physical harm might result — D need not foresee the full extent of the harm.

Lawrence v MPC [1972] AC 626

Consent is irrelevant to appropriation. If V consented to appropriation and D still appropriated the rights dishonestly, there can still be theft.

Gomez [1993] AC 442

Reiterate Lawrence, establishing that the appropration requirement of the theft act can be fufilled even with consent

Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241

Even an indefeasible gift of property can amount to an appropriation for the purposes of theft — D can "steal" property to which she acquires valid legal title if dishonest and intending to permanently deprive. (such as taking advantage of someone’s disability to convince them to give you gifts)

Turner (No. 2) [1971]

Property can "belong to another" even where D is the owner, if V has possession or control (e.g., a garage holding D's car for repair).

Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67

The current test for dishonesty: (1) Ascertain what D actually knew/believed about the circumstances; (2) Was the conduct dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people according to D’s understanding? D's own belief that their conduct was not dishonest is irrelevant.

M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Cl & F 200

Establishes the insanity defence: D must prove a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, such that D did not know the nature and quality of the act, or did not know it was wrong.

Sullivan [1984] AC 156

Epilepsy constitutes a "disease of the mind" — the crucial factor is whether the cause is "internal" to D. Policy: dangerous persons subject to recurrent episodes should be restrained.

Quick [1973] QB 910

Hypoglycaemia (caused by external factor — insulin) is not a disease of the mind and supports a plea of non-insane automatism. Distinguishes internal from external causes.

Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287

Hyperglycaemia (caused by failure to take insulin — internal cause from diabetes itself) is a disease of the mind. Stress, anxiety, and depression are not "external factors."

Burgess [1991]

Sleepwalking (somnambulism) was held to be insanity where the cause was internal/unknown, because violent somnambulism is abnormal and must arise from some internal condition.

Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399

Arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries) is a "disease of the mind" — the law is not concerned with the brain but with the mind; any disease affecting the mind is sufficient.

Richardson and Irwin [1999] 1 Cr App R 392

If D raises a defence from an honest belief (including a mistaken belief), that was made while intoxicated the jury must determine whether D would have made the same belief while sober. (such as drunkingly throwing someone from a balcony while not believing it would cause harm)

Kingston [1995] 2 AC 355

Involuntary intoxication is not a defence if D still formed the mens rea for the offence. (such as still being consioully aware of ones own actions). A "drugged intent" is still an intent.

Lipman [1970] 1 QB 152

Voluntary intoxication by drugs is not a defence to a crime of basic intent, and murder was treated here in a way that meant his self-induced hallucinated state did not excuse the killing.

Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725

An insane person cannot set the standards of reasonableness by reference to his own insanity. Where D's mistaken belief arises from insane delusion, the appropriate defence is insanity, not self-defence.

Gladstone Williams [1987] 3 All ER 411

In regards to self defense, D is to be judged on the basis of the facts as he honestly believed them to be, even if that belief was unreasonable. (Now codified in Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s. 76(4).)

Palmer [1971] AC 814 (PC)

Test for Self Defense

1: Did D believe that force was necessary?

2: According to the circumstances D believed in, was the force used reasonable

Hasan (Z) [2005] UKHL 22

The leading modern authority: duress is a limited exception; policy favors tightening rather than relaxing its conditions. D must reasonably believe in a threat of death or serious physical injury; the threat must be imminent and leave no reasonable opportunity for escape; and D must not have voluntarily associated with criminals foreseeing risk of compulsion. (Such as joining a gang and then being blackmailed into commiting a crime)

Graham (1982) 74 Cr App R 235

The two-part test for Duress defence: (1) Was D compelled to act because of a reasonable belief in a threat of death or serious injury? (2) Would a sober person of reasonable firmness, sharing D's characteristics, have responded similarly?

Howe [1987] 1 AC 417

Duress is not available as a defence to murder (whether as principal or secondary party) or attempted murder (Such as killinging an individiual because you fear you will be killed if you do not).

Willer [1986]

Establishes Durres of circumstances where D commits an offence due to external threat of death or serious injury

Pommell [1995] 2 Cr App R 607

Duress of circumstances is a general defence applying to all crimes except murder and attempted murder. D must desist from the criminal conduct as soon as reasonably possible.

R v Jogee [2016] UKSC 8

Overrules the doctrine of "parasitic accessorial liability" from Chan Wing-Siu. For joint enterprise, D must intend to encourage or assist P's crime. Mere foresight that P might commit the offence is insufficient — it is evidence from which intent may be inferred but is not intent itself.

Smith (David) [1974]

In regards to property damage, D must know or be reckless as to whether the property belongs to another. D's honest belief that property was his own negates mens rea even if that belief is mistaken in law

R v Morris [1984] AC 320 (HL).

Something as simple as switching the sticker prices of an item can constitute an approration of the rights of the owner for the purpose of theft

Dunbar v Plant [1997] EWCA Civ 2167

For section 4 Voluntary mansluaghter by sucide pact, it must be shown that both V and D had a settled intention of dying