criminal law - chapter 7

common law framework for parties to crimes

principal in the first degree (performs actus reus)

principal in the second degree (present during crime)

accessory before the fact

accessory after the fact

modern parties to crime

principal - same as common law

accomplice - they commit the same crime as the principal

accessory - lesser crime, assists after the fact only

vicarious liability - guilty of crime committed by another

you only have the last three if you have liability for the principal

accomplice liability (actus reus and mens rea)

AR: aiding, abetting, inciting, or encouraging to commit a crime, before or during - includes criminal omissions like duty to intervene (aka when mother found guilty of abusing her child but she didn’t touch child, she just saw and let it happen)

- words may be enough but mere presence is not (two people playing game on street, one person robs a random person, the other person flees the scene and gets arrested bc they thought he was accomplice)

MR: specific intent, knowledge is usually not sufficient (someone makes illegal gun sale to someone knowing that they are probably going to commit a crime, not accomplice bc it wasnt his INTENT to do so)

state v ulvinen (guy killed wife and his mom knew)

dude killed wife, told mom, mom helped take care of kids, washed bloody bathroom, and fabricated a story. david later confessed, and suggested mom knew he intended to kill wife. mom convicted as accomplice, appealed saying she was accessory after the fact

issue: was there sufficient evidence that she assisted before or during murder

holding: no

reasoning: the facts support, at most, accessory after the fact. she may have known about it beforehand, but this omission is not a crime and she did not participate in the murder before or during

accessory liability (AR and MR)

AR is aiding a felon to avoid arrest, prosecution, or conviction after a crime

MR is intent to aid (imagine letting a friend who robbed a bank stay on couch for a few days)

state v. chism (church after midnight)

chism was with friend, picked up friend’s uncle who wanted to go find ex-wife to have sex, found her in church, stabbed her, and they drove off and helped. eventually though, chism reported to police

issue: was there sufficient evidence for accessory liability

holding: yes

reasoning: he did not protest or attempt to leave car, removed stabbed woman from car, changed his clothing to conceal crime, and did not immediately report crime

vicarious liability

respondeat superior: common law tort doctrine meaning “let the master answer” (employer related)

basically an employer can be liable for crimes of employee if it was committed during “scope of employment” to benefit of employer

same thing with corporations and parent-child (some states have parental responsibility statutes that make parents liable for crimes of their children)

city of waukesha v. boehnen (alcohol to minor)

dude was convicted for service alc to minor, order to pay fine, but he did not physically sell the alcohol, he just owned the place and it was the bartender who sold the beer. he appealed, saying not intent was proven

issue: did holding him vicariously liable violated his due process rights

holding: no

reasoning: there’s not language about whether intent was required, its actually a strict liability thingy in wisconsin

state v. zeta chi (my case)

the frat held a rush, there were strippers and alc to minors, the frat as a corporation was convicted.

issue: is evidence that frat members provided access to alc and prostitution sufficient to convict the corporation

holding: yes, they can be liable for the crimes of its agents

reasoning: zeta chi was the beneficiary of the proceeds of the alc machine, also a corporation acts through its agents and zeta chi members allowed the prostitution to occur, ALSO having policies against the illegal conduct does not protect the corporation from criminal liability

state v. akers (snowmobiles)

two minor sons were arrested and convicted of driving snowmobiles illegally, father was convicted under the NH parent responsibility law, appealed because the criminal responsibility was not intended and vicarious CL of parents would violate due process

issue: does the NH parental responsibility hold parents vicariously liable? if so, does that violated the NH constitution?

holding: yes, it does hold them criminally liable, and yes, it does violate due process

reasoning: parental responsibility law clearly implies vicarious criminal liability. however, it does violate the NH constitution by punishing a parenthood (qualifies as a status offense because there is not act or omission)