The Widening of the Cold War (1949-1955)

The ‘reverse course’

* the USA’s policy towards Japan, as early as 1947
* meant the USA was not focused on the punishment of Japan: targeted communists rather than war criminals
* the USA wanted to develop firm democratic institutions (restored right-wing conservatives) and practices to rebuild their economy


* the USA wanted to ensure Japan was aligned w/ them as Japan was essential to the USA’s power base in eastern Asia

Economic stabilisation in Japan

* a programme based on austerity and control but its focus was on economic recovery
* the USA was keen to ensure all government income and spending was closely monitored and adhered to strict guidelines
* ‘super balanced budget’: designed to minimise borrowing and to ensure a surplus which could act as an additional economic cushion

US-Japanese relations

* Japan’s significance entered a new phase once China formed an alliance w/ the USSR in Feb 1950 and then in Nov when it joined the Korean War
* this involvement led to the globalisation of containment in many respects
* Japan became a crucial component in the US’ quest to contain communism in the Far East
* Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshida saw an opportunity to negotiate a treaty which would restore Japan’s sovereignty and ensure its security

The San Francisco Peace Treaty

* September 1951
* the treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers is remarkable by its brevity and its limitations
* the treaty did not: place significant restrictions on Japan’s economy or political model; restrict Japan’s rearmament or impose any reparations
* the treaty did force Japan to renounce any claims to neighbouring territories
* the USSR and China did not sign the agreement

The US-Japan Security Treaty

* drawn up in return for the San Francisco Peace Treaty
* gave the USA: unrestricted use of Japanese military bases; administrative control of Owkinawa; right to use military force to intervene in internal disorder in Japan and to veto Japan offering military bases to other states

Mao’s concerns

* at the start of 1949, a communist victory in the Chinese Civil War seemed inevitable and Mao considered the posibility of the US intervening
* Mao reached the conclusion this would not happen and that the US was more interested in Europe
* however Mao was concerned the US would support an exiled nationalist leader Jiang Jieshi, undermining Mao’s aims

US policy towards China and Taiwan

* US policy towards China and Asia was not linked to Europe
* the USA was interested in ensuring the Chinese Communist Party did not come under the influence of the USSR

The China White Paper

* July 1949
* outlined the US’ strategy towards China: Acheson, Secretary of State, was committed to supporting Jiang Jieshi’s nationalist forces (KMT) in Taiwan


* however this should be done secretly so the USA did not appear to be an ‘imperialist menace’
* Acheson wanted the USA to do nothing that might reinforce a Sino-Soviet alliance

NSC-68

* April 1950
* in Sep 1949, the US’ nuclear monopoly ended as the USSR tested its own atomic bomb
* this in addition w/ Truman’s ‘loss of China’ triggered a review of the US’s aims and priorities, which emerged in NSC-68
* stressed the urgency of building the US’ political, economic and military power
* it was focused on the globalisation of the Cold War and there was a powerful military emphasis on the application of containment

Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee

* both the USA and the USSR wanted to install leaders they believed they could control
* Kim Il Sung emerged as chairman of the newly formed communist Korean Provisional People’s Committee
* Syngman Rhee, a nationalist and virulent anti-communist, emerged as the USA’s favoured leader


* both leaders were committed to the restoration of a united Korea under a single leader

USSR’s interests in the Korean War

* to avoid costly conflict w/ the US
* to promote Stalin’s image as a defender of communism
* to undermine China as an emerging rival

USSR involvement in the Korean War

* March 1949: Kim Il Sung turns to Stalin for support but Stalin rejects his pleas, wary of US troops’ presence in Korea


* Feb 1950: Stalin agreed to send the North artillery but no troops after China turns communist and because the US did not include Korea in their Defensive Perimeter Strategy
* Stalin wasn’t prepared to engage in direct military conflict w/ the US, particularly because of the threat of nuclear war

China’s interests in the Korean War

* to establish China’s credentials as a force in the Far East
* to be seen as acting independently of the USSR
* to consolidate its position in terms of recovering Taiwan

China’s involvement in the Korean War

* when the North invaded the South, China did not intervene
* as late as April 1950, Mao was determined to take no actions that might inflame the US
* Nov 1950: China was compelled by the USSR to intervene

The US’ interests in the Korean War

* to ensure stability in the Far East, particularly the security of Japan as an ally
* to protect Taiwan from Chinese aggression
* to contain communism in the Far East

The UN’s involvement in the Korean War

* post the invasion, the US asked for a Security Council meeting
* USSR was boycotting the Council due to its recognition of Jiang Jieshi’s regime as legal and couldn’t use its veto power


* the UN’s resolution to call for a truce was passed w/o opposition and Truman was able to legitimise US intervention in Korea whilst shielding them from responsibility

The settlement

* negotiations started in July 1951 but it wasn’t until July 1953, an armistice was agreed
* Rhee was obstructing talks as he wanted to commit the US to stronger ties w/ South Korea
* when Stalin died in March 1953 and was replaced w/ the more compliant Malenkov, talks were able to progress quicker
* the treaty confirmed: military forces should retreat and there was to be a division line w/ a demilitarised zone on each side

Impact of the Korean War

* long-term security of the North and South, as well as Taiwan, was secured: no more conflict on the Korean peninsula


* war placed economic pressure on the USSR: led to Stalin hastening industrialisation in the Soviet Bloc, and less consumer goods, which led to rebellion
* war led to military forces in West Europe being strengthened: West Germany was rearmed and hope for a solution to the German problem was lost and led to a deepening of uncertainty in Europe

McCarthyism

* McCarthy promoted the idea that there was an army of communist sympathisers in the US government
* rooted in a growing mood of anti-communism among the US public, which came to a head in 1950
* McCarthy targeted the film industry, the Democrats, universities and the UN; failing to uncover one communist
* in 1954, after claiming the ‘Reds’ infiltrated the US army, McCarthy was expelled from the Senate

The House of Un-American Activities Committee

* its purpose was to investigate communist infiltration: the US public came to fear that communists had penetrated the very core of their society
* carried out extensive investigations on the political affiliations of Hollywood filmmakers

The Alger Hiss Affair

* 1950
* a prominent member of FDR’s government was accused by a journalist of being a Communist
* when Hiss was convicted of perjury, Dean G. Acheson still offered him public support
* this only served to heighten the belief that the US’ leaders were somehow tainted w/ communism

US dominance in the United Nations

* the USA used the UN as a vehicle for global intervention, to achieve its foreign policy aims
* the USA was a permanent Security Council member, enhancing its power
* the UN headquarters are based in NYC: significant in terms of US dominance

The isolation of China

* the US refused to accept China into the UN
* the US enhanced their commitment to Taiwan
* the development of SEATO and the creation of the strategic defence perimeter also isolated China further

Consequences of Cold War tensions (1949-50)

* USA no longer has a nuclear monopoly (1949)
* China turns communist and formed Sino-Soviet alliance (1950)
* North Korea invades South Korea (1950)
* McCarthyism pushes the US to adopt a globalist stance
* European states feel threatened by US focus on Asia

The expansion of alliance systems

* Eisenhower placed much greater importance on developing allies than Truman did
* has been argued this was a means of compensating for the lack of development of conventional US forces
* Eisenhower’s strategy was to create a global network of alliances to corner the USSR and China

SEATO

* September 1954
* a collective defensive treaty based on Southeast Asia, brokered in response to close Sino-Soviet relations
* many of its members were not Southeast Asian countries and didn’t have many common borders, unlike NATO
* some important Southeast Asian states such as South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Burma were excluded

FRG and NATO

* Adenauer, the FRG’s first chancellor, recognised the best way to strengthen his country was to align it w/ Western powers
* in May 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO, underlining the commitment the USA had to the nation

The Warsaw Pact

* May 1955
* the West’s decision to allow FRG into NATO and to rearm caused the USSR to consolidate relations w/ its satellite states
* seen by the USSR as a means of legitimising influence in Eastern Europe, just as NATO had for the US in the West
* presented as a non-threatening, collective security alliance but served as military reinforcement for the USSR
* consolidated the political and economic relationship between the USSR and its satellites

Eisenhower and Dulles

* Eisenhower accepted much of what formed the basis of Truman’s national security policy


* the US would retain influence in Europe and Asia; recognised the Soviet threat as real; remained committed to containment and building up both nuclear and conventional forces
* however, Eisenhower rejected Truman’s commitment to a major expansion of conventional forces and believed containment was limited

The New Look policy

* October 1953
* containment had created a stalemate: Dulles wanted to roll back communism in order to bring the Cold War to an end
* Dulles was convinced US national interests and the guarantee of international peace relied on reducing Soviet dominance
* despite Eisenhower’s acceptance of the principle of liberation, he insisted this could only happen through peaceful terms

Massive retaliation

* Eisenhower and Dulles saw containment as a strategy that demanded a global reaction to communist expansion
* this necessitated significant and costly intervention in Korea
* under Eisenhower, nuclear weapons assumed much greater significance as the basis for a US national security strategy
* Oct 1953: NSC 162/2 emphasised the view the most effective way to deter USSR aggression was for the US to display its determination to use nuclear weapons

Brinkmanship

* a strategy designed to convince an enemy there’s a risk of conflict: one side shows no sign of backing down, forcing the opponent to back down or engage in conflict
* the US used its nuclear strength to force agreements from communist opponents
* Dulles was convinced the ability to reach the verge of war w/o engaging in war was essential in effective foreign policy

The domino theory

* a that suggested a communist government in one nation would lead to communist takeovers in neighbouring states
* closely linked w/ the policy of containment

Attitudes to Indochina

* Eisenhower was committed to supporting the French as Southeast Asia was seen as very vulnerable to communism
* Eisenhower was opposed to using conventional forces to support the French, however, preferring a diplomatic solution
* the USSR and China wanted to avoid a military resolution too: at this point negotiations were convened in Geneva

The Geneva Conference

* July 1954
* the agreement at Geneva paved the way for a ceasefire rather than a long-term solution
* it was agreed two zones were to be created w/ the 17th parallel serving as the dividing line
* French forces were to move out of the north zone and nationalist forces were to withdraw from the south
* the US and the southern regime wouldn’t sign the agreement